Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 354 IPC, held that knowledge of outrage of modesty suffices, accepted the delayed complaint, rejected reliance on uncorroborated handwriting expert evidence, affirmed the sufficiency of a single reliable eye‑witness, admitted the statements under Section 157, and reduced the sentence to the time already served.

Summary

S.P.S. Rathore, a senior police officer, was convicted under Section 354 IPC for molesting a minor girl, Ruchika, after she was forced into his office and embraced against her will. The prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of a single eye‑witness, PW‑13 (Aradhana), whose account was corroborated by other witnesses and a memorandum signed by the victim in the presence of several persons. The Supreme Court examined whether the delay of six days in filing the complaint was condonable, whether the handwriting expert’s opinion on the alleged forged signature could be decisive, and whether statements recorded by a non‑statutory authority were admissible. It held that knowledge that a woman’s modesty would be outraged suffices for Section 354, the delay was explainable, handwriting expert evidence is weak without corroboration, a single reliable eye‑witness is sufficient, and the statements under Section 157 are admissible. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already served due to the appellant’s advanced age and health.

Issues considered

Whether the conduct alleged constitutes an offence under Section 354 IPC, and if knowledge or intention is required.
Whether a six‑day delay in lodging the complaint is a ground for condonation.
Whether the handwriting expert’s opinion on the alleged forged signature can be relied upon for conviction.
Whether adverse inference can be drawn from the non‑examination of certain site witnesses.
Whether the testimony of a single eye‑witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Whether statements recorded by Shri R.R. Singh, a non‑statutory authority, are admissible under Section 157 of the Evidence Act.
Whether mitigating factors justify reduction of the sentence.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 354 IPCoutraging modestymolestationevidence lawhandwriting expertdelay in complaintsingle eye‑witnesssentence mitigation

Judgment

(2016] 5 S.C.R. 335

S.P.S. RATHORE A
v.
C.B.I. & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2126 of2010)
SEPTEMBER 23, 2016 B

(V. GOPALA GOWDA AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
s.354 - Essential ingredients - Discussed - In the instant case,
appellant-accused, a very senior police officer of ihe State molested c
minor girl - PW-13 witnessed that the victim was in the grip of
appellant-accused who was holding one hand of victim in his hand
and his other hand was around her waist and he was pulling her
towards his chest so as to embrace her while the victim was trying
to push him back with her free hand-PW-13 withstood her testfmony
from beginning till the end and her deposition was found reliable D
and corroborative with other prosecution wit11esses - Both the courts
below rightly convicted the appellant-accused uls.354 of the !PC -
Crime against wome11 - Outraging modesty of a woman.
s.354 - Delay i11 presenting complaint of molestation - field:
Jn the instant case, appellant-accused, was a very senior,police E
officer of the State - Victim was unmarried minor girl - In the normal
course of hu111an conduct, this unmarried minor girl, would not like
to give publicity to the traumatic experience she had u11dergone
and felt terribly embarrassed in relation to the incident to 11arrate it
to her parents and others overpowered by a feeling of shame and
her natural incli11ation would be to avoid talking about it to anyone, F
lest the family name and honour is brought into controversy - Delay
of 6 days ill presenting the complaint duly explained a11d, therefore,
condonable.
Criminal lmv:
Knowledge that the act amounts to committing an offence - . G
Held: If intention or knowledge is one of the ingredients of any
offence, it has got to be proved like other ingredients for convicting
a person - But, it is also equally true that those ingredients being
state of 111i11d may 11ot be proved by direct evidence and may have to
be inferred from the attending circumstances of a given case. H
335
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A Evidence:
Adverse inference against the prosecution - Held: Can be
drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account
of its failure to obtain certain evidence.
Handwriting expert - Evidentiary value of - Held:
B Uncorroborated evidence of a hand writing expert is an extremely
weak type of evidence and the same should not be relied upon either
for the conviction or for acquittal - The courts, should, therefore,
be wary to give too much weight tq the evidence of handwriting
expert - It can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence
- Before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated
c either by clear, direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
Sole eye witness - Evidentiary value of - Held: No particular
number of witnesses is required for proving a certain fact - It is the
quality and not the quantity of the witnesses that matters - Evidence
is weighed and not counted - Evidence of even a single eye witness,
D truthful, consistent and inspiring confidence is sufficient for
maintaining conviction - It is not necessary that all those persons
who were present at the spot must be examined by the prosecution
in order to prove the guilt of the accused.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
E HELD: 1. In order to constitute the offence under Section
354 of the IPC, mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is
likely to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention
of having such outrage alone for its object. There is no abstract
conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. The essential
F ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman; (ii) that the
accused must have used criminal force on her; and (iii) that the
criminal force must have been used on the woman intending
thereby to outrage her modesty. If intention or knowledge is one
of the ingredients of any offence, it bas got to be proved like
G other ingredients for convicting a person. But, it is also equally
true that those ingredients being state of mind may not be proved
by direct evidence and may have to be inferred from the attending
circumstances of a given case. The sequence of events in the
instant case indicates that the appellant-accused had the requisite
H culpable intention. [Paras 22, 24] (354-F-H; 355-D]
S.P.S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 337

