Holding

Section 53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859 bars prosecution only when the act complained of is done under the Act or any other law conferring police powers; the alleged beating and torture were not such acts, so the limitation provision does not apply.

Summary

The appellant, an arrack shop in‑charge, complained to senior police officials that the Additional Superintendent of Police, K. Shanmuganan, was colluding with illicit distillers. The respondent summoned the appellant, beat him and later tortured him. The appellant filed a criminal complaint under several IPC sections. The respondent obtained a quash order from the High Court, arguing that the prosecution was barred by Section 53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859, which imposes a three‑month limitation on actions done "under" the Act or any other law conferring police powers. The Supreme Court held that the alleged beating and torture were not acts done under the Act or any other law granting police powers, and therefore Section 53 did not apply. Consequently, the High Court's quash order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the trial court.

Issues considered

Whether the alleged beating and torture by a police officer fall within the ambit of Section 53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859, thereby attracting its three‑month limitation period.
Whether the prosecution can be barred on the ground of limitation when the act complained of is not done "under" the Act or any other law conferring police powers.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 197, s. 468, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 307, s. 323, s. 341, s. 342, s. 363, s. 364, s. 506(2)
Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859s. 53

Subjects

police misconductlimitation periodSection 53Tamil Nadu District Police Actcriminal complaintbeatingtorturejurisdictionCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

S.P. VAITHIANATHAN A
v.
K. SHA."IMUGANATHAN

MARCH 1, 1994

[AM. AHMADI AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.) B

Criminal Law-Police Officer-Prosecution of-Allegations of beating
and torturing complainl-l'rosecution resisted as bamd by s.53 of Tamil Nadu
District Police Act, 1859-Held, in order to avail benefit of s.53 accused must
show that he acted under the Act or any other law-Beating and torturing C
complainant cannot be said to be an action in discharge of any duty or
function under Act or any other law.

Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859: Section 53-f'olice Of-
ficel'-l'rosecution of-Limitatio~eld, before a prosecution is terminated
as baned by s.53, accused must show that act complained of was done under D
~ provisions of the Act or any other law.

The appellant, being in-charge of an arrack shop, made a complaint
to the superior officers of the Police Department that the respondent, who
was the Additional Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Enfrorce- E
ment, of the area, was conniving with the persons involved in illicit distil-
lation activities. The respondent on coming to know of this, is alleged to
have summoned the appellant to his office, beat.him np and took him to
thr Prohibition and Excise Wing where he was further tortured. When
awellant's efforts to bring the incident to the notice of the respondent's
- superiors went in vain, he filed a criminal complaint in the court against F
the respondent alleging comission of offences under ss.307, 323, 341, 342,
363, 364 and 506(2) I.P.C. The Court issued process which the respondent
challenged in an application under s.482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court.

The High Court quashed the order by which the process had been G
issued holding that the proceedings were barred by s.53 or the Tamil Nadu
District Police Act, 1859. The appellant filed the appeal by special leave.

' Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. The High Court comitted an error in quashing the H
257
!

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.
(
A complaint on the ground that it was barred by s. 53 of the Tamil Nadu
District Police Act, 1859. (264-B]

1.2. Before a prosecution is terminated as barred by s.53 ofihe Act,
the accused must show that on the allegations made in the complaint it
ex-facie appears that the act complained of was done under the provsions
B of the Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in
- force whereunder powers are conferred on the police. (262-B)

1.3. In order to avail of the benefit of s.53, the accused must show
that he acted 'under' the Act or· any other law. Unless a relationship is
C established between the pro>ision of law 'under' which the accused pur-
forts to act and the misdemeanour complained of, the provision of s.53 will
not be attracted. (262-D, Fl

1.4. In the instant case, the allegation .n the complaint is that while
the appellant was called by service of a summons presumably to inquire
D into allegations of illicit distillation, the respondent had merely used It as
an excuse to secure his presence but in fact his real intention was to beat
him up to prevent him from complaining a1:ainst those who were paying
him 'mamool' (illegal gratification) money. 'Thus according to the appel-
lant, the respondent bore a grudge against ban and, therefore, he misused
E his power, Issued a summons, secured his pn!Sence and then tortured him.
He has charged him for the commission of ol fences under ss.341, 342, 362,
364, 506 (II Part) and 307 IPC. These do no: attract the provision of s.53
of the Act. (262-G-H, 263-A]

