Holding

A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not, by itself, disqualify a wife from maintenance under Section 125(4) CrPC where she has sufficient and justifiable reason to refuse cohabitation, and the husband remains liable to pay maintenance.

Summary

The husband, Dinesh Kumar Mahto, obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife, Reena, in 2022, yet she continued to live apart, alleging mental cruelty, dowry demands, and a miscarriage. Reena filed a maintenance suit under Section 125 of the CrPC in 2019 and was awarded ₹10,000 per month. The husband appealed, arguing that the restitution decree barred her maintenance claim under Section 125(4). The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, the nature of maintenance proceedings, and the relevance of the restitution decree, emphasizing that a wife’s refusal must be assessed on facts and that mere non‑compliance with a restitution decree does not automatically trigger the disqualification provision. It held that Reena had sufficient and justifiable reasons, including mental cruelty and neglect, to refuse cohabitation, and therefore the husband remained liable for maintenance. The Court set aside the High Court’s decision and restored the Family Court’s maintenance order.

Issues considered

Whether a decree for restitution of conjugal rights automatically disqualifies a wife from claiming maintenance under Section 125(4) of the CrPC when she refuses to cohabit.
Whether findings of a civil decree for restitution are binding on a separate maintenance proceeding under the CrPC.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023s. 34, s. 35, s. 36, s. 37
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125, s. 125(4)
Evidence Act, 1872s. 40, s. 41, s. 42, s. 43
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 13(1A)(ii), s. 9

Subjects

Decree for restitution of conjugal rightsNon-complianceMaintenanceAbsolvedSection 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Wife’s right to maintenanceDisqualificationFamily CourtSuit for restitutionRefusal to live with husbandRefusal/desertionReconciliationLack of bonafidesMatrimonial homeMental crueltyResponsibility towards his wifeMiscarriageIll-treatmentJust causeMore than sufficient reasonStay away from the society of husbandMaintenance proceedingsNomenclatureCriminal proceedingsJudgments in remJudgments in personam

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 462 : 2025 INSC 55

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena
v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another
(Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 2025)
10 January 2025
[Sanjiv Khanna, CJI and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Will a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights, stand absolved of paying maintenance to his wife by virtue
of Section 125(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if his wife
refuses to abide by the said decree and return to the matrimonial
home.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.125(4) – Disqualification
under, when not attracted – Wife’s right to maintenance u/s.125,
CrPC – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – s.9 – Decree for restitution
of conjugal rights obtained by respondent No.1-husband –
Non-compliance therewith by the appellant-wife – If would be
sufficient to attract the disqualification u/s.125(4):
Held: No – Mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the
wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification
u/s.125(4) or be determinative straightaway of her right to
maintenance – It would depend on the facts of each case to be
decided, on the evidence available, whether the wife still had valid
and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite
such a decree – Restitution decree was passed on 23.04.2022 –
Admittedly, there was no attempt made at reconciliation after 2017 –
However, having secured the restitution decree, respondent No.1
did nothing – He neither sought execution of the decree or a decree
of divorce – The stalemate created by Respondent No.1 reflects
his lack of bonafides and demonstrates his attempt to disown all
responsibility towards his wife – His conduct in completely ignoring
the appellant after she suffered the miscarriage of their child added
to her suffering due to the ill-treatment in her matrimonial home –
Respondent No.1’s admission that he did not bear the expenditure
* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 463

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

for her treatment and her unrebutted assertion that he did not take
her to the hospital or even come from Ranchi to see her were clear
indicia of the pain and mental cruelty meted out to her – Therefore,
she had just cause to not return to her matrimonial home, despite
the restitution decree – Appellant had more than sufficient reason
to stay away from the society of Respondent No.1 – Hence, her
refusal to live with him, notwithstanding the passing of a decree
for restitution of conjugal rights cannot be held against her – The
disqualification u/s.125(4), CrPC was thus, not attracted – High
Court erred in applying the same holding that the appellant was
not entitled to the maintenance granted to her by the Family
Court – Impugned judgment set aside – Order of the Family Court
restored. [Paras 29, 35, 37-39]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Maintenance proceedings –
Nature:
Held: Even if non-compliance with an order for payment of
maintenance entails penal consequences, like other decrees of
a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become
criminal proceedings – Nomenclature of maintenance proceedings
initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those provisions
find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to the nature
of such proceedings. [Para 30]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Maintenance – Statutory
scheme – Discussed. [Paras 8, 9]
Words and Phrases – Mental cruelty; “Judgments in rem”;
“Judgments in personam” – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.40-43 –
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – ss.34-37 – Discussed.
[Paras 32, 33, 36]

