S. KASIversusSTATE THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTRICT

                         [2020] 5 S.C.R. 277                          277


                             S. KASI                                  A
                                v.
     STATE THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
  SAMAYNALLUR POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTRICT
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2020)                    B
                          JUNE 19, 2020
            [ASHOK BHUSHAN, M.R. SHAH AND
               V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 167(2) – Entitlement
                                                                      C
to bail in event charge sheet not filed by the police within the
stipulated period – The appellant-accused was arrested on
21.02.2020 u/ss. 457, 380, 457(2), 380(2), 411(2) and 414(2) IPC
– After being in judicial custody for more than 73 days and non-
filing of charge-sheet – The appellant filed for bail by default as
contemplated u/s. 167(2) Cr. P.C. before the High Court – The High    D
Court referring to an order of the Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020
passed in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No. 3 of 2020 took the view that the
Supreme Court’s Order extended the period for submission of
charge-sheet prescribed u/s. 167(2) Cr. P.C. – On appeal, held: The
Order dated 23.03.2020 was passed to protect the litigants/ lawyers
                                                                      E
whose petitions/ application/ suits/ appeals/ all other proceedings
would become time barred they being not able to physically come
to file such proceedings considering the challenge faced by the
Country on account of Covid-19 Virus – When the Supreme Court
passed the order for extending limitation for filing petitions/
applications/ suits/ appeals/ all other proceedings, the Order was    F
for the benefit of those who have to take remedy, whose remedy
may be barred by time because they were unable to come physically
to file such proceedings – The Order dated 23.03.2020 cannot be
read to mean that it ever intended to extend the period of filing
charge-sheet by police as contemplated u/s 167(2) of the Cr. P.C.
                                                                      G
– Therefore, even during the lockdown the investigating officer was
not precluded from filing/submitting the charge-sheet even within
the stipulated period before the Magistrate (incharge) – Thus, the
High Court committed error in extending the restriction to filing
of charge-sheet by investigating officer in the Order dated
23.03.2020.                                                           H
                                 277
278            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A           Constitution of India – Proclamation of Emergency and Art.
      21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 167(2) – The Single
      Judge of the High Court held that lockdown announced by the
      Government of India is akin to the proclamation of Emergency and
      the restrictions imposed should not give accuse a right to pray for
      grant of default bail u/s. 167(2) Cr. P.C. – Held: The Seven Judges
B
      Constitution Bench Judgment in K.S. Puthaswamy and Another v.
      Union of India and Others held that life and personal liberty are
      inalienable to human existence – They constitute rights under
      Natural Law – The human element in the life of an individual is
      integrally founded on the sanctity of life – In the instant case, the
C     Single Judge of the High Court erred in holding that the lockdown
      announced by the Government is akin to the proclamation of
      Emergency and the restrictions imposed during the lockdown should
      not give the right to an accused to pray for grant of default bail
      even though charge-sheet has not been filed within the time
      prescribed u/s. 167(2) Cr. P.C. – The views of the Single Judge of
D
      the High Court were not in accordance with law – Accordingly, the
      judgment of the Single Judge set aside.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1. The limitation for filing petitions/ applications/
E     suits/ appeals/all other proceedings was extended to obviate
      lawyers/litigants to come physically to file such proceedings in
      respective Courts/Tribunals. The order was passed to protect
      the litigants/lawyers whose petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/
      all other proceedings would become time barred they being not
      able to physically come to file such proceedings. The order was
F     for the benefit of the litigants who have to take remedy in law
      as per the applicable statute for a right. The law of limitation
      bars the remedy but not the right. When this Court passed the
      above order for extending the limitation for filing petitions/
      applications/ suits/ appeals/all other proceedings, the order was
G     for the benefit of those who have to take remedy, whose remedy
      may be barred by time because they were unable to come
      physically to file such proceedings. The order dated 23.03.2020
      cannot be read to mean that it ever intended to extend the
      period of filing charge sheet by police as contemplated under
      Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
H     Investigating Officer could have submitted/filed the charge sheet
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR           279
                  POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT.


before the (Incharge) Magistrate. Therefore, even during the          A
lockdown and as has been done in so many cases the charge-
sheet could have been filed/submitted before the Magistrate
(Incharge) and the Investigating Officer was not precluded from
filing/submitting the charge-sheet even within the stipulated
period before the Magistrate (Incharge). [Para 17] [289-B-F]
                                                                      B
       2. If the interpretation by the Single Judge in the impugned
judgment is taken to its logical end, due to difficulties and due
to present pandemic, Police may also not produce an accused
within 24 hours before the Magistrate’s Court as contemplated
by Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As noted
above, the provision of Section 57 as well as Section 167 are         C
supplementary to each other and are the provisions which
recognises the Right of Personal Liberty of a person as
enshrined in the Constitution of India. The order of this Court
dated 23.03.2020 never meant to curtail any provision of Code
of Criminal Procedure or any other statute which was enacted          D
to protect the Personal Liberty of a person. The right of
prosecution to file a charge sheet even after a period of 60 days/
90 days is not barred. The prosecution can very well file a
charge sheet after 60 days/90 days but without filing a charge
sheet they cannot detain an accused beyond a said period when
the accused prays to the court to set him at liberty due to non-      E
filing of the charge sheet within the period prescribed. The right
of prosecution to carry on investigation and submit a charge
sheet is not akin to right of liberty of a person enshrined under
Article 21 and reflected in other statutes including Section 167,
Cr.P.C. [Para 18] [289-F-H; 290-A-C]                                  F
      3. This Court, thus, is of the clear opinion that the Single
Judge in the impugned judgment erred in holding that the
lockdown announced by the Government of India is akin to the
proclamation of Emergency. The view of the Single Judge that
the restrictions, which have been imposed during period of            G
lockdown by the Government of India should not give right to
an accused to pray for grant of default bail even though charge
sheet has not been filed within the time prescribed under Section
167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is clearly erroneous
and not in accordance with law. [Para 25] [294-E-G]
                                                                      H
280           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A            4. This Court, thus, is of the view that neither this Court
      in its order dated 23.03.2020 can be held to have eclipsed the
      time prescribed under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. nor the
      restrictions which have been imposed during the lockdown
      announced by the Government shall operate as any restriction
      on the rights of an accused as protected by Section 167(2)
B
      regarding his indefeasible right to get a default bail on non-
      submission of charge sheet within the time prescribed. The
      Single Judge of the High Court committed serious error in
      reading such restriction in the order of this Court dated
      23.03.2020. [Para 26] [294-G-H; 295-A]
C           K.S.Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and
            Others (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 –
            followed.
            Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra
            (2001) 5 SCC 453 : [2001] 2 SCR 878 ; Rakesh
D           Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (2017) 15 SCC 67 :
            [2017] 8 SCR 785 ; Achpal Alias Ramswaroop and
            Another v. State of Rajasthan (2019) 14 SCC 599 :
            [2018] 12 SCR 327 ; State of Punjab and Another v.
            Devans Modern Breweries ltd. and Another (2004) 11
E           SCC 26 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 930 – relied on.
            Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant
            Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521 : [1976] Suppl. SCR
            172; Union of India and Others v. Bhanudas Krishna
            Gawde and Others (1977) 1 SCC 834 : [1977] 2 SCR
F           719 – referred to.
            Settu v. The State (In the High Court of Madras,
            Crl.OP(MD) No. 5291 of 2020) ; Mohammed Ali v.
            State of Kerala (In the High Court of Kerala,
            Bail Application No. 2856 of 2020) ; Pankaj v. State
G           (In the High Court of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal
            Revision Petition No.355 of 2020) ; Vivek Sharma v.
            State of Uttrakhand (In the High Court of
            Uttarakhand, First Bail Application No.511 of 2020)
            – referred to.

H
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                 281
                  POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT.


                   Case Law Reference                                       A
[2001] 2 SCR 878            relied on      Para 11
[2017] 8 SCR 785            relied on      Para 12
[2018] 12 SCR 327           relied on      Para 13
[1976] Suppl. SCR 172      referred to     Para 19
                                                                            B
[1977] 2 SCR 719            referred to    Para 21
[2017] 10 SCR 569           followed       Para 24
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 930    relied on       Para 31
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 452 of 2020.                                                            C
      From the Judgment and Order dated 11.05.2020 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLOP (MD) No. 5296
of 2020
     Jayanth Muthuraj, AAG, Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Karunakar
Mahalik, M. Yogesh Kanna, Advs. for the appearing parties.                  D
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
      1. This appeal has been filed questioning the judgment of Madurai
Bench of Madras High Court dated 11.05.2020 in Crl.OP(MD) No.5296           E
of 2020 by which judgment the bail application of the appellant has been
dismissed.
      2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are: -
      2.1. The appellant is an accused in Crime No.495 of 2015under
Sections 457, 380, 457(2), 380(2), 411(2) and 414(2) of Indian Penal        F
Code. The appellant was arrested on 21.02.2020 in the above case and
lodged in Central Prison, Trichy. The bail application of the appellant
under Section 439 was rejected by the trial court on 30.04.2020. After
being in judicial custody for more than 73 days, the appellant filed an
application Crl.OP(MD)No.5296 of 2020before the High Court of               G
Judicature of Madras at Madurai Bench praying for grant of bail on
account of passage of such 73 days and non-filing of charge sheet.
One of the contentions of the appellant before the High Court was that
charge sheet having not been filed, the appellant is entitled for bail by
default as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.                                                                  H
282             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A           2.2. The High Court referring to an order of this Court dated
      23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No.3 of 2020 took the view:-
             “...The Supreme Court order eclipses all provisions prescribing
             period of limitation until further orders. Undoubtedly, it eclipses
             the time prescribed under Section 17(2) of the code of Criminal
B            Procedure...”
            2.3 Aggrieved by the order of the Madras High Court dated
      11.05.2020, this appeal has been filed.
            3. We have heard Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel
      appearing for the appellant and Shri Jayanth Muthuraj, learned
C     Additional Advocate General for the State.
             4. Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellant
      contends that the High Court committed error in taking the view that
      this Court’s order dated 23.03.2020 extended the period for submission
      of charge sheet as prescribed under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.It is submitted
D     that the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. are provisions for protection
      of personal liberty and in event charge sheet has not been filed by the
      police within the stipulated period, the appellant is entitled for default
      bail. The order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in no manner can be
      read as extending the period for the prosecution to submit the charge
E     sheet. The High Court had erroneously taken the view that the order
      of this Court eclipses the time prescribed under Section 167(2) of Code
      of Criminal Procedure.
             5. Learned senior counsel further submits that learned Single
      Judge in the impugned judgment had also erred in taking a contrary
F     view to an earlier judgment delivered by another learned Single Judge
      in Settu versus The State, Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 5291 of 2020where
      the learned Single Judge of Madras High Court decided on 08.05.2020
      has taken the view that the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in no
      manner can be applied on the provisions of Section 167(2) of Code of
      Criminal Procedure.
G
             6. Learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment
      and submits that due to enormous difficulties in carrying out the
      investigation, charge sheet could not be filed in the present case and
      the appellant is not entitled to take benefit of Section 167(2) in precarious
      situation which has occurred on account of pandemic of Covid-19.
H
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                 283
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


      7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for          A
the parties and perused the record.
      8. The only issue which need to be decided in this appeal is as
to whether the appellant due to non-submission of charge sheet within
the prescribed period by the prosecution was entitled for grant of bail
as per section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Before we          B
notice the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Motu
W.P.(C) No. 3 of 2020 which has been applied by the High Court on
the provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., we need to notice object and
purpose of enactment of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
                                                                            C
       9. In the earlier Code, i.e.,the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
Section 167 laid down the procedure to be followed in the event the
investigation of an offence was not completed within 24 hours. Section
167 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was premised on the
conclusion of investigation within 24 hours or within 15 days on the
outside regardless of the nature of the offence or the punishment.          D

       10. The Law Commission of India in its Forty-first Report
recommended for increasing the time limit for completion of investigation
to 60 days. The new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 gave effect to
the recommendation of the Law Commission. Section 167 as enacted
provided for time limit of 60 days regardless of the nature of offence      E
or the punishment. In the year 1978, Section 167 was amended. Section
167(2) which is relevant for the present case existing as of now is to
the following effect:-
      “167.(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is
      forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not           F
      jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the
      detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate
      thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole;
      and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for
      trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may            G
      order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having
      such jurisdiction: Provided that-
           (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the
               accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the
               police, beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is
                                                                            H
284            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A                       satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so,
                        but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of
                        the accused person in custody under this paragraph
                        for a total period exceeding,-
                        (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an
B                           offence punishable with death, imprisonment for
                            life or imprisonment for a term of not less than
                            ten years;
                       (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any
                            other offence, and, on the expiry of the said
                            period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case
C                           may be, the accused person shall be released on
                            bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail,
                            and every person released on bail under this sub-
                            section shall be deemed to be so released under
                            the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the
                            purposes of that Chapter;]
D
                  (b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any
                        custody under this section unless the accused is
                        produced before him;
                  (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially
                        empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall
E                       authorise detention in the custody of the police”
             11. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Uday Mohanlal
      Acharya versus State of Maharashtra, (2001)5 SCC 453, has noticed
      the object of enacting the provisions of Section 167 Cr.P.C. Section 57
      of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains the embargo on the Police
      Officers to detain in custody a person arrested beyond 24 hours. The
F     object is that the accused should be brought before a Magistrate without
      delay within 24 hours, which provision is, in fact, in consonance with
      the constitutional mandate engrafted under Article 22(2) of the
      Constitution. The provision of Section 167 is supplementary to Section
      57. The power under Section 167 is given to detain a person in custody
G     while police goes on with the investigation. Section 167 is, therefore, a
      provision which authorises the Magistrate permitting the detention of
      the accused in custody prescribing the maximum period. In Uday
      Mohanlal Acharya(Supra), this court while dealing with Section 167
      laid down following:-
             “...This provision of Section 167 is in fact supplementary to
H            Section 57, in consonance with the principle that the accused
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                285
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


      is entitled to demand that justice is not delayed. The object        A
      of requiring the accused to be produced before a Magistrate
      is to enable the Magistrate to see that remand is necessary
      and also to enable the accused to make a representation
      which he may wish to make. The power under Section 167
      is given to detain a person in custody while the police goes
      on with the investigation and before the Magistrate starts the       B
      enquiry. Section 167, therefore, is the provision which
      authorises the Magistrate permitting detention of an accused
      in custody and prescribing the maximum period for which
      such detention could be ordered. Having prescribed the
      maximum period, as stated above, what would be the                   C
      consequences thereafter has been indicated in the proviso
      to sub-section (2) of Section 167. The proviso is unambiguous
      and clear and stipulates that the accused shall be released
      on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish the bail which
      has been termed by the judicial pronouncement to be
      “compulsive bail” and such bail would be deemed to be a              D
      bail under Chapter 33. The right of an accused to be
      released on bail after expiry of the maximum period of
      detention provided under Section 167 can be denied only
      when an accused does not furnish bail, as is apparent from
      Explanation I to the said section. The proviso to sub-section
      (2) of Section 167 is a beneficial provision for curing the          E
      mischief of indefinitely prolonging the investigation and
      thereby affecting the liberty of a citizen...”
       12. Again, there has been very detailed consideration of Section
167 by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul
versus State of Assam, (2017)15 SCC 67. This Court in the above            F
case has traced the legislative history of the provision of Section 167.
This Court in the above case emphasised that the debate on Section
167 must also be looked at from the perspective of expeditious
conclusion of investigation and from the angle of personal liberty. This
Court also held that right for default bail is indefeasible right which
cannot be allowed to be frustrated by the prosecution. Following was       G
laid down in paragraphs 37,38 and 39: -
      “37. This Court had occasion to review the entire case law
      on the subject in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav, (2014) 9
      SCC 457. In that decision, reference was made to Uday
      Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC               H
286            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A           453 and the conclusions arrived at in that decision. We are
            concerned with Conclusion (3) which reads as follows:
                “13.(3) On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or
                60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues
                in favour of the accused for being released on bail on
B               account of default by the investigating agency in the
                completion of the investigation within the period
                prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on
                bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed
                by the Magistrate.”
            38. This Court also dealt with the decision rendered in Sanjay
C           Dutt, (1994) 5 SCC 410 and noted that the principle laid
            down by the Constitution bench is to the effect that if the
            charge sheet is not filed and the right for “default bail” has
            ripened into the status of indefeasibility, it cannot be
            frustrated by the prosecution on any pretext. The accused
D           can avail his liberty by filing an application stating that the
            statutory period for filing the charge sheet or challan has
            expired and the same has not yet been filed and therefore
            the indefeasible right has accrued in his or her favour and
            further the accused is prepared to furnish the bail bond.
            39. This Court also noted that apart from the possibility of
E           the prosecution frustrating the indefeasible right, there are
            occasions when even the court frustrates the indefeasible
            right. Reference was made to Mohd. Iqbal Madar Sheikh v.
            State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 722 wherein it was
            observed that some courts keep the application for “default
            bail” pending for some days so that in the meantime a
F           charge-sheet is submitted. While such a practice both on the
            part of the prosecution as well as some courts must be very
            strongly and vehemently discouraged, we reiterate that no
            subterfuge should be resorted to, to defeat the indefeasible
            right of the accused for “default bail” during the
            interregnum when the statutory period for filing the charge-
G
            sheet or challan expires and the submission of the charge-
            sheet or challan in court.”
            13. One more judgment of this Court on Section 167 Cr.P.C. be
      noticed, i.e.,Achpal Alias Ramswaroop and Another versus State of
      Rajasthan, (2019) 14 SCC 599. After referring to several earlier
H     judgments of this Court including the judgment of this Court in Uday
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                   287
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


Mohanlal Acharya(supra) and Rakesh Kumar Paul(supra), this                    A
Court had laid down that the provisions of the Code do not empower
anyone to extend the period within which the investigation must be
completed. This Court held that no Court either directly or indirectly
can extend such period. Following are the observations of this Court in
paragraph 20: -
                                                                              B
       “20. We now turn to the subsidiary issue, namely, whether
       the High Court could have extended the period. The
       provisions of the Code do not empower anyone to extend the
       period within which the investigation must be completed nor
       does it admit of any such eventuality. There are enactments
       such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)           C
       Act, 1985 and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime
       Act, 1999 which clearly contemplate extension of period and
       to that extent those enactments have modified the provisions
       of the Code including Section 167. In the absence of any
       such similar provision empowering the Court to extend the
       period, no court could either directly or indirectly extend            D
       such period. In any event of the matter all that the High
       Court had recorded in its order dated 03.07.2018 was the
       submission that the investigation would be completed within
       two months by a gazetted police officer. The order does not
       indicate that it was brought to the notice of the High Court           E
       that the period for completing the investigation was coming
       to an end. Mere recording of submission of the Public
       Prosecutor could not be taken to be an order granting
       extension. We thus reject the submissions in that behalf
       advanced by the learned counsel for the State and the
       complainant.”                                                          F
       14. The scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure as noticed above
clearly delineates that provisions of Section 167 of Code of Criminal
Procedure gives due regard to the personal liberty of a person. Without
submission of charge sheet within 60 days or 90 days as may be
applicable, an accused cannot be detained by the Police. The provision
                                                                              G
gives due recognition to the personal liberty.
       15. After noticing the purpose and object of Section 167, we now
come to the judgment of this Court dated 23.03.2020 which has been
relied and referred by learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment
for holding that the time period in Section 167(2) is eclipsed by judgement
of this Court dated 23.03.2020. The Order dated 23.03.2020 was passed         H
288            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A     by this Court in Suo Motu W.P.(C) No.3 of 2020. The entire order
      passed on 23.03.2020 is to the following effect: -
            “This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation
            arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account
            of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced
B           by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/
            applications/ suits/ appeals/all other proceedings within the
            period of limitation prescribed under the general law of
            limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State).
            To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/
C           litigants do not have to come physically to file such
            proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country
            including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of
            limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the
            limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws
            whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th
D
            March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court
            in present proceedings.
            We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with
            Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this
            order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141
E
            on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities.
            This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts
            for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals
            within their respective jurisdiction.
F           Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts,
            returnable in four weeks.”
              16. The reason for passing the aforesaid order for extending the
      period of limitation w.e.f. 15.03.2020 for filing petitions/ applications/
      suits/ appeals/all other proceedings are indicated in the order itself. Two
G     reasons, which are decipherable from the order of this Court dated
      23.03.2020 for passing the order are: -
                   i) The situation arising out of the challenge faced by the
                      country on account of Covid-19 virus and resultant
                      difficulties that are being faced by the litigants across
H                     the country in filing their petitions/ applications/ suits/
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                     289
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


                appeals/all other proceedings within the period of              A
                limitation prescribed.
             ii) To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/
                 litigants do not have to come physically to file such
                 proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across
                 the country including this Court.                              B
       17. The limitation for filing petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/
all other proceedings was extended to obviate lawyers/litigants to come
physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals. The
order was passed to protect the litigants/lawyers whose petitions/
applications/ suits/ appeals/all other proceedings would become time            C
barred they being not able to physically come to file such proceedings.
The order was for the benefit of the litigants who have to take remedy
in law as per the applicable statute for a right. The law of limitation
bars the remedy but not the right. When this Court passed the above
order for extending the limitation for filing petitions/ applications/ suits/
appeals/all other proceedings, the order was for the benefit of those           D
who have to take remedy, whose remedy may be barred by time
because they wereunable to come physically to file such proceedings.
The order dated 23.03.2020 cannot be read to mean that it ever intended
to extend the period of filing charge sheet by police as contemplated
under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The                     E
Investigating Officer could have submitted/filed the charge sheet before
the (Incharge) Magistrate. Therefore, even during the lockdown and
as has been done in so many cases the charge-sheet could have been
filed/submitted before the Magistrate (Incharge) and the Investigating
Officer was not precluded from filing/submitting the charge-sheet even
within the stipulated period before the Magistrate (Incharge).                  F

       18. If the interpretation by learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment is taken to its logical end, due to difficulties and due to present
pandemic, Police may also not produce an accused within 24 hours
before the Magistrate’s Court as contemplated by Section 57 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As noted above, the provision of              G
Section 57 as well as Section 167 are supplementary to each otherand
are the provisions which recognises the Right of Personal Liberty of a
person as enshrined in the Constitution of India. The order of this Court
dated 23.03.2020 never meant to curtail any provision of Code of
Criminal Procedure or any other statute which was enacted to protect            H
290            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A     the Personal Liberty of a person. The right of prosecution to file a charge
      sheet even after a period of 60 days/ 90 days is not barred. The
      prosecution can very well file a charge sheet after 60 days/90 days
      but without filing a charge sheet they cannot detain an accused beyond
      a said period when the accused prays to the court to set him at liberty
      due to non-filing of the charge sheet within the period prescribed. The
B
      right of prosecution to carry on investigation and submit a charge sheet
      is not akin to right of liberty of a person enshrined under Article 21
      and reflected in other statutes including Section 167, Cr.P.C. Following
      observations of Madras High Court in the impugned judgment are
      clearly contrary to the order dated 23.03.2020 of this Court: -
C            “...The Supreme Court order eclipses all provisions prescribing
             period of limitation until further orders. Undoubtedly, it eclipses
             the time prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal
             Procedure also...”
             19. Learned Single Judge in paragraph 13 of the impugned
D     judgment has also observed that the lockdown announced by the
      Government is akin to proclamation of Emergency. Learned Single Judge
      has also referred to Financial Emergency under Article 360 of the
      Constitution. Learned Single Judge also noticed that presently though
      the State is not passing through Emergency duly proclaimed but the
      whole nation has accepted the restrictions for the well-being of the
E
      mankind. Let us also examine as to whether in event of proclamation
      of Emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution,whether right to
      liberty as enshrined under Article 21 stands suspended?
             20. We may recall the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court
      in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur versus Shivakant
F     Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521, where majority of the Judges(Justice
      H.R. Khanna dissenting) had taken the view that after proclamation
      of Emergency under Article 352, no proceedings can be initiated for
      enforcement of right under Article 21. Justice A.N.Ray,C.J., with
      whom three other Hon’ble Judges have concurred in paragraph 136
G     and paragraph 137 laid down following:-
             “136. First, In view of the Presidential Order dated June 27,
             1975 under clause (1) of Article 359 of our Constitution no
             person has locus standi to move any writ petition under
             Article 226 before a High Court for Habeas Corpus or any
             other writ or order or direction to enforce any right to
H            personal liberty of a person detained under the Act on the
S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                291
    POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


   grounds that the order of detention or the continued                  A
   detention is for any reason not under or in compliance with
   the Act or is illegal or mala fide.
   137. Second, Article 21 is the sole repository of rights to life
   and personal liberty against the State. Any claim to a writ
   of habeas corpus is enforcement of Article 21 and, is,                B
   therefore, barred by the Presidential Order.”
   21. Another Three-Judge judgment of this Court in Union of
   India and others versus Bhanudas Krishna Gawde and
   others, (1977) 1 SCC 834, took the same view following the
   majority of this Court in ADM, Jabalpur versus Shivakant
   Shukla. In paragraph 23, following was observed: -                    C
   “23………Accordingly, if a person was deprived of his personal
   liberty not under the Defence of India Act or any rule or order
   made thereunder but in contravention thereof, his locus standi to
   move any court for the enforcement of his rights, conferred by
   Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution was not barred. More or        D
   less, similar was the pattern and effect of the presidential Order
   dated November 16, 1974. The position with respect to the
   Presidential Orders dated 27, 1975 and January 8, 1976 is,
   however, quite different. These orders are not circumscribed by
   any limitation and their applicability is not made dependent upon
   the fulfilment of any condition precedent. They impose a total        E
   or blanket ban on the enforcement inter alia of the fundamental
   rights conferred by Articles 19,21 and 22 of the Constitution which
   comprise all varieties or aspects of freedom of person
   compendiously described as personal liberty. [See A.K. Gopalan
   v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27; Kharak Singh v. State of
   U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 and A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant               F
   Shukla(supra).] Thus there is no room for doubt that the
   Presidential orders dated June 27, 1975, and January 8, 1976,
   unconditionally suspend the enforceability of the right conferred
   upon any person including a foreigner to move any court for the
   enforcement of the rights enshrined in Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22
   of the Constitution.”                                                 G
   22. Article 359 of the Constitution was amended by the Forty-
   fourth Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978. In sub-Article (1)
   of Article 359, the expression “except Articles 20 and 21 have
   been inserted”. After the amendment, Article 359(1) reads as
   follows:-                                                             H
   “
292            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A           Suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part
            III during emergencies.359(1). Where a Proclamation of
            Emergency is in operation, the President may by order
            declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement
            of such of the rights conferred by Part III (except articles
            20 and 21) as may be mentioned in the order and all
B
            proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the
            rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period
            during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter
            period as may be specified in the order”
            23. The sting of the judgment of this Court in Additional District
C     Magistrate, Jabalpur versus Shivakant Shukla (supra), and
      retrograde steps taken in respect of right protected under Article 21
      was, thus, immediately remedied by the Parliament by the above
      Constitutional Amendment. The minority judgment of Justice H.R.
      Khanna in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur versus
D     Shivakant Shukla (supra)has held that State has no power to deprive
      the person of his life or liberty without the authorities of law. In
      paragraphs 525 and 530, Justice Khanna observed:-
            “525....I am of the opinion that Article 21 cannot be
            considered to be the sole repository of the right to life and
            personal liberty. The right to life and personal liberty is the
E           most precious right of human beings in civilised societies
            governed by the rule of law. Many modern Constitutions
            incorporate certain fundamental rights, including the one
            relating to personal freedom. According to Blackstone, the
            absolute rights of Englishmen were the rights of personal
F           security, personal liberty and private property. The American
            Declaration of Independence (1776) states that all men are
            created equal, and among their inalienable rights are life,
            liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G           530. Even in the absence of Article 21 in the Constitution,
            the State has got no power to deprive a person of his life or
            liberty without the authority of law. This is the essential
            postulate and basic assumption of the rule of law and not
            of men in all civilised nations. Without such sanctity of life
            and liberty, the distinction between a lawless society and one
H           governed by laws would cease to have any meaning. The
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                   293
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


       principle that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty         A
       without the authority of law is rooted in the consideration
       that life and liberty are priceless possessions which cannot
       be made the plaything of individual whim and caprice and
       that any act which has the effect of tampering with life and
       liberty must receive sustenance from and sanction of the laws
                                                                              B
       of the land. Article 21 incorporates an essential aspect of
       that principle and makes it part of the fundamental rights
       guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. It does not,
       however, follow from the above that if Article 21 had not been
       drafted and inserted in Part III, in that event it would have
       been permissible for the State to deprive a person of his life         C
       or liberty without the authority of law. No case has been
       cited before us to show that before the coming into force of
       the Constitution or in countries under the rule of law where
       there is no provisions corresponding to Article 21, a claim
       was ever sustained by the courts that the State can deprive
                                                                              D
       a person of his life or liberty without the authority of
       law………………………………...”
       24. We may notice that the Constitution Bench Judgment of this
Court in A.D.M.,Jabalpur versus Shivakant Shukla (supra),
foundation of which judgment was knocked out by Forty-fourth
Constitutional Amendment has been formally over-ruled by Seven-               E
Judges Constitution Bench Judgment in K.S.Puttaswamy and another
versus Union of India and others, (2017) 10 SCC 1. Dr.
D.Y.Chandrachud,J.,speaking for the Court in paragraphs 136 and 139
held:-
       “136.The judgments rendered by all the four judges constituting        F
       the majority in ADM Jabalpur are seriously flawed. Life and
       personal liberty are inalienable to human existence. These rights
       are, as recognised in Kesavananda Bharati, primordial rights.
       They constitute rights under Natural law. The human element in
       the life of the individual is integrally founded on the sanctity of
       life. Dignity is associated with liberty and freedom. No civilized     G
       state can contemplate an encroachment upon life and personal
       liberty without the authority of law. Neither life nor liberty are
       bounties conferred by the state nor does the Constitution create
       these rights. The right to life has existed even before the advent
       of the Constitution. In recognising the right, the Constitution does   H
294             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A           not become the sole repository of the right. It would be
            preposterous to suggest that a democratic Constitution without
            a Bill of Rights would leave individuals governed by the state
            without either the existence of the right to live or the means of
            enforcement of the right. The right to life being inalienable to
            each individual, it existed prior to the Constitution and continued
B
            in force under Article 372 of the Constitution. Khanna, J. was
            clearly right in holding that the recognition of the right to life and
            personal liberty under the Constitution does not denude the
            existence of that right, apart from it nor can there be a fatuous
            assumption that in adopting the Constitution the people of India
C           surrendered the most precious aspect of the human persona,
            namely, life, liberty and freedom to the state on whose mercy
            these rights would depend. Such a construct is contrary to the
            basic foundation of the Rule of Law which imposes restraints
            upon the powers vested in the modern state when it deals with
            the liberties of the individual. The power of the Court to issue a
D
            Writ of Habeas Corpus is a precious and undeniable feature of
            the rule of law.
            139. ADM Jabalpur must be and is accordingly overruled. We
            also overrule the decision in Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna
            Gawde, which followed ADM Jabalpur.”
E
              25. We, thus, are of the clear opinion that the learned Single Judge
      in the impugned judgment erred in holding that the lockdown announced
      by the Government of India is akin to the proclamation of Emergency.
      The view of the learned Single Judge that the restrictions, which have
      been imposed during period of lockdown by the Government of India
F     should not give right to an accused to pray for grant of default bail even
      though charge sheet has not been filed within the time prescribed under
      Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is clearly erroneous
      and not in accordance with law.
            26. We, thus, are of the view that neither this Court in its order
G     dated 23.03.2020 can be held to have eclipsed the time prescribed under
      Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. nor the restrictions which have been imposed
      during the lockdown announced by the Government shall operate as
      any restriction on the rights of an accused as protected by Section
      167(2) regarding his indefeasible right to get a default bail on non-
      submission of charge sheet within the time prescribed. The learned
H
      Single Judge committed serious error in reading such restriction in the
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                295
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


order of this Court dated 23.03.2020.                                      A
       27. There is one more reason due to which the impugned
judgment of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. A learned
Single Judge of Madras High Court in Crl.OP(MD)No. 5291 of
2020,Settu versus the State, had already considered the judgment of
this Court dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto W.P(C)No.3 of 2020          B
and its effect on Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. The above was also a case of
a bail where the accused was praying for grant of default bail due to
non-submission of charge sheet. The prosecution had raised objection
and had relied on the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 passed in
Suo Moto W.P(C)No.3 of 2020 claiming that period for filing charge
sheet stood extended until further orders. The submission of prosecution   C
was rejected by learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge had
made following observations in paragraphs 14 and 15:-
      “14. Personal liberty is too precious a fundamental right.
      Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his
      personal liberty except according to procedure established           D
      by law. So long as the language of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.
      remains as it is, I have to necessarily hold that denial of
      compulsive bail to the petitioner herein will definitely amount
      to violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the
      Constitution of India. The noble object of the Hon’ble               E
      Supreme Court’s direction is to ensure that no litigant is
      deprived of his valuable rights. But, if I accept the plea of
      the respondent police, the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme
      Court which is intended to save and preserve rights would
      result in taking away the valuable right that had accrued to
      the accused herein.                                                  F

      15. Of course, the construction placed by me will have no
      application whatsoever in the case of certain offences under
      certain special laws, such as Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
      Act, 1967 and NDPS Act, 1985. For instance, Section 36-A
      (4) of the NDPS Act enables the investigation officer to apply       G
      to the special court for extending the period mentioned in
      the statute from 180 days to 1 year ifit is not possible to
      complete the investigation. Thus, under certain statutes, the
      prosecution has a right to apply for extension of time. In
      those cases, the benefit of the direction of the Hon’ble             H
296            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A           Supreme Court made 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition
            (Civil) No.3 of 2020 will apply. But, in respect of the other
            offences for which Section 167 of Cr.P.C. is applicable, the
            benefit of the said direction cannot be availed.”
            28. The Prayer of the accused in the said case for grant of
B     default bail was allowed. The claim of the prosecution that by order of
      this Court dated 23.03.2020, the period for filing charge sheet under
      Section 167 Cr.P.C. stands extended was specifically rejected.
             29. The view taken by learned Single Judge of Madras High Court
      in Settu versus The State (supra) that the order of this Court dated
C     23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto W.P(C)No.3 of 2020 does not extend
      the period for filing charge sheet under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. has been
      followed by Kerala High Court as well as Rajasthan High Court. Kerala
      High Court in its judgment dated 20.05.2020 in Bail Application No.
      2856 of 2020 –Mohammed Ali Vs. State of Kerala and Anr. after
      noticing the contention raised on the basis of order of this Court dated
D     23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto W.P(C)No.3 of 2020 rejected the said
      contention and followed the judgment of the learned Single Judge of
      Madras High Court in Settu versus The State (supra). Kerala High
      Court in paragraph 13 of the judgment observes: -
            “13. I respectfully concur with the exposition of law laid down
E           by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in
            Crl.O.P.(MD) No.5291 of 2020 as well by the learned Single
            Judge of Uttarakhand High Court when their lordships held that
            the investigating agency cannot benefit from the directions issued
            by the Supreme Court in the Suo moto Writ Petition.”
F            30. Rajasthan High Court had occasion to consider Section 167
      as well as the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto
      W.P(C)No.3 of 2020 and Rajasthan High Court has also come to the
      same conclusion that the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 has no
      consequence on the right, which accrues to an accused on non-filing
G     of charge sheet within time as prescribed under Section 167 Cr.P.C.
      Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 355
      of 2020 – Pankaj Vs. State decided on 22.05.2020 has also followed
      the judgment of learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Settu
      versus The State (supra) and has held that accused was entitled for
      grant of the default bail. Uttarakhand High Court in First Bail
H     Application No.511 of 2020 – Vivek Sharma Vs. State of
  S. KASI v. STATE THR. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SAMAYNALLUR                    297
      POLICE STATION MADURAI DISTT. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]


Uttarakhand in its judgment dated 12.05.2020 has after considering             A
the judgment of this Court dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto
W.P(C)No.3 of 2020 has taken the view that the order of this Court
does not cover police investigation. We approve the above view taken
by learned Single Judge of Madras High court in Settu versus The
State (supra) as well as the by the Kerala High Court, Rajasthan High
                                                                               B
Court and Uttarakhand High Court noticed above.
      31. Learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment has taken a
contrary view to the earlier judgment of learned Single Judge in Settu
versus The State (supra). It is well settled that a coordinate Bench
cannot take a contrary view and in event there was any doubt, a
coordinate Bench only can refer the matter for consideration by a              C
Larger Bench. The judicial discipline ordains so. This Court in State of
Punjab and another versus Devans Modern Breweries ltd. and
another, (2004) 11 SCC 26, in paragraph 339 laid down following:-
      “339.Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench
      follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a                 D
      coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law
      enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only
      to a Larger Bench. (See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod
      Chandra Patnaik, (2002) 1 SCC 1 followed in Union of India
      Vs. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273.But no decision can be                E
      arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down
      by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores (supra) and K.K.
      Narula (supra) both have been rendered by the Constitution
      Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out
      for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if
      applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by             F
      the majority.”
       32. Learned Single Judge did not follow the judicial discipline while
taking a contrary and diagonally opposite view to one which have been
taken by another learned Single Judge in Settu versus The State
(supra). The contrary view taken by learned Single Judge in the                G
impugned judgment is not only erroneous but also sends wrong signals
to the State and the prosecution emboldening them to act in breach of
liberty of a person.
     33. We may further notice that learned Single Judge in the
impugned judgment had not only breached the judicial discipline but has        H
298                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A     also referred to an observation made by learned Single Judge in Settu
      versus The State as uncharitable. All Courts including the High Courts
      and the Supreme Court have to follow a principle of Comity of Courts.
      A Bench whether coordinate or Larger,has to refrain from making any
      uncharitable observation on a decision even though delivered by a Bench
      of a lesser coram. A Bench sitting in a Larger coram may be right in
B
      overturning a judgment on a question of law, which jurisdiction a Judge
      sitting in a coordinate Bench does not have. In any case, a Judge sitting
      in a coordinate Bench or a Larger Bench has no business to make any
      adverse comment or uncharitable remark on any other judgment. We
      strongly disapprove the course adopted by the learned Single Judge in
C     the impugned judgment.
             34. In view of the foregoing discussions, we allow this appeal,
      set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge, direct that appellant be
      released on default bail subject to personal bond of Rs.10,000/- with
      two sureties to the satisfaction of trial court.
D
      Ankit Gyan                                                 Appeal allowed.




E




F




G




H