1.5. Merely because the appellant wa,: called through a summons
F Issued under law, the conduct of beating and <orturing the app~llant on the
latter appearing in obedience to the summons cannot establish any nexus
between the official act of issuance of summons and the action of the
respondent on the appearance of the appellant. It was no part of the duty
under the Act, Code or any other law for the time being in force conferring
G power on the police to beat and torture th" appellant. By no stretch of
reasoning can it be said that the respondent's action torturing the appellant
was in discharge of any duty or function under the Act or under any other
law. Nor can it be said that respondent's action was incidental to or in
furtherance of bis duties and functions under any law. (262-C-F]

H The State of Andhn1 Pradesh v. N. Venugopal & Ors., (1964] 3 SCR
\

VAI1HIANA11!AN v. SHANMUGANA111AN [AHMADl,J.) 259

742, relied on. A
MauludAhmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963] Snppl. 2 SCR 38 and
v.
Ajaib Singh & Anr. Joginder Singh & Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1422, referred
to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. B
156 of 1994. ·

, From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.90 of the Madras High
Conrt in Cr!. M.P. No. 6529 of 1987.

K. Swami for the Appellant. c
N. Natarajan, V. Ba\achandran and V. Krishnamurthy for the respon-
dent.

The Juc!gm.ent of the Court was delivered by
D
AHMADI, J. Special leave granted .
...
The respondent was the Additional Superintendent of Police,
Prohibition and Enforcement, Salem, at all material times The appellant
herein was in-charge of and arrack shop belonging to his uncle at
Sevathapuram. On account of illicit distillation in that area, the sales at the E
said arrack shop fell sharply. Consequently he complained to te autiiorities
to check illicit distillation. His complaints fell on deaf ears. The illicit
distillation activities were ever on the increase because of the connivance
of the respondent. The appellant, therefore, complained to the l:iigher
authorities about the respondent's involvement and deliberate connivance
at the activities of illicit distillers. The respondenton learning about the F
complaints and allegation of corruption was annoyed and bore a grudge
against the appellant. The respondent, therefore, snmmoned the appellant
to his office on March 20, 1985 at about 8.30 P.M.and beat him up severely
and then took him in a jeep to the Prohibition & Excise wing where he was
further tortured. The appellant contends that it was by sheer accident that G
he escaped alive. He then wrote to the respondent's superiors about the ill
treatment meted out to him but to no avail. He than filed criminal com-
plaint in Court alleging commission of offences under Sections 341, 342,
'\
323, 363, 364, 506, Part II, and 307 of the Indian Penal Code.

The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem issued process. There- H
!

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 2 S.C.R.

A upon the respondent approached the High Court under section 482 of the (
Code of Crininal Procedure (the Code) for quashing the issuance of
process on three grounds, viz.,

(1) there was an inordinate delay of nearly two years in the lodging
of the complaint and hence the learned CJM should not have
B entertained the complaint;

(2) the prosecution was untenable for want of sanction under
section 197 of the Code; and "
(3) the prosecution was :.iared by limitation in view of the provision
c in section 53 of the T.N. District Police Act, 1869, (hereinafter
called 'the Act').

The High Court rejected the first and the second contentions but upheld
the third contention and consequently quashed the order by which process
D was issued. The proceedings initiated against the respondent were conse-
quently rendered untenable as barred by section 53 of the Act. We are,
therefore, required to examine the' correctness of the finding recorded by. "
the High Court on the third point.