Case Law Cited
Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, 2007 INSC 1190 : [2007] 12 SCR 577 :
(2008) 2 SCC 316; Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Others,
2014 INSC 490 : [2014] 8 SCR 858 : (2015) 6 SCC 353; Badshah v.
Urmila Badshah Godse and Another, 2013 INSC 703 : [2013] 10
SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another 2020
INSC 631 : [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324; Shamima
Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, 2015 INSC 283 : [2015] 4 SCR 137 :
(2015) 5 SCC 705; Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat and
Another [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 45 : (1996) 4 SCC 479; Amrita
464 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Singh v. Ratan Singh and Another (2018) 17 SCC 737; Shanti
Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi, 2003 INSC 596 : [2003] Supp.
5 SCR 98 : (2004) 1 SCC 438; Mst. Jagir Kaur and Another v.
Jaswant Singh [1964] 2 SCR 73 : AIR 1963 SC 1521; Iqbal Singh
Marwah and Another v. Meenakshi Marwah and Another [2005] 2
SCR 708 : (2005) 4 SCC 370; K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of
Police and Another [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 350 : (2002) 8 SCC 87;
Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and
Others [1978] 3 SCR 782 : (1978) 4 SCC 70; Parveen Mehta v.
Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706; Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri
(Smt.) and Others, 2000 INSC 115 : [2000] 2 SCR 58 : (2000)
3 SCC 180 – referred to.
K. Narayana Rao v. Bhagyalakshmi, 1983 SCC OnLine Kar 190 :
(1984) 1 Kant LJ 451 : 1984 Cri LJ 276 (Kant); Fakruddin
Shamsuddin Saiyed v. Bai Jenab, AIR 1944 Bom 11; Sampuran
Singh v. Gurdev Kaur and Another, 1985 Cri LJ 1072 (P&H);
Amina Mohammedali Khoja v. Mohammedali Ramjanali Khoja
and Another, 1985 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : 1985 Cri LJ 1909;
Kavungal Kooppakkattu Zeenath v. Mundakkattu Sulfiker Ali, 2008
SCC OnLine Ker 78 : (2008) 3 KLJ 331; Subal Das v. Mousumi
Saha (Das) and Another, 2017 SCC OnLine Tri 175; Babita v.
Munna Lal, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4933; Shri Mudassir v. Shirin
and Others Criminal Revision Application No. 268 of 2022, decided
on 09.02.2023; Smt. S.R. Ashwini v. G. Harish, NC: 2024: KHC:
14466 : RPFC No.104 of 2018; Girishbhai Babubhai Raja v.
Smt. Hansaben Girishchandra and Another, 1985 SCC OnLine
Guj 161 : (1986) GLH 778; Hem Raj v. Urmila Devi and Others,
1996 SCC OnLine HP 116 : (1997) 1 HLR 702; Ravi Kumar v.
Santosh Kumari, 1997 SCC OnLine P&H 529 : (1997) 3 RCR
(Cri) 3 (DB) – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955;
Evidence Act, 1872; Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Bharatiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023.

List of Keywords
Decree for restitution of conjugal rights; Non-compliance;
Maintenance; Absolved; Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Wife’s right to maintenance; Disqualification
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 465

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;
Family Court; Suit for restitution; Refusal to live with husband;
Refusal/desertion; Reconciliation; Lack of bonafides; Matrimonial
home; Mental cruelty; Responsibility towards his wife; Miscarriage;
Ill-treatment; Just cause; More than sufficient reason; Stay
away from the society of husband; Maintenance proceedings;
Nomenclature; Criminal proceedings; Mental cruelty; “Judgments
in rem”; “Judgments in personam”.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
161 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.08.2023 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in CRR No. 440 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Ms. Mohini Priya, Ms. Sayesha Gambhir, Advs. for the Appellant.
Anup Kumar, Ms. Pragya Choudhary, Mrs. Neha Jaiswal, Shivam
Kumar, Ms. Shruti Singh, Vaibhav Prasad Deo, Vishnu Sharma,
Ms. Madhusmita Bora, Shiv Ram Sharma, Pawan Kishore Singh,
Dipankar Singh, Mrs. Anupama Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Kumar, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. Will a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights, stand absolved of paying maintenance to his wife by virtue of
Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if his wife
refuses to abide by the said decree and return to the matrimonial
home?
3. This intriguing question was answered in the affirmative by a learned
Judge of the Jharkhand High Court, vide order dated 04.08.2023 in
Criminal Revision No. 440 of 2022. Aggrieved, Rina Kumari @ Rina
Devi @ Reena, the wife, is in appeal.
466 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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4. The appellant, Reena, and respondent No. 1, Dinesh Kumar
Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, were married on 01.05.2014.
They parted ways in August, 2015, and Reena started living at her
parental home. Original (MTS) Suit No. 495 of 2018 was instituted
by Dinesh on 20.07.2018 before the Family Court, Ranchi, under
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for restitution of conjugal
rights. Reena contested the suit by filing her written statement on
25.04.2019. Dinesh claimed that Reena left the matrimonial home on
21.08.2015 and did not return thereafter. According to him, attempts
were made during August and October, 2017, to bring her back but
she refused to come. He stated that his parents were very old and
needed to be taken care of but Reena was not there to do so. On
the contrary, Reena asserted that she was subjected to torture and
mental agony by Dinesh, who demanded ₹5 lakh to purchase a four-
wheeler. She alleged that he had extramarital relations. Further, she
stated that she suffered a miscarriage on 28.01.2015 but Dinesh did
not even come to see her from his workplace at Ranchi and it was
her brother who took her to Dhanbad for medical care. She claimed
that it was Dinesh who persuaded her to go to her parental home
in August, 2015, on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan and he never
truly tried to bring her back thereafter. She claimed that it was she
who had gone to her matrimonial home in the year 2017 along with
her relations but they were forced to return as Dinesh and his family
members treated them badly. She stated that she was ready to
return to her matrimonial home if Dinesh did not demand money to
purchase a car and if she was not ill-treated by him and his family
members. Her further conditions were that she should be allowed to
use the washroom/toilet in the house, as she was not allowed to do
so earlier, and she should also be allowed to use an LPG stove to
prepare food, as she had to do so by using wood and coal hitherto.
She concluded her written statement by asserting that the suit for
restitution filed by Dinesh was nothing but a tool to save himself
from the effect of laws which were put in place for women’s safety
and prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. Reena, despite
filing the above written statement, failed to appear thereafter before
the Family Court.
5. By judgment dated 23.04.2022, the learned Additional Principal
Judge-II, Additional Family Court, Ranchi, decreed Dinesh’s suit
for restitution of conjugal rights. Therein, it was noted that Dinesh
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 467