2. With regard to the delay of about 6 days in presenting A
the complaint to the SHO, the same has been duly explained. In
a tradition-bound non-permissive society in India, it would be
extremely reluctant to admit that any incident which is likely to
reflect upon chastity of a woman had occurred, being conscious
of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked
B
down by the society. In the instant case, the victim not informing
about the incident to the parents under the circumstances that
the appellant-accused, who being a very senior police officer of
the State, was reasonable and it would not have been an easy
decision for her to speak out. After informing the incident to her
parents, the follow up action was immediately taken by the c
residents and the fellow players and a Memorandum containing
allegations against the appellant-accused was prepared and
submitted before the then Secretary (Home). Therefore, giving
a due consideration to the appellant-accused, once the victim
and her family members got assurance of justice from the superior
D
authorities, they lodged a formal complaint against the appellant-
accused. [Para 26) [355-G-H; 356-A, C-D]
3. The appellant-accused contended that the signature of
the victim on the Memorandum was forged though she signed
the same in from of complainant and others. Acting on the
evidence of any expert, it is usually to see if tha"t evidence is E
corroborated either by clear, direct or circumstantial evidence.
The sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally
sufficient for recording a definite finding about the writing being
of a certain person or not. A court is competent to compare the
disputed writing of a person with others which are admitted or F
proved to be his writings. It may not be safe for a court to record
a finding about a person's writing in a certain document merely
on the basis of expert comparison, but a court can itself compare
the writings in order to appreciate properly the other evidence
produced before it in that regard. The opinion of a handwriting
expert is also relevant in view of Section 45 of the Evidence Act, G
but that too is not conclusive. It is thus clear that uncorroborated
evidence of a hand writing expert is an extremely weak type of
evidence and the same should not be relied upon either for the
conviction or for acquittal. [Paras 27, 30) (356-D-G; 358-C]
H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A 4. With regard to the contention that non-examination of
two important site witnesses viz., the ball picker and the Coach
draws adverse inference against the prosecution, the High Court
has rightly held that adverse inference against the prosecution
can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely
on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. Moreover,
B
they were not in any way connected with the actual commission
of offence and even in their absence, the commission of the
offence of molestation by the appellant-accused stands well
proved by the unimpeachable testimony of the eye witness (PW-
13) to the incident. [Para 321 [358-G-H; 359-AI
c 5. No particular number of witnesses is required for proving
a certain fact. Evidence of even a single eye witness, truthful,
consistent and inspiring confidence is sufficient for maintaining
conviction. It is not necessary that all those persons who were
present at the spot must be examined by the prosecution in order
D to prove the guilt of the accused. PW-13 withstood her testimony
from beginning till the end and her deposition was found reliable
and corroborative with other prosecution witnesses and both the
courts below were right in upholding the conviction of the
appellant-accused under Section 354 of the IPC. [Paras 33, 34)
(359-B, DJ
E
6. With regard to sentence of the appellant-accused, certain
mitigating factors pointed out were - old age of the appellant-
accused, health ailments, responsibility of looking after the
unmarried daughter suffering from congenital hem·t disease, past
meritorious service and prolonged trial. Keeping in view these
F factors especially the old age and physical condition of the
appellant-accused, the sentence of the appellant~accused is
reduced to the period already undergone by him as a special case
considering his very advanced age. [Para 351 [359-E-F]
Vidyadharan vs. State of Kera/a (2004) 1 SCC 215:2003
G (5) Suppl. SCR 524; Tarkeshwar Sahu vs. State of Bihar
(2006) 8 SCC 560 : 2006 (7) Suppl. SCRIO; Mobarik
Ali Ahmed vs. The State. of Bombay AIR 1957 SC
857:1958 SCR 328; Smt, Bhagwan Kaur vs. Shri
Maharaj Krishan Sharma & Ors.(1973) 4 SCC 46 :
H 1973 (2) SCR 702 - relied on.
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.8.1. & ANR. 339

Case Law Reference A
2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 524 relied on Para23
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 10 relied on Para 25
1958 SCR 328 relied on Para28
19?~ (2) SCR 702 relied on Para29
B
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2126 of2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2010 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision No. 1558 of
2010. c
K. V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Priyanjali Singh, Dhananjay
Ray, Mehul M. Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Adv., Raj iv Nanda, Ajay Sharma,
B. V. Bairam Das, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Vikas Mehta, Ms. Anushree
Menon, Advs. for the Respondents. D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. K. AGRAWAL, J. I.This appeal has been filed against the
judgment and order dated 01.09.20 I0 passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision No. 1558 of 2010
whereby learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the revision· E
petition filed by the appellant herein.
2. Brief facts:
(a) SPS Rathore-the appellant-accused, a member of the prestigious
service of the country, was on deputation with Bhakhra Beas F
Management Board (BBMB), Chandigarh as Director (Vigilance &
Security) at the relevant time. He also founded the Haryana Lawn
Tennis Association (HLTA) in the year 1988.
(b) The office of HLTA was established in the garage of House No.
469, Sector 6, Panchkula, an under construction building owned by the G
appellant-accused which was divided into three portions wherein front
portion was being used as the office ofHLTAand the other two portions
were being utilized by T. Thomas and Kuldeep Singh, Coach and
Manager respectively of the Association for residential purposes. HLTA
enrolled several member players who were mostly nearby residents of
Panchkula on payment of monthly subscription. H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A (c) Ms. Ruchika (since deceased), daughter ofShri S.C. Girhotra and
Ms. Aradhana @ Reemu, daughter of Shri Anand Prakash and Madhu
Prakash (the complainant), both aged about 15 years, residents of
Panchkula got themselves enrolled as members of the HLTA. Both of
them were good friends and used to go together for practice at the
Tennis court. The appellant-accused was also a frequent visitor to the
B
said Tennis court. One day, when Ms. Ruchika informed the appellant-
accused about her plan to go abroad, the appellant-accused met her
father-Shri S.C. Girhotra on 11.08.1990 in order to persuade him to not
to send his daughter out of the country for specialized tennis coaching
and promised that special coaching would be arranged for her at HLTA
c itself and also asked him to send Ruchika to his office on the very next
day in connection with the same. Shri Girhotra informed the same to his
daughter-Ruchika and asked her to meet the appellant-accused in his
office on 12.08.1990.
(d) On 12.08.1990, Ms. Ruchika visited the house of Ms. Aradhana and
D told her about the visit of the appellant-accused to her house and also
that he had called her in his office. When both of them were practicing
in the tennis court, Paltoo-the ball picker, informed Ms. Ruchika that the
appellant-accused had called her in his office. Accordingly, Ms. Ruchika
along with Ms. Aradhana went to meet the appellant-accused who was
standing outside the office at that particular point of time. The appellant-
E accused insisted them to come inside the office. On his insistence, both
the girls went inside the office. The appellant-accused got fetched one
chair which was occupied by Ms. Aradhana and Ms. Ruchika kept
standing on the right side of Ms. Aradhana while the appellant-accused
sat in his chair which was on the other side of the table. The appellant-
F accused requested Ms. Aradhana to call for Mr. Thomas-the Coach.
Accordingly, Ms. Aradhana went outside leaving behind the appellant-
accused and Ms. Ruchika in the office. Ms. Aradhana asked the person
who fetched the chair for her in the office to inform the Coach to come
to the office of the appellant-accused. However, the Coach refused to
come.
G (e) Immediately thereafter, when Ms. Aradhana returned to the office,
she witnessed that Ms. Ruchika was in the grip of the appellant-accused,
who was holding one hand of Ruchika in his hand and his other hand
was around her waist. The appellant-accused was pulling her towards
his chest so as to embrace her and Ruchika was trying to push him back
H with her free hand.
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 341
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

(f) On seeing Ms. Aradhana (PW-13), the appellant-accused got A
frightened and released Ms. Ruchika and fell on his chair. The appellant-
accused asked Ms. Aradhana to go out of his room again and personally
bring the coach with her. The appellant-accused insisted Ruchika to
stay in his room, but she somehow managed to escape. When Aradhana
was about to go behind Ruchika, the appellant-accused told her "Ask
B
her to cool down, I will do whatever she will say". After listening to this,
Ms. Aradhana also ran behind Ms. Ruchika to enquire about the matter.
Thereafter, Ruchika narrated the whole incident to her. After discussion,
both the girls decided not to inform the same to their parents as the
appellant-accused, being IG of Police, could involve or harass them and
their parents. c
(g) On 14.08.1990, Ms. Ruchika along with Ms. Aradhana went to the
lawn tennis court at about 4:30 p.m., instead of their usual timing, in
order to avoid the appellant-accused, who used to visit the court in the
evening. When both the girls were about to return, at about 6:30 p.m.,
Mr. Paltoo-the ball picker, came out of the court and told Ms. Ruchika D
that the appellant-accused had called her in his office. However, Ms.
Ruchika refused to meet him and pointed out to Ms. Aradhana that
since they had not informed their parents about the mis-behaviour of the
appellant-accused on 12.08.1990, the appellant-accused was feeling
emboldened and had again called her to his office with a view to molest
her. Thereafter, both of them decided to disclose the incident that took E
place on 12.08.1990 to their respective parents. Accordingly, Ruchika
narrated the incident of her molestation at the hands of the appellant-
accused to her father, Shri S. C. Girhotra. Also, the parents of Ms.
Aradhana were made aware of the entire incident.
(h) On hearing this, Shri S.C. Girhotra, gathered the residents of the F
locality, who were mostly parents of trainee boys and girls, and they
went to the HLTA office to meet the appellant-accused but they were
informed that the appellant-accused had already left for Chandigarh.
On 15.08.1990, a Memorandum/petition, duly signed by Ms. Ruchika,
Ms. Aradhana, Mr. Anand Prakash and Ms. Madhu Prakash-father and G
mother of Ms. Aradhana, was presented to the then Secretary (Home),
Haryana. Afterthe approval of the Home Minister, Shri R.R. Singh, the
then DGP was directed to hold an inquiry into the allegations leveled
against the appellant-accused in the Memorandum/petition.
(i) After conducting the enquiry into the incident, Shri R.R. Singh
H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A concluded that the allegation of molestation is based on true facts and a
cognizable case is made out against the appellant-accused under the
provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the !PC') and
forwarded his enquiry report dated 03.09.1990 to the Secretary (Home),
Government of Haryana.
B U) During investigation it was also revealed that after the incident of
molestation, Ms. Ruchika confined herself in her house. Later, on
28.12.1993, she committed suicide by consuming poison and died on
29.12.1993.
(k) The enquiry report by Shri R.R. Singh was examined by the Legal
c Division of the Government of Haryana in 1990 and 1992 which also
recommended for registration of a case against the appellant-accused.
Madhu Prakash-the complainant/Respondent No. 2 herein requested
several authorities in the Government of Haryana for registration of a
case but no action was taken on which she filed a Criminal Writ Petition
being No. 1694 of 1997 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
D The High Court, vide order dated 21.08.1998, issued direction to the
Superintendent of Police, Panchkula that after registration of the case,
the investigation shall be handed over to the Central Bureau oflnvestigation
(CBI) and the same shall be conducted by an officer not below the rank
of DIG. This Court, by its order dated 14.12.1999, upheld the order of
E the High Court dated 21.08.1998 which culminated into registration of a
First Information Report (FIR) being No. 516 of 1999 under Sections
354 and 509 of the !PC at PS Panchkula, Haryana against the appellant-
accused.
(I) The CBI filed charge-sheet dated 16.11.2000 before the Court of
F Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ambala under Section 354 of the IPC.
A petition under Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(in short 'the Code') was filed by the CBI for condoning the delay in
filing the charge sheet and for taking cognizance which was allowed by
the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate, by his order dated 05.12.2000.
Being aggrieved by the order dated 05.12.2000, the appellant-accused
G preferred Writ Petition (C~iminal) being No. 46381 of2000 before the
High Court challenging the condonation of delay. The High Court, by its
order dated 18.04.200 I dismissed the petition with a direction to the trial
court to dispose of the case preferably within six months.
(m) Further, a petition was filed for addition of Section 306 IPC in the
H charge sheet which was allowed by an order of the Trial Court dated
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 343
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

23. I0.200 I. Being aggrieved by the order dated 23 .I 0.200 I, the appellant- A
accused preferred Criminal Misc. Petition being No. 44607-M/201 I
before the High Court. The High Court, by its order dated 12.02.2002,
set aside the order dated 23. I0.200 I passed by the Trial Court. In appeal,
this Court also upheld the order dated 12.02.2002 passed by the High
Court.
B
(n) The Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, by its judgment
and order dated 21.12.2009 in Challan No. 3/17-11-2000, 12 T/10.04.2006
RBTI 91/17-11-2009, held the appellant-accused guilty of offence under
Section 354 of the !PC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment
(RI) for six months along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. Being aggrieved by
the judgment and order dated 21.12.2009, the appellant-accused preferred c
Criminal Appeal being No. 5 of 12.01.20 I0 before the Court ofAdditional
Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. The CBI and Madhu Prakash-Respondent
No. 2 herein also preferred Criminal Appeal being Nos. 26of12.01.20 I 0
and 22 of05.02.20 I0 respectively, before the Court for enhancement of
sentence. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, by his order D
dated 25.05.2010 dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-accused
while allowing the appeals filed by the CBI and Madhu Prakash for
inadequacy of the sentence and for enhancement of sentence of
imprisonment and the appellant-accused was awarded with rigorous
imprisonment for 1 Yi years (one and a halt) for committing offence
under Section 354 of the !PC. The sentence of fine remained unchanged. E

(o) Being aggrieved of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, the
appellant-accused preferred Criminal Revision being No. 1558 of2010
before the High Court. The High Court, by its order dated 01.09.2010,
dismissed the revision filed by the appellant-accused.
F
(p) Aggrieved by the above said order, the appellant-accused has
preferred this petition by way of special leave before this Court. This
Court, by its order dated 11 .11.2010, has allowed the petition filed by the
appellant-accused for bail.
3. Heard Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel for the G
appellant-accused and Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel
for the CBI and Shri Vikas Mehta, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2.
Rival contentions:
4. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-accused contended
H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A that given the situation of the HLTA make shift office in a garage at the
relevant point of time along with the presence of a number of people
including labourers, it would be impossible to even try for such an act,
knowing well that the act can be seen by others. Learned senior counsel
further contended that the prosecution story is absolutely false and
frivolous and the appellant-accused has been framed in the present case
B
by the complainant party and the high level officers of the State with an
ulterior motive. The appellant-accused neither visited the house of Shri
S.C. Girhotra nor asked for a meeting with Ruchika on 12.08.1990 in
HLTA office. It was further argued that the Memorandum/petition has
been drafted after prolonged consideration and deliberation by several
c interested persons including some senior police officers of the State of
Haryana. The name of the players who were allegedly accompanying
Ms. Ruchika at the relevant time has not been mentioned in the
Memorandum intentionally and later on Ms. Aradhana has been planted
as 'Sathi Khiladi'. It was contended that the words 'Sathi Khiladi' have
been mentioned in the Memorandum for the purpose of introducing an
D
eye witness of choice. Learned senior counsel further contended that
the signature of Ms. Ruchika on the alleged Memorandum is false and
forged and on this ground, the document cannot be relied upon. This
document does not disclose the details of the incident and merely suggests
that the appellant-accused misbehaved with Ms. Ruchika which does
E not attract Section 354 of the IPC.
5. Learned senior counsel further contended that no complaint
was filed by Ms. Ruchika or her father Shri S.C. Girhotra or Shri Ashu
- elder brother of Ms. Ruchika or Mrs. Madhu Prakash (PW-2) or Sh.
Anand Prakash (PW-I) or by Ms. Aradhana (PW-13) in the police station.
F Even after 14.08.1990, when Ms. Ruchika and Ms. Aradhana allegedly
informed their parents, none of them approached the police to get the
FIR registered. The police post, Sector 6, Panchkula is at a distance of
300 yards only from the tennis court. It is situated very near to the
house of Shri S.C. Girhotra also. In thiS way undue and unexplained
delay resulted in manipulations and proper version could not be put forth
G before the court.
6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-accused further
contended that the inquiry conducted by Shri R.R. Singh was without
jurisdiction as the appellant-accused, at the relevant point of time, was
on deputation with the BBMB and was not under the administrative
H
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.l. & ANR. 345
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

control of the Government of Haryana. He further contended that the A
IAS lobby in the Government of Haryana was entirely against the
appellant-accused and it had colluded with Shri Anand Prakash (PW-1)
and others against the appellant-accused. He further pointed out the
reason that there was rivalry between the two tennis associations, one
headed by the appellant-accused and one formed later on by the IAS
B
group with Shri J.K. Duggal, Secretary (Home) as its President with the
patronage of Shri B.S. Ojha. It was further contended from the side of
the appellant-accused that before forming the Haryana Tennis Association
(HTA), the IAS lobby pressurized the appellant-accused to step down
from the Presidentship of HLTA in favour of Shri B.S. Ojha to which
the appellant-accused refused which annoyed Shri B.S. Ojha, who had c
strong reasons for ordering the enquiry by Shri R.R. Singh and police
officers .working under him had organized the drafting of the said
Memorandum against the appellant-accused. The enquiry conducted
by Shri R.R. Singh cannot be relied upon because no enquiry could be
marked to him and also he has not held the enquiry in proper manner. It
D
was further submitted by learned senior counsel that the media has played
a negative role in the present case and published the selective news
items only in collusion with the complainant party. The material witnesses
like ball picker - Paltoo and Coach - K.T. Thomas, who were allegedly
present at the place of alleged incident, have not been examined by the
prosecution. Further, the witnesses have made a lot of improvements E
and there are other discrepancies also in the statements of witnesses
and therefore, the same could not have been relied upon by the courts
below. Learned senior counsel finally contended that the case of the
prosecution is false and frivolous, the net result of which is that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case and the appellant-accused is
F
entitled to be acquitted.
7. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the CBI submitted that
the occurrence is well proved by the unimpeachable testimony of Ms.
Aradhana (PW-13). The eye witness stood with her testimony till end
and therefore, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant-accused
with regard to the above evidence has no relevance or substance. On a G
careful examination of the statement of PW-13, it can be very easy to
arrive at the conclusion that there was every possibility that Ms. Ruchika
could have been embraced by the appellant-accused in the manner that
the eye-witness eventually described in her deposition before the trial
court. Even Shri S.C. Girhotra- father of Ms. Ruchika has categorically H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A deposed that the appellant-accused met him and requested him not to
send his daughter abroad and also insisted to meet her in his office on
12.08.1990 which gets corroboration from the statement of PW-13 that
both the girls went to meet the appellant-accused at his office at HLTA.
8. \\'ith regard to the claim of signature on the Memorandum as
B well as on the application given to the SHO, learned senior counsel for
the CBI submitted that as far as the signatures of Ms. Ruchika on the
document are concerned, Ms. Ruchika has signed the alleged
Memorandum in the presence of others and the same is established by
the witnesses like Ms. Aradhana, Mrs. Madhu Prakash and Sh. Anand
Prakash in whose presence she signed the documents, which is a direct
c evidence. The evidence of expert witness cannot be considered
conclusive proof of the charge and it requires independent and reliable
evidence for its corroboration. She further submitted that Ms. Ruchika
was the best person to depose about the genuineness of her signatures,
but as she is no more, therefore, she could not appear in the witness box
D to depose about the genuineness of her signature on the alleged
Memorandum. In her absence, the persons, in whose presence, she signed
the document are the best witnesses to prove the genuineness of the
signature of the victim. The strong direct evidence on record cannot be
rebutted by weak type of evidence of hand writing expert upon which
reliance is placed by the learned senior counsel on behalfof the appellant-
E accused.
9. With regard to the contention urged by the appellant-accused
that Ms. Aradhana was the 'Sathi Khiladi' as mentioned in the
Memorandum, on the basis of which FIR got registered, was manipulated,
learned senior counsel submitted that a perusal of the contents of the
F Memorandum reveals that it merely gives a sequence of events which
had happened from the very beginning and no manipulation appears to
be made out. Merely on the ground that Shri C.P. Bansal, the then DIG
and Shri Sham Lal Goyal, the then DSP were present on the spot, it
cannot be said that they actively participated in its drafting and certain
G unnecessary and unwarranted facts were added to it. If experienced
police officers would have participated in its drafting then it should have
been in the form of FIR and the evidence must have been specifically
pointed out in it. But the language of the Memorandum is like that the
people have tried to show their resentment against the alleged act and
demanded action against the accused. The reason for not mentioning
H
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 347
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

the name of Ms. Aradhana in the Memorandum is that she could have A
been harassed by the accused, who being a high ranking police officer.
Because of this reason only, Ms. Ruchika or Ms. Aradhana or their
parents did not approach the local police to lodge the FIR. They were
fully aware that the appellant-accused, being a senior most police officer,
holding a key post in the State, would definitely hamper the investigation
B
or may not allow the police officers to cooperate with the complainant
party.
I 0. Learned senior counsel for the CBI further pointed out that
Shri R.R. Singh was an authority legally competent to investigate the
facts of the Memorandum and he was asked by the Government of
Haryana to enquire into the facts given in the Memorandum and to submit
c
a report to it. To make a person an authoritx legally competent to
investigate, it is not necessary that he should be having authority which
flows from a Statute. It is sufficient that such person was authorized
legally by the State Government to investigate the fact. As such, Sh.
R.R. Singh was competent authority to investigate the facts in question D
and the statements given by the witnesses before him are admissible in
evidence irrespective oftime gap between the time when the incidents
occurred and the date on which the statements were given.
11. Learned senior counsel for the CBI finally submitted that the
alleged rivalry between the HLTA and HTA as well as the arguments E
advanced by learned senior counsel for the appellant-accused regarding
the credibility of Shri Anand Prakash (PW-I) and Shri S.C. Girhotra
(PW-15) have no bearing on the case at hand and the prosecution has
made out a case for conviction of the appellant-accused under Section
354 of the IPC.
F
Discussion:
12. It is not disputed that HLTA was floated in 1988-89 at
Panchkula, Haryana. The appellant-accused was the President ofHLTA.
Its office was established in the garage of an under construction house
at Sector 6, Panchkula owned by the appellant-accused. It is also an G
admitted fact that Ms. Aradhana (PW-13), Mr. Manish Arora (PW-3),
Mr. Vipul Chanana (PW-4) and Ms. Ruchika (since deceased) were the
memhers of the Association and used to play tennis in its court. It is the
case of the prosecution that on 11.08.1990, the appellant-accused visited
the house ofShri S.C. Girhotra (PW-15) and requested him not to send
his daughter to Canada for coaching as he would arrange special coaching H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A for her at HLTA itself. This fact has been well proved by Shri S.C.
Girhotra (PW-15) in his statement. He has deposed before the trial Court
that on 11.08.1990, the appellant-accused visited his house at about 12.00
noon and had asked him not to send his daughter to Canada and that he
would arrange special coaching for her. The appellant-accused further
asked him to send his daughter on 12.08.1990, at about 12.00 noon, in his
B
office to discuss about the training. At that particular point of time, Ms.
Ruchika was not present at her house. On her return, PW-15 informed
the same to her and also asked her to meet the appellant-accused on
12.08.1990 in his office at 12.00 noon. This fact finds corroboration
from the statement of Ms. Aradhana (PW-13). She has deposed that on
c 12.08.1990, at about 11.00 a.m., Ms. Ruchika came to her house and
she very excitedly told her that on 11.08.1990, the appellant-accused
had visited her house and requested her father not to send her abroad
and that he would arrange special coaching for her at HLTA itself as
she was a promising player. She further informed Ms. Aradhana that
the appellant-accused had asked her to meet him on 12.08.1990, at 12.00
D
noon, at HLTA office. The very same fact finds place in the Memorandum
also which was signed by Ms. Ruchika along with others. The evidence
of PW-15 corroborates with the evidence of PW-13 in order to
substantiate the fact that the appellant-accused visited the house ofShri
S.C. Girhotra on 11.08.1990 and asked him to send Ms. Ruchika to his
E office on 12.08.1990, at 12.00 noon.
13. Ms. Ruchika (since deceased) and Ms. Aradhana went to
play at lawn tennis court on 12.08.1990 and while they were playing Sh.
Paltoo-the ball picker came there and told Ms. Ruchika that the appellant-
accused had called her to his office at 12.00 noon. Accordingly, Ms.
F Ruchika and Ms. Aradhana went to his office. The appellant-accused
asked Ms. Aradhana to fetch the coach-Shri T. Thomas. While Ms.
Aradhana had left the place, the appellant-accused molested/outraged
the modesty of Ms. Ruchika. When Ms. Aradhana returned to the
office, she witnessed the appellant-accused molesting Ms. Ruchika. Ms.
Aradhana, in her statement, has categorically deposed that on that day
G when both of them i.e., Ms. Ruchika and Ms. Aradhana were playing
tennis, Shri Paltoo, the ball picker, came and informed Ms. Ruchika that
the appellant-accused had called her in HLTA office. They saw that the
appellant-accused was standing outside his office. On seeing them, the
appellant-accused asked them to come to his office. Though Ms. Ruchika
H requested the appellant~accused to talk to her outside the office, but he
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 349
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

insisted them to come to his office. On his insistence, they followed him A
towards his office. On being asked by the appellant-accused, a chair
was brought on which Ms.Aradhana(PW-13) sat down while Ruchika
remained standing on her right side. Immediately thereafter, the appellant-
accused asked Ms. Aradhana to fetch the coach-Mr. T. Thomas. When
she went outside to call the coach, she found him standing at a distance
B
on the other side of the house across the road. She asked the ball picker-
Paltoo to go and fetch the coach. Mr. Thomas, on being informed about
the same by Mr. Paltoo, waved his hand towards Ms. Aradhana expressing
his inability to come at that moment. Thereafter, Ms. Aradhana returned
and when she entered the office, she saw that the appellant-accused
was holding one hand of Ms. Ruchika and his other hand was around c
her waist. Ms. Ruchika was trying hard to get herself released by pushing
him away with her other hand. On seeing Ms. Aradhana (PW-13), the
appellant-accused became nervous and released Ms. Ruchika and fell
down on his chair. When she informed the appellant-accused that coach
has refused to come to his office, the appellant-accused rudely ordered
D
her to go again and call the coach personally. In the meantime, Ms.
Ruchika came to her side and went out of the office. When PW-13 was
trying to follow her, the appellant-accused told her "ask her to cool down,
I will do whatever she will say". Thereafter, PW-13 followed Ms.
Ruchika and when she reached near her, Ruchika started weeping loudly.
When she asked Ms. Ruchika as to what had happened, she narrated E
that as soon as she left to fetch the coach, the appellant-accused caught
hold of her hand which she got released with great difficulty, but he
again caught hold of her hand and with his other hand the appellant-
accused caught hold of her waist and dragged her towards him and
embraced her. She further told her that in the meantime when PW-13
F
reached there, he got scared and immediately released her. After
discussion as to whether the incident be disclosed to their parents or not,
both of them decided not to inform their parents about the incident as the
appellant-accused, being a high ranking police officer, could harm their
families. The molestation of Ms. Ruchika, at the hands of the appellant-
accused is very well proved from the deposition of PW-13. There was G
no reason for Ms. Aradhana (PW-13) to depose falsely. In fact, she
witnessed the actual act of molestation of Ms. Ruchika at the hands of
the appellant-accused. Further, the fact regarding molestation of Ms.
Ruchika by the appellant-accused has been stated on oath by Shri Anand
Prakash (PW-1), Mrs. Madhu Prakash (PW-2), Mr. Manish Arora
H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A (PW-3), Mr. Vipul Chanan (PW-4) and Shri S.C. Girhotra (PW-15).
There is no reason as to why PW-13 and other aforementioned prosecution
witnesses would falsely implicate the appellant-accused in the case.
14. Ms. Ruchika and Ms. Aradhana visited the lawn tennis court
on 14.08.1990, at 4:30 p.m., instead of their usual timing deliberately in
B order to avoid confrontation with the appellant-accused, who usually
used to visit the court in the evening daily. At about 6.30 p.m., when
they were about to return after practice, Shri Paltoo - the ball picker,
came over the lawn tennis court and told Ms. Ruchika that the appellant-
accused had called her in his office immediately. However, Ms. Ruchika
refused to go there and told Ms. Aradhana that since they had not
c informed about the incident which took place on 12.08.1990 to their
parents that has emboldened the appellant-accused. Thereupon, they
decided to inform aboutthe overt act of the appellant-accused to their
parents. They went to the house of Ms. Ruchika where they met Shri
S.C. Girhotra - father of Ms. Ruchika. Ms. Ruchika started narrating
D the incident of molestation to her father, however, she could not narrate
the entire incident and broke down, whereupon her father told Ms.
Aradhana to take Ms. Ruchika to her mother. They went to the house
of Ms. Aradhana where Mrs. Madhu Prakash (PW-2) and Shri Anand
Prakash (PW-I) were present. Ms. Ruchika disclosed the entire incident
to PW-2, who further informed her husband about the said incident.
E Thereafter, Ms. Ruchika, Ms. Aradhana, Shri Anand Prakash, Mrs. Madhu
Prakash and Shri S.C. Girhotra and other persons went to HLTA court
to meet the appellant-accused wherefrom they came to know that the
appellant-accused had already left for Chandigarh.
IS. On 15.08.1990, a number of persons, who were mostly players
F and their parents, gathered at the residence of Shri Anand Prakash.
They decided that the incident should be brought to the notice of higher
authorities including the Chief Minister of Haryana. Accordingly, a
Memorandum was prepared. A number of copies of this Memorandum
were prepared for being handed over to different authorities. This
G Memorandum was signed by Sh. Anand Prakash, Ms. Ruchika, Mrs.
Madhu Prakash, Meenu, Sangeet, Aradhana, Anirudh, Beenu, Naresh
Mittal, C.S. Gupta and Shri I.D. Mittal. The witnesses who were
examined in the court identified their signatures as well as signatures of
Ms. Ruchika on the Memorandum. The appellant-accused disputed the
genuineness of signatures of Ms. Ruchika. He tried to substantiate his
H
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 351
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

contention by examining the hand writing expert. The contention of the A
appellant-accused is not tenable as the witnesses who have been
examined by the prosecution and in whose presence the Memorandum
was signed, have identified the signatures of Ms. Ruchika. Shri Anand
Prakash has proved the preparation of Memorandum. In this regard,
the law is very clear that a fact.should be proved by the best available
B
evidence. The witnesses had identified the signatures of Ms. Ruchika
on the Memorandum, therefore, the evidence of the hand writing expert
cannot considered to be safe and it requires corroboration from
independent witnesses. As already stated, the signatures of Ms. Ruchika
have been proved by the witnesses who have signed the Memorandum
and are direct, primary and best available evidence in the case and, c
therefore, the same can be relied upon.
16. On 16.08.1990, the Memorandum was given to Shri J.K. Duggal
(PW-12), the then Secretary (Home) who assured them that the matter
would be enquired igto. He asked the persons who had presented the
Memorandum to him to reach the lawn tennis court where Shri S.K. D
Joshi, the then SDM would also be reaching. After reaching there, they
found a Notice dated 15.08.1990 declaring suspension of Ms. Ruchika
with effect from 13.08.1990 displayed on the Notice Board. ShriS.K.
Joshi, the then SOM also reached there. Shri Kuldeep Singh-the Manager
and Shri T. Thomas-the Coach were also present there. On being asked,
Shri Kuldeep Singh, in the presence of witnesses, i_nformed that he has E
affixed the notice on the directions of the appellant"accused. He further
disclosed that Ms. Ruchika has committed no act of indiscipline. On,
being asked, Shri Kuldeep Singh gave the same facts in writing on the
Notice. This fact was confirmed by the Coach - Shri T. Thomas and he
signed at a point where the following words were written "I support the F
contents of the endorsement of Sh. Kuldeep Singh". He was also asked
to give it in writing, if any act of indiscipline has been committed by Ms.
Ruchika. On this, he made an endorsement to the effect that to the best
of his knowledge Ms. Ruchika has not done any act of misbehavior or
indiscipline in the HLTA tennis court. This notice was produced by Shri
Anand Prakash at the time of his deposition before the trial court. It has G
also come in his evidence that said notice was given to him by the SOM
immediately after making endorsement. These facts have been proved
by PW-I, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-13. The presence ofShri
Kuldeep Singh and Shri T. Thomas on that day and time has already
been proved by the then SHO, Panchkula who was on patrolling duty on H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A that date and reached the spot on receiving verbal transmission message
about the incident.
17. Shri R.R. Singh was directed by the Chief Minister and Home
Minister of the State ofHaryana to conduct an enquiry into the allegations
contained in the Memorandum. In compliance of the said order, Shri
B R.R. Singh recorded the statements of the witnesses including Mrs.
Madhu Prakash (PW-2), Ms. Aradhana (PW-13), Shri S.C. Girhotra
(PW-15) and Shri Anil Kumar. The statements of Ms. Ruchika and Shri
Anand Prakash (PW- I) were also recorded. After the enquiry, he
recommended that a case under the relevant provisions of the IPC be
got registered. Despite the fact that Shri R.R. Singh had recommended
c the registration of a case against the appellant-accused, no action was
taken by the State Government. It is most surprising that no value was
attached to the said Report and to the recommendations made by such a
high ranking police officer i.e., Director General of Police; Haryana.
18. lt has also been argued from the side of the appellant-accused
D that Shri B.S. Ojha and Shri J.K. Duggal were having great grudge
against him. It was further contended that the relations between the
appellant-accused and Shri R.R. Singh were strained since 1976. But
this suggestion was denied by the witness while appearing in the court.
Learned senior counsel for the CBI has strenuously submitted that a
E proper report was given by Shri R.R. Singh and it is a matter of common
experience that no girl or father would make a false complaint of such
heinous nature even against their enemy.
19. Shri R.R. Singh had conducted the enquiry under the orders
of the Government of Haryana, therefore, he was competent to
F investigate/enquire into the allegations made in the Memorandum. As
such, all the statements recorded by him are admissible under Section
157 of the Indian Evidence Act for the purpose of corroboration. Shri
J.K. Duggal and Shri B.S. Ojha are independent witnesses and they
have no grudge against the appellant-accused as alleged by the learned
senior counsel. For the sake of arguments, even if it is assumed to be
G correct that there was some dispute over the control of HLTA between
them, it was not such a big issue which would have induced them to
implicate the appellant-accused falsely. There is no evidence on record
to substantiate the allegations that these two officers were in any way
instrumental in preparation of Memorandum or implicating the appellant-
H accused in the case. There is also no evidence on record to suggest any
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.l. & ANR. 353
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

