RANA AYYUBversusDIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

892                       [2023]
               SUPREME COURT     3 S.C.R. 892
                              REPORTS                     [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A                               RANA AYYUB
                                       v.
                   DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
                  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
                   (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 12 of 2023)
B
                             FEBRUARY 07, 2023
        [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND J.B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
             Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – s. 3, 4, 44 and
      45 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 4.3, 406, 418, 420 – Information
C     Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 – s. 66D – Black Money Act –
      s. 4 – Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – s. 37 – Income
      Tax Act, 1961 – ss. 133(6) – Petitioner during the pandemic did the
      crowdfunding campaign using an online crowdfunding platform
      “Ketto” – Mumbai Zonal Office of the Enforcement Directorate (ED)
      initiated inquiry under FEMA – Also, a complaint was lodged by a
D
      person (private complainant) in Ghaziabad for the offences u/ss.
      403, 406, 418, 420 of IPC, s. 66D of IT Act and s. 4 of the Black
      Money Act – In the meantime the Mumbai Zonal Office of the ED
      issued notice to the petitioner seeking response relating to certain
      documents and the petitioner in response to that complied with the
E     notice – Thereafter, the Delhi Zonal Office of the ED lodged a
      complaint before the Special Judge at Ghaziabad citing that the
      complaint filed by the private complainant – After that the
      provisional order of attachment of the bank account of the petitioner
      located at Navi Mumbai was passed by the ED – Thereafter, the
      Special Judge, Ghaziabad took cognizance of the complaint lodged
F
      by the ED (the respondent) and summoned the petitioner for
      appearance – Aggrieved by the order of summoning the petitioner
      has approached the Supreme Court pleading that the Special Judge
      Ghaziabad has no territorial jurisdiction over the alleged offence
      – Held: Acquisition of the proceeds of crime has taken place in the
G     virtual world, the places from where online transfers of money took
      place, are known only to the petitioner or their Bankers – The
      question of territorial jurisdiction in the instant case requires an
      enquiry into a question of fact as to the place where the alleged
      proceeds of crime were (i) concealed; or (ii) possessed; or (iii)
      acquired; or (iv) used – This question of fact will depend upon the
H
                                      892
         RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                         893
              THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR


evidence that unfolds before the Trial Court – The issue of territorial   A
jurisdiction cannot be decided in a writ petition, especially when
there is a serious factual dispute about the place/places of
commission of the offence – Petitioner given liberty to raise the
issue of territorial jurisdiction before the Trial Court.
      Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – s. 44 –                  B
Jurisdiction of Special Court to try scheduled offences – Held: A
combined reading of Section 44 of the PMLA and the provisions of
Sections 177 to 184 of the Cr.P.C. will make it clear that in view of
the specific mandate of clauses (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of
Section 44, it is the Special Court constituted under the PMLA that
would have jurisdiction to try even the scheduled offence – Even if       C
the scheduled offence is taken cognizance of by any other Court,
that Court shall commit the same, on an application by the concerned
authority, to the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the
offence of money-laundering.
      Dismissing the Writ Petition, the Court                             D
      HELD: 1. What is dealt with by Section 44(1)(a) of
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 is a situation where
there is no complication. Section 44(1)(a) lays down the most
fundamental rule relating to territorial jurisdiction, by providing
that an offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA and any
                                                                          E
scheduled offence connected to the same shall be triable by the
Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has
been committed. It is relevant to note that Section 44(1)(a) uses
the expression “offence” in three places in contradistinction to
the expression “scheduled offence” used only once. This usage
is not without significance. In all three places where the word           F
“offence” alone is used, it connotes the offence of money-
laundering. The place where the expression “scheduled offence”
is used, it connotes the predicate offence. By prescribing that an
offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA and any
scheduled offence connected to the same shall be triable by the
                                                                          G
Special Court constituted for the area in which “the offence” has
been committed, Section 44(1)(a) makes it crystal clear that it is
the Special Court constituted under Section 43(1), which will be
empowered to try even the scheduled offence connected to the
same. [Para 23][903-A-D]
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894            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A           2. If the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled
      offence is different from the Special Court which has taken
      cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, then the authority
      authorised to file a complaint under PMLA should make an
      application to the Court which has taken cognizance of the
      scheduled offence. On the application so filed, the Court which
B
      has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence, should commit
      the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court
      which has taken cognizance of the complaint of money-laundering.