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

had attempted to bring his wife back only once but, relying on the
evidence of his witnesses, the Family Court concluded that he
wanted to live with her as husband and wife. As no evidence was
adduced by Reena, the Family Court held against her as regards her
allegation that Dinesh demanded ₹5 lakh to purchase a car and her
allegation of ill treatment and torture by him and his family members.
As to her two conditions, the Family Court noted that Dinesh was a
Junior Lineman in Jharkhand State Electricity Board and observed
that he would be expected to provide an LPG stove to his wife to
prepare food. Opining that there must be something more serious
than the ordinary wear and tear of married life for a wife to withdraw
from the society of her husband, the Family Court held in Dinesh’s
favour. He was, however, directed to ensure the respect and dignity
of his wife and to see that her conditions with regard to cooking and
toilet facilities were complied with. Reena was directed to resume
conjugal life with Dinesh within two months. Admittedly, Reena did
not abide by this decree.
6. Significantly, in the meanwhile, on 10.08.2018, Reena lodged a
complaint under Section 498A IPC against Dinesh, in C.P. Case No.
3270 of 2018. As a result of this, he was sent to prison and was
consequently suspended from service for some time. The case is
stated to be pending. Thereafter, on 03.08.2019, Reena instituted
Original Maintenance Case No. 454 of 2019 against Dinesh seeking
maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.’). This case was allowed by the learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad, vide order dated 15.02.2022,
i.e., before the decretal of Dinesh’s suit for restitution. Therein, the
Family Court noted Dinesh’s stand that he was ready and willing to
keep Reena with full dignity but held, on the evidence adduced, that
she was entitled to maintenance. Dinesh’s pay-slip (Ex-3) revealed
that he was working as a Junior Engineer in the Electricity Board and
his net salary, after deductions from the gross salary of ₹62,000/-,
was ₹43,211/-. The Family Court held that Dinesh, despite having
sufficient means, had neglected to maintain his wife, who was unable
make ends meet on her own. The petition was accordingly allowed
and Dinesh was directed to pay ₹10,000/- per month to Reena
towards maintenance. Such maintenance was held payable from
the date of the application, i.e., 03.08.2019, and the arrears were
directed to be paid within two months.
468 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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7. Challenging this order, Dinesh filed Criminal Revision No. 440 of
2022 before the Jharkhand High Court. A learned Judge allowed
the revision by the impugned judgment dated 04.08.2023. Therein,
the learned Judge noted that Reena, who deposed as PW-1,
was not even cross-examined by Dinesh. Similarly, the other two
witnesses who appeared on her behalf were also not subjected to
cross-examination. In her deposition, Reena asserted that she was
not working and this was confirmed by her brother, Dilip Kumar
Mahato (PW-3), who stated that she was completely dependent
upon him. Dinesh, in his own cross-examination, denied that it
was due to his assault that his wife suffered a miscarriage. He
also denied that he had demanded ₹5 lakh in dowry. He, however,
admitted that Reena suffered an abortion and that he did not bear
any expense in that regard. It was submitted on behalf of Dinesh,
that he was ready to pay ₹5,000/- per month to Reena, but not
from the date of filing of the maintenance petition, as he was
suspended from service during that period owing to his being in
judicial custody in relation to the Section 498A IPC case instituted
by her. The learned Judge, however, noted that there was a specific
finding in the judgment dated 23.04.2022 in Original (MTS) Suit
No. 495 of 2018 that Reena had withdrawn from her husband’s
society without reasonable excuse and that she had not returned
to the matrimonial home despite the said decree for restitution of
conjugal rights, which she had not even chosen to challenge by
way of appeal. The learned Judge, therefore, reasoned that Section
125(4) Cr.P.C. would come to Dinesh’s aid and, in consequence,
Reena would not be entitled to maintenance. Hence, the learned
Judge allowed the revision.
8. Before proceeding to consider the matter on merits, it would be
apposite to take note of the statutory scheme. Chapter IX of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is titled ‘Order for Maintenance
of Wives, Children and Parents’ and comprises Sections 125 to
128. Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. provides to the effect that, if any person
having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his
legitimate or illegitimate children, falling in the prescribed categories,
or his parents, who are all unable to maintain themselves, a Magistrate
of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order
such person to pay a monthly allowance, as thought fit, for their
maintenance. Notably, Section 125 Cr.P.C. is not of recent origin. It
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 469

