RENUKA PRASADversusTHE STATE REPRESENTED BY ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

                 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 160 : 2025 INSC 657

                           Renuka Prasad
                                 v.
                     The State Represented by
                 Assistant Superintendent of Police
                (Criminal Appeal No(s). 3189-3190 of 2023)
                                 09 May 2025
           [Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and
       convicting the accused persons based on the testimony of the
       IOs which was founded only on s.161, CrPC statements of the
       witnesses; whether present was a case of two probable views, in
       which case the one favourable to the accused ought to be taken.

                                  Headnotes†
       Appeal against acquittal – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –
       s.161 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 r/w s.120B – Murder – 71
       out of the total 87 witnesses including eye-witnesses turned
       hostile – Trial Court acquitted the accused persons – High
       Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused relying
       on the testimony of the IOs based only on the statements of
       the witnesses recorded u/s.161, CrPC – Sustainability:
       Held: Unsustainable – High Court erred in relying on the statements
       made by the witnesses u/s.161, CrPC as affirmed by the IO, in
       violation of s.162, CrPC – What is revealed in the investigation to
       the IO has to be clearly established before Court by oral testimony
       or other evidence, failing which the Court cannot base a conviction
       on the predilection of the IO that a particular circumstance was
       revealed in the investigation – Statements made by the IOs
       regarding the motive, conspiracy and preparation comes out as
       the prosecution story, as discernible from the s.161 statements
       of various witnesses who were questioned by the police during
       investigation; which statements are wholly inadmissible u/s.162,
       CrPC – Merely because the IOs spoke of such statements having
       been made by the witnesses during investigation, does not give


* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             161

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     them any credibility, enabling acceptance, unless the witnesses
     themselves spoke of such motive or acts of commission or
     omission or instances from which conspiracy could be inferred
     as also the preparation, established beyond reasonable doubt –
     High Court reversed the order of acquittal of the Trial Court on
     mere surmises and conjectures relying wholly on the testimony
     of the IOs, who merely regurgitated the statements recorded
     u/s.161 and the voluntary statements of the accused – Prosecution
     failed to prove the allegations raised and charged against each
     accused – Judgment of the High Court reversed, accused acquitted.
     [Paras 14, 19, 26, 48, 49]

     Appeal against acquittal – Murder – Hostile witnesses – Trial
     Court acquitted the accused persons – High Court reversed
     the acquittal – Whether present was a case of two probable
     views, in which case the one favourable to the accused ought
     to be taken:
     Held: No – In the present case, there are no two views coming
     forth from the evidence – The only view that comes forth is that
     the prosecution failed to prove the allegations raised and charged
     against each of the accused, more by reason of all the witnesses
     turning hostile for reasons unknown – Whatever be the reason
     behind such hostility, it cannot result in a conviction, based on
     the testimony of the IOs which is founded only on s.161, CrPC
     statements and voluntary statements of accused; the former
     violative of s.162, CrPC and the latter in breach of ss.25, 26,
     Evidence Act – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.161, 162 –
     Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27. [Para 48]

     Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27, 30 – Confession u/s.27 not
     relied upon:
     Held: Confessions allegedly made by A1 regarding the sites where
     the conspiracy was hatched and the money transacted does not lead
     to any discovery of fact – The narration about the conspiracy and the
     money transactions are not admissible and the mere pointing out of
     two sites does not lead to any discovery of fact, when the narration
     is eschewed – The clothes and machetes allegedly, worn by A5 &
     A6 and used by them to commit the crime, were recovered on the
     confession statement of A3, the alleged conspirator – However,
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       neither the clothes nor machetes are connected to A5 & A6 who
       were alleged to have committed the crime nor is A3, an alleged
       conspirator even accused of having been involved in the crime
       proper, that is the murder of the deceased – Confession u/s.27
       cannot be relied upon and no aid can be drawn from it to implicate
       the other accused – The sites pointed out by A1, did not lead to
       any discovery of a fact and it is hit by ss.25 and 26 . [Paras 39, 45]

                                Case Law Cited
       Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil [2000] Supp. 5 SCR 144 : (2001)
       1 SCC 652; Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh [2020] 7 SCR
       546 : (2020) 9 SCC 627 – distinguished.
       Ramesh v. State of Haryana [2016] 8 SCR 936 : (2017) 1 SCC
       529; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007)
       4 SCC 415; State, State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar [2018] 2 SCR
       656 : (2018) 13 SCC 808; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad
       [1962] 3 SCR 10; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [2002] Supp. 2
       SCR 31 : (2002) 7 SCC 334; Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan
       [2015] 10 SCR 553 : (2016) 14 SCC 640; Kali Ram v. State of
       H.P. [1974] 1 SCR 722 : (1973) 2 SCC 808; R. Shaji v. State of
       Kerala [2013] 3 SCR 1172 : (2013) 14 SCC 266; Rajendra Singh v.
       State of U.P. [2007] 8 SCR 834 : (2007) 7 SCC 378; State (NCT
       of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11
       SCC 600; H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash [1972] 2 SCR 765 : (1972)
       1 SCC 249; State of Maharashtra v. Damu [2000] 3 SCR 880 :
       (2000) 6 SCC 269; Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam [2013] 3
       SCR 801 : (2013) 7 SCC 417; Raja v. State of Haryana [2015]
       3 SCR 947 : (2015) 11 SCC 43; Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State
       of Maharashtra [2002] 1 SCR 338 : (2002) 2 SCC 490; John
       Pandian v. State [2010] 15 SCR 1012 : (2010) 14 SCC 129;
       Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] 1 SCR 526 :
       (1952) 1 SCC 275; Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [1964] 6
       SCR 623; State v. Chhaganlal Gangaram Lavar, 1954 SCC OnLine
       Bom 69 – referred to.
       Athappa Goundan, In re, 1937 SCC OnLine Mad 76; Naresh
       Chandra Das v. King-Emperor, 1941 SCC OnLine Cal 178 –
       referred to.
       Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 – referred to.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                              163

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

                                 List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Criminal Procedure Code,
     1973.

                              List of Keywords
     Appeal against acquittal; Testimony of the Investigating Officers
     (IOs); Testimony of IO founded only on Section 161, CrPC
     statements of the witnesses; Conviction based on the testimony of
     the IOs based only on Section 161, CrPC statements; Statements
     made by the witnesses under Section 161, CrPC; Witnesses
     turning hostile; Hostility of witnesses at trial; Eye-witnesses turned
     hostile; Sibling rivalry; Section 27, Evidence Act, 1872; Failed to
     identify the assailants; Homicidal death; Conspiracy; Confession;
     Motive; Preparation; Two reasonable views possible; No two views;
     Presumption of innocence of the accused until proved guilty;
     Voluntary statements of accused; Discovery of a fact; Recovery
     of the machetes, the weapons used in the offence; Recovery of
     the clothes; Seizure of currency; Test identification parade (TIP);
     Seizures and recoveries; Prosecution failed to prove the allegations
     raised and charged.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
     3189-3190 of 2023
     From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2023 and 05.10.2023 of
     the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLA No. 870 of 2017
     With
     Criminal Appeal No(s). 3399 and 85-86 of 2024

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Ratnakar Dash, Siddharth Luthra, Sr. Advs., G.Sivabalamurugan,
     Selvaraj Mahendran, C.adhikesavan, Ms. Ratan Priya Pradhan,
     Harikrishnan P.v, C.kavin Ananth, Mrs. Vaijayanthi Girish, Girish
     Ananthamurthy, Ayush Kaushik, Sougat Pati.
     Advs. for the Respondent:
     Aman Panwar, A.A.G., V. N. Raghupathy, Shrey Brahmbhatt.
164                                                           [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       K. Vinod Chandran, J.