      Therefore, it is clear that the trial of the scheduled offence should
      take place in the Special Court which has taken cognizance of
C     the offence of money-laundering. In other words, the trial of the
      scheduled offence, insofar as the question of territorial jurisdiction
      is concerned, should follow the trial of the offence of money-
      laundering and not vice versa. [Paras 24, 25][903-E-H]
            3. Since the Act contemplates the trial of the scheduled
D     offence and the trial of the offence of money-laundering to take
      place only before the Special Court constituted under Section
      43(1), a doubt is prone to arise as to whether all the offences are
      to be tried together. This doubt is sought to be removed by
      Explanation (i) to Section 44(1). Explanation (i) clarifies that the
      trial of both sets of offences by the same Court shall not be
E     construed as joint trial. [Para 26][904-A-B]
             4. A careful dissection of clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section
      (1) of Section 44 shows that they confer primacy upon the Special
      Court constituted under Section 43(1) of the PMLA. These two
      clauses contain two Rules, namely, (i) that the offence punishable
F     under the PMLA as well as a scheduled offence connected to the
      same shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the
      area in which the offence of money-laundering has been
      committed; and (ii) that if cognizance has been taken by one Court,
      in respect of the scheduled offence and cognizance has been taken
G     in respect of the offence of money-laundering by the Special Court,
      the Court trying the scheduled offence shall commit it to the
      Special Court trying the offence of money-laundering. [Para
      27][904-C-D]
            5. The whole picture is thus complete with a combined
H     reading of Section 44 of the PMLA and the provisions of Sections
         RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                        895
              THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR


177 to 184 of the Cr.P.C. Once this combined scheme is                   A
understood, it will be clear that in view of the specific mandate of
clauses (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 44, it is the Special
Court constituted under the PMLA that would have jurisdiction
to try even the scheduled offence. Even if the scheduled offence
is taken cognizance of by any other Court, that Court shall commit
                                                                         B
the same, on an application by the concerned authority, to the
Special Court which has taken cognizance of the offence of money-
laundering. [Paras 35 and 36][908-E-G]
       6. The involvement of a person in any one or more of certain
processes or activities connected with the proceeds of crime,
constitutes the offence of money-laundering. These processes             C
or activities include, (i) concealment; (ii) possession; (iii)
acquisition; (iv) use; (v) projecting as untainted property; or (vi)
claiming as untainted property. In other words, a person may (i)
acquire proceeds of crime in one place, (ii) keep the same in his
possession in another place, (iii) conceal the same in a third place,    D
and (iv) use the same in a fourth place. The area in which each
one of these places is located, will be the area in which the offence
of money-laundering has been committed. To put it differently,
the area in which the place of acquisition of the proceeds of crime
is located or the place of keeping it in possession is located or
the place in which it is concealed is located or the place in which      E
it is used is located, will be the area in which the offence has
been committed. [Paras 38, 39][909-A-C]
      7. The question of territorial jurisdiction in this case
requires an enquiry into a question of fact as to the place where
the alleged proceeds of crime were (i) concealed; or (ii)                F
possessed; or (iii) acquired; or (iv) used. This question of fact
will actually depend upon the evidence that unfolds before the
Trial Court. [Para 45][910-D]
      Kaushik Chatterjee v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2020)
      (10) SCC 92 – relied on.                                           G
      Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India &
      Ors. 2022 SCC Online SC 929 – referred to.
      CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.12 of 2023.
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896                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A               (Under Article 32 of The Constitution Of India)
            Ms. Vrinda Grover, Soutik Banerjee, Aakarsh Kamra, Ms. Devika
      Tulsiani, Ms. Mannat Tipnis, Advs. for the Petitioner.
            Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Zoheb
      Hussain, Kanu Agarwal, K. Parmeshwar, Padmesh Mishra, Advs. for
B     the Respondent.
                The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
             1. Challenging a summoning order issued by the Court of the
C     Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, CBI Court No.1, Ghaziabad, on a
      complaint lodged by the respondent under Section 45 read with Section
      44 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 20021, the petitioner has
      come up with the above writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
      of India.
D            2. We have heard Ms. Vrinda Grover, learned Counsel for the
      petitioner and Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India for
      the respondent.
              3. It is the case of the petitioner that during the pandemic, she
      initiated crowdfunding campaign through an online crowdfunding platform
E     named “Ketto” and ran three campaigns from April 2020 to September
      2021. In connection with the same, the Mumbai Zonal Office of the
      Enforcement Directorate initiated an enquiry against the petitioner under
      the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 2 through an Office Order
      dated 3.8.2021.