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

is analogous to and in continuance of Section 488 of the erstwhile
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
9. In its 41st Report submitted on 24th September, 1969, the Law
Commission of India, while adverting to Section 488 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898, observed that the primary justification
for placing provisions relating to maintenance of wives and children,
which is a civil matter, in the Criminal Procedure Code was that a
remedy, speedier and more economical than that available in the
Civil Courts, is provided to them. The Law Commission noted that
the provision was aimed at preventing starvation and vagrancy,
leading to commission of crime.
10. On the same lines, in Chaturbhuj vs. Sita Bai,1 this Court observed
that the object of maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person
for his neglect but to prevent the vagrancy and destitution of a deserted
wife, by providing her food, clothing and shelter by a speedy remedy.
It was held that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice,
especially enacted to protect women and children, falling within the
constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the
Constitution. Thus, the objective of the provision, then and now, is
to alleviate the financial plight of destitute wives, children and now,
parents, who are left to fend for themselves.
11. In Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena and others,2 this Court
observed that Section 125 Cr.P.C. was conceived to ameliorate the
agony, anguish and financial suffering of a woman, who left her
matrimonial home for the reasons provided in the provision, so that
some suitable arrangement can be made by the Court and she can
sustain herself and also her children, if they are with her. It was held
that the concept of sustenance did not necessarily mean ‘to lead
the life of an animal, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from
grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else’ and
the wife would be entitled in law to lead a life in a similar manner
as she would have lived in the house of her husband. This Court
further cautioned that, in a proceeding of this nature, the husband
cannot be permitted to take subterfuge to deprive the wife of the

1 [2007] 12 SCR 577 : (2008) 2 SCC 316
2 [2014] 8 SCR 858 : (2015) 6 SCC 353
470 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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benefits of living with dignity and there could be no escape route,
unless there is an order from the Court that the wife is not entitled to
get maintenance from the husband on legally permissible grounds.
12. Earlier, in Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and another,3 this
Court held that the provision of maintenance aims at empowering
the destitute and achieving social justice or equality and dignity of
the individual and while dealing with cases thereunder, the drift in
the approach from adversarial litigation to social context adjudication
is the need of the hour. More recently, in Rajnesh vs. Neha and
another,4 this Court emphasized that maintenance laws were enacted
as a measure of social justice to provide recourse to dependent
wives and children for their financial support, so as to prevent them
from falling into destitution and vagrancy.
13. In Shamima Farooqui vs. Shahid Khan,5 this Court noted that
the inherent and fundamental principle behind Section 125 Cr.P.C.
is the amelioration of the financial state of affairs as well as the
mental agony and anguish that a woman suffers when she is
compelled to leave her matrimonial home. It was further observed
that, as per law, she is entitled to lead life in a similar manner as
she would have lived in the house of her husband and as long as
she is held entitled to grant of maintenance within the parameters
of Section 125 Cr.P.C., it has to be adequate so that she can live
with dignity. Lastly, it was noted that, a plea is sometimes advanced
by the husband that he does not have the means to pay as he
does not have a job or his business is not doing well, but these
are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in
law as a husband, who is healthy, able-bodied and in a position
to support himself is under a legal obligation to support his wife
and her right to receive maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.,
unless disqualified, is an absolute right.
14. Such disqualification, by way of an exception, was envisaged under
Section 488(4) of the old Code, which is replicated, almost verbatim,
in Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It reads thus:

3 [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188
4 [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324
5 [2015] 4 SCR 137 : (2015) 5 SCC 705
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 471

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

“Section 125
(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an [allowance for
the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses
of proceeding, as the case may be,] [Substituted by Act
50 of 2001, Section 2 for “allowance” (w.e.f. 24-9-2001)]
from her husband under this section if she is living in
adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses
to live with her husband, or if they are living separately
by mutual consent.”
15. The issue, presently, turns upon the applicability of Section 125(4)
Cr.P.C. to the case on hand. The question as to whether non-
compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by a
wife would be sufficient in itself to deny her maintenance, owing to
Section 125(4) Cr.P.C, has been addressed by several High Courts
but no consistent view is forthcoming, as their opinions were varied
and conflicting.
16. In K. Narayana Rao vs. Bhagyalakshmi,6 the Karnataka High
Court observed that the Court dealing with a maintenance claim
under Section 125 Cr.P.C. has to carefully examine and take into
consideration the decree for restitution of conjugal rights which has
not been complied with by the wife but it would not be bound by
all the findings therein, including findings on questions, such as,
whether the wife withdrew from the society of the husband; desertion
on her part; or her leading an adulterous life. Reference was made
to Fakruddin Shamsuddin Saiyed vs. Bai Jenab,7 wherein the
Bombay High Court had held that the Magistrate should not ‘surrender
his own discretion’ simply because the husband was armed with a
decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
17. In Sampuran Singh vs. Gurdev Kaur and another,8 the Punjab &
Haryana High Court observed that a wife can still claim maintenance
in the presence of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights if the
conduct of the husband is such that it obstructs her from obeying
the decree.