1.     Prevaricating witnesses, turning hostile in Court and overzealous
       investigations, done in total ignorance of basic tenets of criminal law,
       often reduces prosecution to a mockery. Witnesses mount the box
       to disown prior statements, deny recoveries made, feign ignorance
       of aggravating circumstances spoken of during investigation and
       eye witnesses turn blind. Here is a classic case of 71 of the total
       87 witnesses including eye-witnesses, turning hostile, leaving the
       prosecution to stand on the testimony of the police and official
       witnesses. Even a young boy, the crucial eyewitness, who saw his
       father being hacked to death, failed to identify the assailants.
2.     The prosecution alleged that due to differences arising from sharing of
       assets of the father; an entrepreneur who set up several educational
       institutions, A1 and his brother, PW4, were at loggerheads. The
       deceased an employee of one of the institutions, later allotted to
       the share of A1, resigned to join an institution managed by PW4,
       after the division of assets. The enmity of A1 arises, according to
       the prosecution, due to the active involvement of the deceased in
       the sibling rivalry, aligning himself with PW4, to the hilt. A1 along
       with his employees A2 to A4 engaged A5 and A6, through A7, an
       Advocate, to murder the deceased. A5 and A6 is said to have carried
       out the brutal murder, hacking the deceased to death, in front of his
       son, PW8, at 07:45 pm on 28.04.2011. PW8, immediately contacted
       his relatives and the deceased was rushed to the hospital where he
       breathed his last at 08:40 pm on the same day.
3.     The first information statement (FIS) was lodged by PW8, leading to
       the registration of the crime and the resultant investigation. As was
       said, 87 witnesses were led in trial to speak about the homicide, the
       motive, the meeting of minds leading to the conspiracy, the preparation,
       what transpired after the incident and the arrest, recovery, chemical
       analysis and so on and so forth; all in vain for most turned hostile,
       especially the ones who were relevant. The Trial Court acquitted the
       accused finding no support for the prosecution case from the large
       number of witnesses arrayed to prove the various aspects leading to
       the murder, all of whom, except the official witnesses, turned hostile.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        165

                          Renuka Prasad v.
      The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

      The Division Bench of the High Court reversed the acquittal and
      convicted A1 to A6 under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of
      the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The acquittal of A7 by the Trial Court
      was affirmed by the High Court.
4.    A1 has filed one of the appeals in which Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned
      Senior Counsel, appeared for the accused/appellant. Mr. Ratnakar
      Dash, learned Senior Counsel appeared in the other appeals filed
      by A2 to A6. Mr. Aman Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General
      appeared for the State. Heard both the learned Senior Counsel
      appearing for the appellants and the learned Additional Advocate
      General and perused the records.
5.    The Division Bench at the outset, dealt with the judgment in
      Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka1 wherein this Court had set
      out the general principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court
      in dealing with an appeal from an acquittal. The principles are trite;
      extract having been made in the impugned judgment, we would not
      repeat. We are tasked to find out whether the principles have been
      followed scrupulously by the Division Bench in setting aside the order
      of acquittal. Whether, while exercising the full power conferred in an
      appeal to review, reappreciate and consider the evidence led in the
      case, the Division Bench has been circumspect, keeping in mind
      the trite fundamental principle that the presumption of innocence
      available to the accused, under the general law, stands fortified and
      strengthened by reason of the order of acquittal. Whether, the Trial
      Court has been absolutely unreasonable in taking a view that there
      was insufficient evidence to bring home a conviction in the case and
      whether it was a case of two probable views, in which case the one
      favourable to the accused ought to be taken.
6.    PW8 is the eyewitness who spoke of the incident but failed to
      identify the assailants or the weapons recovered, despite the FIS
      having categorically stated his ability to identify them, who suddenly
      came out of the bushes; when he and his father were taking a stroll,
      brutally hacked his father and fled on their foot. While MO6 and
      MO7, spectacles and mobile of the deceased seized by the police
      from the scene of occurrence, was identified, the witness could
      neither identify either of the appellants; A5 and A6. The weapons


1    (2007) 4 SCC 415
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       were not even confronted to PW8, since he expressed his inability
       to identify them. PW8’s knowledge of the motive, spoken of in the
       statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, was denied. PW 1 &
       PW9 were the persons who came to the scene of occurrence, as per
       the prosecution case, immediately after the incident, who also saw
       two persons running away. PW1 completely denied his presence at
       the scene of occurrence, while PW9 spoke only of having seen one
       person running away. PW9 deposed of seeing the injured and his
       son, the latter of whom was advised to call relatives. He called the
       Police and summoned an ambulance, but even before its arrival, the
       injured was taken to the hospital in a pick-up van. The statement
       made by PW1 and PW9, under Section 161, regarding their ability to
       identify the persons who were running away and their awareness of
       the motive; being residents of the locality and the conspiracy having
       been hatched by reason of the sibling rivalry of prominent persons
       of the locality, were all denied.
7.     PW2, the brother of the deceased, PW3, his uncle and PW10, his
       wife, were examined to prove the inquest and also the motive. All of
       them saw the injured at the hospital, spoke of the injuries numbering
       twenty-five, admitted of the inquest and identified the dress and
       other personal effects of the deceased, seized by the police from
       the body. PW2, though spoke of his brother’s employment with A1
       and subsequent resignation due to a disagreement, did not support
       the prosecution case of an active enmity between the deceased
       and A1 by reason of the allegiance to PW4, the brother of A1; a
       departure from his Section 161 statement. Curiously, the wife of
       the deceased also denied her statement to the police that A1 had
       insulted and threatened the deceased. PW3 was the uncle of the
       deceased who along with PW2 and PW10 saw the deceased at the
       hospital. There were a number of witnesses examined to prove the
       motive, the conspiracy and the incidental circumstances, leading
       eventually to the murder of the deceased, all of whom turned hostile.
       The Appellate Court though accepted that all these witnesses turned
       hostile, looked at the story projected by the prosecution as spoken of
       in the Section 161 statements of the witnesses, which the witnesses
       did not accept, in the box, at the trial before Court.
8.     PW4, the brother of A1, to whom was aligned the deceased, and
       a star witness to speak on the motive, admitted the division of
       the properties between the brothers but denied any long-standing
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       167