F           4. It appears that thereafter a complaint was lodged on 7.9.2021
      by one Vikas Sankritayan, claiming to be the founder of Hindu IT Cell, in
      FIR No. 2049/2021 with Indirapuram Police Station, Ghaziabad for
      alleged offences under Sections 403, 406, 418 and 420 IPC read with
      Section 66D of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008
      and Section 4 of the Black Money Act.
G
             5. In the meantime, the petitioner received an order under Section
      37 of the FEMA read with Section 133(6) of the Income- tax Act, 1961
      from the Mumbai Zonal Office of the Enforcement Directorate seeking
      1
          For short, “PMLA” or the “Act”, as the case may be.
      2
H         For short, “FEMA”
       RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                   897
  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


certain documents, in addition to the documents submitted by the petitioner       A
in response to the previous Office Order dated 3.8.2021 issued by the
very same Mumbai Zonal Office.
       6. After the petitioner submitted a detailed response to the Mumbai
Zonal Office of the Enforcement Directorate, the Delhi Zone-II Office
of the Directorate of Enforcement registered a complaint in ECIR No.              B
DLZO-II/58/2021 on 11.11.2021, in the Court of the Special Judge at
Ghaziabad. It was stated in the said complaint that the FIR registered on
7.9.2021 on the file of the Indirapuram Police Station, Ghaziabad formed
the basis for the complaint of the Enforcement Directorate.
      7. After the registration of the aforesaid complaint by the                 C
Enforcement Directorate, the petitioner was summoned to the Delhi
Zone-II Office and her statement under Section 50 of the PMLA was
recorded on 15.12.2021.
       8. Thereafter, a provisional order of attachment of the bank account
of the petitioner in HDFC Bank, Koperkhairane Branch, Navi Mumbai,                D
Maharashtra, was passed by the Directorate of Enforcement on 4.2.2022.
Pursuant to the order of provisional attachment, the Adjudicating Authority
issued a show cause notice dated 8.3.2022.
       9. While things stood thus, a Look out Circular was issued against
the petitioner, but the same was set aside by the High Court of Delhi in          E
a writ petition filed by the petitioner. In a second writ petition filed by the
petitioner, the High Court of Delhi restrained the Directorate of
Enforcement from taking further steps under Section 8 of the PMLA on
the short ground that the validity period of 180 days, of the order of
provisional attachment, came to an end statutorily on 4.8.2022.
                                                                                  F
       10. Thereafter, the Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption,
CBI Court No.1, Ghaziabad, passed an order on 29.11.2022 taking
cognizance of the complaint lodged by the respondent and summoning
the petitioner for appearance on 13.12.2022. Upon coming to know of
the said Summoning Order, the petitioner has come up with the above
writ petition. It is claimed by the petitioner in paragraph 5(v) of the writ      G
petition that “No summons have yet been received…” by her and that
she had annexed a screenshot of the e-court website reflecting the case
details. However, a print out of the copy of the Summoning Order is
filed along with the writ petition.
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898               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A             11. At the outset, it is made clear by Ms. Vrinda Grover, learned
      Counsel for the petitioner that the challenge to the impugned Summoning
      Order is limited to the question of territorial jurisdiction alone and that
      the impugned Summoning Order is not being challenged on any ground
      other than the lack of territorial jurisdiction.
B             12. In brief, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner
      is that under Section 44(1) of the PMLA, an offence punishable under
      the Act, shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area
      in which the offence has been committed. This is notwithstanding anything
      contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733. Apart from the
      non-obstante clause with which Section 44(1) begins, Section 71 of the
C     Act also gives overriding effect to PMLA. Therefore, it is contended by
      the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Special Court in
      Maharashtra alone could have taken cognizance of the complaint.
              13. Heavy reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the
      petitioner on the opinion of this Court in paragraphs 353 to 358 of the
D     decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India &
      Ors.4. It was held in the said decision that the trial of the offence of
      money-laundering should proceed before the Special Court constituted
      for the area in which the offence of money-laundering has been
      committed and that in case the scheduled offence is triable by the Special
      Court under a special enactment elsewhere, both the trials need to proceed
E     independently, but in the area where the offence of money- laundering
      has been committed. Paragraphs 356 and 357 of the decision in Vijay
      Madanlal Choudhary (supra) read as follows:
              “356. The amendment of 2013 in fact clarifies the dispensation
              to be followed in regard to trials concerning offence of money-
F             laundering under this Act and the trial in relation to scheduled
              offence including before the Special Court trying such (scheduled)
              offence. By virtue of this clause, the trials regarding the offence
              of money-laundering need to proceed before the Special Court
              constituted for the area in which the offence of money-laundering
              has been committed. In case the scheduled offence is triable by
G
              Special Court under the special enactment elsewhere, the provision,
              as amended, makes it amply clear that both the trials after coming
              into effect of this Act need to proceed independently, but in the
              area where the offence of money-laundering has been committed.
