S.P. ANAND, INDOREversusH.D. DEVE GOWDA AND ORS.

A                           S.P. ANAND, INDORE
                                     v.
                       H.D. DEVE GOWDA AND ORS.

                              NOVEMBER 6, 1996

B           (A.M. AHMADI CJ. AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.]

        Constitution of India-Articles 74 and 75 (5; 163 and 164(4)-
  Appointment of .a non-member of either House of Parliament/State
  Legislature as Minister in Central/State Cabinet including that as Prime
  Minister/Chief Minister-Appointment Vf!lidfor a period ofsix consecutive
C months-If during that period the person so appointed is not elected to
  either House of Parliament/State Legislature, appointment to cease.

          Article 75-Appointment of a non-member of either House of
    Parliament as Prime Minister-Appointment valid as long as the appointee
    commands support and confidence of the House-Once appointed, the
D   Prime Minister and his Council ofMinisters become collectively answerable
    to the House-British convention that the Prime Minister should be a
    member of either House, preferably the House of Commons, is not in tune
    without Constitutional Scheme or recognised practice.

         Articles 32, 136-Public Interest Litigations-Expousing a public
E cause and invoking Court 'sjurisdiction seeking waiver oflocus standi rule-
    Not to be drafted in a casual and cavalier fashion-To be only drafted by
    persons having expert knowledge in the field after proper research-Casual
    approach to consider decisions ofSupreme Court not to be countenanced.

F        Public Interest Litigations-Withdrawal thereofonly with permission
    ofthe Court-Decision to be guided by considerations ofpublic interest so
    as not to result in the abuse of the process of law-On facts, in the present
    case, withdrawal was allowed as the same question was raised, for
    determination in different Courts.

G         The Petitioner, by means of a public interest litigation under
    Article 32 of the Constitution has challenged the appointment of Shri
    H.D. Deve Gowda, the then Prime Minister of India on the ground
    that he was not a member of either House of Parliament and therefore
    was not eligible to be so appointed by the President of India, The
    Petitioner inter alia prayed for an appropriate writ of this Court in
H   exercise of its powers for quashing of the said appointment alleging
                                        486
                  S.P. ANAND v. H. D. DEVE GOWDA                     487

that it was violative-of Articles 14, 21 and 75 of the Constitution. The A
said appointment of the then Prime Minister was also challenged in
writ petitions more or less on the same grounds in the High Courts of
Delhi and Calcutta which were duly dismissed by the High Courts.

     Dismissing the petition, this Court
                                                                           B
      HELD: 1.1. A comparative study of Art. 75(5) and Art. 164(4)
clearly shows that a person who is not a member of either House of
Parliament or of either House of State Legislature can be appointed
a Minister in Central Cabinet (which would include a Prime Minister)
or a Minister in the State Cabinet (which would include a Chief
Minister) as the case may be. 1492-F]                                C

      The provisions in Articles 74 and 75 deal with the appointment
of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head to aid
and advice the President. The provisions contained in Articles 164
and 165 which are also similar deal with the appointment of the
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head to aid and        D
advise the Governor in exercise of its functions. It is evident that the
Constitution-makers desired to permit such appointment for a period
of 6 consecutive months_ and if during the said period he was not
elected to either House, he would cease to be a Minister. 1491 CDI

     No material change has been brought about in the legal position       E
by reason of amendment of Article 173 (a) of the Constitution (the
corresponding provision in regard to Parliament is Art. 84 (a) ).

     Har Sharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh CM, UP, 11971] 1
SCC 616 Har Sharan Verma v. State of UP., 1198512 SCC 48 and Har
Sharan Verma v. UO.l, [19871 Supp. SCC 310, relied on.                     F
     1.2. It cannot be said that if a person who is not a member of
the House is chosen as Prime Minister, national interest would be
jeopardised or that it would run a great risk. Even if a person is not
a member of the House, if he has the support and confidence of the         G
House, he can be chosen to head the Council of Ministers without
violating the norms of democracy and the requirement of being
accountable to the House would ensure the smooth functioning of the
democratic process. 1498 D-FJ

     As envisaged by Article 75(1) the I.' resident has to act in accordance H
    488                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.


A with the advice of the Council of Ministers as a body and not go by the
    advice of any single individual. Only a person who, the President
    thinks, commands the confidence of the Lok Sabha would be appointed
    the Prime Minister who in turn would choose the other ministers. The
    Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House of
    People. Therefore, even though a Prime Minister is not a member of
8   either House of Parliament, once he is appointed he becomes answerable
    to the House and so also his Ministers and the principle of collective
    responsibility governs the democratic process. [497 GH, 498-Cf

          Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn) page 347 para 745,
    referred to.
c       1.3. The English convention that the Prime Minister should be a
  member of either House, preferably the House of Commons has neither
  been a recognised practice in our country nor is in tune with our
  Constitutional scheme since our Constitution permits a non-member
  to br appointed a Chief Minister or a Prime Minister for a short
D duration of six months. That is why in such cases when there is a
  doubt in the ;nind of the President, he normally asks the person
  appointed to seek a vote of confidence of the House of People within
  a few days of his appointment. In the past, persons who were not
  elected to State Legislatures have become Chief Ministers and those
  not elected to either House of Parliament have been appointed Prime
E Ministers. [498 F-H)
        2.1. A petition challenging the appointment to the high office of
  the Prime Minister of this country should not be drafted in a cavalier
  fashion betraying lack of study, research and seriousness. Those who
  invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of locus standi rule
F must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas
  wherein they are not well-ve"Sed. Such a litigant must remember that
  as a person seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public
  as well as to the Court that he does not rush to court without undertaking
  a research, even if he is qualified and competeD.t to raise the issue. It
  must also be borne in mind that no one has the right to the waiver of
G the locus standi rule and the court should permit it only when it is
  satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent bands of
  a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not
  moved by any other extraneous considerations. So also the court must
  be careful to ensure that the process of the court is not sought to be
H abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost
            S.P. ANANDv. H. D. DEVE GOWDA [AHMADI, CJ.]                489

carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filing a series of petitions         A
refusing to accept the Court's earlier decisions as concluding the point.
A casual approach tQ considered decisions of the court even by a person
well-versed in law would not be countenanced. (499 GH, 500 A-E]

     Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, (1984] I SCC 390 and
Mithilesh Kumar Sinha v. Returning Officer for Presidential Election,          B
(1993] Supp. 4 SCC 386, relied on.

      2.2. In PIL cases, the petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his
petition at his sweet will unless the court sees reason to permit
withdrawal. Io granting the permission, the Court would be guided
by considerations of public interest and would also ensure that it             C
does not result in abuse of the process of law. Courts must guard
against possibilities of such litigants settling the matters out of court
to their advantage and then seeking withdrawal of the case. There
are umpteen ways in which the process can be abused and the Courts
must be aware of the same before permitting withdrawal of the
petition. In this case however withdrawal was not allowed as the very          D
same question was raised from court to court. [499 C-E]

        CIV_IL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Wirt Petition (C) No. 850 of
1996.

        Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.                         E
        In-person for the Petitioner.

     A.H. Desai, Additional Solicitor General and P. Parmeswaran for
the Respondents.
                                                                               F
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

      AHMADI, CJI. Can a person who is not a member of either House
of Parliament be sworn in as the Prime Minister of India? That is the main
question of public important that the petitioner has raised in this petition   G
brought under Article 32 of the Constitution. According to the petitioner,
the first respondent, Shri H.D. Deve Gowda, the present Prime Minister
of India, not being a member of either House of Parliament was, under
the Constitution, not eligible to be appointed as the Prime Minister of
India and the President of India, Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, the third
respondent, committed a grave and serious Constitutional error in swearing     H
   490                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP.8 S.C.R.


A him in as the Prime Minister. This action of the third respondent, says the
  petitioner, is violative of Articles 14, 21 and 75 of the Constitution and,
  therefore, void ab initio and deserves to be quashed by an appropriate writ
  of this Court which may be issued in exercise of the powers conferred by
  Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner has also impleaded the Union
  of India, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the .Leader of the Muslim
B League in Lok Sabha (without naming the individual) as respondents 2, 4
  and 5 respectively.

         A Constitution Bench of this Court had occasion to consider whether
  a person who is not a member of either House of the State Legislature
  could be appointed a Minister of State and this question was answered in
C the affirmative on a true interpretation of Articles 163 and 164 of the
  Constitution which, in material particulars, correspond to Articles 74 and
  75 bearing on the question of appointment of the Prime Minister. In that
  case, Shri T.N. Singh was appointed the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh
  even though he was not a member of either House of the State Legislature
  on the date of his appointment. His appointment was challenged in the
D High Court by way of a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
  Constitution. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition but granted a
  certificate under Article 132 of the Constitution. That is how the matter
  reached this Court.

         Now, Article 164(4) provides that a Minister who for any period of
E six consecutive months is not a member of the Legislature of the State
  shall at the expiration of that period, cease to be Minister. It was, however,
  urged that on the plain language of the said provision, it is obvious that it
  speaks of appointment of a Minister who is a .member of the State
  Legislature but who loses his seat at a later date in which case he can
  continue as a Minister for a period of six months during which he must be
F re-elected or otherwise, must vacate office. Interpreting the said clause in
  the context of Article 163 and other clauses of Article 164, this Court held
  that Clause 4 of Article 164, had an ancient lineage and there was no
  reason to whittle down the plain thrust of the said provision by confining
  it to cases where a person being a member of the Legislature and a Minister,
G for some reason, loses his seat in the State. Accordingly, the decision of
  the High Court was affirmed. See Har Sharan Verma v. Shri Tribhuvan
  Narain Singh, Chief Minister, U.P. and Another, [1971} 1 SCC 616.

        The same petitioner again raised the issue when Shri K.P. Tiwari
  was appointed in November, 1984 as a Minister of the U.P. Government
H even though he was not a member of either House of the State Legislature.
           S.P. ANAND v. H. D. DEVE GOWDA [AHMADI, CJ.]                  491


He contended that the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Shri        A
T.N. Singh was not good law since the Court had overlooked the amendment
of Article l 73(a) effected by the Constitution (Sixteenth) Amendment
Act, 1963. [The corresponding provision in regard to Parliament is Article
84(a)]. Dealing with this contention this Court pointed out that the object
ofintroducing the amendment in clause (a) of Article 173 ofthe Constitution
was to provide that not only before taking his seat shall a member of            B
Legislature take the oath prescribed by the Third Schedule as required by
Article 188 of the Constitution but that even before standing for election
a candidate must take the same oath. This was to ensure that only a person
having allegiance to India shall be eligible for membership the Legislature.
The Court further pointed out that clause (4) of Article 164 of the
Constitution provides that a Minister (which includes a Chief Minister           C
also) who, for any period of six consecutive months, is not a member of
the Legislature of a State shall, at the expiration of that period cease to be
a Minister. In other words the Court held that a person who was not a
member of either House of the State Legisture could also be appointed by
the Governor as the Minister (which includes the Chief Minister) for a
period not exceeding six consecutive months. The Court, therefore, did           D
not see any material change brought about in the legal position by reason
of the amendment of Article 173(a) of the Constitution from that as
explained in the earlier' decision in Shri T.N. Singh 's case (supra). This
decision is reported as Har Sharan Verma v. State of U.P., [1985] 2 SCC
48.
                                                                                 E
      Not content with these two decisions rendered by this Court, the
very same petitioner once again questioned the appointment of Shri Sita
Ram Kesri as a Minister of State of the Central Cabinet since he was not a
member of either House of Parliament at the date of the appointment.
Spuming the challenge, this court held that to appoint a non-member of
the Parliament as a Minister did not militate against the constitutional         F
mechanism nor did it militate against the democratic principles embodied
in the Constitutfon.The Court, therefore, upheld the appointment under
Article 75(5) of the Constitution read with Article 88 thereof, which Article,
inter alia, conferred on every Minister the right to speak in, and otherwise
to take part in the proceedings of, either House, in joint sitting of the        G
Houses, and in a Committee of Parliament of which he may be named a
member. though not entitled to vote .. The Court, therefore, on a combined
reading of the aforesaid two provisions held that a person not being a
member of either House of Parliament can be appointed a Minister up to
a period of six months. This case came to be reported as Har Sharar
Verma v. Union of India and Another, [1987] Suppl. SCC 310.                      H
    492                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.


A         We may now refer to two decisions rendered by the High Courts of
    Delhi and Calcutta in which the appointment of the present Prime Minister
    Shri H.D. Deve Gowda was challenged on more or less the same ground.
    One Dr. Janak Raj Jai filed a writ petition No. 2408 of 1996 in which he
    questioned the appointment since the present Prime Minister was not a
    member of either House of Parliament on the date he was sworn-in by the
B   President of India as the Prime Minister of India. He contended that while
    under Article 75(5) a person can be appointed a Minister, he cannot be and
    should not be appointed a Prime Minister. Dealing with this submission
    the High Court, after referring to Articles 74 and 75 of the Constitution,
    held that "when Article 75(5) speaks of a "Minister" it takes within its
    embrace that Minister also who is described in the Constitution as Prime
C   Minister." In other words that High Court found that the Constitution did
    not make any distinction between the Prime Minister and other Ministers.
    The High Court dismissed the petition.

          In the Calcutta High Court C.0. No.1336 (w) of 1996 was filed by
    one Ashok Sen Gupta, a Senior Advocate, challenging the appointment of
D   Shri H.D. Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister of India on the ground that
    he was not eligible for appointment as he was not a member of either
    House of Parliament. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in a
    well considered Judgment held that Article 75(5) of the Constitution permits
    the President of Ind.ia to appoint a person who is not a member of either
    House of Parliament as a Minister, including a Prime Minister subject to
E   the possibility of his commanding the support of the majority of members
    of the Lok-Sabha. On this line of reasoning the petition was dismissed in
    Limi.ni.

          From the aforesaid three decisions of this Court and the High Courts
    it becomes clear that a person who is not a member of either House of
F   Parliament or of either House of a State Legislature can be appointed a
    Minister in the Central Cabinet (which would include a Prime Minister)
    or a Minister in the State Cabinet (which would include a Chief Minister),
    as the case may be. But the p~titioner herein remains not satisfied.

          The petitioner who argued the case in person with great passion,
G zeal and emotion, claiming to be concerned about the survival of the
    democratic process and the pristine glory of our constitutional scheme,
    submitted that if a person who is not the elected representative of the
    people of the country and in whom the people have not placed confidence,
    is allowed to occupy the high office of the Prime Minister on whom would
H   rest the responsibility of governing the Nation during peace and war (God
           S.P. ANAND v. H. D. DEVE GOWDA [AHMADI, CJ.]                    493


forbid), it would be talcing a great risk which the country can ill afford to      A
talce and, therefore, we should so construe the relevant provisions of the
Constitution as would relieve the country of such a risk. When his attention
was drawn to the case law aforementioned he stated that those decisions
were old and needed to be reconsidered in the changed circumstances. He
submitted his submissions in writing which are by and large a repetition
of the averments in the petition.                                                  B
       We cannot but observe that the averments in the petition are of a
rambling nature and lack cohesion. It is regrettable that a petition
challenging the appointment to the high office of the Prime Minister of
this country should have been drafted in such a cavalier fashion betraying
lack of study, research and seriousness. The petition abounds in casual and        C
irrelevant averrnents ranging from cases on freedom of speech to fraternity,
from judicial independence to judicial review, from civil code to cow
slaughter and so on and so forth. Jn fairness to the petitioner we must state
that he desired to refer to cases on these subjects but we did not permit
him as we thought it would be a sheer waste of public time. We, therefore,
asked him to confine himself to the principal issue, namely, whether a             D
person who is not a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed
a Prime Minister. Even on this point his submissions were more in the
nature of empty rhetoric than of substance. Jn fact on reading the petition
and his written submissions, the words of Chandrachud, C.J in Mithilesh
Kumar Sinha, etc. v. Returning Officer for Presidential Election and Ors,
etc., [1992] Supp. I SCR 651 come to mind:                                         E
             "It is regrettable that election petitions challenging the election
             to the high office of the President of India should be filed in
             a fashion as cavalier as the one which characterises these two
             petitions. The petitions have an extempore appearance and
             not even a second look, leave alone a second thought,                 F
             appears to have been given to the manner of drafting these
             petitions or to the contentions raised therein. In· order to
             discourage the filing of such petitions, we would have been
             justified in passing a heavy order of costs against the two
             petitioners."
                                                                                   G
       In order to appreciate the contention raised in this petition, and to
determine ifthe aforesaid decision on which the learned Attorney General
relied has any bearing on the point at issue in the present petition, it would
be advantageous to read Articles 74 and 75 in juxtaposition with Articles
163 and 164 of the Constitution:
                                                                                   H
    494                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.


A 74. Council of Ministers to           163. Council of Ministers to aid
  aide and ac!vise President ---        and advise Governor.--(!) There
  (I) There shall be a Counci I of      shall be a Council of Ministers
  Ministers with the Prime              with the Chief Minister at the
  Minister at the head to aid and       head to aid and advise the
  advise the President who shall,       Governor in the exercise of his
B in the exercise of his functions,     functions, except in so far as he
  act in accordance with such           is by or under this Constitution
  advice:                               required to exercise his functions
                                        or any of them in his discretion.

  [Provided that the President
C may require the Council of            (2) If any question arises whether
  Ministers to reconsider such          any matter is or is not a matter
  advice, either generally or           as respects which the Governor
  otherwise, and the President          is by or under this Constitution
  shall act in accordance with the      required to act in his discretion,
D advice tendered after such            the decision of the Governor in
  reconsideration.]                     his discretion shall be final, and
                                        the validity of anything done by
                                        the Governor shall not be called
    (2} The question whether any,       in question on the ground that he
    and if so what, advice was          ought or ought not to have acted
E   tendered by Ministers to the        in his discretion.
    President shall not be inquired
    into in any court.                  (3) The question whether any,
                                        and if so what, advice was
                                        tendered by Ministers to the
    75. Other provisions as to
                                        Governor shall not be inquired
F Ministers.----(!) The Prime           into in any court.
  Minister shall be appointed by
  the    President    and· the
  other Ministers shall be              164. Other provisions as to
  appointed by the President on         Ministers.---( I) The Chief
G the advice of the Prime               Minister shall be appointed by
  Ministers.                            the Governor and the other
                                        Ministers shall be appointed by
                                        the Governor on the advice of the
    (2) The Ministers shall hold        Chief Minister, and the Ministers.
    office during the pleasure of the   shall hold office during the
H   President.                          pleasure of the Governor:
          S.P. ANAND v. H. D. DEVE GOWDA (AHMADI, CJ.]                   495


(3) The Council of Ministers            Provided that in the States ofBihar, A
shall be collectively responsible       Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, there
to the House of the People.             shall be a Minister in charge of
                                        tribal welfare who may in addition
                                        be in charge of the welfare of the
(4) Before a Minister enters upon       Scheduled Castes and backward
his office, the President shall         classes or any other work.           B
administer to him the oaths
                                        (2) The Council of Ministers shall
of office and of secrecy
                                        be collectively responsible to the
according to the forms set out
                                        Legislative Assembly of the State.
for the purpose in the Third
Schedule.                               (3) Before a Minister enters upon C
                                        his office, the Governor shall
                                        administer to him the oaths of office
(5) A Minister who for any              and of secrecy according to the
period of six consecutive months        forms set out for the purpose in the
is not a member of either House         Third Schedule.
of Par! iament shall at the
expiration of that period cease to      (4) A Minister who for MY period         D
be a Minister.                          of six consecutive months is not a
                                        member of the Legislature of the
                                        State shall at the expiration of that
(6) The salaries and allowances         period cease to be a Minister.
of Ministers shall be such as
Parliament may from time to             (5) The salaries and allowances of       E
time by law determine and, until        Ministers shall be such as the
                                        Legislature of the State may from
Parliament so determines, shall
                                        time to time by law determine and,
be as specified in the Second           until the Legislature of the State so
Schedule.                               determines, shall be as specified in     F
                                        the Second Schedule.

       When we compare Articles 74 and 75 which Articles 163 and 164,
the first point of difference is that while the former deal with the President
and the.Prime Minister, the latter deal with the Governor and the Chief
Minister, Article 74(1) and Article 163(1) are substantially the same except     G
that the sentence beginning with 'except' and ending with 'discretion',
special to the Governor's function, is not to be found in Article 74(1). The
proviso to Article 74(1) which grants a special privilege to the President is
not to be found in Article 163(1) whereas clause (2) of Article 163 is not
to be fourd in Article 74, clause (2) to Article 163 is a corollary to the
exception clause in Article 163(1) and has no relevance to the issue on          H
    496                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.


A hand. Article 74(2) and Article 163(3) are verbatim the same.
          Article 75(1) and (2) are identical to Article 164(1) exceµt that in
    the case of the latter, the two clauses have been combined into one. The
    proviso to Article 164(1) which is special to States, is not to be found in
    Article 75. The rest of the Clauses of the two Articles are identical except
B   for consequentiai changes.

        On a plain reading of Article 75(5) it is obvious that the Constitution-
  makers desired to permit a person who was not a member of either House
  of Parliament to be appointed a Minister for a period of six consecutive
  months and if during the said period he was not elected to either House of
C Parliament, he would cease to be a Minister. This becomes clear if one
  were to read the debates of the Constituent Assembly (the draft Articles
  were 62 and 144 for the present Articles 75 and 164). Precisely on the
  ground that permitting such persons to be appointed Ministers at the Union
  or State levels would "cut at the very root of democracy", an amendment
  was moved to provide:"No person should be appointed a Minister unless
D at the time of his appointment, he is elected member of the House:" which
  amendment was spurned by Dr. Ambedkar in the following words:

                  "Now with regard to the first point,. namely that no person
                  shall be entitled to be appointed a Minister unless he is at the
                  time of his appointment an elected member of the House, I
E                 think it forgets to take into consideration certain important
                  matters which cannot be overlooked. First is this and it is
                  perfectly possible to imagine that person who is otherwise
                  competent to hold the post of a Minister has been defeated in
                  a constitutency for some reason and which, although it may
                  be perfectly good, might have annoyed the constituency and
F                 he might have incurred the displeasure of that particular
                  constituency. It is not a reason why a member so competent
                  as that should not be permitted to be appointed a member of·
                  the Cabinet on the assumption that he shall be able to get
                   himself elected from the same constituency or from another
                  constituency. After all the privileges that he is permitted is a
G                  privilege that extends only to six months. It does not confer
                   a right on that individual to sit in the House being elected at
                   all. My second submission is this that the fact that a nominated
                   Minister is a member of the Cabinet does not either violate
                   the principle of collective responsibility nor does it violate
                   the principle of confidence because he is a member of the
H
           S.P. ANAND v. H. D. DEVE GOWDA [AHMADI, CJ.]                    497


              cabinet if he is prepared to accept the policy of the Cabinet        A
              stands part of the Cabinet and resigns with the Cabinet when
              he ceases to have the confidence of the House, his
              membership of the Cabinet does not in any way cause any
              inconvenience or breach of the fundamental principles on
              which parliamentary government is based. Therefore, this
              qualification in my judgment is quite unnecessary."                  B
At the end of the discussion, the Constituent Assembly rejected the proposed
amendment. Furthermore, as pointed out in the decision of this Court,
[1987] Supp. SCC 310, such an appointment does not militate against the
democratic principles embodied in our Constitution. With respect, we agree.

      The petitioner then invited our attention to Halsbury' s Laws of
                                                                                   c
England (Third Edition) page 347 wherein at para 745 it is stated:" By
conventional usage the Prime Minister is invariably a member of either
House of Commons or House of Lords." footnote (i) proceeds to add that
the person selected is preferably to be a member of the House of Commons.
The petitioner further urged that even if the Constitution is construed-to         D
permit a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament to be
appointed a Minister for six months, there is nothing in Article 75(5) to
suggest that he can be appointed the Prime Minister of the country. He
urged that the status of the Prime Minister is distinct from that ofa Minister
and, therefore, it is essential that a person who occupies the high position
of a Prime Minister should be an elected representative of the people. This        E
submission overlooks the fact that the person who is appointed the Prime
Minister is chosen by the elected representatives of the people and can
occupy the position only if he enjoys the confidence of the majority of the
elected representatives in the Lok Sabha. Secondly, we must bear in mind
the scheme of our Constitution and if our constitution permits such
appointment, that should put an end to the controversy.                            F
      Now Article 75(1) envisages a Council of Ministers with the Prime
Ministor at the head to aid and advise the President, and the latter is expected
to act in accordance with such advice but ifhe has any reservations he may
require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice. Thus, the
President has to act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers     G
as a body and not go by the advice of any single individual. Only a person
who, the President thinks, commands the confidence of the Lok Sabha
would be appointed the Prime Minister who in turn would choose the
other Ministers. The Council of Ministers is made collectively responsible
to the House of the People. The form of the oath prescribed in the Third           H
   498                     SUPREMECOURTREPORT5 [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.


A Schedule under Article 75(4) is the same for the Prime Minister as well as
  a Minister. In other words, the Constitution does not draw any distinction
  between the Prime Minister and any other Minister in this behalf. This is
  not to sa7 that the Prime Minister does not enjoy a special status; he does
  as the he~d of the Council of Ministers but the responsibility of the Council
  of Minislers to the House of the People is collective. Besides, the caption
B of article 75 as a whole is "other provisions as to Ministers." No separate
  provision is to be found dealing with the appointment of the Prime Minister
  as such. Therefore, even though the Prime Minister is appointed by the
  President after he is chosen by such number of members of the House of
  the people as would ensure that he has the confidence of the House and
  would be able to command the support of the majority, and the Ministers
C are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, the entire Council of
  Ministers is made collectively responsible to the House and that ensures
  the smooth functioning of the democratic machinery. If any Minister does -
  not agree with the majcrity decision of the Council of Ministers, his option
  is to resign or accept the majority decision. If he does not, the Prime
  Minister would drop him from his cabinet and thus ensure collective
D responsibility. Therefore, even though a Prime Minister is not a member
  of either House of Parliament, once he is appointed he becomes answerable
  to the House and so also his Ministers and the principle of collective
   responsibility governs the democratic process. Even if a person is not a
  member of the House, if he has the support and confidence of the House,
  he can be chosen to head the Council of Ministers without violating the
E norms of democracy and the requirement of being accountable to the House
   would ensure the smooth functioning of the democratic process. We,
   therefore, find it difficult to subscribe to the petitioner's contention that
   if a person who is not a member of the House is chose as Prime Minister,
   national interest would be jeopardised or that we would be running a great
   risk. The English convention that the Prime Minister should be a member
F of either House, preferably House of Commons, is not our constitutional
   scheme since our Constitution clearly permits a non-member to be
   appointed a Chief Minister or a Prime Minister for a shori duration of six
   months. That is why in such cases when there is any doubt in the mind of
   the President, he normally asks the person appointed to seek a vote of
G confidence of the House of the People within a few days of his appointment.
    By parity of reasoning if a person who is not a member of the State
   Legislature can be appointed a Chief Minister of a State under Article
    164(4) for six months, a person who is not a member of either House of
    Parliament can be appointed Prime Minister for the same duration. We
    must also bear in mind the fact that conventions grow from long-standing
H accepted practice or by agreement in areas where the law is silent and such
           S.P. ANAND v. H. D. DEVE GOWDA [AHMADI, CJ.]                  499


a convention would not breach the law but fill the gap. If we go by that         A
principle, the practice in India has been just the opposite. In the past,
persons who were not elected to State Legislatures have become Chief
Ministers and those not elected to either House of Parliament have been
appointed Prime Ministers. We are, therefore, of the view that the British
Convention to which the petitioner has referred is neither in.June with our
constitutional scheme nor has it been a recognised practice in our country.      B
       The petitioner had contended before this Court when his petition
 was called on for hearing on 30.7.1996 that he had filed a similar petition
 bearing No.774 of 1996 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court and that the
 High Court had ordered notice to issue exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. He sought permission to withdraw his petition.          C
 Here we must mention that in PIL cases, the petitioner is not entitled to
withdraw his petition at his sweet-will unless the Court sees reason to
permit withdrawal. In granting the permission the Court would be guided
by considerations of Public interest and would also ensure that it does not
result in abuse of the nrocess oflaw. Courts must guard against possibilities
of such litigants settling the matters out of the court to their advantage and   D
then seeking withdrawal of the case. There are umpteen ways in which the
process can be abused and the courts must be aware of the same before
permitting withdrawal of the petition. This is not to say that this was one
such case. Here we did not allow withdrawal as we noticed that the very
same question was being raised from court to court. It was raised in the
High Courts of Delhi and Calcutta. Notwithstanding the decisions rendered        E
in the said two cases, to which we have already referred, we were informed
by the petitioner himself that he had raised the issue in the Madhya Pradesh
High Court and another such petition was filed in the Allahabad High
Court. To avoid such snowballing leading to multiplicity of cases we thought
it in public interest to examine the issue with a view of avoiding conflict
of opinions. That is the reason why we refused to permit withdrawal of           F
the petition and decided to settle the issue of law one way or the other,
which we do by this decision.

       Before we part, we cannot help mentioning that on issues of
constitutional laws, litigants who can lay no claim to have expert knowledge
in t.hat field should refrain from filing petitions, which if we may say so, G
are often drafted in a casual and cavalier fashion giving an extempore
appearance not having had even a second look. This is the impression that
one gets on reading the present petition. It is of utmost importance that
those who invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus
standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in H
    500                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.


A areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb
  to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-errant roaming at will
  in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person
  seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the
  court that he does not rush to court without undertaking a research, even if
  he is quali_fied or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be
B remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are filed on half-
  baked information without proper research or by persons who are not
  qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a
  petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind
  that no one has a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the court
  should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is
C in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public
   interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the
  court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought
  to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view,
   almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filing a series of petitions
   refusing to accept the court's earlier decisions as concluding the point. We
D say this because when we drew the attention of the petitioner to earlier
   decisions of this Court, he brushed them aside, without so much as showing
   willingness to deal with them and without giving them a second look, as
   having become state and irrelevant by passage of time and challenged
   their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration.
   Except for saying that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to
E the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered
   decisions of this Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be
   countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having
   no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases,
    freedom of speech and expression, uniform civil code, etc. we need say no
   more except to point out that indiscriminate use of this important lever of
F public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself.
         We would have ordered the petitioner to pay the cost of this petition
  but we refrain from doing so on this occasion in the hope that he will
  exercise restraint in future, failing which he may in a similar or like case
  be visited with an order of cost. With these observations we dismiss the
G petition. The interim order staying proceedings pending elsewhere shall
  stand vacated with a direction that they shall be disposed of in the light
  hereof.

     R.D.                                                    Petition dismissed.