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     enmity between them. He also denied that he wrote a letter to his
     father complaining about the actions of A1. A photocopy of the said
     letter confronted to him, at the trial, was denied, though he admitted
     that the signature seen therein was similar to his. The effort of the
     prosecution to prove the various aspects leading to the crime and
     what happened afterwards; (i) of the conspiracy; hatched through
     the meetings carried out by the accused, purportedly to prove the
     meeting of minds, the inquiries made to find out the contract killers,
     persons approached for owning up the crime; (ii) preparation; like,
     the purchase of machetes, procurement of fake number plates to
     be affixed in a motorbike and pick up van, used to escape from
     the crime scene and reach the hide out; and the (iii) motive itself;
     through employees of the Medical College, PW57 to PW62 & PW72,
     including the Administrative Superintendent and the Principal of the
     College, to establish the enmity between A1 and PW4, all of which
     collapsed like a pack of cards, when all of these witnesses turned
     hostile. The motive, conspiracy, preparation made before, and what
     transpired after the crime, as projected by the prosecution remained
     a mere scripted story as discernible from the Section 161 statements;
     not established in the trial.
9.   Surprisingly, all the panch witnesses who attested the various
     recoveries, like cash seized from A2 to A5, the weapons used, and
     the clothes worn by the accused, when the crime was committed,
     also turned hostile. We will deal with Exhibit P49, recovery of the
     machetes, the weapons used in the offence and Exhibit P50, recovery
     of the clothes worn by A5 and A6 at the time of the crime, a little
     later, which has to be considered along with the FSL report and
     the result of analysis coming forth. We also notice that there were
     two Mahazars produced as Annexure P51 and P54, wherein A1
     allegedly confessed and pointed out the place where the conspiracy
     was carried out and the money transfer occurred. This, however,
     is not a confession under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
     1872, since there was no tangible object recovered from the two
     sites pointed out, leading to the discovery of a fact. The confession
     statement regarding the conspiracy, of course cannot at all be relied
     upon, being hit by Sections 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act. The other
     witnesses examined to prove the aggravating circumstances also
     turned hostile in which event the Court turned to the evidence of the
     Investigating Officers, PW’s 83, 84 and 87.
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10. Commencing the analysis of evidence the High Court first held that
    undisputedly Ramkrishna met with a homicidal death, which is also
    the conclusion of the Trial Court from which there is no reason for
    us to differ. The evidence of PW8, who was an eye witness and
    PW9, who saw the hacked body of the deceased immediately after
    the incident, coupled with the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 10, brother,
    uncle and wife, who saw the body of the deceased at the hospital and
    spoke of the injuries sustained, clearly established the brutal attack
    on the deceased. The post-mortem report and the cause of death
    as spoken of by the Doctor, PW74, also established the homicidal
    death caused by the cutting wounds inflicted on the deceased, which
    were also ante-mortem. We need not further deal with the issue and
    fully agree with the Trial Court and the High Court that the deceased
    was brutally murdered.
11. The High Court having found that all the witnesses except the
    official witnesses turned hostile looked at the evidence of the official
    witnesses especially the Investigating Officers and the recoveries
    made in the course of investigation. The High Court also relied on
    two decisions of this Court, State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil2
    and Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh3 to find that the courts
    need not always feed on a distrust of police officers. We have to
    emphasize that the proposition coming out of the said decisions were
    in the context of recoveries made under Section 27 of the Evidence
    Act or the seizures effected on search or interception.
12. In Sunil and another2, the recovery of a blood-stained knickers
    was eschewed by the High Court since there were no independent
    witnesses. A distinction was drawn from a case of recovery, under
    information supplied by the accused and a discovery made on a
    search, where there is an insistence on having independent witnesses,
    under Chapter VII of the Code. It was held that it is fallacious to hold
    that every recovery under Section 27 must necessarily be attested by
    independent witnesses and it is for the Police Officer to have such
    witnesses present to provide further veracity to the recovery. But there
    could be circumstances in which there were no witnesses present or
    none had agreed to affix his signature on the mahazar, which cannot
    always lead to the evidence of recovery being eschewed, especially


2   (2001) 1 SCC 652
3   (2020) 9 SCC 627
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        169

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     when the testimony of the Police Officer is not shown to be tainted
     in any manner and is also found to be credible. It was held that it
     is archaic and a colonial hangover that actions of the Police Officer
     should be approached with primal distrust, always. Rizwan Khan3
     was a three Judge Bench decision which affirmed Sunil & another2
     to hold that if the police witnesses are found to be reliable and trust
     worthy, no error can be attributed to the conviction entered relying
     upon such testimony. Therein, it was a case of recovery of a narcotic
     substance from a motor-cycle in which the accused were travelling,
     search having been conducted on interception of the vehicle. The
     panchnama witnesses turned hostile but the evidence of the Police
     Officers, found to be trust worthy was relied upon.
13. State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar4, again was a case in which
    there were no independent witnesses to attest the recovery of the
    contraband, since none were available due to the severe cold on
    that day. The conviction was based on the testimony of seizure of
    contraband from the accused, as testified by the Police Officers.
    We cannot digress from the above proposition as laid-down by this
    Court but only raise a caution, insofar the recovery made under
    Section 27, in the context of the findings of the High Court, in the
    instant case, having to be necessarily connected to the crime and
    the accused, failing which the recovery is of no consequence. We
    also have to observe that the confession can only be with respect
    to the discovery of a fact leading to the recovery of a material object
    and cannot be with respect to any confession as to the actual crime
    as has been held in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor5.
14. The High Court having stated the principle, went on to examine the
    evidence of PW’s 83, 84 and 87. PW83 commenced the investigation,
    to whom was handed over the letter, MO40, allegedly written by PW4
    to his father; which however, was denied by PW4 in his testimony.
    The High Court discussing PW83’s evidence specifically referred
    to the Section 161 statements made by PWs 1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 26
    and 51, which were affirmed to have been made by them before the
    Police as spoken of by PW83. Observing that in cross-examination of
    PW83 but for general suggestions, which were denied by him there
    was nothing to discredit him and hence the testimony of PW83 is