      3
          For short, “Cr.P.C”
H     4
          2022 SCC OnLine SC 929
       RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                               899
  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


      357. In that, the offence of money-laundering ought to proceed          A
      for trial only before the Special Court designated to try money-
      laundering offences where the offence of money-laundering has
      been committed. This is a special enactment and being a later
      law, would prevail over any other law for the time being in force
      in terms of Section 71 of the 2002 Act.”
                                                                              B
       14. On facts, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the
petitioner that no part of the alleged offence of money-laundering was
committed within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, Ghaziabad and
that the petitioner’s bank account where the alleged proceeds of crime
were deposited, is located in Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra. Even the
proceedings for the provisional attachment of the bank account were           C
initiated in New Delhi. Therefore, it is contended that the lodging of the
complaint at Ghaziabad was an abuse of the process of the court and
that the same having been done at the instance of the founder of the
Hindu IT Cell, is completely vitiated. It is also contended that the Court
of the Special Judge, ought to have returned the complaint to the             D
respondent, in terms of Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and that the Order taking cognizance is vitiated also by non-application
of mind.
        15. In response, it is contended by Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned
Solicitor General that under the scheme of the Act, the complaint of          E
money-laundering should follow the complaint in respect of the scheduled
offence. Since the complaint in respect of the scheduled offence was
registered on 7.9.2021 in Indirapuram Police Station, Ghaziabad, the
respondent necessarily had to lodge the Enforcement Case Information
Report (ECIR) on 11.11.2021, on the file of the same court, within whose
jurisdiction the scheduled offence became triable. In addition, it is         F
contended by the learned Solicitor General that the petitioner was alleged
to have received money through an online crowdfunding platform and
that there were several victims within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court of the Special Judge who had contributed money. In other words,
it is the contention of the learned Solicitor General that a part of the      G
cause of action had actually arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court of
the Special Judge, Ghaziabad.
      16. From the rival contentions, it appears that two questions arise
for consideration before us. They are (i) whether the trial of the offence
of money-laundering should follow the trial of the scheduled/predicate
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900             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     offence or vice versa; and (ii) whether the Court of the Special Judge,
      Anti-Corruption, CBI Court No.1, Ghaziabad, can be said to have
      exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction, even though the offence alleged,
      was not committed within the jurisdiction of the said Court.
             17. In order to find an answer to question No.1, it is necessary for
B     us to take note of a few provisions of the PMLA.
             18. The word “money-laundering” is defined in Section 2(1)(p)
      of the Act to have the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 3.
      Section 3 of the Act makes a person guilty of the offence of money-
      laundering, if he (i) directly or indirectly attempts to indulge; or (ii)
      knowingly assists or; (iii) knowingly is a party; or (iv) is actually involved
C     in any process or activity. Such process or activity should be connected
      to ‘proceeds of crime’ including its concealment or possession or
      acquisition or use. In addition, a person involved in such process or activity
      connected to proceeds of crime, should be projecting or claiming it as
      untainted property. The Explanation under Section 3 makes it clear that
D     even if the involvement is in one or more of the following activities or
      processes, namely, (i) concealment; (ii) possession; (iii) acquisition; (iv)
      use; (v) projecting it as untainted property; or (vi) claiming it as untainted
      property, the offence of money- laundering will be made out.
             19. Thus, Section 3 comprises of two essential limbs, namely, (i)
      involvement in any process or activity; and (ii) connection of such process
E
      or activity to the proceeds of crime. The expression “proceeds of crime”
      is defined in Section 2(1)(u) to mean any property derived or obtained,
      directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating
      to a scheduled offence or the value of such property or where such
      property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent
F     in value held within the country or abroad.
             20. PMLA provides for a two-pronged approach, one for dealing
      with the proceeds of crime and the other for dealing with the person
      guilty of the offence of money-laundering. While Chapter III and Chapter
      VI prescribe the procedure for dealing with the proceeds of crime, through
G     a process of attachment, confirmation through adjudication and an
      appellate remedy to the Special Tribunal, Chapter VII deals with the
      prosecution of the money launderers by Special Courts.
