Holding

The President’s discretion to fix and vary the number of Election Commissioners is unfettered, and the abolition of the posts did not violate the independence of the Election Commission; thus the termination of service was lawful.

Summary

The petitioners, appointed as Election Commissioners in October 1989, challenged the President’s January 1990 notifications that rescinded their appointments and abolished the two posts. They argued that the abolition violated the tenure provisions in the service rules, infringed the independence of the Election Commission, was done mala‑fide on the Chief Election Commissioner’s advice, caused material loss of dignity, and that the televised flashing of their photographs was defamatory. The Court held that Article 324(2) gives the President unfettered discretion to fix the number of Election Commissioners and to create or abolish posts, and that the abolition did not impair the Commission’s independence. The service‑rule tenure was not a guarantee against abolition of posts, and there was no evidence of mala‑fide advice or improper removal. The televised flashing, while condemned, was irrelevant to the petition’s core relief. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

The President’s power under Article 324(2) to determine the number of Election Commissioners and to rescind appointments.
Whether abolition of Election Commissioner posts infringes the constitutional independence of the Election Commission.
Whether the service‑rule tenure of five years or up to age 65 is enforceable against abolition of posts.
Whether the removal was done mala‑fide on the advice of the Chief Election Commissioner.
Whether the flashing of photographs on television caused material loss of dignity and warrants relief.

Legislation cited

Constitution (61st Amendment) Act, 1989
Constitution (64th Amendment) Act, 1989
Constitution (65th Amendment) Act, 1989
Constitution of Indias. Article 324(2), s. Article 324(3), s. Article 324(4), s. Article 324(5)
Representation of the People Act, 1950
Representation of the People Act, 1951

Subjects

Election CommissionArticle 324Appointment and removal of Election CommissionersAbolition of postsIndependence of constitutional bodiesService tenureMaterial loss of dignityTelevision broadcast of officials

Judgment

S.S. DHANOA A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

JULY 24, 1991

[M.H. KANIA AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ] B

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 324. Election Commission-
President's Notification-Determination of number and appointment of
Election Commissioners-Ru/es providing ,tenure of 5 years or upto
superannuation age of 65 years-Subsequent notification by President
-Abolition of the post of Election Commissioners-Whether ma/a fide, C
whether affects independence of Election Commission-Material loss to
incumbents-Whether exigency of employment-Flashing of photo-
graphs of Election Commissioners while announcing their removal on
TV deprecated.

Election Commission-Salient features and composttwn of~ p
Appointment of Chief Election Commissioner is obligatory-Appoint-
ment of other Election Commissioners is not obligatory-Comn,ission's
work should warrant appointment of other Election Commissioners-
Distinction in service conditions and tenure of the Chief Election Com-
\
missioner and other £/ection Commissioners-What is-Chief Election
Commissioner whether primus inter partes-Need for laying down the E
. procedure for transacting the business of Election Commission
emphasised.

Article 324(2) of the Constitution empo~ers the President to fix
and appoint such number of Election Commissioners as he may from
time to time determine. By a notification dated 7.10.1989 the President F
fixed the number of Election Commissioners at two. By another notifi-
cation dated 16.10.89, the President appointed the petitioner and
another person as El~ction Commissioners. Simultaneously, the Presi-
dent also promulgated the rules regulating the conditions of service and
tenure of the Election Commissioners under which an Election Commis-
sioner was to hold office for a ferm of five years or until he attained the O
age of 65 years whichever was earlier.

However, on Isl January, 1990, the President issued two notifica-
tions rescinding the earlier two notifications dated 7.10.89 and
16.10.89. Consequently, the two posts of Election Commissioners were
abolished and the appointment of the petitioner and the other ElectiolJ H
(:ommissioner came to an end.
159
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991) 3 S.C.R.

A The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the
legality of the notifications dated 1st January, 1990 contending that: (a)
the Election Commission being an independent body, the abolition of
the posts of Election Commissioners and their consequent removal
tampered with the independence of the Election Commission directly or
indirectly; (b) in view of the service rules made by the President the
B Election Commissioners were entitled to continue in office for full
tenure of five years or until they attained the age of 65 years which-
ever was earlier; (c) the notification abolishing the two posts and
removing the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner were
issued ma/a fide under the advice of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner; (d) Petitioner's removal affected him materially; and (e) the
flashing of the photographs of the petitioner and. other Election Com-
c missioner while announcing their removal on the television during a
· news bulletin subjected them to severe loss of dignity and reputation.

Dismissing the petition, this Court,

D HELD: 1. The Election Commission as envisaged by the Constitu-
tion is an independent institution and has to function as such. In the ~
discharge of its duties and functions it is not amenable to the control of
any other body. The salient features of the composition of the Election
Commission as given in Article 324 are that the Commission shall
always consist of a permanent incumbent, viz. the Chief Election Com-
E missioner. But the President has also been given the power to appoint
such number of other Election Commissioners as he may, from time to
time, fix. While the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner is
a must, the appointment of the other Election Commissioner or Com-
missioners is not obligatory. The number of other Election Commis-
sioners is left to the discretion of the President depending upon the need
F felt from time to time. [169A-B-C]

1.1 However, in the 1natter of the conditions of service and tenure
of office of the Election Cu1nmissioners, a distinction is made between
the Chief Election Commissioner on the one hand and Election Com-
missioners and Regional Co1nmissioners on the other. Whereas the con-
G ditions of service and tenure of office of all are to be such as the Presi-
dent may, by rule determine, a protection is given to the Chief Election
Commissioner in that his conditions of service shall not be varied to his
disadvantage after his appointment, and he shall not be removed from
his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of the
Supreme Court. These protections are not available either to the Elec-
B lion Commissioners or to the Regional Commissioners. Their conditions
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. 161

of service can be varied even to their disadvantage after their appoint-
A
ment and they can be removed on the recommendation of the Chief
Election Commissioner, although not otherwise. Thus in these two
respects not only the Election Commissioners are not on par with the
Chief Election Commissioner, but they are also placed on par with the
Regional Commissioners although the former constitute the Commis-
sion and the latter do not and are only appointed to assist the B
Commission. [169H, 170A-8-C]
Article 324(4) though spells out the relationship between Election
,
Commission and Regional Commissioners does not help to throw light
on the relationship between the Chief Election Commissioner and Elec-
tion Commissioners inter se. The fact that the Regional Commissioners
are to be appointed by the President in consultation with the Commi•- C
sion to asist the Commission to perform its functions, though places the
Election Commissioners on a higher pedestal than the Regional
Commissioners does not raise them to the status of the Chief Election
Commissioner. The Chief Election Commissioner does not, therefore,
appear to be primus inter partes, i.e. first among the equals, but is
D
intended to be placed in a distinctly higher position. Therefore, it can-
not be held that the Election Commissioners have the same powers
.\. and the authority as the Chief Election Commissioner, and it may well
be that the Chief Election Commissioner has the power to disregard
and override the views of the Election Commissioners the abolition
of their posts therefore least infringed on the independence of the
E
Commission. [1758, 174H, J75A, 170E, 1808]
1.2 The petitioner and the other Election Commissioners were
appointed when the work of the Commission did not warrant their
---', appointment. It is evident from record that the then Government had
thought it fit to make the two appointments although there was no need
to do so. What other considerations weighed with the then Government F
in making the appointment is anybody's guess, and the Court does nut
propose to go into them. However, it w&s expected that the Union of
India would candidly admit the initial mistake of making the said
appointments rather than defend them on non-existent grounds. Not
only there was no need for the said appointments, but also the appoint-
ments in the absence of the definition of their roles in the Commission G
__. were creating an untoward and unworkable situation rendering the
Commission internally torn and ineffectual in its functioning. Thus the
manner of appointment of the Election Commissioners and the attitude
adopted by them in the discharge of their functions was hardly cal-
culated to ensure free and independent functioning of the Commission.
much less its smooth working. [175E, 179C-D, E, 178C] H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A 1.2.1 In view of the fact that there was no need for the posts of the
Election Commissioners at the time the appointments were made and
that in the absence of a clear definition of their role in the Commission,
particularly, vis-a-vis the Chief Election Commissioner, the appoint-
ments were an oddity, the abolition of the posts far from striking at the
independence of the Commission paved the way for its smooth and
B effective functioning. [179H, 180AI

2. The instant case is not a case of a premature termination of
service. It is a clear case of the abolition of posts and the termination of
the service is a consequence thereof. Hence the termination of service is
not open to challenge on the ground of any illegality. [1800-Ej
c 3. The allegations of mala fides against the Chief Election
Commissioner are hard to accept. The removal of the Election Commis-
sioners was not on the recommendations of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner under the 2nd proviso to clause (5) of the Article 324. Nothing
has been brought on record to show that even otherwise the Govern-
D ment while abolishing the posts had acted on the suggestion of the Chief
Election Commissioner. On the other hand, the records shows that
although tht:re were bickerings even on petty issues, all the decisions
were taken ultimately unanimously. It is, however, another thing that
this unison in working, in the circumstances, could not have been
guaranteed for all time to come, and the Government if they desired the
E continuance of the two Commissioners had an option to make the rules of
business. That the Government chose one rather than the other option
is no ground to allege ma/a fides against them and much less against the
Chief Election Commissioner. [!SIB; 180F-H, 181A]

4. Material loss on account of cutting short of the tenure is not
F unknown in a service career and is one of the exigencies of employment.
The creation and abolition of post is the prerogative of the executive,
and in the present case of the President. Article 324(2) leaves it to the
President to fix and appoint such number of Election Commissioners as
he may from time to time determine. The power to create the posts is
unfettered. So also is the power to reduce or abolish them. If, therefore,
G the President, finding that there was no work for the Election Commis·
sioners or that the Election Commission could not function, decided to ....._
abolish the posts, that was an exigency of the office held by the
petiticmer. [181C-Dj

5. The flashing of the photographs of the petitioner and the other
H Election Commissioner in the news bulletin by the Doordarshan was
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.L 163

clearly uncalled for. Although there is nothing on record to show at
whose instance it was don~;-:yet the act deserves condemnation in the A
strongest language. It was within the powers of the Government to
investigate the incident and it could have offered to investigate the event
and to make proper amends to the petitioner and the other Election
Commissioner. Instead it has casually dismissed the incident by a
mechanical denial of it. The attitude adopted by the Government towards B
the erstwhile public servants is strongly disapproved. [182E-F-G-H, 183A]

6. It appears that there is an impression in some quarters lh'!\ if
the Government admits its mistake whether it is committed by the same
Government or the earlier Government, it loses its face. Nothing can.. be
farther from reality. In a democratic regime, the Government repre-
sents the people. It adds to its respectability and credibility, if the c
Government also owns its mistakes frankly: I179D-E]

7. In the absence of rules to the contrary, the members of a
multi-member body are not and need not always be on par with each
other in the matter of their rights, authority and powers. [174C] D

7. I It is an acknowledged rule of transacting business in a multi-
member body that when there is ·DO express provision to the contrary,
the business has to be carried on unanimously. The rule to the contrary
such as the decision by majority, has to be laid down specifically by
· spelling out the kind of majority-whether simple special of all the E
members or of the members present and voting etc. [174E]

7 .2 In a case such as that of the Election Commission which is not
-', merely an advisory body but an executive one, it is difficult to carry on
its affairs by insisting on unanimous decisions in all matters. No proce-
dure has been laid down for transacting the business when Election F
Commissioners are appointed. Hence, a realistic approach demands
that either the procedure for transacting business is spelt out by a
statute or a rule either prior to or simultaneously with the appointment
of the Election Commissioners or that no appointment of Election Com-
missioners is made in the absence of such procedure. I 174F-G]
G
8. There is no doubt that two heads are better than one, and
particularly when an institution like the Election Commission is
entrusted with vital functions, and is armed with exclusive uncontrolled
power to execute them, _it.is both necessary and desirable that the powers
are not exercised by one individual, however, all-wise he may be. It
ill-conforms the tenets of the democratic rule. It is true that the inde- H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

pendence of an institution depends upon the perso.ns who man it and not
A
on their number. A single individual may sometimes prove capable of
withstanding all the pulls and pres.sures, which many may not. How-
ever, when vast powers are exercised by an institution which is account~
able to none, it is politic to entrust its affairs to more hands than one. It
helps to assure judiciousness and want of arbitrariness. The fact, how-
B ever, remains that where more individuals than one man an institution,
their role have to be clearly defined, if the functioning of the institution
is not to come to a naught. [I 78E-G I

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 235 of
1990.
c (Under Article 32 of the Constitution oi India).

Gopal Subramanium, Ms. Binu Tamta and S. Murlidhar for the
Petitioner.

D Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. A. Subhashini,
K. Swami, C.S. Vaidyanathan and S.R. Setia for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SA WANT, J. On 7th October, 1989, by a notification issued in
E exercise of the powers conferred by clause (2) of Article 324 of the
Constitution, the President fixed, until further orders, the number of
Election Commi>S!oners (other than the Chief Election Commis-
sioner), at two. By a subsequent notification of 16th October, 1989
issued under the same provisions, the President appointed the
petitioner and one Shri V.S. Seigell as Election Commissioners w.e.f.
F the afternoon of that day. On the same day, by another notification
issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (5) of Article 324
of the Constitution, the President made rules to regulate the condi-
tions of service and tenure of office of the Election Commissioners
(other than the Chief Election Commissioner). These conditions laid
down, among other things, that an Election Commissioner shall hold
G office for a term of five years or until he attains the age of 65 years
whichever happens earlier.

2. On 1st 1anuary, 1990, in exercise of the powers conferred
under Article 324(2) of the Constitution. the President issued two
notifications-one rescinding, with immediate effect, the notification of
H 7th October, 1989 creating the two posts of Election Commissioners
S.S. DHANOA v .. U.0.1. [SAWANT. J.] 165

and another rescinding, with immediate effect, the notification of 16th
A
October, J9S9 by which the appointment of the petitioner and Shri
V.S. Seigell was made. It is these two notifications of 1st January, 1990
which are being assailed in the present petition.

3. The grounds of attack are, firstly, once appointed, an Elec-
tion Commissioner continues in office for his full tenure determined by B
the rules made under Article 324(5) of the Constitution which is five
years or till the attainment of 65 years of age whichever is earlier. The
President could remove the petitioner only on the recommendation of
the Chief Election Commissioner. He had otherwise no power to cut
short the tenure either under the Constitution or under the rules.
Hence, the rescission of the notifications of 7th and 16th October,
1989 by the impugned notifications of !st January, 1990 is illegal. c
Secondly, it is urged that the Election Commission is an independent
body and its independence is vital to free and fair elections which are a
sine qua non for democracy. Any interference with the working of the
Election Commission. directly or indirectly, is bound to have adverse
effect on the health of our democracy. Hence, it is of paramount D
importance to the democracy enshrined in our Constitution that its
independence is not eroded in any manner. The device adopted in tbe
present case, viz., of the rescission of the notification creating the
posts and thereby abolishing the posts and thus removing the peti-
tioner and the other Election Commissioner was an attempt to remove
the Election Commissioners which removal could not be effected E
otherwise either under the Constitution or under the service rules. The
third attack is that the two notifications were issued mala fide under
the advice of the Chief Election Commissioner with the sole object of
getting rid of the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner
because the Chief Election Commissioner was from the beginning ill-
disposed towards the creation of the posts of the Election Commis- F
sioners. It is also alleged that there were differences of opinion bet-
ween the Chief Fite.ion Commissioner on the one hand and the Elec-
tion Commissioners on the other and the former desired that he should
have the sole power of decisi(}n-making in all matters. Lastly, it is
contended that the petitioner's removal affected him materially since
after a distinguisl.~d career as a civil servant he had joined the Bihar G
-• Public Service Commission as its Chairman only on 30th September,
1989 and had resigned the said post on 14th October, 1989 to join as
Election Commissioner on 16th October, 1989. His career was abrup-
tly ended within less than three months thereafter. It was also urged
that while announcing the removal, his photograph was flashed on the
television during a news-bulletin of 2.1.1990 subjecting him to severe H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 3 S.C.R.

j\
loss of dignity and reputation. This act also shows ma/a /ides of the
Janata Dal which was a part of the succeeding government and had a
prejudice against him.

4. The petition is resisted by the !st respondent (Union of India)
and the 2nd respondent (the then Chief Election Commissioner). No
B separate coun.ter-affidavit is filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent-
Election Commission. After the sad demise of the 2nd respondent
during the pendency of the petition, he was deleted as a party to the
petition. However, the reply filed by him is being relied upon on
behalf of the other respondents. In the reply filed by the 1st respon-
dent, it is contended that the President had issued the impugned notifi-
cation rescinding the notification of 7th October, 1989 in bona fide
c exercise of his power under the first part of clause (2) of Arlide 324 of
the Constitution which authorises the President to determine the
strength of the Election Commission and fix the number of Election
Commissioners from time to time. There is no limita.tion on the power
of the President to determine and fix the strength of the Election
D Commission from time to time. The exercise of the said power is based
on the subjective satisfaction of the President formed on the advice
tendered by the Counsel of Ministers. In SUl.!Jlort.,of this contention, it
is pointed out that whereas Article 324(2) creates an obligation that
the Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner, as regards the appointment of the other Election Commis-
E sioners and their number, the matter is left, without any limitation, to
the discretion of the President. It is further pointed out that when the
President had issued the notifications of 7th and 16th October, 1989,
he had expected that on account of the reduction in the lower-age limit
of the voters from 21 to 18 years necessitating revision of the electoral
rolls and the impending statutes, viz., the Panchayat Raj and Nagar
F Palika Bills, which were then before the Parliament, the work of the
Election Commission would increase, and to cope up with the same,
the augmentation of the strength of the Election Commissi9n was
necessary. However, the electoral rolls became ready and the two Bills
in question lapsed on 13th October, 1989. Hence, the augmented
strength was considered surplus to the requirement. A decision was,
G therefore, taken to abolish the posts and the impugned notification of
7th October, 1989 was rescinded. Consequent upon it, the appoint-
ments of the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner came to
an end. It was not necessary to issue another notification to rescind the
·-
notification of 16th October, 1989 by which the said appointments
were made. However. by way of abundant precaution, the notifica-
H tion of 16th October, 1989 was also rescinded by another notification
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. [SAWANT. J.j 167

of 1st January, 1990. It was, thus, according to the !st respondent. a
A
case of a termination of service of the petitioner consequent upon the
abolition of the post. It was not a case of a removal of the petitioner
from service as alleged by the petitioner. In the affidavit filed by the
2nd respondent, he has been candid in stating that there was in fact no
need of any Election Commissioner and the Chief Election Commis-
sioner along with his then machinery was capable of coping with the B
work. However, after the appointment of the Election Commis-
sioners, the Election Commission took decisions on all matters unani-
mously although there were differences of opinion. There was no occa-
sion for the Chief Election Commissioner either to resent the appoint-
ment of the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner or to
recommned their removal. In fact, the petitioner himself has admitted
in the petition that the Chief Election Commissioner had at no stage c
made any recommendation for his removal or for the removal of the
other Election Commissioner. He has also vehemently denied the alle-
gations made against him qua the various incidents and has contended
the all his ac.tions were in conformity with law and the past practices of
the Commission. D

5. Article 324 of the Constitution reads as follows:

"324. Superintendence, direction and control of elections
to be vested in an Election Commssion.·-( I) The superin-
tendence, direction and control of the preparation of the E
elecroral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to
Parliament, and to the Legislature of every State and of
elections to the offices of President and Vice-President
held under this Constitution shall be vested in a Commis-
sion (referred to in this Constitution as the Election
Commission). F

2. The Election Commission shall consist of the
Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other
Election Commissioners, if any, as the President may fron1
time to time fix and the appointment of the Chief Election
Commissioner and other Election Commissioners shall. G
subject to the provisions of any law made 'in that behalf by
Parliament, be made by the President.

(3) When any other Election Commissioner is so
appointed the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the
Chairman of the Election Commission. H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A
(4) Before each general election to the House of the
People and to the Legislative Assembly of each State, and
before the first general election and thereafter before each
biennial election to the Legislative Council of each State ~-
having such Council, the President may also appoint after
consultation with the Election Commission such Regional
B Commissioners as he may consider necessary to assist the
Election Commission in the performance of the functions
conferred on the Commission by clause (1).

(5) Subject to the Provisions of any law made by
Parliament, the conditions of service and tenure of office of
the Election Commissioners and the Regional Commis·
c sioners shall be such as the President may by rule determine:

Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shall
not be removed from his office except in like manner and
on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court and
D the conditions of service of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his
appointment:

Provided further that any other Election Commis-
sioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed
E from office except on the recommendation of the Chief
Election Commissioner.

(6) The President, or the Governor of a State, shall,
when so requested by the Election Commission, make
available to the Election Commission or to a Regional
F Commissioner such staff as may be necessary for the dis-
charge of the functions conferred on the Election Commis-
sion by clause (1)."

The provisions of clause ( 1) of the Article show that the
superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the
G electoral rolls for and the conduct of all elections to Parliament and to
the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of the
President and Vice-President are vested in the Election Commission.
...
The relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1950
and of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 further show that
various functions are entrusted to, and powers are conferred upon, the
H Commission in the matter of the conduct of election to the Parliament
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. [SAWANT. J.] 169

and to the Legislatures of the States. Jn the discharge of these duties A
and in the exercise of these powers, the Commission has to act on its
own and to take various dicisions and implement them as an indepen-
dent body. In the discharge of its duties and functions, it is not amen-
able to the control of any other body. There is no doubt, therefore,
that the Election Commission as envisaged by the Constitution is an
independent institution and has to function as such. B

6. The salient features of the composition of the Election Com-

, mission as given in clauses (2), (3) and{4) of the Article are that the
Commission shall always consist of a perm'lnent incumbent, viz., the
Chief Election Commissioner. But the Preside.nt has also been given
the power to appoint such number of other Election Commissioners as
he may, from time to time, fix. In other words, \llhile. the appointment
of the Chief Election Commissioner is a must, the appointment of the
c
other Election Commissioner or Commissioners is <not obligatory.
What is further, the number of other Election Commissioners is left to
the descretion of the President depending upon the need felt from .time
to time. This would mean that both the increase and the reduction in D
the number of the Election Commissioners would depend upon the
..J requirements of the time as assessed by the President.

7. The power given to the Preside,nt to appoint the Chief Elec-
tion Commissioner and other E.lection Commissioners is subject to the
provisions of any law that may be made by the Parliament in that E
behalf. The Parliament has thus reserved to itself the power to regu-
late these appointments. It is obvious from clauses (2) and (3), that
_._ when the Commission consists only of Chief Election Commissioner, it
is he who alone constitutes the Commission and acts as such. How-
ever, when other Election Commissioners are appoirtted, the Commis-
sion consists of both the Chief Election Commissioner and the other F
Election Commissioners and together they constitute the Commission.
In such a case, the Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Chairman
of the Election Commission.

8. Clause (4) of the Article gives power to the President to
appoint, after consulting the Election Commission, such Regional G
Commissioners as he may consider necessary to assist the Election
Commission in the performance of the functions conferred on the
Commission. The Regional Commissioners abviously do not constitute
the Commission but are appointed to assist it.

9. However, in the matter of the conditions of service and H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

tenure of office of the Election Commissioners, a distinction is made
A
between the Chief Election Commissioner on the one hand and Elec-
tion Commissioners and Regional Commissillners on the other.
Whereas the conditions of service and tenure of office of all are to be
such as the President may, by rule determine, a protection is given to
the Chief Election Commissioner in that his conditions of service shall
l3 not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, and he shall
not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like
grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. These protections are not
available either to the Election Commissioners or to the Regional
Commissioners. Their conditions of service can be varied even to their
disadvantage after their appointment and they can be removed on the
recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner, although not
c otherwise. It would thus appear that in these two respects not only the
Election Commissioners are not on par with the Chief Election
Commissioner, but they are placed on par with the Regional Commis-
sioners although the former constitute the Commission and the latter
do not and are only appointed to assist the Commission.
D
10. It is necessary to bear these features in mind because
although clause (2) of the Article states that the Commission will
consist of both the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election
Commissioners if and when appointed, it does not appear that the
framers of the Constitution desired to give the same status to the
E Election Commissioners as that of the Chief Election Commissioner.
The Chief Election Commissioner does not, therefore, appear to be
primus inter partes. i.e., first among the equals. but is intended to be
placed in a distinctly higher position. The conditions that the President
may increase or decrease the number of Election Commissioners
according to the needs of the time, that their service conditions may be
F varied to their disadvantage and that they may be removed on the
recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner militate against
their being of the same status as that of the Chief Election Commis-
sioner. In this connection, the controversy as to whether there should
be a one 1nember Commission or a multi-member Commission also
assumes a little importance since it throws light both on the genesis of
G Article 324 as well as its implications. We may first refer to the rele-
vant discussion on the subject in the Constituent Assembly.

11. In the Draft Constitution, the present Article 324 was
numbered as Article 289. It appears from Dr. Ambedkar's introduc-
tory comments on the Article (Constitu~nt Assembly Debates, Vol.
H VIII p. 905) that the Drafting Committee appointed on the Fundamen-
S.S. DHANOA v. U.O.l. {SAWANT, J.{ 171

ta! Rights had made a report that the independence of the electipns
A
and the avoidance of any interference by the executive in the elections
to the legislature should be regarded as a Fundamental Right and
provided for, in the Chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. When
the matter came up before the House, it was decided to treat it as of
fundamental importance but to provide for it in some other part of the
Constitution and not in the chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. B
The House had affirmed without any kind of dissent that in the
interests of purity and freedom of elections, the Commission should be
free from any kind of interference from the executive of the day.
Article 289 (now Article 324) wa:s designed to carry· out that part of the
decision of the House. Explaining the provisions of clause (2) of the
Article, Dr. Ambedkar staled that there were two alternatives before
the Drafting Committee, viz., either to have a permanent body con-
c
sisting of 4 or 5 members of the Election Commission who would
continue in office throughout without any break, or to permit the
President to have an ad hoc body appointed at the time when there is
an election on the anvil. The Drafting Committee had steered a middle
course. What the Committee proposed by the said clause was to have D
permanently in office one man called the Chief Election Commissioner
so that the skeleton machinery would always be available ..This was felt
sufficient, taking into consideration all exigencies. At the same time, it
was felt that when the elections come up, the President may add to the
machinery by appointing other members of the Commission. Com-
menting upon clause (4) of the then Article 289 (rrow clause (5) of E
Article 324), Dr. Ambedkar stated as follows:

"So far as clause (4) is concerned, we have left the matter
to the President to determine the conditions of service and
the tenure of office of the members of the Election Com-
mission, subject to one or two conditions, that the Chief F
Election Commissioner shall not be liable to be removed
except in the same manner as a Judge of the Supreme
Court. If the object of this House is that all matters relating
to Elections should be outside the control of the Executive
Government of the day, it is absolutely necessary that the
new machinery which we are setting up, namely, the Elec- G
tion Commission should be irremovable by. the executive
by a mere fiat. We have, therefore, given the Chief Elec-
tion Commissioner the same status so far as removability is
concerned as we have given to the Judges of the Supreme
Court. We, of course,.do not propose to give.the same status
to the other members of the Commission. We have left the H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A matter to the President as to the circumstances under which
he would deem fit to remove any other member of the
Election Commission, subject to one .condition that the
Chief Election Commissioner must recommend that the
removal is just and proper.
(Emphasis supplied)
B
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena wanted, among other things, the
appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner as well as of the
Election Commissioners to be confirmed by two-third majority in a
joint session of both Houses of Parliament. He also wanted both the
Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners to be
c removed by the same process, viz., in like manner and on the like
grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court, and non-variation of the
service conditions of the Election Commissioners to their disadvantage
as was provided for in the service conditions of the Chief Election
Commissioner. This amendment was supported, among others, by
Pandit Hriday Nath Kunjru. The amendments were not accepted by
D the House, and the distinction between the Chief Election Commis-
sioner and the Election Commissioners with regard to the security of
the service conditions and the procedure of their removal was
maintained as was proposed.