4   (2018) 13 SCC 808
5   AIR 1947 PC 67
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       not affected, the Division Bench held there is no reason to discard
       it. We are afraid that the High Court seriously erred in relying on the
       statements made by the witnesses under Section 161, as affirmed
       by the Investigating Officer, clearly in violation of Section 162 and
       the specific use to which Section 161 statements can be put to,
       as we will further elaborate, a little later. It’s also pertinent that the
       conspiracy angle spoken of by PW83, is what has been stated to
       him by A7, clearly inadmissible in evidence.
15. The evidence of PW84 with respect to seizure of currency worth
    Rs.8,50,000/- and two mobile phones respectively from the staff
    quarters of A5 and the person of A6, on information, the source of
    which has not been disclosed was emphasised. The arrest of A3,
    the seizure of Rs.2,00,000/- and a mobile phone from A3 were also
    relied on. The Trial Court had placed no reliance on these recoveries
    finding it to be not admissible under Section 27; which the High Court
    was not impressed with and found it to be permissible under Section
    102 of Cr.P.C. Seizure under Section 102, unless it is linked to the
    crime cannot be relied on to convict the accused for murder on the
    conspiracy alleged. But more relevant is the fact that only the bundles
    of the money recovered were identified in Court, by PW78, an ASI
    who accompanied PW84 at the time of seizure and PW84, since
    there was no proper inventory taken of the cash recovered. Further
    though PW84 spoke of the cash recovered being in bundles with
    slips showing the name of the banks, no attempt was made to find
    out its source from the Banks. The money hence was not connected
    to the crime and the Call Data Records of the mobile phones were
    not proved in the trial.
16. Now we come to the IO, who concluded the investigation and filed
    charge-sheet, PW87, before whom A3, A5 and A6 were produced
    by PW84, after which the investigation was carried out by PW87. It
    was PW87’s testimony that the voluntary statements of A3 led to A2,
    from whose staff quarters Rs.2,58,000/- and two mobile phones were
    recovered. A1 was also arrested, who is said to have given statements
    about his enmity with PW4 and also the deceased. These voluntary
    statements and the confession statements of A3, under Section
    27 also led PW87 to Amarajyothi Farms, from where the weapons
    (MO 10 & MO 11) and a motorcycle (MO 49) were recovered as per
    Ex.P49 Mahazar and MO12 to MO15 clothes worn by A5 & A6 were
    recovered as per Ex.P113, Mahazar. PW87’s testimony also spoke
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                            171

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     about PW5 who was close to the deceased having spoken of the
     enmity between A1 and PW4; denied in Court by PW5. A reading
     of PW87’s statement would reveal that she has just spoken of the
     voluntary statements made by the various accused and there is no
     investigation worthy of reliance spoken of by the witness. We are
     reminded of the extract in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad6,
     an eleven Judge Bench, of a quote attributed to Sir James Fitzjames
     Stephen, the principal draftsman of the Evidence Act:
            “If it is permissible in law to obtain evidence from the
            accused person by compulsion, why tread the hard path
            of laborious investigation and prolonged examination of
            other men, materials and documents? It has been well said
            that an abolition of this privilege would be an incentive for
            those in charge of enforcement of law “to sit comfortably
            in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil’s eyes
            rather than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence”.
                           (Stephen, History of Criminal Law, p. 442)

17. The High Court has placed heavy reliance on the testimonies of PW’s
    83, 84 and 87, the IOs, with the assertion that they were unshaken
    in cross-examination and reliance was placed on the affirmation of
    the statements made by the witnesses under Section 161, which
    the witnesses did not speak themselves in the box, at the trial. We
    cannot but observe that, though reliance is said to be placed on
    the testimony of the IOs’ this would in fact be a reliance placed on
    Section 161 statements as spoken of by the IOs which is egregiously
    wrong. The High Court in paragraph 85 speaks of the affirmation of
    statements given by witnesses examined by PW87 and records that
    though these were denied by the witnesses, a reading of the cross-
    examination of PW87 indicates that she had not been discredited
    and the suggestions made to her in cross were denied. The reliance
    placed on the so called voluntary statements of the accused and the
    statements made under Section 161 as recorded by PW87, based
    on the decisions afore-cited cannot be countenanced.
18. As we noticed, the decisions cited by the High Court regarding the
    testimony of the Police Officers before Court not liable to be treated


6   (1962) 3 SCR 10
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       with distrust, was specifically with respect to recoveries made
       under Section 27 and the seizures of contraband. Seizure often is
       on surprise interception or on information received, which principle
       cannot be imported to the affirmation of the statements made by
       the witnesses during investigation under Section 161; if they do not
       subscribe to it at trial. Merely for the IO having spoken about such
       a statement having been made, it cannot be treated as gospel truth.
       Nor can the voluntary statements of the accused relied on except
       to the extent of the discovery of fact, on information supplied, which
       would be a strong implicating circumstance if, and only if, there is
       a link established to the crime.
19. In this context, we also have to specifically notice paragraph 86
    where some of the responses by PW87 were discussed to add
    further credibility to her testimony; which in fact runs counter
    to the prosecution case. The test identification parade had not
    given any result, which was stated to be not an argument against
    the prosecution. We perfectly agree, since even if there was an
    identification at the stage of investigation, as per the precedents, it
    only aids the investigation and cannot lead to a conviction, unless
    the accused are identified in the box at the time of trial, in Court,
    which in the present case has not occurred. PW87 admitted to a
    suggestion that when she interrogated the family members of the
    deceased, none talked about the existing differences between the
    deceased and A1. The said admission was rubbished on the ground
    that, to another suggestion in the same vein, PW87 firmly denied
    it and this was because her investigation revealed involvement of
    A1; a presumptuous finding without any legal basis. What has been
    revealed in the investigation, to the IO, has to be clearly established
    before Court by oral testimony or other evidence, failing which the
    Court cannot base a conviction on the predilection of the IO that a
    particular circumstance was revealed in the investigation.
20. The discrepancy regarding the statements made by her with respect
    to the clothes of A5 and A6 was attempted to be explained away.
    We would not dwell on the discrepancy since nothing comes out of
    the recovery made under Section 27. The recovery was made on a
    confession statement by A3 and not A5 or A6. Further, the statement
    attributed to A3 as spoken of by PW 87 marked as exhibit P 113
    is “The machetes used in this murder is kept in a gunny bag in the
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       173

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     last room of the first floor of the farmhouse of Renuka Prasad at
     Ajjavara-Addangaya-Mavinapalla. The blood-stain clothes which
     were worn by Sharan and Bhavani Shankar during the offence and
     the Kannada number plate which was affixed to the Hero Honda
     Splendour bike during the offence are kept near the water pump in
     a plastic cover; and if you come with me, I will show them to you.”
     (sic) The reference to murder and offence has to be completely
     eschewed and the fact discovered is only the concealment of the
     weapons and the dress which information supplied is by A3 who even
     according to the prosecution, was not involved in the crime proper, of
     murder. Further, while recording the Mahazar for recovery, the shirt
     and pants recovered were said to be of A5 and a shirt and jeans
     of A6. Nothing was done to verify whether MO12 – MO15 items of
     dress would fit A5 & A6. PW87 in fact admits that she did not ask A5
     and A6 to wear it nor was it verified from a tailor as to whether the
     dress recovered would fit A5 & A6. There is no statement made by
     A3 regarding the handing over of the weapons & dress, by A5 & A6
     to A3, which in any event would have to be proved independently.
     The identification of A5 & A6, of their dress at the time of recovery
     also is inadmissible. The mere recovery of dress under Section 27,
     that also through a confession statement of an alleged conspirator,
     does not implicate A5 or A6 who were alleged to be the assailants
     who killed the deceased. Pertinently the site or farm from which the
     recoveries were made was not proved to be owned by A1.
21. Insofar as the crime is concerned, the eye witness PW8 and the
    persons who reached the occurrence immediately thereafter, PW1
    and PW9, admittedly did not identify the accused. PW8 being a
    young boy of 15 at the time of incident, the Division Bench was of
    the opinion that it was quite natural that he was not able to identify
    the accused. It was also observed from his statement that, it was
    the police who informed him about A5 & A6 having committed the
    murder. As far as PW1 is concerned looking at the evidence of
    PW9, it has been found that PW1 had stated a deliberate falsehood
    before Court; which again, would not enable the Court to look at
    his Section 161 statement. PW9 also did not identify the accused
    and he spoke only of seeing one person running away. Obviously
    since no reliance could be placed on the evidence of PW8, PW1 &
    9, to pin the crime on A5 & A6, the Division Bench went on to look
    at the circumstances attempted to be established at the trial; being
174                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       the motive, the conspiracy, the preparation, seizure of incriminating
       materials and the FSL report. Before leaving the eye-witnesses
       testimony, we cannot but notice that the prosecution never attempted
       to confront PW8 with the clothes recovered as MO12 to MO15, said
       to have been worn by A5 & A6, at the time when the crime was
       committed. Neither was it shown to PW9, who at least spoke of
       having seen one person running away from the scene.
22. On the question of motive, the Division Bench examined the evidence
    of PW4, the brother of A1, PW10, the wife of the deceased and
    PWs 6, wife of PW4, PW7, their son & PWs 11 to 13, relatives of A1
    & PW4, all of whom turned hostile. The employees in the institutions
    of PW4 & A1 also denied their former statements of enmity between
    the brothers and the alleged ill will of A1 against the deceased.
    PW4 denied the letter which was produced as MO40 before Court.
    However, the Division Bench has relied on MO40 and its contents
    on the ground that PW83 had stated that PW4 came to the Police
    Station and handed over the xerox copy of a 14-page letter. We
    are unable to accept the reasoning of the Division Bench especially
    since MO40 was confronted to PW4, when he was examined and
    he denied having written such a letter. The letter hence was not
    proved, though marked through the IO. Merely because PW83, the
    IO, submitted that it was handed over to him by PW4 at the time of
    investigation, that cannot be a reason to place reliance on MO40
    or to look into its contents to find enmity existing between A1 and
    PW4 and threats having been levelled against the deceased, by A1.
23. The High Court further places reliance on PW10’s testimony or rather
    the statements made by her in the Section 161 statement on the
    reasoning that the wife will definitely be aware of the reasons behind
    the murder. She cannot be believed, if it is deposed that she is not
    aware of anything, was the finding. A statement made by PW10 that,
    she knew about A1 having insulted and levelled threats against the
    deceased; confronted to PW10 but denied, was relied upon, finding
    that it was affirmed by PW83. PW4 was also found to have resiled
    from his earlier statement under Section 161 because the sister of
    PW4 and A1 had filed a suit against them which was being jointly
    contested by them; a mere surmise to place heavy reliance on the
    Section 161 statements made by PW4. According to us the motive
    insofar as A1 having inimical feelings against the deceased, for having
    meddled in the affairs of the institutions and the division of assets,
    does not stand proved. PW4 only admitted to certain differences
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       175

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     between the brothers with reference to the running of a mess in
     the college and there was no reference to the deceased in so far
     as the specific dispute spoken of. We find absolutely no reason to
     find the motive established.
24. The next aspect dealt with by the High Court was on the conspiracy
    and preparation for the crime. Rightly reliance was placed on Mohd.
    Khalid v. State of W.B.7 wherein it was opined that conspiracies
    are not hatched in the open and when done in secrecy, it is very
    difficult for direct evidence to be produced relating to the conspiracy
    and the Court would have to fall back upon circumstantial evidence,
    which also has to be based on inferences made from the various
    circumstances proved from the acts and omissions of the accused.
    The Division Bench while referring to the various witnesses who
    were produced to prove the conspiracy first looked at the evidence
    of PW71, a Director of one of the institutions, also the wife of A1
    and PW72, who was an employee in the same institution. PW71
    though denied the various documents alleged to have been produced
    before Court, the Division Bench presumed that her testimony was
    a deliberate falsehood intended to save her husband. PW72 had
    produced the salary certificate of A2 issued by him in the capacity
    of in-charge Principal of the Dental College. The aforesaid evidence
    was relied on to find close acquaintance of A1 with A2 to A4, the
    former being the employer of the latter three persons. Insofar as the
    conspiracy hatched, the Court relied on the voluntary statements
    made by A3, A5 and A6 before PW87 and relied on Mehboob Ali v.
    State of Rajasthan8. The testimony of PW87 regarding the sites,
    where discussions were held and money changed hands, pointed
    out through the voluntary statements made by A1, was relied on by
    the Division Bench. In addition, Section 161 statements of PW61 to
    PW64 who had resiled from their statements in the testimony before
    Court regarding A3 having been seen with A5 and A6 in a hotel on
    28.04.2011, was also relied upon. As far as the preparation made,
    since the witnesses examined for proving the same also turned
    hostile, the evidence of the police officers were reckoned and the
    story as spoken of by the IOs were elaborately discussed, which in
    effect is based on the Section 161 Statements made by the various
    witnesses, before the police.


7   (2002) 7 SCC 334
8   (2016) 14 SCC 640
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25. Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was dealt with
    in Kali Ram v. State of H.P. 9 to hold that the provision makes it
    plain that ‘the statement made by any person to a police officer
    in the course of an investigation cannot be used for any purpose
    except for the purpose of contradicting a witness, as mentioned
    in the proviso to sub-section (1) or for the purposes mentioned
    in sub-section (2)’ (sic para-17). The said principle was reiterated
    with reference to Section 162 under the Criminal Procedure Code,
    1973 in R. Shaji v. State of Kerala10. It was held by this Court that
    ‘statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can be used only for the
    purpose of contradiction and statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
    can be used for both corroboration and contradiction’ (sic para-25).
    It was further held that though the object of the statement of witness
    recorded under Section 164 is two-fold, there is no proposition that
    if the statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164 before
    a Magistrate, the evidence of such witness in Court should be
    discarded. Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. 11 was a case in which
    the High Court, as in the present case, relied upon the statements
    of six witnesses, recorded by the IO under Section 161 Cr.P.C., to
    enter a finding that the respondent could not have been present at
    the scene of crime, as he was present in the meeting of the Nagar
    Nigam at Allahabad. It was unequivocally held that ‘a statement
    under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence.
    In view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 162 Cr.P.C., the
    statement can be used only for the limited purpose of contradicting
    the maker thereof in the manner laid down in the said proviso’ (sic
    para-6). It was found that the High Court committed a manifest error
    of law in relying upon wholly inadmissible evidence in recording a
    finding on the alibi claimed by one of the accused.
26. The statements made by the IOs regarding the motive, conspiracy
    and preparation comes out as the prosecution story, as discernible
    from the Section 161 statements of various witnesses who were
    questioned by the police during investigation; which statements
    are wholly inadmissible under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. Merely
    because the IOs spoke of such statements having been made by