6 1983 SCC OnLine Kar 190 = (1984) 1 Kant LJ 451 : 1984 Cri LJ 276 (Kant)
7 AIR 1944 Bom 11
8 Criminal Revision No. 1562 of 1983, decided on 17.01.1985 : 1985 Cri LJ 1072 (P&H)
472 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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18. In Amina Mohammedali Khoja vs. Mohammedali Ramjanali
Khoja and another,9 the Bombay High Court noted that an order of
maintenance can always be passed in favour of a wife even if her
husband obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, unless
it is established that she willfully deserted her husband and was
not willing to stay with him without reasonable cause or sufficient
reason. On facts, it was found that the record did not show that
the wife had deserted the husband and was unwilling to stay with
him without reasonable cause or sufficient reasons. It was further
noted that, after obtaining the decree, the husband had not taken
any effective steps to get the decree satisfied as he had made no
genuine, honest and sincere efforts to see that his wife comes back
to him. It was, therefore, held that he was only interested in a paper
decree for restitution of conjugal rights, which he had gotten ex parte.
19. In Kavungal Kooppakkattu Zeenath vs. Mundakkattu Sulfiker
Ali,10 the Kerala High Court noted that the expression used in Section
125(4) Cr.P.C. is ‘refusal’ and not ‘failure’ to live with the husband and
that there is evidently some difference between the two. It was held
that ‘failure’ would mean not doing something that one is expected
to do but ‘refusal’ would mean saying or showing that one would not
do or accept something which is offered. In effect, if a husband says
he is willing to do something for the wife but she states or shows
that she does not want or accept that something which is offered to
her, then only there is refusal.
20. In Subal Das vs. Mousumi Saha (Das) and another,11 the Tripura
High Court held that a wife who refuses to comply with a decree for
restitution of conjugal rights cannot be deprived of maintenance under
Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It was observed that it would be incongruent
to assume that a wife against whom a decree for restitution has
been passed is disentitled to maintenance while a wife who has
been divorced can still claim the same. It was further observed
that the Civil Court’s judgment for restitution can only be treated
as relevant evidentiary material but the conduct of the wife, i.e.,
whether she had sufficient reason to refuse to live with the husband,

9 985 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : 1985 Cri LJ 1909
10 2008 SCC OnLine Ker 78 : (2008) 3 KLJ 331
11 2017 SCC OnLine Tri 175 : Criminal Revision Petition No. 89 of 2016, decided on 25.07.2017
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 473

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

has to be assessed by the Magistrate and only thereafter, it could
be decided whether she would be entitled to maintenance or not. It
was concluded that the restriction imposed by Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
had been substantially diluted, if not virtually negated.
21. In Babita vs. Munna Lal,12 the Delhi High Court opined that an ex
parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights would not automatically
put an end to the wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
It was held that, even if such a case is contested by the wife and
is decided in the husband’s favour, non-compliance therewith could
be taken to be a ground to deny maintenance, provided the Court is
satisfied on the strength of evidence that the wife had no justifiable
grounds to stay away from the husband. The mere presence of a
decree for restitution of conjugal rights was, therefore, held insufficient
to disentitle a wife from claiming maintenance, if the conduct of the
husband is such that she is unable to obey such a decree or if the
husband creates such circumstances that she cannot stay with him.
It was noted that even a divorced wife is entitled to maintenance
under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and it would be improper and unfair to
deny maintenance to a wife merely because she refused to cohabit
with the husband, despite having sufficient grounds therefor.
22. In Shri Mudassir vs. Shirin and others,13 the Bombay High Court
noted that mere readiness and willingness on the part of the husband
to cohabit with the wife would not be sufficient to absolve him of the
liability to pay maintenance, by projecting that the wife left his company
without sufficient reason. It was held that if the grounds justified the
wife and children staying away from the husband, Section 125(4)
Cr.P.C. would have no application.
23. In its recent judgment in Smt. S.R. Ashwini vs. G. Harish,14 the
Karnataka High Court held that there is nothing in law to bar the
grant of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. even if a decree for
restitution of conjugal rights is secured by the husband. It was noted
that, at the most, such a decree would enable the husband to take
that defence in the maintenance proceedings initiated by the wife but,
for the Court, it would not be the sole factor to refuse maintenance

