Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellants are entitled to arrears in the pre‑revised pay‑scale for only three years prior to the filing of the writ petitions, with interest at 7% per annum from 1 September 2017, and the corporation is not required to refund the amounts already recovered.

Summary

The appellants, employed as Data Entry Operators of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, were initially placed in the Rs 4,000‑6,000 pay‑scale but were later granted the higher Rs 5,000‑8,000 scale of the next promotional post. In 2010 the corporation corrected this by withdrawing the higher scale, revising it to the first higher scale and recovering the excess amount. After a seven‑year delay, the appellants filed writ petitions seeking restoration of the higher scale and arrears from 2010. The Division Bench limited the benefit to the date of the single judge’s judgment (31 July 2018) and denied arrears, invoking delay and laches. The Supreme Court held that while the doctrine of delay and laches applies, the claim for arrears is a "continuing wrong" and the appellants are entitled only to arrears for three years preceding the writ filing, with interest at 7% per annum from 1 September 2017, and the corporation is not required to refund amounts already recovered. The Court partially allowed the appeals and directed payment of the limited arrears within four months.

Issues considered

The doctrine of delay, laches and limitation as a bar to the appellants' claim for arrears from 2010
Whether the appellants are entitled to arrears for the period before filing of the writ petition under the principle of a continuing wrong
Whether interest should be awarded on the arrears and at what rate
Whether the corporation must refund the amounts recovered under the 2010 order
The appropriate date to be used for calculating the period of arrears – date of single judge judgment or date of filing of the writ petition

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 22, s. 23

Subjects

service lawpay scalearrearslimitationlachescontinuing wrongrecurring wronginterestmunicipal corporationemployee benefits

Judgment

1014 [2022]
SUPREME COURT 16 S.C.R. 1014
REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK
v.
BHAVNAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
(Civil Appeal No. 4134 of 2022)
B MAY 18, 2022
[AJAY RASTOGI AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Service Matter: Pay Scale – Recovery of arrears – In terms
of the scheme, the appellant-‘Data Entry Operator’ granted higher
pay-scale of the next promotional post of Rs.5,000-8,000/- from
C
different dates – Pursuant to the order dated 28th October 2010,
the benefit provided under the Scheme revised by the respondent-
Corporation observing that the appellants and others employees
were erroneously granted benefit of the higher grade pay-scale of
the next promotional post instead of the next stage in the hierarchy
D of pay scales – Higher pay scale of the promotional posts granted
to the appellants withdrawn and the excess payments made were
recovered from the appellants – After a gap of seven years, the
appellants filed writ petitions challenging the order dated 28th
October, 2010 and direction was sought against the respondent-
Corporation to avail the pay-scale of the next higher promotional
E
post and to pay the arrears – Writ Petition allowed – Division Bench
partially allowed the appeal by the Corporation, in view of delay
and laches on the part of the appellants in approaching the court,
by restricting the grant of higher pay-scale of Rs.5,000-8,000/- with
consequential benefits from the date of the judgment of the Single
F Judge; that the prayer of the appellants for recovery of arrears
from 2010 was declined, and that the respondent-Corporation,
would not be required to refund any amount that they have
recovered from the appellants pursuant to the order dated 28th
October 2010 – On appeal, held: Rules of limitation and delay and
laches are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a
G
larger public interest and are founded on public policy – If the
employee’s claim is found to be correct on merits, they would be
entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay-scale in future
and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears

H
1014
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1015
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

for the past period – Appellants entitled to arrears in the pre-revised A
pay-scale of Rs.5,000-8,000/- for three years prior to the date of
filing of the Writ Petitions along with interest at the rate of 7% per
annum with effect from 1st September 2017 – Limitation Act, 1963
– Delay and Laches.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court B
HELD: 1.1 The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that
matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have
been expressed. The courts have expressed the view that the
law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest C
for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have
lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons
with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should
pursue them with reasonable diligence. Equally, change in de facto
position or character, creation of third party rights over a period D
of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in
dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period
of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply
to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional
court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is E
applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community,
suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent
oppression. [Para 9][1021-A-D]
1.2 The law recognises a ‘continuing’ cause of action which
may give rise to a ‘recurring’ cause of action as in the case of F
salary or pension. So long as the employee is in service, a fresh
cause of action would arise every month when they are paid their
salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to the
rules. If the employee’s claim is found to be correct on merits,
they would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed
pay-scale in future and the question of limitation would arise for G
recovery of the arrears for the past period. [Para 10][1022-E-G]
1.3 The respondent-Corporation had accepted the
interpretation rendered by the High Court to the Scheme whereby