9    (1973) 2 SCC 808
10   (2013) 14 SCC 266
11   (2007) 7 SCC 378
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                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

     the witnesses during investigation, does not give them any credibility,
     enabling acceptance, unless the witnesses themselves spoke of such
     motive or acts of commission or omission or instances from which
     conspiracy could be inferred as also the preparation, established
     beyond reasonable doubt. We are unable to find either the motive,
     the conspiracy or the preparation or even the crime itself to have
     been established in Court, at the trial through the witnesses examined
     before Court. The witnesses had turned hostile, for reasons best
     known to themselves. The only inference possible, on the witnesses
     turning hostile is that either they have been persuaded for reasons
     unknown or coerced into resiling from the statements made under
     Section 161 or that they had not made such statements before police
     officers. Merely because the story came out of the mouth of the IO,
     it cannot be believed and a legal sanctity given to it, higher than that
     provided to Section 161 statements under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.
27. The High Court has also relied on voluntary statements made
    regarding the sites where discussions were held, and the money
    was transferred, by A1 itself, to further find the conspiracy relying
    on Mehboob Ali 8. That was a case in which, pursuing the voluntary
    statements of the accused arrested, on the charge of dealing in
    counterfeit notes, the kingpin was arrested, from whose possession
    fake notes were recovered. In the present case but for the accused
    having pointed out the various places where allegedly discussions
    were held and money was transacted, there was no fact discovered
    from the site, or any recovery made of a concealed object which
    could lead to an inference of a culpable fact.
28. Now we come to the seizures and recoveries relied on by the Court,
    again as spoken of by the Investigating Officer since the independent
    witnesses who attested the mahazars turned hostile. The significant
    recoveries made were of cash from the possession of A2 to A6, the
    clothes alleged to have been worn by A5 & A6 when the crime was
    committed, the weapons with which the crime was committed and
    the vehicles in which the getaway was carried out. As far as the
    vehicles are concerned even the eyewitnesses, either PW1 or PW9,
    who were at the crime scene immediately after the commission of
    the offence, did not speak of A5 & A6 having fled on a motor bike.
    The specific allegation of PW8, the eyewitness, in his FIS was that
    while himself and his father were strolling, at the scene of occurrence,
    suddenly two persons emerged from the bushes, hacked his father
178                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       to death and ran away, obviously on foot. This was the statement
       made by both PW1 and PW9, the former of whom turned completely
       hostile, and the latter did not speak of any motor bike. The recovery
       of the motor bike hence is of no consequence. The pickup van is
       said to have been used for reaching the hide out, which is said to be
       a farm. There was no incriminating material found from the pickup
       van connecting this vehicle to the crime.
29. Insofar as the clothes are concerned, we cannot but notice that the
    analysis report indicates that the recovered dress materials had blood
    stains on it which were analyzed to be human blood of ‘O’ group,
    and the post-mortem certificate indicates the deceased to be of ‘O+’
    group. It is trite that this alone cannot implicate the accused since
    there should be a clear connection established of the recovered
    items with the accused and the crime. Especially in this case, where
    the clothes were not recovered on the confession statement of A5
    & A6, who are alleged to have committed the crime. The weapons,
    as were the clothes, were recovered on the confession statement of
    A3, from the farm. Though, the High Court went on to find that A5
    & A6 had handed over the clothes and the weapons to A3 to hide,
    this has to be proved by the prosecution and cannot be based on
    the so called voluntary statements made by the accused. A3, A5 &
    A6 were arrested on the same day and they were taken together,
    allegedly in pursuance of the confession statement made by A3.
    The identification said to have been made by A5 & A6 at the time
    of recovery, to the police officers, again is not a confession made
    under Section 27 and would be hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the
    Evidence Act.
30. Athappa Goundan, In re12, was relied on heavily in the impugned
    judgment by the Division Bench to bring in the confession under
    Section 27, to inculpate the accused other than those who confessed,
    under Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Therein the confession
    specifically spoke of the murder by the person in police custody and
    also offered to produce two bottles, a rope and a cloth gag, which
    was used to commit the murder. These objects were recovered on the
    same being pointed out by the accused. The Court opined that the
    objects produced, not being incriminating in nature, their production
    would be irrelevant unless they were connected with the murder;


12   1937 SCC OnLine Mad 76
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                          Renuka Prasad v.
      The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

      when there was no evidence to connect the objects to the murder,
      apart from the confession. It was hence held that any information
      which served to connect the object discovered with the offence
      charged was admissible under Section 27. Pulukuri Kottaya5 held:
             “Their Lordships are unable to accept this reasoning. The
             difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered
             on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact
             can afford no justification for reading into Section 27
             something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a
             confession barred by Section 26. Except in cases in which
             the possession, or concealment, of an object constitutes
             the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that
             information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the
             foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in
             the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in
             manner allowed by law.”
                                                        (Paragraph 10)

31. Naresh Chandra Das v. King-Emperor13, in a dissenting judgment
    held that so much of the statements leading to the discovery of a fact
    is admissible, but still, for the fact discovered to be made relevant,
    the prosecution has to supply independent evidence and for this
    purpose the confessional statement cannot be utilised, since it
    would offend Section 25 and Section 26 of the Evidence Act. It was
    held that “If the prosecution cannot bring in any evidence aliunde,
    connecting the fact discovered with the offence, the prosecution
    may have to fall”. (sic)
32. Pulukuri Kottaya5 considering the impact of Section 27 held that the
    disclosure, under Section 27, is with reference to the concealment of
    some object and not the object itself, which object recovered must
    be connected to the crime to pin the guilt on the accused, who was
    instrumental in making the recovery by supplying the information of
    concealment. The confession under Section 27, if speaking of the
    crime itself, that portion is not admissible evidence, since it would
    offend Sections 25 and 26. We extract paragraph 9 which dealt with
    the effect and impact of Section 27:


13   1941 SCC OnLine Cal 178
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                      Supreme Court Reports


       “Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an
       exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding
       section, and enables certain statements made by a person
       in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary
       to bring the section into operation is that the discovery
       of a fact in consequence of information received from a
       person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police
       officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of
       the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
       discovered may be proved. The section seems to be
       based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered
       in consequence of information given, some guarantee
       is afforded thereby that the information was true, and
       accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence;
       but clearly the extent of the information admissible must
       depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which
       such information is required to relate. Normally the section
       is brought into operation when a person in police custody
       produces from some place of concealment some object,
       such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to
       be connected with the crime of which the informant is
       accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued that in
       such a case the “fact discovered” is the physical object
       produced, and that any information which relates distinctly
       to that object can be proved. Upon this view information
       given by a person that the body produced is that of a
       person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the
       one used by him in the commission of a murder, or that
       the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would
       all be admissible. If this be the effect of Section 27, little
       substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two
       preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or
       by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably
       inspired by the fear of the legislature that a person under
       police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise
       of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban
       be the inclusion in the confession of information relating
       to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable
       to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will
       prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                                181