Section 53 of the Act reads as under:
E
"Limitation of action -

All actions and prosecutions against any persons which may be
lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done, under
the provisions of this Ac~ or under the provisions of any other law
F for the time being in force conferring powers on the police shall ~
be commenced within three montlis after the act complained of
shall have been committed an4 not otherwise ..... "

On a plain reading of this provision it becomes clear all actions and
prosecutions for anything done 'under the provisions of the Act or any
G other law in force conferring powers on the police' must be commenced
within three months after the act complained of is committed and not
otherwise. There is no doubt that the said provision applies to prosecutions ,··
also in respect of any action taken or anything done under the provisions
of the Act or under the provisions of any other law conferring powers on
H the police. Two questions, therefore, arise: (i) is the action of the respon-
VAITHIANAIBAN ... SHANMUGANATHAN [AHMADl,J.J 261

dent complained of done under the provisions of the Act? or (ii) is the said A
action done under the provisions of any other law for the time being in
force conferring powers on the police? The High Court placing reliance.
on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the High Cow t of Andhra
Pradesh (1978) XXIl MU Reports 412 came to the conclusion:

"....whereas section 53 of the Act does not provide for limitation B
i < relation to particular categories of offences unlike section 468
c.f the Crl.P.C., which provides for limitation in respect of prosecu-
tion, irrespective of their nature instituted against police officers.
As such Section 468 Crl.P.C. and section 53 of the Act operate in
different fields. Section 53 of the Act is a special proVISion in C
regard to police officers while section 468 of the Crl.P.C. is a
general provision in regard to offenders in general. Therefore,
these two sections do not operate in the same field or area and do
not overlap an:! that apart, the provision of section 53 of the Act,
which is a special provision, must prevail over the general law
enacted in section 468 of the Crl.P.C." D
On the above line of reasoning it held the complaint to be barred by section
53 of the Act. It is clear that after coming to the conclusion thl'.t section
that section 53 of the Act would prevail over the general provision found
in section 468 of the Code, the High Court did not examine, if in the facts E
and circumstances of the case, the provision of section 53 of the Act was
attracted. It did not address itself to the aforesaid two questions but relying
on the aforesaid case law by which it was held that section 53 of the Act
would prevail, it concluded that the prosecution was time-barred and
quashed the same.
F
The Act was enacted for better regulation of the police-force
throughout the Madras Presidency with a view to making it a more efficient
instrument for the prevention and detection of crime. By section 6 all
powers which hitherto belonged to the existing police-authorities came to
be vested in the police-authorities apointed under the Act to the extent not G
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 21 states that every
police-officer shall, for the purposes of the Act, be considered to be always
' on duty and it should be his endeavour to prevent all crimes, offences and
public nuisances, etc. Section 50 lays down that any charge against a police
offieer above the rank of a constable under this Act shall be enquired into
and determined only by an officer exercising the powr.rs of a Magistrate. H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 2 S.C.R

A Section 53 extracted above then provides for limitation of action. W~ will
assume, without deciding, that section 53 of the Act will prevail over
section 468 of the Code.

It seems clear to us that before a prosecution is terruinated as barred
by section 53 of the Act, the accused must show that on the allegations
B made in the complaint ex-facie appears that the act complained of was done
under the provisions of the Act or under the provisions of any other law
for the time being in force whereunder powers are conferred on the police.
It is true that under section 21 or the Act a police officer can be said to
be on duty all the 24 hours. The prosecution launclted against the respon-
dent. is in regard to the ill-treatment meted out to the appellant when the
C latter visited Lite former in response to the summons. It was no part of the
duty under the Act, Code or any other law for the time being in force
conferring power on the police to beat and torture the allellant when he
presented himself before the respondent in respo1' I to the summons. By
no stretch of reasoning can it be said that the respondent's action of
D torturing the appellant was in discharge of any duty or function under the
Act or under any other law. It is a1so difficult to say, if the allegations made
are taken at their face value, that the respondent's action was incidental to
or in furtherance of his duties and functions under any law. It must be
realised that in order to avail of the benefit of section 53 of the Act, the
respondent must show that he acted 'under' the Act or any other law.
E Merely because the appellant was called through a summons issued under
Jaw, the. conduct of beating and torturing the appellant on the latter
appearing in obedience to the summons cannot establish any nexus be-
tween the official act of issuance of summons and the action of the
respondent on the appearance of the appellant. Unless a relationship is
established between the provision of law 'under' which the respondent
F purports to act and the misdemeanour complained of, the provision of
sectim1 53 will not be attracted. In the present case the allegation in the
complaint is that while the appellant was called by service of a summons
presumably to inquire into allegations of illicit distillation, the respondent
had merely used it as an excuse to secure his presence but in fact his real
G intention was to beat him up to prevent him from complaining against those
who were paying him 'mamool' (illegal gratification) money. Thus accord-
ing ro the appellant the respondent bore a grudge against him and, there-
fore, he misused his power, issued a summons, secured his presence and
then tortured him. He has charged him for the commission of offences
under sections 341, 342, 363, 364, 506, (II Part) and307, I.P.C. These do
H
\