nexus of these two officers with Shri Anand Prakash (PW-I) and Shri A
S.C. Girhotra (PW-15). There is no evidence to suggest any enmity
between the appellant-accused and PW- I to implicate him in a fabricated
case. It is further the case of the appellant-accused that statement
recorded by Shri R.R. Singh cannot be used by the prosecution for the
purpose of corroboration under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. The
B
contention of the accused is not tenable at all. This section envisages
two categories of statements of witnesses, which can be used for
corroboration. First is the statement made by a witness to any person at
or about the time when the incident took place. The second is the
statement made by him to any authority legally competent to investigate
the matter. Such statements gain admissibility, no matter that it was c
made long after the incident. But if the statement was made to non-
authority, it loses its probative value due to lapse of time. Shri R.R. Singh
was an authority legally competent to investigate the incident. He was
asked by the State Government to enquire into the facts given in the
Memorandum and report thereon. To make a person an authority legally
D
competent to investigate, it is not necessary that he should be having
authority which flows from a Statute. It is sufficient that such person
was authorized legally by the State Government to investigate the matter.
Hence, we are of the view that Shri R.R. Singh was authority competent
to investigate the fact in question and the statements given by the
witnesses before him are admissible in evidence· irrespective of time E
gap between the time when incidents occurred and the date on which
the statements were given. Shri R.R. Singh was in fact competent to
investigate the matter since the enquiry conducted by him was merely a
fact finding enquiry. The undisputed fact is that nothing happened even
after the submission of the report by Shri R.R. Singh because no action
was taken by the State Government on the same. Further, all the witnesses
F
including Sh. J .K. Duggal and Shri B.S. Ojha examined by the prosecution
are the independent witnesses and the enmity, as suggested by the
appellant-accused, is not proved, as discussed above.
20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-accused has
contended that in the present fact situation, how a person can embrace G
other while standing behind the table and then suddenly fall into his chair
on the entry of PW-13. In this regard, we have carefully considered the
evidence given by the prosecution, especially the evidence of PW-13.
She, being the sole witness to prove the actus reus, her evidence should
receive some careful consideration and we do not find any reason for H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 5 S.C.R.

A her to depose falsely against the appellant-accused. There is, thus,
every possibility that Ms. Ruchika could have been embraced by the
appellant in the manner as described by PW-13. •
21. The High Court, on proper re-appreciation of the entire
evidence, came to the right conclusion that the prosecution was successful
B in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt and the offence punishable
under Section 354 of the IPC was made out. There is devastating
increase in cases relating.Jo crime against women in the world and our
country is also no exception to it. Although the statutory provisions provide
strict penal action against such offenders, it is for the courts to ultimately
decide whether such incident has occurred or not. The courts should be
c more cautious in appreciating the evidence and the accused should not
be left scot-free merely on flimsy grounds. By the consistent evidence
of Ms. Aradhana (PW-13), the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt the offence committed by the appellant under Section 354 of the
IPC. A charge under Section 354 of the IPC is one which is very easy
D to make and is very difficult to rebut. It is not that on account of alleged
enmity between the appellant and Shri Duggal and Shri Ojha, he was
falsely implicated. It would, however, be unusual in a conservative society
that a woman would be used as a pawn to wreak vengeance. When a
plea is taken by the appellant-accused that he has been falsely implicated,
courts have a _duty to make deeper scrutiny of the evidence and decide
E the acceptability or otherwise of the accusations made against him. In
the instant case, both the trial court and the High Court have done that.
There is no scope for taking a different view from the view already
been taken by the courts below. The occurrence of the overt act is well
proved by the unimpeachable testimony of the eye-witness - Ms.
F Aradhana (PW-13).
22. In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 of the
IPC, mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged
is sufficient without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone
for its object. There is no abstract conception of modesty that can apply
to all cases. A careful approach has to be adopted by the court while
G
dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients
of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;
.(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the woman
H intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 355
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

23. This Court, in Vidyadliaran vs. State of Kera/a (2004) 1 A
sec 215, held as under .
"10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable
under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed by a person
assaulting or using criminal force to any woman, ifhe knows that
by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. B
Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and
cannot be demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of
intention or knowledge has to be culled out from various
circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is
alleged to have been committed. A victim of molestation and
indignation is in the same position as an injured witness and her
c
testimony should receive the same weight ....."
24. It is undoubtedly correct that if intention or knowledge is one
of the ingredients of any offence, it has got to be proved like other
ingredients for convicting a person. But, it is also equally true that those
ingredients being state of mind may not be proved by direct evidence D
and may have to be inferred from the attending circumstances of a
given case. The sequence of events which we have detailed earlier
indicates that the appellant-accused had the requisite culpable intention.
25. This Court, in Tarkesliwar Salru vs. State ofBilrar, (2006) 8
sec 560, held as under:- E

"39. So far as the offence under Section 354 IPC is concerned,
intention to outrage the modesty of a woman or knowledge that
the act of the accused would result in outraging her modesty is
the gravamen of the offence.
F
40. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable
intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of
the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive.
Modesty iS an attribute associated with female human beings as a
class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex."
G
26. With regard to the delay of about 6 days in presenting the
complaint to the SHO, this Court is of the view that the same has been
duly explained. In a tradition-bound non-permissive society in India, it
would be extremely reluctant to admit that any incident which is likely to
reflect upon chastity of a woman had occurred, being conscious of the
danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A society. In the instant case, the victim-Ms. Ruchika not informing about
the incident to the parents under the circumstances that the appellant-
accused; who being a very senior police officer of the State, was
reasonable and it would not have been an easy decision for her to speak
out. In the normal course of human conduct, this unmarried minor girl,
would not like to give publicity to the traumatic experience she has
B
undergone and felt terribly embarrassed in relation to the incident to
narrate it to her parents and others overpowered by a feeling of shame
and her natural inclination would be to avoid talking about it to anyone,
lest the family name and honour is brought into controversy. After
informing the incident to her parents, the follow up action was immediately
c taken by the residents and the fellow players and a Memorandum
containing allegations against the appellant-accused was prepared and
submitted before the then Secretary (Home). Therefore, giving a due
consideration to the appellant-accused, once the victim and her family
members got assurance of justice from the superior authorities, they
lodged a formal complaint against the appellant-accused.
D
27. With regard to the contention ofleamed senior counsel for the
appellant-accused that the signature of Ms. Ruchika on the Memorandum
was forged though she signed the same in front of Shri Anand Prakash,
Shri S.C. Girhotra, Ms. Aradhana and Mrs. Madhu Prakash and they
have admitted the same, we are of the opinion that expert evidence as to
E handwriting is only opinion evidence and it can never be conclusive.
Acting on the evidence ofany expert, it is usually to see ifthat evidence
is corroborated either by clear, direct or circumstantial evidence. The
sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally sufficient for
recording a definite finding about the writing being of a certain person or
F not. A court is competent to compare the disputed writing of a person
with others which are admitted or proved to be his writings. It may not
be safe for a court to record a finding about a person's writing in a
certain document merely on the basis of expert comparison, but a court
can itself compare the writings in order to appreciate properly the other
evidence produced before it in that regard. The opinion of a handwriting
G expert is also relevant in view of Section 45 of the Evidence Act, but
that too is not conclusive. It has also been held by this Court in a catena
of cases that the sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally
sufficient for recording a definite finding about the writing being of a
certain person or not. It follows that it is not essential that the handwriting
H expert must be examined in a case to prove or disprove the disputed
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 357
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

writing. It is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take the place of A
substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see
if it is corroborated either by clear, direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence.
28. In Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. Tile State of Bombay AIR 1957
SC 857, this Court has held as under:- B
"! I. ....Learned counsel objected to this approach on a question
of proof. We are, however, unable to see any objection. The proof
of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the
document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The
evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may c
consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document
being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of
the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the
modes provided in Sections45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.
It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents
of the document. This last mode of proof by the contents may be D
of considerable value where the disputed document purports to
be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are
proved to the satisfaction of the court. In such a situation the
person who is the recipient of the document, be iteither a letter or
a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with E
reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of
the alleged sender limited though it may be, as also his knowledge
of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to
its authorship. In an appropriate case the court may also be in a
position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link
in the chain of correspondence and thus to determine its F
authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach
adopted by the courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the
letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The
question, if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on
which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived G
at. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be
canvassed before us.
29. In Smt. Bliagwan Kaur vs. Sllri Maharaj Krislian Sliarma
And Otliers ( 1973) 4 SCC 46, this Court held as under:-
"26. It is no doubt true that the prosecution led evidence of H
,_
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A handwriting expert to show the similarity of handwriting between
(PW I/A) and other admitted writings of the deceased, but in this
respect, we are of the opinion that in view of the main essential
features of the case, not much value can be attached to the expert
evidence. The evidence of a handwriting expert, uni ike that of a
fingerprint expert, is generally of a frail character and its fallibilities
B
have been quite often noticed The courts should, therefore, be
wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting
expert. In Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu
Ganesh Prasad Bhagat this Court observed that conclusions
based upon mere comparison of handwriting must at best be
c indecisive and yield to the positive evidence in the case."
30. It is thus clear that uncorroborated evidence of a hand writing
expert is an extremely weak type of evidence and the same should not
be relied upon either for the conviction or for acquittal. The courts, should,
therefore, be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting
D expert. It can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence.
Before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated
either by clear, direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
31. It is the claim of learned senior counsel for the appellant-
accused that the present case is fabricated and a result of the rivalry
E between HLTA and HTA. Further, Shri Anand Prakash has derived
professional benefit from this exercise besides venting his longstanding
grudge against the appellant-accused. It does not stand to logic that
having regard to the Indian social set up, any father would let his
daughter's honour and reputation be damaged merely because one of
his associate has his own agenda against the appellant-accused. However,
F each case has to be determined on the touchstone of the factual matrix
thereof. In the instant case, there is nothing on record on the basis of
which it can be said that the tender age of the victim was exploited for
the benefit of Shri Anand Prakash (PW- I)
32. With regard to the contention of learned senior counsel that
G non-exam_ination of two important site witnesses viz., Shri Paltoo-the
ball picker and Shri T.Thomas-the Coach draws adverse inference against
the prosecution, the High Court has rightly held that adverse inference
against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence
and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. We
H are also of the opinion that they were not in any way connected with the
S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. 359
[R. K. AGRAWAL, J.]

actual commission of offence and even in their absence, the commission A
of the offence of molestation by the appellant-accused stands well proved
by the unimpeachable testimony of the eye witness (PW-13) to the
incident.
33. No particular number of witnesses is required for proving a
certain fact. It is the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses that B
matters. Evidence is weighed and not counted. Evidence of even a
single eye witness, truthful, consistent and inspiring confidence is sufficient
for maintaining conviction. It is not necessary that all those persons
who were present at the spot must be examined by the prosecution in
order to prove the guilt of the accused. Having examined all the witnesses,
even if other persons present nearby not examined, the evidence of eye-
c
witness cannot be discarded.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that
Ms. Aradhana (PW-13) withstood her testimony from beginning till the
end and her deposition was found reliable and corroborative with other
prosecution witnesses and both the courts below were right in upholding D
the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 354 of the IPC.
35. With regard to sentence of the appellant-accused, learned
senior counsel on his behalf has pointed out certain mitigating factors
which are - old age of the appellant-accused, health ailments,
responsibility of looking after the unmarried daughter suffering from E
congenital heart disease, past meritorious service and prolonged trial.
Keeping in view the aforementioned factors especially the old age and
physical condition of the appellant-accused, we do not think it expedient
to put him back in jail. While we uphold the findings as to the guilt of the
appellant-accused, we are.of the opinion that the cause of justice would F
be best sub-served when the sentence of the appellant-accused would
be altered to the period already undergone. We, therefore, reduce the
sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone by him as a
special case considering his very advanced age.
36. In view of the foregoing discussion, we confirm the conviction G
of the appellant-accused under Section 354 of the IPC while modifying
the sentence to the period already undergone. The appeal is disposed of
with the above terms.
Devika Gujral Appeal disposed of.

H