                          Renuka Prasad v.
      The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

             will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their
             Lordships think that the proviso to Section 26, added by
             Section 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of
             the section. In their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to treat
             the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the
             object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place
             from which the object is produced and the knowledge of
             the accused as to this, and the information given must
             relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user,
             or the past history, of the object produced is not related
             to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered.
             Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will
             produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does
             not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered
             many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
             a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his
             knowledge; and if the knife is proved to have been used
             in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is
             very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added
             “with which I stabbed A”, these words are inadmissible
             since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in
             the house of the informant.”
                                        (underlined by us for emphasis)

33. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu14 traced the history of case
    law and described Pulukuri Kottaya5 as a locus classicus which set
    at rest much of the controversy centring around the interpretation
    of Section 27. The first requirement, according to the learned
    Judges was that the IO should depose that he discovered a fact in
    consequence of the information received from an accused person
    in police custody, which fact was not in the knowledge of the police
    officer. The information or disclosure should necessarily be free from
    any element of compulsion and only so much of the information
    as relating distinctly to the fact thereby discovered can be proved
    and nothing more. The Section explicitly clarifies that confession
    is not taboo, but the confessional part which is admissible is only
    such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the facts


14   (2005) 11 SCC 600
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                          Supreme Court Reports


       discovered, by means of the information furnished. The rationale
       behind the provision was held to be that, if a fact is discovered in
       consequence of the information supplied, it offers some guarantee
       that the information is true and can therefore, be safely allowed to
       be admitted in evidence as an incriminating circumstance against
       the accused.
34. In H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash15, there was a recovery made of a
    dagger from under a stone, on the concealment being informed to
    the police and the accused also pointed out the person from whom
    he had purchased the dagger. While the former statement was
    admissible under Section 27, the latter was held to be inadmissible.
    The concealment of a knife, which the police were not aware of,
    when discovered by the information supplied, then the information
    of concealment is reliable. However, if the person from whom the
    knife is purchased is pointed out, it cannot be said to be discovered,
    if nothing is found or recovered from him, as a consequence of the
    information furnished by the accused.
35. The State in its written submission has relied on State of Maharashtra v.
    Damu16, Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam17, Raja v. State of
    Haryana18, to buttress its contention regarding the admissibility of
    the disclosure statements. In Damu16, the dead body was recovered
    from a site, to which site, it was carried by the 2nd & 3rd accused,
    in the former’s motorcycle and thrown in the canal. Since the dead
    body was recovered prior to the disclosure made, the statement
    was found to be inadmissible under Section 27. But a broken piece
    of glass was recovered from the spot, pointed out by A3, which
    correctly fitted into the broken tail lamp of the motorcycle recovered
    from the house of A2. This provided credence to the confession
    statement of the accused, despite the dead body having been
    recovered, antecedent to the information. Navjot Sandhu14 (supra),
    affirmed Om Prakash15 and Damu16 and held that “discovery of a
    fact would not comprehend a pure and simple mental fact or state
    of mind relating to a physical object, dissociated from the recovery
    of a physical object.” (sic)


15   (1972) 1 SCC 249
16   (2000) 6 SCC 269
17   (2013) 7 SCC 417
18   (2015) 11 SCC 43
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      183

                          Renuka Prasad v.
      The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

36. In this context, we must notice Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State of
    Maharashtra19, wherein Pulukuri Kottaya5 was followed and it was
    reiterated that the fact discovered is not equivalent to the object
    produced. The information regarding concealing of the article of the
    crime, it was held, does not lead to discovery of the article but this
    leads to the discovery of the fact that the article was concealed at
    the indicated place, within the knowledge of the accused.
37. In Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam17, the confession of the
    accused led to the discovery of a knife and skipping rope and the
    medical evidence corroborated the fact that the deceased died
    because of strangulation and there was also a stab injury on his
    chest. The weapons concealed by the accused and recovered on
    their information had a direct nexus with the injuries found in the
    post-mortem report. In Raja v. State of Haryana18, there was a
    recovery of knife and blood-stained clothes and ashes of a burnt
    blanket. The blood-stained clothes and the weapons were sent to the
    FSL, whose report clearly indicated blood stains on the clothes and
    the knife, despite absence of matching of the blood group. Relying
    on John Pandian v. State20, it was held that the accused has not
    offered any explanation as to how the human blood was found on
    the clothes and the knife, which was an incriminating circumstance.
38. With the above principles in mind when we look at the recoveries
    made, even if the testimonies of the IOs are believed, that there was
    an unexplained stash of money recovered from the person and the
    residential accommodations of A2 to A6, they were not recoveries
    under Section 27. The recovery was akin to a seizure, not one made
    on the information supplied or confession recorded. Further, there
    is nothing connecting the cash with the crime. As we held, even the
    Mahazar did not carry out a proper inventory, of the cash recovered
    and the identification made in Court, was of the bundles in which
    the cash was seized. A question arises as to how the accused came
    in possession of such huge amounts of cash, which if found to be
    beyond their means and sources of income, proceedings will have
    to be initiated elsewhere and unless there is a connection clearly


19   (2002) 2 SCC 490
20   (2010) 14 SCC 129
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       established of the money having been transacted, in furtherance
       of the conspiracy, which is totally lacking in the above case, the
       recovery cannot aid the prosecution.
39. The clothes and machetes allegedly, worn by A5 & A6 and used
    by them to commit the crime, were recovered on the confession
    statement of A3, the alleged conspirator. True, there were blood
    stains on the clothes and the machetes, which were found to be of
    ‘O’ group, matching the blood group of the accused as found from the
    post-mortem report. A3, we have pertinently observed is not alleged
    to have committed the crime proper, i.e. the hacking of the deceased
    victim. There is also no independent evidence to prove that A5 & A6
    handed over the clothes and the machetes to A3. The confession
    statement of A3 that the clothes and machetes were handed over
    to him by A5 & A6 is the history, which has to be cogently proved
    by evidence aliunde. The fact discovered is the concealment of the
    clothes and the machetes, by A3, which fact of concealment has to
    be connected to the actual crime. In the present case neither are the
    clothes or machetes connected to A5 & A6 who are alleged to have
    committed the crime nor is A3, an alleged conspirator even accused
    of having been involved in the crime proper, that is the murder of
    the deceased. Further, it was not even verified whether the clothes
    recovered fit A5 & A6, in which context they owe no explanation
    insofar as the blood found on the clothes. Confessions allegedly
    made by A1 regarding the sites where the conspiracy was hatched
    and the money transacted does not lead to any discovery of fact.
    The narration about the conspiracy and the money transactions are
    not admissible and the mere pointing out of two sites does not lead
    to any discovery of fact, when the narration is eschewed.
40. The High Court has laboured on Section 30 of the Evidence Act to
    hold that the confession of a co-accused can be used against the other
    accused. It was held, Section 30 would bring within its ambit even a
    Section 27 confession in addition to an extra-judicial confession or
    one made under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.; the last two of which is
    totally absent in the present case. In so far as Section 30 is concerned
    Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh21, held so :



21   (1952) 1 SCC 275
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             185