12 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4933 : Criminal Revision Petition No. 1001 of 2018, decided on 22.08.2022
13 Criminal Revision Application No. 268 of 2022, decided on 09.02.2023
14 NC: 2024: KHC: 14466 : RPFC No.104 of 2018, decided on 23.02.2024
474 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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to her. In the result, it was held that a petition under Section 125
Cr.P.C. could be considered on its own merits independently, without
being influenced by the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. It was
further held that, even if there is a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights, and the wife still does not choose to join the matrimonial home
that would not amount to voluntary refusal/desertion which would
bar her claim to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
24. On the other hand, the Gujarat High Court, in Girishbhai Babubhai
Raja vs. Smt. Hansaben Girishchandra and another,15 observed
that when the Civil Court orders the wife to go and stay with her
husband and fulfil her marital obligations, it presupposes that she has
no justification to be away from the husband and refuse to perform
her corresponding marital obligations.
25. A similar view was taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court
in Hem Raj vs. Urmila Devi and others,16 wherein it was held
that, once a Civil Court found in a contested proceeding that the
wife had no just or reasonable cause to withdraw her society from
the husband, she cannot claim maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C. It was observed, on facts, that the wife had not pleaded any
subsequent event or circumstance which justified her staying away
from her husband in spite of the decree for restitution of conjugal
rights passed against her.
26. On the same lines, in Ravi Kumar vs. Santosh Kumari,17 a Division
Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a wife against
whom a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed
by the Civil Court would not be entitled to claim maintenance under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. if, in the proceedings of restitution, a specific issue
was framed as to whether the wife refused to live with her husband
without sufficient reason and the parties were given an opportunity
to lead evidence, whereupon specific findings were recorded by the
Civil Court against the wife on the issue. It was, however, added
that in the event the husband got an ex parte decree for restitution,
such a decree would not be binding on the Criminal Court exercising
jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. It was also clarified that if the

15 1985 SCC OnLine Guj 161 : (1986) GLH 778
16 1996 SCC OnLine HP 116 : (1997) 1 HLR 702
17 1997 SCC OnLine P&H 529 : (1997) 3 RCR (Cri) 3 (DB)
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 475

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

decree for restitution of conjugal rights was obtained by the husband
subsequent to the order for maintenance passed by the Magistrate
under Section 125 Cr.P.C., then the decree would not ipso facto
disentitle the wife to her right to maintenance and the husband
would have to approach the Magistrate to get the order granting
maintenance cancelled.
27. Now, turning to the decisions of this Court on the point, in Kirtikant
D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat and another,18 it was held that
Section 125 Cr.P.C. has to be given a liberal construction to fulfil and
achieve the intention of the legislature and, therefore, the passing
of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the wife would
not, by itself, defeat her right to maintenance under Section 125(1)
Cr.P.C. It was further observed that the mere ‘failure’ of the wife to
live with her husband would not be sufficient to disentitle her from
receiving maintenance from him, especially as the crucial word
carefully chosen in the relevant provision is ‘refusal’.
28. In Amrita Singh vs. Ratan Singh and another,19 this Court held,
on facts, that the plea of the husband that his wife had deserted him
without reasonable cause and that he was ready to take her back
was falsified by the fact that the wife was treated with cruelty and
subjected to persistent demands for dowry, resulting in her being
ousted from the matrimonial house, whereupon she was compelled
to file a criminal complaint under Section 498A IPC ending in the
conviction of the husband and his father. The wife was held to have
reasonable grounds not to join the husband, thereby entitling her
to maintenance.
29. Thus, the preponderance of judicial thought weighs in favour of
upholding the wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
and the mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights
at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife
would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under
Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It would depend on the facts of the individual
case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material
and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient
reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree.

18 [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 45 :(1996) 4 SCC 479
19 (2018) 17 SCC 737
476 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard and it must invariably
depend on the distinctive facts and circumstances obtaining in each
particular case. In any event, a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights secured by a husband coupled with non-compliance therewith
by the wife would not be determinative straightaway either of her
right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under
Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
30. Another contention that was urged before us is that the findings in the
judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a
Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition under
Section 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings.
This specious argument needs mention only to be rejected outright.
No doubt, in Shanti Kumar Panda vs. Shakuntala Devi,20 this Court
held that a decision by a Criminal Court would not bind the Civil Court
while a decision by the Civil Court would bind the Criminal Court.
However, maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in nature and
the reason for inclusion of the provisions dealing therewith in the Code
of Criminal Procedure was clarified by the Law Commission of India
in September, 1969. Significantly, as long back as in the year 1963,
in Mst. Jagir Kaur and another vs. Jaswant Singh,21 a 3-Judge
Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 488 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the precursor to Section 125
Cr.P.C., are in the nature of civil proceedings; the remedy, being a
summary one; and the person seeking that remedy, ordinarily being
a helpless person. Therefore, even if non-compliance with an order
for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may
other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify
as or become criminal proceedings. Nomenclature of maintenance
proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those
provisions find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to
the nature of such proceedings.
31. Further, in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another vs. Meenakshi Marwah
and another,22 while dealing with the contention that an effort should
be made to avoid conflict of findings between Civil and Criminal