             21. Section 43(1) of the Act provides for the constitution of Special
      Courts, by the Central Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice
      of the High Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 empowers a Special
H
       RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                901
  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


Court constituted under Section 43(1), also to try an offence other than       A
the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, with which the
accused may be charged at the same trial under the Cr.P.C. In other
words, a Special Court is constituted under Section 43(1) primarily for
the purpose of trying an offence punishable under Section 4. But sub-
section (2) of Section 43 confers an additional jurisdiction upon such a
                                                                               B
Special Court to try any other offence with which the accused may be
charged at the same trial. Section 43 reads as follows:-
       “43. Special Courts.—(1) The Central Government, in consultation
       with the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall, for trial of offence
       punishable under section 4, by notification, designate one or more
       Courts of Session as Special Court or Special Courts for such           C
       area or areas or for such case or class or group of cases as may
       be specified in the notification.
               Explanation.—In this sub-section, “High Court” means the
       High Court of the State in which a Sessions Court designated as
       Special Court was functioning immediately before such designation.      D
               (2) While trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court
       shall also try an offence, other than an offence referred to in sub-
       section (1), with which the accused may, under the Code of
       Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same
       trial.”
                                                                               E
       22. Section 44 deals with the question of territorial jurisdiction of
the Special Court, constituted under Section 43(1). At the outset, Section
44(1) takes note of two different contingencies, namely, (i) cases where
the scheduled offence as well as the offence of money-laundering are
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the same Special Court
constituted under Section 43(1); and (ii) cases where the Court which          F
has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence, is other than the Special
Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of
money- laundering. Section 44(1) reads as follows:
       “44. Offences triable by Special Courts.—
       (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal          G
       Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
       (a) an offence punishable under section 4 and any scheduled
       offence connected to the offence under that section shall be triable
       by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence
       has been committed:                                                     H
902      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled offence before
      the commencement of this Act, shall continue to try such scheduled
      offence; or;
      (b) a Special Court may, upon a complaint made by an authority
      authorised in this behalf under this Act take cognizance of offence
B     under section 3, without the accused being committed to it for
      trial;
      Provided that after conclusion of investigation, if no offence of
      money-laundering is made out requiring filing of such complaint,
      the said authority shall submit a closure report before the Special
C     Court; or
      (c) if the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled
      offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance
      of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering under sub-
      clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorised to
D     file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the
      scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court
      shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the
      stage at which it is committed.
      (d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or the
E     offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in accordance with
      the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),
      as it applies to a trial before a Court of Session.
      Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that,—
      (i) the jurisdiction of the Special Court while dealing with the
F     offence under this Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial under
      this Act, shall not be dependent upon any orders passed in respect
      of the scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets of offences by
      the same court shall not be construed as joint trial;
      (ii) the complaint shall be deemed to include any subsequent
G     complaint in respect of further investigation that may be conducted
      to bring any further evidence, oral or documentary, against any
      accused person involved in respect of the offence, for which
      complaint has already been filed, whether named in the original
      complaint or not.”
H
       RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                 903
  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


        23. What is dealt with by Section 44(1)(a) is a situation where         A
there is no complication. Section 44(1)(a) lays down the most fundamental
rule relating to territorial jurisdiction, by providing that an offence
punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA and any scheduled offence
connected to the same shall be triable by the Special Court constituted
for the area in which the offence has been committed. It is relevant to
                                                                                B
note that Section 44(1)(a) uses the expression “offence” in three places
in contradistinction to the expression “scheduled offence” used only
once. This usage is not without significance. In all three places where
the word “offence” alone is used, it connotes the offence of money-
laundering. The place where the expression “scheduled offence” is
used, it connotes the predicate offence. By prescribing that an offence         C
punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA and any scheduled offence
connected to the same shall be triable by the Special Court constituted
for the area in which “the offence” has been committed, Section 44(1)(a)
makes it crystal clear that it is the Special Court constituted under Section
43(1), which will be empowered to try even the scheduled offence
                                                                                D
connected to the same.
        24. After mapping out/laying down such a general but fundamental
rule, the Act then proceeds to deal with a more complicated situation in
Section 44(1)(c). The question as to what happens if the Court which
has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special
Court which has taken cognizance of the offence of money-laundering,            E
is what is sought to be answered by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of
Section 44. If the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled
offence is different from the Special Court which has taken cognizance
of the offence of money-laundering, then the authority authorised to file
a complaint under PMLA should make an application to the Court which            F
has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence. On the application so
filed, the Court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence,
should commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special
Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of money- laundering.
       25. Therefore, it is clear that the trial of the scheduled offence       G
should take place in the Special Court which has taken cognizance of
the offence of money-laundering. In other words, the trial of the scheduled
offence, insofar as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned,
should follow the trial of the offence of money-laundering and not vice
versa.
                                                                                H
904             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A            26. Since the Act contemplates the trial of the scheduled offence
      and the trial of the offence of money-laundering to take place only before
      the Special Court constituted under Section 43(1), a doubt is prone to
      arise as to whether all the offences are to be tried together. This doubt is
      sought to be removed by Explanation (i) to Section 44(1). Explanation (i)
      clarifies that the trial of both sets of offences by the same Court shall
B
      not be construed as joint trial.
             27. A careful dissection of clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (1)
      of Section 44 shows that they confer primacy upon the Special Court
      constituted under Section 43(1) of the PMLA. These two clauses contain
      two Rules, namely, (i) that the offence punishable under the PMLA as
C     well as a scheduled offence connected to the same shall be triable by
      the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence of money-
      laundering has been committed; and (ii) that if cognizance has been
      taken by one Court, in respect of the scheduled offence and cognizance
      has been taken in respect of the offence of money-laundering by the
D     Special Court, the Court trying the scheduled offence shall commit it to
      the Special Court trying the offence of money- laundering.
             28. It is only because of the Special Court constituted under Section
      43(1) being conferred primacy that Section 44(1) begins with the words
      “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
E     Procedure”. Though the PMLA contains a non-obstante clause in
      relation to the Cr.P.C, both in Section 44(1) and in Section 45(1), there
      are two other provisions where the Code of Criminal Procedure is
      specifically declared to apply to the proceedings before a Special Court.
      Section 46(1) specifically makes the provisions of the Cr.P.C applicable
      to proceedings before a Special Court. Similarly, Section 65 of the PMLA
F     makes the provisions of Cr.P.C apply to arrest, search and seizure,
      attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other
      proceedings under the Act.
            29. Therefore, it is clear that the provisions of the Cr.P.C. are
      applicable to all proceedings under the Act including proceedings before
G     the Special Court, except to the extent they are specifically excluded.
      Hence, Section 71 of the PMLA providing an overriding effect, has to
      be construed in tune with Section 46(1) and Section 65.
           30. Having taken note of the relevant provisions of the PMLA,
      which have a bearing upon the jurisdiction of the Special Court, let us
H
         RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                  905
    THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


now turn our attention to some of the provisions of the Cr.P.C, which              A
deal with the question of territorial jurisdiction.
       31. As pointed out by this Court in Kaushik Chatterjee vs. State
of Haryana & Ors.5, the question of territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases revolves around, (i) place of commission of the offence; or (ii)
place where the consequence of an act, both of which constitute an                 B
offence, ensues; or (iii) place where the accused was found; or (iv)
place where the victim was found; or (v) place where the property in
respect of which the offence was committed, was found; or (vi) place
where the property forming the subject-matter of an offence was required
to be returned or accounted for, etc., according as the case may be.
                                                                                   C
        32. As articulated in Kaushik Chatterjee (supra), the jurisdiction
of a civil court is limited by territorial as well as pecuniary limits, but the
jurisdiction of a criminal court is determined by (i) the offence; and/or
(ii) the offender.
       33. The discussion on the question of territorial jurisdiction in terms     D
of the provisions of the Cr.P.C can be cut short by extracting the principles
culled out in paragraphs 19 to 21 of the decision in Kaushik Chatterjee.
They read as follows:
         “19. Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains
         provisions relating to jurisdiction of criminal courts in inquiries and   E
         trials. The Code maintains a distinction between (i) inquiry; (ii)
         investigation; and (iii) trial. The words “inquiry” and “investigation”
         are defined respectively, in clauses (g) and (h) of Section 2 of the
         Code.
         20. The principles laid down in Sections 177 to 184 of the Code           F
         (contained in Chapter XIII) regarding the jurisdiction of criminal
         courts in inquiries and trials can be summarised in simple terms as
         follows:
         20.1. Every offence should ordinarily be inquired into and tried
         by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. This
                                                                                   G
         rule is found in Section 177. The expression “local jurisdiction”
         found in Section 177 is defined in Section 2(j) to mean “in relation
         to a court or Magistrate, means the local area within which the

5
    2020 (10) SCC 92
                                                                                   H
906      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     court or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers
      under the Code”.
      20.2. In case of uncertainty about the place in which, among the
      several local areas, an offence was committed, the Court having
      jurisdiction over any of such local areas may inquire into or try
B     such an offence.
      20.3. Where an offence is committed partly in one area and partly
      in another, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having
      jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
      20.4. In the case of a continuing offence which is committed in
C     more local areas than one, it may be inquired into or tried by a
      court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
      20.5. Where an offence consists of several acts done in different
      local areas it may be inquired into or tried by a court having
      jurisdiction over any of such local areas. (Numbers 2 to 5 are
D     traceable to Section 178)
      20.6. Where something is an offence by reason of the act done,
      as well as the consequence that ensued, then the offence may be
      inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction
      either the act was done or the consequence ensued. (Section 179)
E
      20.7. In cases where an act is an offence, by reason of its relation
      to any other act which is also an offence, then the first mentioned
      offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose
      local jurisdiction either of the acts was done. (Section 180)
      20.8. In certain cases such as dacoity, dacoity with murder,
F
      escaping from custody, etc., the offence may be inquired into and
      tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction either the offence
      was committed or the accused person was found.
      20.9. In the case of an offence of kidnapping or abduction, it may
      be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction
G     the person was kidnapped or conveyed or concealed or detained.
      20.10. The offences of theft, extortion or robbery may be inquired
      into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction, the offence
      was committed or the stolen property was possessed, received or
      retained.
H
     RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                             907
THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


   20.11. An offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach      A
   of trust may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local
   jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property
   was received or retained or was required to be returned or
   accounted for by the accused person.
   20.12. An offence which includes the possession of stolen              B
   property, may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose
   local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property
   was possessed by any person, having knowledge that it is stolen
   property. (Nos. 8 to 12 are found in Section 181)
   20.13. An offence which includes cheating, if committed by means       C
   of letters or telecommunication messages, may be inquired into or
   tried by any court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or
   messages were sent or received.
   20.14. An offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery
   of the property may be inquired into or tried by a court within        D
   whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person
   deceived or was received by the accused person.
   20.15. Some offences relating to marriage such as Section 494
   IPC (marrying again during the lifetime of husband or wife) and
   Section 495 IPC (committing the offence under Section 494 with         E
   concealment of former marriage) may be inquired into or tried by
   a court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed
   or the offender last resided with the spouse by the first marriage.
   (Nos. 13 to 15 are found in Section 182)
   20.16. An offence committed in the course of a journey or voyage       F
   may be inquired into or tried by a court through or into whose
   local jurisdiction that person or thing passed in the course of that
   journey or voyage. (Section 183).
   20.17. Cases falling under Section 219 (three offences of the
   same kind committed within a space of twelve months whether
                                                                          G
   in respect of the same person or not), cases falling under Section
   220 (commission of more offences than one, in one series of acts
   committed together as to form the same transaction) and cases
   falling under Section 221, (where it is doubtful what offences have
   been committed), may be inquired into or tried by any court
   competent to inquire into or try any of the offences. (Section 184).   H
908            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A           21. Apart from Sections 177 to 184, which lay down in elaborate
            detail, the rules relating to jurisdiction, Chapter XIII of the Code
            also contains a few other sections. Section 185 empowers the
            State Government to order any case or class of cases committed
            for trial in any district, to be tried in any Sessions Division. Section
            186 empowers the High Court, in case where two or more courts
B
            have taken cognizance of the same offence and a question as to
            which of them should inquire into or try the offence has arisen, to
            decide the district where the inquiry or trial shall take place. Section
            187 speaks of the powers of the Magistrate, in case where a
            person within his local jurisdiction, has committed an offence
C           outside his jurisdiction, but the same cannot be inquired into or
            tried within such jurisdiction. Sections 188 and 189 deal with
            offences committed outside India.”
             34. It may be seen from the principles culled out from Sections
      177 to 184 of the Cr.P.C that almost all contingencies that are likely to
D     arise have been carefully thought out and laid down in these provisions.
            35. The only contingency that could not have been provided in the
      above provisions of the Cr.P.C, is perhaps where the offence of money-
      laundering is committed. This is why Section 44(1) begins with a non-
      obstante clause. The whole picture is thus complete with a combined
E     reading of Section 44 of the PMLA and the provisions of Sections 177 to
      184 of the Cr.P.C.
             36. Once this combined scheme is understood, it will be clear that
      in view of the specific mandate of clauses (a) and (c) of sub- section (1)
      of Section 44, it is the Special Court constituted under the PMLA that
F     would have jurisdiction to try even the scheduled offence. Even if the
      scheduled offence is taken cognizance of by any other Court, that Court
      shall commit the same, on an application by the concerned authority, to
      the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the offence of money-
      laundering. This answers the first question posed before us.

G           37. Coming to the second question arising for our consideration,
      clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 44 leaves no semblance of any
      doubt that the offence of money-laundering is triable only by the Special
      Court constituted for the area in which the offence of money-laundering
      has been committed. To find out the area in which the offence of money-
      laundering has been committed, we may have to go back to the definition
H     in Section 3 of the PMLA.
       RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                  909
  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


       38. As we have pointed out earlier, the involvement of a person in        A
any one or more of certain processes or activities connected with the
proceeds of crime, constitutes the offence of money- laundering. These
processes or activities include, (i) concealment; (ii) possession; (iii)
acquisition; (iv) use; (v) projecting as untainted property; or (vi) claiming
as untainted property.
                                                                                 B
        39. In other words, a person may (i) acquire proceeds of crime in
one place, (ii) keep the same in his possession in another place, (iii)
conceal the same in a third place, and (iv) use the same in a fourth
place. The area in which each one of these places is located, will be the
area in which the offence of money- laundering has been committed. To
put it differently, the area in which the place of acquisition of the proceeds   C
of crime is located or the place of keeping it in possession is located or
the place in which it is concealed is located or the place in which it is
used is located, will be the area in which the offence has been committed.
       40. In addition, the definition of the words “proceeds of crime”
focuses on “deriving or obtaining a property” as a result of criminal            D
activity relating to a scheduled offence. Therefore, the area in which the
property is derived or obtained or even held or concealed, will be the
area in which the offence of money- laundering is committed.
       41. Having seen the legal landscape on the question of jurisdiction,
let us now come back to the facts of the case on hand. It is the case of         E
the petitioner that what was attached by the Enforcement Directorate
under Section 5 of the Act as proceeds of crime, was the bank account
of the petitioner in Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra and that therefore the
offence of money- laundering, even according to the respondent has
been committed in Maharashtra.                                                   F
      42. But the said contention overlooks the six different types of
processes or activities mentioned in Explanation (i) under Section 3 of
the Act, as connected with proceeds of crime, namely, concealment,
possession, acquisition, or use, etc.
       43. Even according to the petitioner, she ran three campaigns             G
from April 2020 to September 2021 in an online crowdfunding platform
named “Ketto”. From the pleadings on record, we are not able to make
out (i) the number of persons who provided funds; and (ii) the places
where the donors were located.
                                                                                 H
910             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A            44. The bank account of the petitioner in HDFC Bank,
      Koperkhairane Branch, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra, is the ultimate
      destination, to which all funds reached. Therefore, Navi Mumbai,
      Maharashtra is the place where the proceeds of crime were taken
      possession of (if they were actually proceeds of crime). Therefore,
      Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra is a place where only one of the six different
B
      processes or activities listed in Section 3 has been carried out. The other
      activity namely acquisition of the proceeds of crime (if they really are)
      has taken place in the virtual mode with people from different parts of
      the country/world transferring money online. If acquisition has taken
      place in the real physical world, the difficulty with respect to the question
C     of jurisdiction would have been lesser. Since acquisition has taken place
      in the virtual world, the places from where online transfers of money
      took place, are known only to the petitioner or perhaps their Bankers.
             45. Therefore, the question of territorial jurisdiction in this case
      requires an enquiry into a question of fact as to the place where the
D     alleged proceeds of crime were (i) concealed; or (ii) possessed; or (iii)
      acquired; or (iv) used. This question of fact will actually depend upon
      the evidence that unfolds before the Trial Court. It will be useful in this
      regard to extract Paragraph 38 of the decision in Kaushik Chatterjee
      which reads as follows: -
E           “38. But be that as it may, the upshot of the above discussion is:
            38.1. That the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence”
            or “offender” as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction, depend
            upon facts established through evidence.
            38.2. That if the issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the same
F           has to be decided with respect to the various rules enunciated in
            Sections 177 to 184 of the Code.
            38.3. That these questions may have to be raised before the court
            trying the offence and such court is bound to consider the same.”
             46. Therefore, we are of the view that the issue of territorial
G
      jurisdiction cannot be decided in a writ petition, especially when there is
      a serious factual dispute about the place/places of commission of the
      offence. Hence, this question should be raised by the petitioner before
      the Special Court, since an answer to the same would depend upon
      evidence as to the places where any one or more of the processes or
H     activities mentioned in Section 3 were carried out. Therefore, giving
       RANA AYYUB v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT                                       911
  THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]


liberty to the petitioner to raise the issue of territorial jurisdiction before       A
the Trial Court, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as
to costs.

Ankit Gyan                                                 Writ petition dismissed.
(Assisted by : Harshed Sunder and Mahendra Yadav, LCRAs)
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