                          Renuka Prasad v.
      The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

             “The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to
             marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the
             confession altogether from consideration and see whether,
             if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it.
             If it is capable of belief independently of the confession,
             then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in
             aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared
             to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if
             believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In
             such an event, the Judge may call in aid the confession
             and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and
             thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the
             confession he would not be prepared to accept.”
41. A Constitution Bench in Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar22,
    held that a confession as mentioned in Section 30 is not evidence
    under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. We extract from paragraph 13
    of the said decision:
             “… The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case
             against an accused person, the court cannot start with
             the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with
             other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it
             has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect
             of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the
             confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion
             of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the
             said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of
             the provisions contained in Section 30. The same view
             has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v.
             State of Madhya Pradesh(1952) 1 SCC 275 where the decision
             of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu Case has been cited
             with approval.”
42. Athappa Goundan’s 12 case was held to be wrongly decided, by the
    Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya5. When even the recovery made
    based on a confession under Section 27, by itself cannot inculpate
    the person who made such a confession, if there is no independent


22   (1964) 6 SCR 623
186                                                         [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       evidence otherwise connecting the fact discovered to the crime, there
       is no question of such a confession being made use of, to inculpate
       the other accused under Section 30 of the Evidence Act.
43. Before leaving the impact and effect of Section 27 and Section 30,
    we cannot but reiterate the caution expressed in Pandurang Kalu
    Patil19 wherein was impugned a judgment of a Division Bench of the
    High Court of Bombay which disagreed with the ratio in Pulukuri
    Kottaya5. In that context this Court referred to the judgment in
    State v. Chhaganlal Gangaram Lavar23 and an extract was made
    from page 6 paragraph 10 which is as below:
            “So long as the Supreme Court does not take a different
            view from the view taken by the Privy Council, the decisions
            of the Privy Council are still binding upon us, and when
            we say that the decisions of the Privy Council are binding
            upon us, what is binding is not merely the point actually
            decided but an opinion expressed by the Privy Council,
            which opinion is expressed after careful consideration of
            all the arguments and which is deliberately and advisedly
            given.”
44. It was held that Pulukuri Kottaya5 was considered and tested by
    this Court time and again and on all such occasions, its ratio was
    re-affirmed, lately, as we noticed in Navjot Sandhu14. The attention
    of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka obviously was
    not drawn to the decision in Pulukuri Kottaya5 , of the Privy Council,
    affirmed and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of India, in which, the
    Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Athappa Goundan12,
    relied on in the impugned judgment, had been overruled.
45. In the present case, we have already held that the confession under
    Section 27 cannot be relied upon and there is no question of any
    aid being drawn from it to implicate the other accused. As far as the
    sites pointed out by A1, we have found that it did not lead to any
    discovery of a fact and it is hit by Section 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act.
46. We cannot but observe that the judgment of the High Court reversing
    the order of acquittal of the Trial Court proceeds on mere surmises


23   1954 SCC OnLine Bom 69
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                          187

                          Renuka Prasad v.
      The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

      and conjectures relying wholly on the testimony of the Investigating
      Officers, who merely regurgitated the statements recorded under
      Section 161 and the voluntary statements of the accused. As has
      been rightly pointed out in Ramesh v. State of Haryana24 when
      the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure is resiled from, there arises a possibility that the police
      coerced such statements, but considering the huge prevalence of
      such instances, as in the present case, of the entire witnesses turning
      hostile, there could be various other factors also. It could be for fear
      of deposing against the accused, political pressure, pressure from
      family or society and even instances of monetary consideration. We
      do not think that the High Court could have relied on the decision
      to hold that the reason for the enblock hostility of witnesses at trial,
      could only be due to the influence wielded by the accused who
      had even persuaded the wife of the deceased to turn hostile; which
      reasoning is presumptuous and fallacious.
47. We quite understand the consternation of the learned Judges, in
    the cold-blooded murder of a person, carried out in front of his own
    son where the investigation though elaborate, it collapsed miserably
    at the trial, where the prosecution witnesses; all of them, turned
    hostile. We share the consternation of the learned Judges but that
    is no reason for us to rely on Section 161 statements or the story
    scripted by the investigating agency based on the so called voluntary
    statements and the recoveries made, which the prosecution failed to
    prove to have a nexus with the crime. We also notice that there was
    a test identification parade carried out, in which also PW1, PW8 and
    PW9 failed to identify the assailants. We make this observation fully
    conscious of the principle that a TIP is only to aid the investigation
    but keeping in mind the fact that it could always lend support to an
    identification made in Court, which unfortunately in the present case
    was not made either in Court or at the stage of investigation. We
    find absolutely no reason to sustain the conviction entered by the
    High Court, reversing the order of acquittal.
48. Though Chandrappa1 was specifically noticed by the High Court,
    the principles were not rightly appreciated, while setting aside the


24   (2017) 1 SCC 529
188                                                           [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       order of acquittal. It has been emphasized that when there are two
       reasonable views possible from the evidence led, the one favouring
       the accused should be adopted, especially since the presumption
       of innocence of the accused until proved guilty, a fundamental tenet
       of criminal jurisprudence, stands further strengthened by the order
       of acquittal. In the present case, we are afraid that there are not
       even two views coming forth from the evidence. The only view that
       comes forth is that the prosecution completely failed to prove the
       allegations raised and charged against each of the accused, more by
       reason of all the witnesses paraded before Court, at the trial, having
       turned hostile for reasons unknown. Whatever be the reason behind
       such hostility, it cannot result in a conviction, based on the testimony
       of the Investigating Officers which is founded only on Section 161
       statements and voluntary statements of accused; the former violative
       of Section 162 of the Cr.P.C and the latter in breach of Sections 25
       & 26 of the Evidence Act.
49. We cannot but say that the High Court has egregiously erred in
    convicting the accused on the evidence led and has jumped into
    presumptions and assumptions based on the story scripted by the
    prosecution without any legal evidence being available. Truth is always
    a chimera and the illusion surrounding it can only be removed by
    valid evidence led, either direct or indirect, and in the event of it being
    circumstantial, providing a chain of circumstances with connecting
    links leading to the conclusion of the guilt of the accused and only
    the guilt of the accused, without leaving any reasonable doubt for
    any hypothesis of innocence. We can only accede to and share the
    consternation of the Division Bench of the High Court, which borders
    on desperation, due to the futility of the entire exercise. That is an
    occupational hazard, every judge should learn to live with, which
    cannot be a motivation to tread the path of righteousness and convict
    those accused somehow, even when there is a total absence of legal
    evidence; to enter into a purely moral conviction, total anathema to
    criminal jurisprudence. With a heavy heart for the unsolved crime,
    but with absolutely no misgivings on the issue of lack of evidence,
    against the accused arrayed, we acquit the accused reversing the
    judgment of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial Court.
50. Criminal Appeals are allowed.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       189

                         Renuka Prasad v.
     The State Represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police

51. The accused shall be released forthwith, if in custody and not required
    in any other case and if already released on bail, their bail bonds
    shall stand cancelled.
52. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey