RISAL SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

                       [2014] 7 S.C.R. 544


A                         RISAL SINGH
                                v.
                  STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 2839 of 2011)
                          MAY 13, 2014
B
            [DIPAK MISI~ AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

      Service law - Dismissal from service - Dispensing with
  the disciplinary inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) - Absence of
C ascription of reasons: - Held: Order of dismissal passed
  against the Sub inspector by the Superintendent of Police
  dispensing with the inquiry unsustainable - Non-ascribing of
  reason while passing an order dispensing with enquiry, which
  othenvise is a must, cfefinitely invalidates such an action -
D Order passed by the High Court upholding the dismissal of
  employee, set aside - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article
  311(2)(b).

       The appellant-Assistant Sub Inspector was involved
E in a corruption sting operation in a television channel.
  The Superintendent of Police dismissed the appellant
  dispensing with the disciplinary inquiry under Article
  311 (2)(b) of the Constitution, without ascribing reasons
  for the same. Both the High Courts upheld the order
  passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Hence, the instant
F appeal.
                    •
       Allowing the app~:ral, the Court
      HELD: 1.1. The order by the Disciplinary Authority is
G bereft of reason. Non-ascribing of reason while passing
  an order dispensing with enquiry, which otherwise is a
  must, definitely invalidates such. an action. The order
  passed by the Superintendent of Police dispensing with
  the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby
H                             .544
        RISAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                 545

·annulled. The order of the High Court giving the stamp        A
 of approval to the ultimate order without addressing the
 lis from· a proper perspective is also indefensible and
 resultantly, the order of dismissal passed by the
 disciplinary authority has to pave the path of extinction.
 The order passed by the High Court and .that of the           B
 disciplinary authority are set aside. [Paras 6, 10 and 11]
 [548-B-C; 550-D-E]

     Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsitam Patel (19'85) 3 SCC
 398: 1985 (2 ) Suppl. SCR 131; Jaswant Sing v. State of       C
'Punjab and Others (1991) 1 SCC 362: 1990 ( 3) Suppl. SCR
 354; Reena Rani v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 215:
2012 (3) SCALE 519 - relied on.

       1.2. The appellant would be deemed to be in service
till the date of superannuation. As he has attained the age    D
of superannuation in the meantime, he shall be entitled
to all consequential benefits. Needless to say, the
respondents are not precluded from initiating any
disciplinary proceedings, if advised in law. However, it is
clarified that the observations herein should not be           E
construed as a mandate to the authorities to initiate the
proceeding against the appellant. The State Government
should conduct itself as a model employer and act with
the objectivity which is expected from it. [Para 11] [550-
F-0; ~1~                                                       F
                    Case Law Reference :
     (1985) 3 sec 398        Relied on           Para 6
     (1991) 1 sec 362        Relied on            Para 7
                                                               G
   . (2012) 10 sec 215       Relied on            Para 9
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2839 of 2011.
                                                               H
    546       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A       From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2008 in
    C.W.P. No. 19816 of 2008 of the High Court of Punjab &
    Haryana at Chandigarh.

          S. .Janani, Deepak Goel, Sunando Raha for the Appellant.
B       Manjit Singh, Nupur Choudhary, K.M. Gupta for the
    Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C      DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. In this appeal, by special leave, the
  assail is to the defensibility of the judgment and order dated
  21.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
  at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 19816/2008 whereby the Division
  Bench has concurred with the order of dismissal of the
  appellant passed by the Government after dispensing with the
D inquiry as provided unde1r Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution.

       2. The broad essential facts which need to be adumbrated
  for the decision of the present appeal are that the appellant,
  an Assistant Sub-Inspector (Ad hoc Sub-Inspector) serving in
E the Department of Police in the State of Haryana, as alleged,
  was involved in a corruption sting operation in a television
  channel. Because of the said alleged sting operation, the
  Superintendent of Police, Mewat at Nuh, vide order dated
  19.06.2008, after referring to the news item in the television
F channel, proceeded to pass the following order:

          "

          2. The above said act on the part of above official shows
          his criminal activities. He being a member of a disciplined
G         force is responsible for protecting the life and property of
          the citizen of this country, but instead of discharging his
          duty honestly and sincerely he himself has indulged in
          criminal activities. As such he has not only tarnished the
          image of the Haryana Police but also has rudely shaken
H
        RISAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                       547
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    faith of the citizens of Haryana in the entire Police force,
    who is supposed to be their protectors. He has acted in a
    most reprehensible manner. Which is unexpected from a
    member of disciplined force and undoubtedly extremely
    prejudicial to the person safety and security of citizen.
                                                                      B
    3. The involvement of said police official in such a shameful
    criminal activity has eroded the faith of common people
    and his continuance in the force is likely to cause further
    irreparable loss to the functioning and credibility of Haryana
    Police. The defaulter has acted in a manner highly
    unbecoming of police official. After such act of serious          C
    misconduct. If he is allowed to continue in the Police force,
    it would be detrimental to public interest.

    4. Keeping in view the overall circumstances of above
    operation, I K.K. Rao, IPS, Superintendent of Police,             D
    Mewat at Nuh, in exercise of the powers conferred under
    Article 311 (2)(b) of Constitution of India I hereby order the
    dismissal of SI Rishal Singh No. 133/GGN with immediate
    effect. A copy of this order be delivered to him free of cost."
                                                                      E
     3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant
preferred a civil writ petition and the High Court without
adverting to the essential contention that no reason had been
ascribed for dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b)
opined that prompt action was required to be taken to avoid
                                                                      F
spreading of trouble and, therefore, the order passed by the
authority was justified.

    4. Ms. S. Janani, learned counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the power with the employer rests to dispense
with the inquiry invoking the constitutional provision, yet           c;
appropriate reasons have to be ascribed and in absence of
ascription of reasons, the order is vitiated in law and the
eventual consequence would be quashment of the order of
dismissal.                                          ·
    548.     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2014] 7 S.C.R.


A        5. Mr. Manjit Singh, learned counsel for the State submitted
    that regard being had to the nature of allegations, the
    Superintendent of Police, who is the competent authority,
    thought it appropriate to dispense with the inquiry and, hence,
    the order of dismissal cannot be flawed.

         6. We· have already reproduced the order passed by the
    competent authority. On a bare perusal of the same, it is clear
    as day that it is bereft of reason. Non-ascribing of reason while
    passing an order dispensing with enquiry, which otherwise is
    a must. definitely invalidates such an action. In this context,
c   reference to the authority in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram
    Pate/1 is apposite. In the said case the Constitution Bench,
    while dealing with the exercise of power under Article 311 (2)(b),
    has ruled thus:

D        '130. The condition precedent for the application of clause
         (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is
         not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry
         contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is
         pertinent to note is that the words used are "not reasonably
E        practicable" and not "impracticable". According to the
         Oxford English Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable
         of.being put into practice, carried out in action, effected,
         accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New
         International Dictionary define~ the word "practicable"
F      . inter alia as meaning "possible to practice or perform :
         capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished:
         feasible". Further, the words used are not "not practicable"
         but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New
         International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as
         "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus,
G
         whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must
         be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably
         practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute
         impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is
H · 1. (1985) 3 sec 398.
          RJSAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA. .                          549
                   [DIPAK MISRA, J_.] . . . ~
      requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable       A
      in the opinion of a reasonable mari takirig a reasonable
      view of the p~revailing situation."             · ··    · ' ·

    7. In Jaswant Sing .v. State of Punjab and ·Others2 the
Court, while dealing with the exercise of. power as conferred               B
by way of exception under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution,
opined as follows:

      "Clause (b) of the ~econd proviso to Article 311 (2) can be
                                          '      11          ;   ·.

      invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the
      material placed before him that it is not reasonably                  C
      practicable to hold a departmental enquiry; This is dear
      from the following observation at page 270 of Tulsiram
      case: (SCC p.504, para 130)               ·          ·

              "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense         0
              with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily of out
              of ulterior motives or merely in order to "'void the
              holding of an inquiry or because the department's
              case against the government servant is weak and
              must fail."
                                                                            E
      The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry
      cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the
      concerned authority. When the satisfaction ..of ·the
      concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, ·ih.s
      incumbent on those who support the order to show that the             F
      satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not
      the outcome of the whim or caprice ofthe conce'fhed
      officer."                                                 '·

     8. After so stating, the two-Judge Bench quashed the order             G
of dismissal and directed the appellant to be reinstated in
service forthwith with the monetary benefits. Be it noted, it was
also observed therein that it would be open to the employer, if
                                                   ...
                                                   ...   ,



2.   (1991) 1 sec 362.
                                                                            H
     550       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 7 S.C.R.

~.   so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time, to proceed with
     the disciplinary proceedings.

       9. Recently, in Reena Rani v. State of Harya11a 3, after
  referring to the various authorities in the field, the Court ruled
  that when reasons are not ascribed, the order is vitiated and
8
  accordingly set aside the order of dismissal which had been
  concurred with by the Single Judge and directed for
  reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. It has
  also been observed the!rein that the order passed by this Court
  would not preclude the competent authority from taking action
C against the Appellant in accordance with law.

       10. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid authorities,
  the irresistible conclusion is that the order' passed by the
  Superintendent of Police dispensing with the inquiry is totally
D unsustainable and is hereby annulled. As the foundation
  founders, the order of the High Court giving the stamp of
  approval to the ultimate order '{'lithout addressing the lis from
  a proper perspective is also indefensible and resultantly, the
  order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority has to
E pave the path of extinction.

            11. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the
  order passed by the High Court and that ,of the disciplinary
  authority. The appellant shall be deemed to be in service till the
  date of superannuation. As he has attained the age of
F superannuation in the meantime, he shall be entitled to all
  consequential benefits. The arrears shall be computed and paid
  to the appellant within a period of three months hence.
  Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded from
  initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised in law. As the
G lis has been pending before the Court, the period that has been
  spent in Court shall be 1excluded for the purpose of limitation
  for initiating the disciplinary proceedings as per rules. However,
  we may hasten to clarify that our observations herein should not

H 3.       (2012) 10 sec 215.
         RISAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA                      551
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
be construed as a mandate to the authorities to initiate the         A
proceeding against the appellant. We may further proceed to
add that the State Government shall conduct itself as a model
employer and act with the objectivity which is expected from it.
There shall be no order as to costs.
                                                                     B
Rajendra Prasad                                    Appeal allowed.




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