20 (2004) 1 SCC 438
21 [1964] 2 SCR 73 : AIR 1963 SC 1521
22 [2005] 2 SCR 708 : (2005) 4 SCC 370
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 477

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

Courts, a Constitution Bench pointed out that there is neither any
statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded
in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other,
as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein.
32. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, distinguishes between judgments
in rem and judgments in personam and Sections 40 to 43 therein
stipulates the relevance of existing judgments, orders or decrees in
subsequent proceedings in different situations. The relevant provisions
are extracted hereunder for ready reference:
40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit
or trial: -
The existence of any judgment, order or decree which
by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance
of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when
the question is whether such Court ought to take
cognizance of a such suit, or to hold such trial.
41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc.,
jurisdiction: -
A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court,
in the exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or
insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes
away from any person any legal character, or which
declares any person to be entitled to any such
character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as
against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant
when the existence of any such legal character, or the
title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.
Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof—
that any legal character, which it confers accrued at
the time when such judgment, order or decree came
into operation;
that any legal character, to which it declares any such
person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the
time when such judgment, [order or decree] declares
it to have accrued to that person;
478 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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that any legal character which it takes away from
any such person ceased at the time from which
such judgment, [order or decree] declared that it had
ceased or should cease;
and that anything to which it declares any person to
be so entitled was the property of that person at the
time from which such judgment, [order or decree]
declares that it had been or should be his property.
42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or
decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41: -
Judgments, orders or decrees other than those
mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to
matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but
such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive
proof of that which they state.
Illustration:
A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the
existence of a public right of way over the land,
which A denies.
The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant,
in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same
land in which C alleged the existence of the same
right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof
that the right of way exists.
43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in
sections 40 to 42, when relevant. -
Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those
mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant,
unless the existence of such judgment, order or
decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some
other provisions of this Act.
Illustrations
(a) A and B separately sue C for a libel which
reflects upon each of them. C in each case says,
that the matter alleged to be libellous is true, and
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 479

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

the circumstances are such that it is probably true
in each case, or in neither.
A obtains a decree against C for damages on the
ground that C failed to make out his justification. The
fact is irrelevant as between B and C.
(b) A prosecutes B for adultery with C, A’s wife.
B denies that C is A’s wife, but the Court convicts
B of adultery.
Afterwards, C is prosecuted for bigamy in marrying B
during A’s lifetime. C says that she never was A’s wife.
The judgment against B is irrelevant as against C.
(c) A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him, B,
is convicted.
A afterwards sues C for the cow, which B had sold
to him before his conviction. As between A and C,
the judgment against B is irrelevant.
(d) A had obtained a decree for the possession of land
against B, C, B’s son, murders A in consequence.
The existence of the judgment is relevant, as showing
motive for a crime.
[(e) A is charged with theft and with having been
previously convicted of theft. The previous conviction
is relevant as a fact in issue.
(f) A is tried for the murder of B. The fact that B
prosecuted A for libel and that A was convicted and
sentenced is relevant under section 8 as showing
the motive for the fact in issue.
33. Sections 34 to 37 of the Bharata Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023,
correspond to Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
with some modifications. Section 41, as is clear from the extraction
hereinabove, specifically deals with instances where an earlier
judgment, order or decree constitutes conclusive proof whereas
Section 42 provides that an earlier judgment is relevant if it relates to
matters of public nature relevant to the inquiry, but such judgments,
480 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.
These provisions were considered in detail by a 3-Judge Bench
of this Court in K.G. Premshankar vs. Inspector of Police and
another,23 in the context of when a judgment in a civil proceeding,
on the same cause of action, would be relevant in a criminal case,
and it was observed thus:
“30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is –
(1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon
as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act;
(2)..; (3)..; (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings
are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would
be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are
satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be
conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41
provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of
what is stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in
previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under
Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act
then in each case, the court has to decide to what extent
it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s)
decided therein. … Hence, in each and every case, the first
question which would require consideration is – whether
judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant – its
effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as,
motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the
facts of each case.”
Decisions of this Court manifest that judgments passed on merits
in civil proceedings have been accepted as sufficient cause to
discharge or acquit a person facing prosecution on the same grounds.
This dictum is applied especially in cases where civil adjudication
proceedings, like in tax cases, lead to initiation of prosecution by the
authorities. Such cases are, however, different as there is a direct
connect between the civil proceedings and the prosecution which is
launched. The facts and allegations leading to the prosecution directly
arise as a result of the civil proceedings. Moreover, the standard

23 [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 350 : (2002) 8 SCC 87
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 481

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

of proof in civil proceedings is a preponderance of probabilities
whereas, in criminal prosecution, conviction requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt. We do not think the said principle can be applied
per se to proceedings for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by
relying upon a judgment passed by a Civil Court on an application
for restitution of conjugal rights. Further, the two proceedings are
altogether independent and are not directly or even indirectly
connected, in the sense that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
do not arise from proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights.
34. Long ago, in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Mrs. Veena
Kaushal and others,24 this Court noted that it is valid to assert that
a final determination of a civil right by a Civil Court would prevail
against a like decision by a Criminal Court but held that this principle
would be inapplicable when it comes to maintenance granted
under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, as opposed to
maintenance granted under Section 125 Cr.P.C. It was noted that
the latter provision was a measure of social justice specially enacted
to protect women and children falling within the constitutional sweep
of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39.
35. Viewed thus, the findings in the proceedings for restitution of conjugal
rights, which were partly uncontested as Reena did not appear before
the Family Court to adduce evidence or advance her case after filing
her written statement, did not clinch the issue and the High Court
ought not to have given such undue weightage to the said judgment
and the findings therein. In the process, certain crucial factors were
overlooked. Particularly, the fact that the witnesses who appeared
on behalf of Reena in the Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were
not even cross-examined. It was clear therefrom that Dinesh did
not even contest or rebut what they had stated. The fact that Reena
was fully dependent on her brother was thus admitted. Further,
documents were placed on record in proof of Reena’s abortion in
January, 2015. In that regard, Dinesh’s admission that he did not
bear the expenditure for her treatment and her unrebutted assertion
that he did not take her to the hospital or even come from Ranchi
to see her were clear indicia of the pain and mental cruelty meted
out to her. The fact that she was not allowed to use the toilet in the

24 [1978] 3 SCR 782 : (1978) 4 SCC 70
482 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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house or avail proper facilities to cook food in the matrimonial home,
facts which were accepted in the restitution proceedings, are further
indications of her ill-treatment.
36. Pertinently, in Parveen Mehta vs. Inderjit Mehta,25 this Court
held that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling of one of
the spouses due to the behavioral pattern by the other and, unlike
physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct
evidence. It was observed that a feeling of anguish, disappointment
and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can
only be appreciated on cumulatively assessing the attending facts
and circumstances in which the two spouses have been living. In
a case of mental cruelty, per this Court, it would not be the correct
approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then
pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to
cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative
effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence
on record and then draw a fair inference whether the spouse has
been subjected to mental cruelty due to the conduct of the other.
37. Applying this standard, Dinesh’s conduct in completely ignoring his
wife, Reena, after she suffered the miscarriage of their child would
have been the proverbial last straw adding to her suffering due to the
ill-treatment in her matrimonial home. She, therefore, had just cause
to not return to her matrimonial home, despite the restitution decree.
Further, the events thereafter or rather, the lack thereof, is relevant.
The restitution decree came to be passed on 23.04.2022. Admittedly,
there was no attempt made at reconciliation after 2017. However,
having secured the said restitution decree, Dinesh did nothing! He
neither sought execution of the decree under Order XXI Rule 32
CPC nor did he seek a decree of divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii)
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
38. The reason for this is not far to gather. In Rohtash Singh vs.
Ramendri (Smt.) and others,26 this Court clarified that a wife, who
suffered a decree of divorce on the ground of deserting her husband,
would not be entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as
long as the marriage subsisted, but she would be entitled to such

25 (2002) 5 SCC 706
26 [2000] 2 SCR 58 : (2000) 3 SCC 180
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 483

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v.
Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr.

maintenance once she attained the status of a divorced wife, in the
light of the definition of a ‘wife’ in Explanation (b) to Section 125(1)
Cr.P.C. Dinesh, therefore, sought to protect himself from a claim
by Reena for maintenance by projecting the disobeyed restitution
decree as a defence and as long as she did not attain the status
of a divorced wife, that protection would endure to his benefit. This
stalemate of sorts created by Dinesh clearly reflects his lack of
bonafides and demonstrates his attempt to disown all responsibility
towards his wife, Reena. These factors, taken cumulatively, clearly
manifest that Reena had more than sufficient reason to stay away
from the society of her husband, Dinesh, and her refusal to live with
him, notwithstanding the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights, therefore, cannot be held against her. In consequence, the
disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. was not attracted and
the High Court erred grievously in applying the same and holding
that Reena was not entitled to the maintenance granted to her by
the Family Court.
39. The appeal is accordingly allowed, setting aside the judgment dated
04.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in
Criminal Revision No. 440 of 2022. In consequence, the order dated
15.02.2022 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Dhanbad, in Original Maintenance Case No. 454 of 2019 shall
stand restored. In furtherance thereof, Dinesh, respondent No. 1
herein, shall pay maintenance @ ₹10,000/- per month to Reena,
the appellant, on or before the 10th day of each calendar month.
Such maintenance would be payable from the date of filing of the
maintenance application, i.e., 03.08.2019. Arrears of the maintenance
shall be paid by Dinesh in three equal installments, i.e., the first
instalment by 30.04.2025, the second instalment by 31.08.2025 and
the third and final instalment by 31.12.2025.
In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey