Holding

An application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the statutory award‑making period.

Summary

Rohan Builders sought an extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 after the statutory twelve‑month period (or the six‑month consent‑based extension) for making an arbitral award had expired. The Calcutta High Court had held that such an application was not maintainable, a view echoed by a few other High Courts, while several other High Courts allowed post‑expiry applications. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 29A(4) and the adjoining proviso, focusing on the meaning of the word “terminate” and the legislative intent behind the provision. It concluded that “terminate” is conditional on the absence of a court‑granted extension and does not create an absolute bar to filing an extension application after expiry. Accordingly, the Court held that an application under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the twelve‑month or extended six‑month period, provided there is sufficient cause. The appeals were ordered to be listed for a final hearing and disposal.

Issues considered

Whether an application for extension of time under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed after the expiry of the twelve‑month period or the consent‑based six‑month extension.
How the term “terminate” in Section 29A(4) should be interpreted – whether it creates an absolute limitation on filing extension applications.
Whether Section 29A implicitly imposes a limitation period for filing extension applications.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 28(1), s. 28(2)
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 29A(4), s. 29A(5), s. 29A(6), s. 29A(7), s. 29A(8), s. 29A(9)
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015s. Insertion of Section 29A
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019s. Amendment of Section 29A(1) and provisos to 29A(4)

Subjects

Extension of timeApplication for extension of timeArbitral awardSection 29ATerminateSuspendLimitation periodInterpretation of statutesPurposive interpretationSufficient cause

Judgment

[2024] 9 S.C.R. 473 : 2024 INSC 686

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited
v.
Berger Paints India Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 10620 of 2024)
12 September 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether an application for extension of time under Section 29A,
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed after the expiry
of the period for making of the arbitral award.

Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.29A(4) – ‘terminate’ –
Interpretation – Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2015 – Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 –
Application for extending the time to pass an arbitral award
u/s.29A(4) r/w s.29A(5), if maintainable after the expiry of the
twelve-month or the extended six-month period – Contrary
views taken by different High Courts:
Held:Yes, an application for extension of the time period for passing
an arbitral award u/s.29A(4) r/w s.29A(5) is maintainable even after
the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period,
as the case may be – Such extension applicationsto be decided on
the principle of sufficient cause and extensions not to be granted
mechanically – View taken by the High Courts of Delhi, Jammu
and Kashmir and Ladakh, Bombay, Kerala, Madras and the High
Court at Calcutta in Ashok Kumar Gupta, accepted – Reasoning
of the High Court at Calcutta in Rohan Builders, is fallacious and
unacceptable – The word “terminate” in s.29A(4) should not be
read as an isolated word with a strict dictionary meaning, but
rather in conjunction with the surrounding words and expressions
which evinces the legislative intent – The legislative preference for
the term “terminate” over “suspend” is apparent, since the word
“suspend” could cause incongruity and a legal conundrum if no
party files an application for an extension of time – The legislature
by using the word “terminate” intends to affirm the principle of

* Author
474 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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party autonomy – The word “terminate” in s.29A(4) makes the
arbitral tribunal functus officio, but not in absolute terms – The
true purport of the word “terminate” must be understood in light of
the syntax of the provision – Absence of a full stop after the word
“terminate” is noteworthy – The word “terminate” is followed by
the connecting word “unless”, which qualifies the first part with the
subsequent limb of the section, i.e. “unless the court has, either
prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended
the period” – The expression “prior to or after the expiry of the
period so specified” has to be understood with reference to the
power of the court to grant an extension of time – Termination
of the arbitral mandate is conditional upon the non-filing of an
extension application and cannot be treated as termination stricto
sensu – The word “terminate” in the contextual form does not
reflect termination as if the proceedings have come to a legal and
final end, and cannot continue even on filing of an application for
extension of time – Giving a narrow and restrictive meaning to
s.29A(4), would be indulging in judicial legislation by incorporating
a negative stipulation of a bar of limitation, which has a severe
annulling effect – Arigid interpretation would amount to legislating
and prescribing a limitation period for filing an application u/s.29A,
when the section does not state so – Consequences of restrictive
and narrow interpretation, enumerated. [Paras 9-12, 15, 19]
Interpretation of Statutes – Literal construction vis-à-vis
purposive interpretation – Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 – s.29A(4):
Held: While interpreting a statute, an interpretation which
produces an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute
if there is some other equally possible construction which is
acceptable, practical and pragmatic – An interpretive exercise
must be conducted with careful consideration of both the text
and the context of the provision – Therefore, sometimes the court
eschews a literal construction if it produces manifest absurdity
or unjust results – An interpretive process must recognize the
goal or purpose of the legal text – s.29A intends to ensure the
timely completion of arbitral proceedings while allowing courts
the flexibility to grant extensions when warranted – Prescribing
a limitation period, unless clearly stated in words or necessary,
should not be accepted – Bar by limitation has penal and fatal
consequences. [Paras 9, 13, 18]
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 475

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited

Case Law Cited
Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. and Another v. Ashok Paper
Mill (Assam) Ltd. and Another [2023] 15 SCR 821 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1649 – relied on.
Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited,
AP/328/2023 – disapproved.
ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd,
2023 : DHC : 8078; Wadia Techno-Engineering Services Limited v.
Director General of Married Accommodation Project and Another,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2990; Nikhil H. Malkan and Others v.
Standard Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Limited 2023 :
BHC-OS : 14063; Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal and Others v. Vineeth
M.V. and Others 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 5151; G.N.Pandian v. S.
Vasudevan and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 737; H.P. Singh
v. G.M. Northern Railways and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine J&K
1255; Ashok Kumar Gupta v. M.D. Creations and Others, 2024
SCC OnLine Cal 6909 – approved.
South Bihar Power Distribution Company Limited v. Bhagalpur
Electricity Distribution Company Private Limited, Civil Writ
Jurisdiction Case No. 20350 of 2021 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals cited
176th Report of the Law Commission of India.

List of Acts
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2015; Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)
Act, 2019; Arbitration Act, 1940.

List of Keywords
Extension of time; Application for extension of time; Extension
applications; Extending the time to pass an arbitral award;
Application for extending the time to pass arbitral award; Expiry
of the period for making of the arbitral award; Termination of the
arbitral mandate; ‘Terminate’; ‘Termination’; “Suspend”; Expiry;
Arbitral mandate; Bar of limitation; Limitation period; Interpretation
of Statutes; Literal construction; Purposive interpretation; Rigid
interpretation; Narrow interpretation; Restrictive meaning/
interpretation; Sufficient cause.
476 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 23320 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.09.2023 of the High Court
at Calcutta in AP No. 328 of 2023
With
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 24489, 26938, 26990-26991 and
27353 of 2023 and Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 1344, 2115,
8131, 12170 and 13975-13976 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Nakul Dewan, Gopal Jain, Siddharth Bhatnagar, Neeraj Kishan
Kaul, Shyam Divan, Harin P. Raval, Sr. Advs., Nirav Shah, Soumya
Ray Chowdhury, Bhushan Panse, Satyender Saharan, Sathvik
Chandrashekar, Ms. Udita Singh, Raunak Dhillon, Ms. Madhavi
Khanna, Ms. Isha Malik, Ms. Niharika Shukla, M/s. Cyril Amarchand
Mangaldas, Samrat Sengupta, Udayaditya Banerjee, Soumya
Dutta, Parag Chaturvedi, Rajat Joseph, Ms. Deeplaxmi Subhash
Matwankar, Dr. Ravindra Chingale, Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, Karthik
Nayar, Abhisek Mohanty, Sanjay Baid, Arindam Ghosh, Swarnendu
Chatterjee, Nilay Sengupta, Sujit Banerjee, Ankit Agarwal, Ms.
Deepakshi Garg, Mrs. Vanita Bhargava, Ajay Bhargava, Ms. Wamika
Trehan, Ms. Raddhika Khanna Tandon, M/s. Khaitan & Co., Umesh
Kumar Khaitan, Deepak Khurana, Ms. Manali Singhal, Ms. Nishtha
Wadhwa, Santosh Sachin, Ms. Shreya Singhal, Deepak Rawat,
Milind Kumar, Vikas Mehta, Apoorv Khator, Ashish Batra, Sebin
Michael Joseph, Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Ms. Srija Choudhury,
Anant, Ms. Sajal Bhardwaj, Ms. Aanchal Basur, Ivan, Advs. for the
appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Leave granted.
2. This common judgment decides whether an application for extension
of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 477

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited

19961 can be filed after the expiry of the period for making of the
arbitral award. The High Court at Calcutta in Rohan Builders (India)
Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited 2 has held that the application
for extension of time under Sections 29A(4) and 29A(5) of the A & C
Act can only be entertained if filed before the expiry of the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal. The High Court at Calcutta held that once
the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is terminated by afflux of time
of twelve months, or when so consented to by the parties after a
further six-month extension, the power of the court to extend time
under Section 29A(4) cannot be invoked. A similar view has been
taken by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna
in South Bihar Power Distribution Company Limited v. Bhagalpur
Electricity Distribution Company Private Limited.3 However, a catena of
judgments from other High Courts have taken an opposite view. The
High Court of Delhi in ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd.,4 Wadia Techno-Engineering Services Limited v.
Director General of Married Accommodation Project and Another,5
and some other cases;6 the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
Nikhil H. Malkan and Others v. Standard Chartered Investment and
Loans (India) Limited;7 the High Court of Kerala in Hiran Valiiyakkil
Lal and Others v. Vineeth M.V. and Others;8 the High Court of Madras
in G.N.Pandian v. S. Vasudevan and Others;9 and the High Court
of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in H.P.Singh v. G.M. Northern
Railways and Others,10 have held that an application for extension
of time limit for arbitral award can be filed by a party even after the
expiry of the term of twelve months or the extended period of six
months. Recently, the High Court at Calcutta in a subsequent decision

1 For short, “A & C Act”.
2 AP/328/2023 and other connected matters decided on 06.09.2023.
3 Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 20350 of 2021 and other connected matters decided on 26.04.2023.
4 2023:DHC:8078.
5 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2990.
6 ATS Infrastructure Ltd. and Another v. Rasbehari Traders, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8645, M/s Power Mech
Projects Ltd. v. M/s Doosan Power Systems India Pvt. Ltd., 2024:DHC:3769, KMP Expressways Ltd.
v. IDBI Bank Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2617, Reliance Infrastructure Limited v. Madhyanchal Vidyut
Vitran Nigam Limited, 2023:DHC:5745 et al.
7 2023:BHC-OS:14063.
8 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 5151.
9 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 737.
10 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1255.
478 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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of the single Judge in Ashok Kumar Gupta v. M.D. Creations and
Others,11 on elaborated examination, has concurred with this view.12
3. For the reasons recorded below, we accept the view taken by the
High Courts of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Bombay,
Kerala, Madras, and the subsequent view expressed by the High
Court at Calcutta in Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra). However, before we
elucidate our reasons, it would be appropriate to first quote Section
29A of the A & C Act as it stands today:
“29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.—(1) The award in
matters other than international commercial arbitration
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of
twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings
under sub-section (4) of Section 23:
Provided that the award in the matter of international
commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour may be made to dispose of the
matter within a period of twelve months from the date of
completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of Section
23.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from
the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the
arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount
of additional fees as the parties may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified
in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period
not exceeding six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in
sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-
section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate
unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of
the period so specified, extended the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this

11 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6909.
12 This Court while issuing notice in the Civil Appeal a/o SLP (C) No. 2115 of 2024 had granted a stay on
the operation of the common judgment in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 479

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited

sub-section, if the court finds that the proceedings
have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the
arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of
arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent for each
month of such delay:
Provided further that where an application under sub-
section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall
continue till the disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an
opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.
(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4)
may be on the application of any of the parties and may
be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms
and conditions as may be imposed by the court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section
(4), it shall be open to the court to substitute one or all
of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are
substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the
stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and
material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed
under this section shall be deemed to have received the
said evidence and material.
(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this
section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be
deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed
arbitral tribunal.
(8) It shall be open to the court to impose actual or
exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be
disposed of by the court as expeditiously as possible and
endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within
a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice
on the opposite party.”
4. Earlier, the Arbitration Act, 1940, stipulated in its First Schedule that
the arbitral award must be made within four months from the date
of reference, or from the date the arbitrator was called upon to act
480 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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by notice, or within any extended time granted thereafter.13 Section
28(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, empowered the court to extend
the time for making an award, irrespective of whether the original
time had expired or whether the award had already been made. As
per Section 28(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, parties could extend
the time for making an award by mutual consent.14 Prior to the
enactment of Section 29A, the A & C Act did not specify a time limit
for making an arbitral award. This was deliberate, given the fact that
the First Schedule and Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 led to
litigation and delay. Section 29A, as quoted above, was inserted by
Act No. 3 of 201615 with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. The

13 Paragraph 3 to the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940 reads:
“3. The arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after
having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within
such extended time as the Court may allow.”
14 “28. Power to Court only to enlarge time for making award.—
(1) The Court may, if thinks fit, whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the
award has been made or not, enlarge from time to time the time for making the award.
(2) Any provision in an arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire may except with the
consent of all the parties to the agreement, enlarge the time for making the award, shall be void and of
no effect.”
15 Section 29A was inserted in the A & C Act vide the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015
(Act No. 3 of 2016) which read:
“15. Insertion of new Sections 29-A and 29-B.— After Section 29 of the principal Act, the following new
sections shall be inserted, namely—
‘29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.—
(1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters
upon the reference.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, an arbitral tribunal shall be deemed to have entered
upon the reference on the date on which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be, have
received notice, in writing, of their appointment.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the
reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties
may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a
further period not exceeding six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified
under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior
to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the court finds that the proceedings
have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees
of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent for each month of such delay.
(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the application of any of the parties
and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by
the court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be open to the court to substitute
one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings
shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material already
on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said
evidence and material.
(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted
shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 481

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 aimed to ensure
that arbitration proceedings are completed without unnecessary
adjournments and delay.
5. Section 29A envisages two time limits for making of an arbitral award.
First, Section 29A(1) states that an award shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months. Secondly, Section
29A(3) stipulates that the parties by consent can extend the time for
making the award beyond twelve months, up to an additional period
of six months. Extension beyond six months, even by consent of the
parties, is not permitted. In terms of the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act No. 33 of 2019),16 the time-limit for
making an arbitral award under Section 29A(1) is not applicable to
international commercial arbitration. As per the amendment made
by Act No. 33 of 2019, the twelve-month period commences from
the date of completion of pleadings under Section 23(4) of the A &
C Act. Earlier, Section 29A(1) had stipulated that the twelve-month
period would begin from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon
reference. Section 29A(2) states that if the award is made within six
months, the arbitral tribunal will be entitled to receive such amount
as additional fees as the parties may agree.
6. Section 29A(4) is the provision which requires interpretation. It
states that where the award is not made within the specified period
of twelve or eighteen17 months, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal

(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this
section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the court as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the
date of service of notice on the opposite party.’ ”
16 Section 29A was further amended vide the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act No.
33 of 2019) which read:
“6. Amendment of Section 29-A.— In Section 29-A of the principal Act,—
(a) for sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:—
‘(1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral
tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4)
of Section 23:
Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously
as possible and endeavour may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of twelve months from
the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of Section 23.’;
(b) in sub-section (4), after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:—
‘Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator
shall continue till the disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.’”
17 This includes the period of twelve months under Section 29A(1) and the extended period of six months
under Section 29A(3).
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will terminate. However, this provision does not apply if the court has
extended the period, either before or after the expiry of the initial or
the extended term. In other words, Section 29A(4) empowers the
court to extend the period for making of the arbitral award beyond
a period of twelve months or eighteen months, as the case may be.
The expression “either prior to or after the expiry of the period so
specified” is unambiguous. It can be deduced by the language that
the court can extend the time where an application is filed after the
expiry of the period under sub-section (1) or the extended period in
terms of sub-section (3). The court has the power to extend the period
for making an award at any time before or after the mandated period.
7. Section 29A(5) states that a party to the arbitration proceedings can file
an application in court for an extension of time for making the award.
As per the second proviso to Section 29A(4), where an application
for an extension of time under Section 29A(5) has been filed and is
pending, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall continue till the
disposal of the application. Thus, the second proviso to Section 29A(4),
by specific mandate, allows the arbitration proceedings to continue
during the pendency of the extension application under Section 29A(5)
before the court. Lastly, the extension of time is to be granted by the
court only for ‘sufficient cause’ and on such terms and conditions as
may be imposed by the court. We will elaborate on the last aspect,
and why this interpretation is preferable. First, we will refer to the ratio
and reasoning in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
8. The core of the ratio and reasoning of Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) is based on the use of the expression “terminate” in Section
29A(4). The judgment relies on the recommendations made by the
176th Report of the Law Commission of India, which had suggested
using the term “suspend”. Juxtaposing the words “terminate” and
“suspend”, it is noted that the use of the expression “terminate”
reflects the legislative intent of terminating the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal upon the expiry of the specified period. Therefore,
the reasoning observes that on the termination of the mandate, the
arbitral tribunal becomes de jure incapable of performing its function.
Along the same lines, it is argued before us that, as a sequitur, and
in view of Sections 14, 15, 29A and 32 of the A & C Act, a party
must file an application for an extension of time to make an arbitral
award before the culmination of the initial twelve-month period or
the extended six-month period.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 483

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited

9. In our opinion, the aforesaid reasoning is fallacious and unacceptable.
Language serves as a means to express thoughts and intentions.18
Words can have various meanings and connotations; thus, an
interpretive exercise must be conducted with careful consideration of
both the text and the context of the provision. Therefore, sometimes
the court eschews a literal construction if it produces manifest
absurdity or unjust results.19
10. The word “terminate” in Section 29A(4) has to be read in the context
of the said provision.20 It should not be read as an isolated word
with a strict dictionary meaning, but rather in conjunction with the
surrounding words and expressions which warrant recognition and
consideration. This evinces the legislative intent. Secondly, the
legislative preference for the term “terminate” over “suspend” is
apparent, since the word “suspend” could cause incongruity and a
legal conundrum if no party files an application for an extension of time.
In such a scenario, the arbitral proceedings would stand suspended
ad infinitum. Therefore, the legislature by using the word “terminate”
intends to affirm the principle of party autonomy. Resultantly, if neither
party moves an application for an extension of time for making the
award, the arbitration proceedings are terminated. Consequences
follow. Clearly, the use of the word “suspension” would have led to
infeasible ramifications.
11. The word “terminate” in Section 29A(4) makes the arbitral tribunal
functus officio, but not in absolute terms. The true purport of the word
“terminate” must be understood in light of the syntax of the provision.
The absence of a full stop after the word “terminate” is noteworthy.
The word “terminate” is followed by the connecting word “unless”,
which qualifies the first part with the subsequent limb of the section,
i.e. “unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the
period so specified, extended the period.” The expression “prior to

18 Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. and Others v. Collector of Central Excise and Others, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716.
19 Babu Manmohan Das Shah and Others v. Bishun Das, (1967) 1 SCR 836.
20 This Court in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others, (2022) 5 SCC 1 at ¶66 held
that
“It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions of a statute, it is necessary that the textual
interpretation should be matched with the contextual one. The Act must be looked at as a whole and it
must be discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed
to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation.(…)”
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or after the expiry of the period so specified” has to be understood
with reference to the power of the court to grant an extension of time.
12. Accordingly, the termination of the arbitral mandate is conditional
upon the non-filing of an extension application and cannot be treated
as termination stricto sensu. The word “terminate” in the contextual
form does not reflect termination as if the proceedings have come
to a legal and final end, and cannot continue even on filing of an
application for extension of time. Therefore, termination under Section
29A(4) is not set in stone or absolutistic in character.21
13. An interpretive process must recognize the goal or purpose of the
legal text.22 Section 29A intends to ensure the timely completion
of arbitral proceedings while allowing courts the flexibility to grant
extensions when warranted. Prescribing a limitation period, unless
clearly stated in words or necessary, should not be accepted. Bar
by limitation has penal and fatal consequences. This Court in North
Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. and Another v. Ashok
Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. and Another 23 observed:
“When no limitation stands prescribed it would be
inappropriate for a Court to supplant the legislature’s wisdom
by its own and provide a limitation, more so in accordance
with what it believes to be the appropriate period.”
Courts should be wary of prescribing a specific period of limitation in
cases where the legislature has refrained from doing so.24 If we give
a narrow and restrictive meaning to Section 29A(4), we would be
indulging in judicial legislation by incorporating a negative stipulation
of a bar of limitation, which has a severe annulling effect. Such an
interpretation will add words to widen the scope of legislation and
amount to modification or rewriting of the statute. If the legislature
intended such an outcome, it could have stated in the statute that –
“the Court may extend the period only if the application is filed before
the expiry of the mandate of the arbitrator, not after”. Indeed, there
would have been no need to use the phrase “after the expiry of the
period” in the statute.

21 Supra note 11.
22 Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619.
23 [2023] 15 SCR 821 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1649.
24 Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. and Another, (1999)
6 SCC 82.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 485

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In other words, a rigid interpretation would amount to legislating and
prescribing a limitation period for filing an application under Section
29A, when the section does not conspicuously so state. Rather, the
expression and intent of the provision are to the contrary.
14. In our opinion, a restrictive interpretation would lead to rigour,
impediments and complexities. A party would have to rush to the
court even when the period of arbitral mandate of twelve months
has not expired, notwithstanding the possibility of a consent-
based extension of six months under Section 29A(3). Narrow
interpretation presents an additional challenge by relegating a
faultless party to a fresh reference or appointment of an arbitrator
under the A & C Act,25 thereby impeding arbitration rather than
facilitating it.26 The legislature vide the 2015 Amendment envisions
arbitration as a litigant-centric process by expediting disposal of
cases and reducing the cost of litigation.27 A narrow interpretation
will be counterproductive. The intention is appropriately captured
in the following observations made in the 176th Report of the Law
Commission of India :
“2.21.1 (…) But the omission of the provision for extension
of time and therefore the absence of any time limit has given
rise to another problem, namely, that awards are getting
delayed before the arbitral tribunal even under the 1996
Act. One view is that this is on account of the absence of
a provision as to time limit for passing an award.
xx xx xx
2.21.3 (…) The time limit can be more realistic subject to
extension only by the court. Delays ranging from five years

25 We have not examined and pronounced on the legal consequence when the proceedings “terminate” in
terms of Section 29A of the A & C Act and the legal remedy available to the parties.
26 This Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 &
Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1 at para ¶94 held:
“The Arbitration Act represents the principles of modern arbitration, which seeks to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to resolve their disputes by a neutral third-party Arbitral Tribunal, whose
decision is final and binding on all the parties. Arbitration law allows the parties to design arbitral
procedures, which ensures efficiency and expediency of the arbitration process. One of the reasons
that business and commercial entities prefer arbitration is because it obviates cumbersome judicial
processes, which can often prove expensive, complex and interminable. (…) It is the duty of this Court to
interpret the Arbitration Act in a manner which gives life to the principles of modern arbitration in India.”
27 See Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015
inserting Section 29A.
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to even fourteen years in a single arbitration have come
to the Commission’s notice. The Supreme Court of India
has also referred to these delays of the arbitral tribunal.
The point here is that these delays are occurring even
in cases where there is no court intervention during the
arbitral process. The removal of the time limit is having
its own adverse consequences. There can be a provision
for early disposal of the applications for extension, if that
is one of the reasons for omitting a provision prescribing
a time limit, say one month. Parties can be permitted
to extend time by one year. Pending the application for
extension, we propose to allow the arbitration proceedings
to continue.(…)
xx xx xx
2.21.4 It is, therefore, proposed to implement the
recommendation made in the 76th Report of the Law
Commission with the modification that an award must be
passed at least within one year of the arbitrators entering on
the reference. The initial period will be one year. Thereafter,
parties can, by consent, extend the period upto a maximum
of another one year. Beyond the one year plus the period
agreed to by mutual consent, the court will have to grant
extension. Applications for extension are to be disposed
of within one month. While granting extension, the court
may impose costs and also indicate the future procedure
to be followed by the tribunal . There will, therefore, be a
further proviso, that further extension beyond the period
stated above should be granted by the Court. We are
not inclined to suggest a cap on the power of extension
as recommended by the Law Commission earlier. There
may be cases where the court feels that more than 24
months is necessary. It can be left to the court to fix an
upper limit. It must be provided that beyond 24 months,
neither the parties by consent, nor the arbitral tribunal could
extend the period. The court’s order will be necessary in
this regard. But in order to see that delay in disposal of
extension applications does not hamper arbitration, we
propose to allow arbitration to continue pending disposal
of the application.
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2.21.5 One other important aspect here is that if there is
a delay beyond the initial one year and the period agreed
to by the parties (with an upper of another one year) and
also any period of extension granted by the Court, there
is no point in terminating the arbitration proceedings. We
propose it as they should be continued till award is passed.
Such a termination may indeed result in waste of time and
money for the parties after lot of evidence is led. In fact,
if the proceedings were to terminate and the claimant is
to file a separate suit, it will even become necessary to
exclude the period spent in arbitration proceedings, if he
was not at fault, by amending sec. 43(5) to cover such a
situation. But the Commission is of the view that there is
a better solution to the problem.
The Commission, therefore, proposes to see that an arbitral
award is ultimately passed even if the above said delays
have taken place. In order that there is no further delay,
the Commission proposes that after the period of initial
one year and the further period agreed to by the parties
(subject to a maximum of one year) is over, the arbitration
proceedings will nearly stand suspended and will get revived
as soon as any party to the proceedings files an application
in the Court for extension of time. In case none of the
parties files an application, even then the arbitral tribunal
may seek an extension from the Court. From the moment
the application is filed, the arbitration proceedings can be
continued. When the Court takes up the application for
extension, it shall grant extension subject to any order as
to costs and it shall fix up the time schedule for the future
procedure before the arbitral tribunal. It will initially pass an
order granting extension of time and fixing the time frame
before the arbitral tribunal and will continue to pass further
orders till time the award is passed. This procedure will
ensure that ultimately an award is passed.”
15. Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) highlights that an interpretation
allowing an extension application post the expiry period would
encourage rogue litigants and render the timeline for making the
award inconsequential. However, it is apposite to note that under
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Section 29A(5), the power of the court to extend the time is to be
exercised only in cases where there is sufficient cause for such
extension. Such extension is not granted mechanically on filing of
the application. The judicial discretion of the court in terms of the
enactment acts as a deterrent against any party abusing the process
of law or espousing a frivolous or vexatious application. Further, the
court can impose terms and conditions while granting an extension.
Delay, even on the part of the arbitral tribunal, is not countenanced.28
The first proviso to Section 29A(4) permits a fee reduction of up to
five percent for each month of delay attributable to the arbitral tribunal.
16. Lastly, Section 29A(6) does not support the narrow interpretation of
the expression “terminate”. It states that the court – while deciding
an extension application under Section 29A(4) – may substitute one
or all the arbitrators. Section 29A(7) states that if a new arbitrator(s)
is appointed, the reconstituted arbitral tribunal shall be deemed to
be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal. This
obliterates the need to file a fresh application under Section 11 of
the A & C Act for the appointment of an arbitrator. In the event of
substitution of arbitrator(s), the arbitral proceedings will commence
from the stage already reached. Evidence or material already on
record is deemed to be received by the newly constituted tribunal.
The aforesaid deeming provisions underscore the legislative intent
to effectuate efficiency and expediency in the arbitral process. This
intent is also demonstrated in Sections 29A(8) and 29A(9). The
court in terms of Section 29A(8) has the power to impose actual or
exemplary costs upon the parties. Lastly, Section 29A(9) stipulates
that an application for extension under sub-section (5) must be
disposed of expeditiously, with the endeavour of doing so within
sixty days from the date of filing.
17. As per the second proviso to Section 29A(4), the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal continues where an application under sub-section
(5) is pending. However, an application for extension of period of
the arbitral tribunal is to be decided by the court in terms of sub-
section (5), and sub-sections (6) to (8) may be invoked. The power
to extend time period for making of the award vests with the court,
and not with the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal may

28 Supra note 10.
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not pronounce the award till an application under Section 29A(5) of
the A & C Act is sub-judice before the court. In a given case, where
an award is pronounced during the pendency of an application for
extension of period of the arbitral tribunal, the court must still decide
the application under sub-section (5), and may even, where an
award has been pronounced, invoke, when required and justified,
sub-sections (6) to (8), or the first and third proviso to Section 29A(4)
of the A & C Act.
18. While interpreting a statute, we must strive to give meaningful life
to an enactment or rule and avoid cadaveric consequences that
result in unworkable or impracticable scenarios.29 An interpretation
which produces an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a
statute if there is some other equally possible construction which is
acceptable, practical and pragmatic.
19. In view of the above discussion, we hold that an application for
extension of the time period for passing an arbitral award under
Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after
the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period,
as the case may be. The court while adjudicating such extension
applications will be guided by the principle of sufficient cause and
our observations in paragraph 15 of the judgment.
20. We, accordingly, answer the question in the aforesaid terms. The
appeals are directed to be listed in the week commencing 30.09.2024
for final hearing and disposal.

Result of the Case: Appeals to be listed for final hearing and
disposal.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey

29 Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P) Ltd. and Another v. Amruta Garg and Others, (2021) 6 SCC
736.