H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A the appellants, on financial upgradation, would be entitled to the
higher grade pay-scale of the next promotional post, which is
Rs.5,000-8,000/- in the instant case. The impugned judgment of
the Division Bench accepts the said position and grants the
appellants the said pay-scale but restricts the benefit from the
date of the judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ Petitions
B
filed by the appellants, that is, with effect from 31.07.2018. The
Division Bench should not have taken the date of the decision/
judgment of the Single Judge for grant of the said benefit in view
of the decision and ratio in Tarsem Singh’s case. Only date of
filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining the question
C of delay and laches or limitation. The appellants would be entitled
to the arrears for three years before the date of filing of the Writ
Petitions. [Para 14][1025-E-G; 1026-A]
1.4 There is an inclination to grant interest to the appellants
on the arrears at the rate of 7% per annum, which would be
D payable with effect from 1.09.2017. The said date is fixed for grant
of interest as the respondent-Corporation has accepted the
interpretation of the Scheme rendered on 16.08.2016 in the Writ
Petition preferred by MJ. Normally, and as a model employer, on
accepting the said decision, the respondent should have uniformly
applied and granted the benefit to all its similarly situated
E employees affected by the order dated 28th October 2010. This
would have avoided unnecessary litigation before the courts. [Para
15][1026-B-C]
1.5 The prayer of the appellants that they should be given
arrears right from 2010 has to be rejected. The prayer of the
F appellants that they should be refunded the entire amount which
had been collected by the respondent-Corporation in terms of
the order dated 28 th October 2010 is rejected. The appellants
would be entitled to arrears in the pre-revised pay-scale of
Rs.5,000-8,000/- for three years prior to the date of filing of the
G Writ Petitions along with interest at the rate of 7% pa with effect
from 1st September 2017. The arrears, with interest, would be
paid within the stipulated period. [Para 16, 17][1027-F-H]

H
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1017
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Tarsem Singh (2008) A
8 SCC 648:[2008] 12 SCR 104; M.R. Gupta v. Union
of India and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 628:[1995] 2 Suppl.
SCR 852 – relied on.
The Moon Mills, Ltd. v. M.R. Meher AIR 1967 SC 1450;
Shiv Dass v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (2007) 9 B
SCC 274:[2007] 1 SCR 1127; Balkrishna Savalram
Pujari and Ors. v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj
Sansthan and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 798:[1959] Suppl.
SCR 476; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava (2015) 1 SCC 347:[2014] 12 SCR 193; State
of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Yogendra Shrivastava C
(2010) 12 SCC 538:[2009] 14 SCR 1137; Asger
Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
(2016) 13 SCC 797:[2015] SCR 865; Nav Rattanmal
and Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC
1704:[1962] SCR 324; State of Kerala and Ors. v. V.R. D
Kalliyanikutty and Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 657:[1999] 2
SCR 372; Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank
of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510:[2005] 2
Suppl. SCR 1030; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
(1998) 7 SCC 123:[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 403; M.R.
Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC E
628:[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 852 – referred to.
Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company
v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John
Kemp (1874) LR 5 PC 221 – referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
[1962] SCR 324 referred to Para 9
[1999] 2 SCR 372 referred to Para 9
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 1030 referred to Para 9
G
[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 403 referred to Para 9
[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 852 relied on Para 10
[2007] 1 SCR 1127 referred to Para 11

H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A [1959] Suppl. SCR 476 referred to Para 11
[2014] 12 SCR 193 referred to Para 15
[2009] 14 SCR 1137 referred to Para 13
[2015] SCR 865 referred to Para 13
B [2008] 12 SCR 104 relied on Para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4134
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.06.2019 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No.930 of 2019.
C
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4136, 4137 and 4135 of 2022.
Nachiketa Joshi, Ms. Sucheta Joshi, Ms. Himadri Haksar, Ms.
Medhavi Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.
D
Ms. Aastha Mehta, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
E
Leave granted.
2. This common judgment decides the afore-stated appeals filed
by the employees of the Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation1 who have
challenged the judgment dated 13th June 2019 of the Division Bench of
F the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, whereby the appeal filed by
the respondent-Corporation was partially allowed, in view of delay and
laches on the part of the appellants in approaching the court, by restricting
the grant of higher pay-scale of Rs.5,000-8,000/-2 with consequential
benefits from the date of the judgment of the Single Judge on 31 st July
2018. Prayer of the appellants for recovery of arrears from 2010 was
G declined. The respondent-Corporation, it has been held, would not be
required to refund any amount that they have recovered from the
appellants pursuant to the order dated 28th October 2010.

1
Hereinafter the ‘respondent-Corporation’.
2
Revised to 9,300-34,800 in terms of the 6th Pay Commission
H
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1019
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

3. The appellants, who were initially appointed to the post of A
‘Junior Clerk’ on an ad hoc basis, were made permanent on the post of
‘Data Entry Operator’ in the Computer Department of the respondent-
Corporation in the pay-scale of Rs.4,000-6,000/- on different dates.
4. On 19th February 2007, the respondent-Corporation, vide order
no. Mahekam/1/223, adopted and implemented in a modified form the B
Scheme of the Government of Gujarat3 to, inter alia, deal with the
problem of ... ‘absence or restricted chances of promotion to the
Government employees’. The Scheme, inter alia, envisaged grant of
pay-scale of the next promotional post on completion of 9, 18 or 27
years of service. The Scheme had also stipulated that in case of
‘employees on posts having more than one promotional post in C
different scales of pay, their pay of Higher Grade Scale shall be
considered the pay of the pay-scale of the lowest of the promotional
posts’.
5. The appellants were granted the higher pay-scale of the next
promotional post of Rs.5,000-8,000/- from different dates upon furnishing D
undertakings in favour of the respondent-Corporation. One of the clauses
in the undertaking stipulated that the appellants shall give up the benefit
made available under the Scheme in case of denial of regular promotion
accessible to the employee. In such a scenario, the employee shall accept
the original downgraded pay and salary in the original pay-scale. Further, E
the appellants had agreed that the arrears were payable to them only
from 1st January 2006.
6. However, pursuant to the order dated 28th October 2010, the
benefit provided under the Scheme was revised by the respondent-
Corporation observing that the appellants and others employees were F
erroneously granted benefit of the higher grade pay-scale of the next
promotional post instead of the next stage in the hierarchy of pay-scales,
that is, the first higher pay-scale. Consequently, the employees who were
in the pay-scale of Rs.4,000-6,000/- had been wrongly granted the higher
pay-scale of Rs.5,000-9,000/-, in accordance with the pay-scale of the
next promotional post, instead of the pay-scale of Rs.4,500-7,000/- , the G
next stage in the hierarchy of pay-scales. The order dated 28 th October
2010 states that the anomaly had arisen as the respondent-Corporation
had not appropriately fixed the pay-scales and thereby, excessive and
3
Scheme of Higher Grade Scale dated 16 th August 1994 (Government resolution No.
PAY-1194/(44)/M), hereinafter referred to as the ‘Scheme’ H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A unintended benefits had been given to the employees. As a result, the
respondent-Corporation had to bear improper and excessive financial
burden of the higher pay-scales. Pursuant to the order, the pay-scales of
the appellants were appropriately revised to the first higher pay scale
and the excess payments made were recovered from the appellants.
B 7. After nearly seven years, in September 2017, the appellants
filed Writ Petitions before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
challenging the order dated 28th October 2010 whereby the higher pay-
scales of the promotional post granted to them were withdrawn and a
direction was sought against the respondent-Corporation to avail the
pay-scale of the next higher promotional post and to pay the arrears. In
C support of their contention, the appellants had relied upon the interpretation
of the Scheme rendered in the judgment dated 16th August 2016 passed
in a Writ Petition, SCA No. 14370 of 2011, that was preferred by one
Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi, an employee of the respondent-
Corporation. In this case, on interpretation of the relevant clauses of the
D scheme, it has been held that on financial upgradation, Mukeshbhai
Jaswantrai Joshi would be entitled to the pay-scale applicable to the
next promotional post of Rs.8,000-13,500/-, notwithstanding the fact that
it was not the next higher pay-scale in the hierarchy of pay-scales. The
respondent-Corporation was further directed to recompense the
difference of arrears of pay with interest at the rate of 9% per annum
E from the date on which the benefit was withdrawn until the date of
payment. This interpretation of the Scheme has been accepted and not
challenged by the respondent-Corporation.
8. By way of background, it is noted that Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai
Joshi had challenged the impugned order dated 28th October 2010 in a
F Writ Petition, SCA No. 14857 of 2010, which was filed in the year 2010.
He had partly succeeded as the respondent-Corporation was directed to
pass a fresh reasoned order in accordance with law after affording an
opportunity of personal hearing to Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi. However,
on 12th September 2011, the respondent-Corporation issued a second
G order reiterating their earlier decision that Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi
was entitled to the higher pay-scale of Rs.6,500-10,500/- only, and not
the pay-scale of the next promotional post of Rs.8,000-13,500/-. It can
be seen that Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi, unlike the appellants before
us, approached the court with diligence and without any delay.

H
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1021
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of A
limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace,
though some contrary opinions have been expressed.4 The courts have
expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of
greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant
B
might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that
persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them)
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.5 Equally, change in de
facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of
time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are
equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed C
by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the
discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as
delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of
the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent
oppression.6 Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon
D
pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases
where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the
courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of
limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are
not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public
interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during E
which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise,
there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of
the parties.7 Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court,
way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial
Court, Bombay and Others,8 had referred to the view expressed by Sir
F
Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company AND. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp,9 in the following
words:
4
See Nav Rattanmal and Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704
5
State of Kerala and Others v. V. R. Kalliyanikutty and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 657
relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of G
England, Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005
6
See Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC
510
7
See N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123
8
AIR 1967 SC 1450
9
(1874) LR 5 PC 221
H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
B
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material. But in every case, if an
C argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course
not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of
D
the delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
10. At the same time, the law recognises a ‘continuing’ cause of
E action which may give rise to a ‘recurring’ cause of action as in the case
of salary or pension. This Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and
Others,10 has held that so long as the employee is in service, a fresh
cause of action would arise every month when they are paid their salary
on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to the rules. If the
F employee’s claim is found to be correct on merits, they would be entitled
to be paid according to the properly fixed pay-scale in future and the
question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past
period. The Court held that the arrears should be calculated and paid as
long as they have not become time-barred. The entire claim for the past
period should not be rejected.
G
11. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio, this Court in the case of
Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh,11 while referring to the

10
(1995) 5 SCC 628
11
(2008) 8 SCC 648
H
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1023
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

decision in Shiv Dass v. Union of India and Others,12 quoted the A
following passages from the latter decision:
“8...The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because
it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, B
and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable
delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction
is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an C
important factor which also weighs with the High
Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.
xx xx xx
D
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however,
cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the
petition. … If petition is filed beyond a reasonable
period say three years normally the Court would
reject the same or restrict the relief which could be E
granted to a reasonable period of about three years.”
In Tarsem Singh (supra), reference was also made to Section
22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the following passage from
Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare and Others v. Shree
Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Others,13 which had explained F
the concept of continuing wrong in the context of Section 23 of the
Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding to Section 22 of the Limitation Act,
1963, observing that:
“31...It is the very essence of a continuing wrong
that it is an act which creates a continuing source of G
injury and renders the doer of the act responsible
and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If

12
(2007) 9 SCC 274
13
AIR 1959 SC 798
H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete,
there is no continuing wrong even though the damage
resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a
wrongful act is of such a character that the injury
caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes
a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary
B
to draw a distinction between the injury caused by
the wrongful act and what may be described as the
effect of the said injury.”
Accordingly, in Tarsem Singh (supra) it has been held that
principles underlying ‘continuing wrongs’ and ‘recurring/successive
C wrongs’ have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing wrong’
refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury.
‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur periodically, each
wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. Having held
so, this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) had further elucidated some
D exceptions to the aforesaid rule in the following words:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related
claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and
laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an
E application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of
the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a
continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is
based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with
reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
F commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an exception
to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any
order or administrative decision which related to or
affected several others also, and if the reopening of
G the issue would affect the settled rights of third
parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For
example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation
of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties.
But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority
H
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1025
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would A
render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation
will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of
recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned,
the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs
will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will
B
restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears
normally to a period of three years prior to the date
of filing of the writ petition.”
12. In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching
the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this
Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest. C
The Court restricted “the relief relating to arrears to only three years
before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date
of writ petition, whichever was lesser”. Further, the grant of interest
on arrears was also denied.
13. The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) has been followed D
by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Yogendra
Shrivastava14 and Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation
of India.15
14. In the facts of the present case, it is accepted that the
respondent-Corporation had accepted the interpretation rendered by the E
High Court of Gujarat to the Scheme whereby the appellants, on financial
upgradation, would be entitled to the higher grade pay-scale of the next
promotional post, which is Rs.5,000-8,000/- in the present case. As noted
above, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench accepts the said
position and grants the appellants the said pay-scale but restricts the F
benefit from the date of the judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ
Petitions filed by the appellants, that is, with effect from 31st July 2018.
The Division Bench should not have taken the date of the decision/
judgment of the Single Judge for grant of the said benefit in view of the
decision and ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) which has been followed in
several other decisions. That apart, the date of the decision of the Single G
Judge is a fortuitous circumstance. Only the date of filing of the writ
petition is relevant while examining the question of delay and laches or
limitation. The appellants would, in consonance with the case law referred
14
(2010) 12 SCC 538
15
(2016) 13 SCC 797 H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A to above, be entitled to the arrears for three years before the date of
filing of the Writ Petitions.
15. We are also inclined to grant interest to the appellants on the
arrears at the rate of 7% per annum, which would be payable with
effect from 1st September 2017. We have fixed the said date for grant
B of interest as the respondent-Corporation has accepted the interpretation
of the Scheme rendered on 16th August 2016 in the Writ Petition preferred
by Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi. Normally, and as a model employer,
on accepting the said decision, the respondent-Corporation should have
uniformly applied and granted the benefit to all its similarly situated
employees affected by the order dated 28th October 2010. This would
C have avoided unnecessary litigation before the courts, as was held in
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and
Others:16
“22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set
of employees is given relief by the court, all other
D identically situated persons need to be treated alike
by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount
to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14
of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to
be applied in service matters more emphatically as
E the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from
time to time postulates that all similarly situated
persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the
normal rule would be that merely because other
similarly situated persons did not approach the Court
earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
F
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-
recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays
as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not
challenge the wrongful action in their cases and
acquiesced into the same and woke up after long
G delay only because of the reason that their
counterparts who had approached the court earlier
in time succeeded in their efforts, then such
employees cannot claim that the benefit of the

16
H (2015) 1 SCC 347
RUSHIBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATHAK v. BHAVNAGAR 1027
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated A
persons be extended to them. They would be treated
as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their
claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those B
cases where the judgment pronounced by the court
was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to
all similarly situated persons, whether they
approached the court or not. With such a
pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the
authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all C
similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur
when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon
the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and
the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On
the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in D
personam holding that benefit of the said judgment
shall accrue to the parties before the court and such
an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it
can be impliedly found out from the tenor and
language of the judgment, those who want to get the
benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall E
have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from
either laches and delays or acquiescence.”
16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the prayer of the appellants
that they should be given arrears right from 2010 has to be rejected. We
also reject the prayer of the appellants that they should be refunded the F
entire amount which had been collected by the respondent-Corporation
in terms of the order dated 28th October 2010.
17. Recording the aforesaid, we partly allow the present appeals
with a direction that the appellants would be entitled to arrears in the
pre-revised pay-scale of Rs.5,000-8,000/- for three years prior to the G
date of filing of the Writ Petitions along with interest at the rate of 7%
per annum with effect from 1st September 2017. The arrears, with interest,
would be paid within a period of four months from the date of
pronouncement of this judgment. A computation sheet/statement of
accounts on the basis of which payment is made by the respondent- H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A Corporation shall be furnished to the appellants. The impugned judgment
is, accordingly, partly set aside and the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants
would be treated as allowed in the aforesaid terms. There would be no
order as to costs.

B Nidhi Jain and Amarendra Kumar Appeals partly allowed.
(Assisted by : Ajay, LCRA)

C

D

E

F

G

H