VAITHIANA1HAN v. SHANMUGANATHAN [AHMAD!,J.] 263

not attract the provision of section· 53 of the Act. A
In this view which we are inclined to take in the facts and circumstan-
ces of this case, we are fortified by a Three-Judge Bench of decision of this
Court in The State ofAndhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal & Ors., (1964) 3 SCR
742. The background facts in which this decision was rendered were that
during the course of investigation information was received that. one B
Ramanna had received stolen articles: Ramanna was, therefore, taken into
custody and within less than 3 days thereafter his dead body was found
with a number of injuries. The police officers were prosecuted for having
caused the injuries to Ramanna for the purpose of extorting from him
information which might lead to the detection of an offence and restoration C
of stolen property. The police officers pleaded that the prosecution was
barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of Section 53 of the Act.
Dealing with this contention in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts this
Court held on the language of that provision that the protection of Section
53 is not confined only to acts done or intended to be done under the
provisions of the Act but extends to acts done or intended to be done under D
the provisions of any other law conferring powers on the police such as the.
Code of Criminal Procedure which confers numerous powers of, arrest,
search and investigation. Any prosecution in respect of any act dpne or
intended to be done under the provisions of any of these law has also to
be commenced within the period prescribed by Section 53; but the Court
~ E
"........it becomes the task of the Court, whenever any question
whether this section applies or not arises to bestow particular care
on its decision. In doing this it has to as certain first what act is
complained of and then to examine if there is any provision of the F
Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police under
which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done.
The Court has to remember in this connection that an act is not
'under" a provision of law merely because the point of time at
which it is done coincides with the point of time when some act G
in the exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in
performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an
act is done "under a provision of law, one must discover the
11

existence of a reasonable relationship between the provisions and
the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to
be done "under' the particular provision of law. H
I

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 2 S.C.R.

A Proceeding further this Court pointed out that the act of beating or the act
of confining was, it is true, alleged to be done at a time when the police
officer was engaged in investigation. 'But it is not possible to see what
resonable relationship these acts had with the process of investigation. Nor
can one see how the act of sending away the injured person had any
B relation to the process of investigation. This Court pointed out that the
High Court fell into an error in thinking that whatever a police officer does
to a person suspected of a crime at the time when the said officer is
engaged in investigating that crime should be held to be done in the
discharge of his official duties to investigate and would, therefore, be
covered by Section 53 of the Act. Taking this view, this Court reversed the
C finding recorded by the High Court in this behalf. Applying the said
principles to the facts alleged against the officer in this case, it is difficult
to agree with the High Court that the case falls within the mischief of
Section 53 of the Act.

D Out attention was also invited to two decisions of this Court in
Mau/ud Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 38 andAjaib
Singh & Anr. v. Joginder Singh & Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1422 which turned
on the language of Section 42 of the Police Act, 1861. The language of that
provision is not the same as that of Section 53 of the Act, in that, it does
not carry the expression 'or under the provisions of any other law for the
E time being in force conferring powers on the police power on the police'
although it uses the words "under the general police powers hereby given'
and, therefore, confmed it self to any thing done or intended to be done
under that enactment. Therefore, that section cannot be said to apply to
prosecution or anything done under the provisions of any other Act or
under police powers conferred by any other Act.
F
In view of the above we have no hesitation in concluding that the
High Court committed an error in quashing the complaint on the ground
that it was barred by Section 53 of the Act. We, therefore, allow the appeal,
set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the Trial
G court for disposal in accordance with law. We may clarify that we have
merely gone by the averments or allegations made in the complaint and we
should, therefore, not be understood to express any opinion on facts which
would have to be proved at the trial.

R.P. Appeal allowed.