12. It appears that the issue whether the Commission should be
E uni-member or multi-member had remained alive even after the adop-
tion of the Constitution, and it cannot be said that it has lost its rele-
vance even today. This is clear from the Election Commission's
reports of the earlier period. The 2nd respondent in the Commission's
report for 1986-87, had· referred to this issue and observed therein, as
pointed out by the petitioner himself, as follows:
F
"though three of the former Chief Election Commissioners
have opposed a multi-member body on the ground, inter
alia, that quick decisions are needed in Election matters
and the Commission acts in actual practice in consultations
with various authorities, agencies and that a process of
G deliberation precedes its decisions and there is consider-
able force in what they have said, it would, in view of the
demand from certain quarters for a multi-member Com-
mission, be desirable to eBmine the proposal and take a
decision after ascertaining the views of the various political
parties. A suggestion to tliis effect was made to the
H Government by the Commission through its letter dated
S.S. DHANOA v. U.O.l. [SAWANT, J.] 173

October 29, 1986 to the Law Minister".
A
As stated by the 2nd respondent, the then Prime Minister had
categorically stated in Parliament in December 1988 that he was
against a multi-member Election Commission. It is presumed that this
statement was made by the Prime Minister after the Government had
considered the views expressed by the 2nd respondent in his letter of B
29th October, 1986 to the Law Minister.

13. Unfortunately, there was no discussion in the Constituent
Assembly on the subject of the procedure to be adopted by the Com-
mission in transacting its business when Election Commissioners are
appointed in addition to the Chief Election Commissioner. We are C
also not aware as to what precise relationship between the Chief Elec- ·
tion Commissioner and the other Election Commissioners, if and when
appointed, was assumed by the earlier three Chief Election Commis-
sioners when they opposed the multi-member Election Commission
or what suggestion was made by the 2nd respondent with regard to
the said relati"nship in his letter of 29th October, 1986 to the Law D
Minister. As we have seen from the provisions of clause (3) of Article
_,, 324, all that the Article says is that when any other Election Commis-
sioner is appointed. the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the
Chairman of the Election Commission.

14. What is, therefore, evident from the discussion of the E
framers of the Constitution is, firstly, they did not want to give the
same status to the Election Commissioners as of the Chief Election
Commissioner and, secondly, they wanted the Chief Election Commis-
--4., sioner to be in overall control of the business of the Commission. The
nearest analogy of another Constitutional institution that comes to our
mind in this connection, is that of the Council of Ministers under F
Articles 74 and 163 of the Constitution. The Prime Minister and the
Chief Minister, as the case may be, are at the head of the Council of
Ministers and they together with the other Ministers constitute the
Council. They are, however, not bound by the views of the other
Ministers and may even override them. Nor have the other Ministers
the same power as the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister. There is G
--' also "~me similarity between the powers of the Prime Minister and the
Chief Minister on the one hand and the Chief Election Commissioner
on the other, in the matter of recommendations for the removal of the
other Ministers and Commissioners respectively. There is no doubt
that there is an important distinction between the Council of Ministers
and the Election Commission in that whereas the Prime Minister or H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

the Chief Minister is appointed by the President or the Governor and
A
the other Ministers are appointed by the President or the Governor on
the advice of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister, the appoint-
ment of both the Chief Election Commissioner and the other Election
Commissioners as the law stands today, is made by the President under
Article 324(2) of the Constitution. It has, however, to be noted that
B the provisions of the said Article have left the matter of appointment
of the Chief Election Commissioner and the other Election Commis-
sioners to be regulated by a law to be made by the Parliament, and the
President exercises the power of appointing them today because of the
absence of such law which has yet to be made. In pointing out these
similarities we do not intend to place the two institutions on par.
Instead, we want to stress that in the absence of rules to the contrary,
c the members of a multi-member body are not and need not always be
on par with each other in the matter of their rights, authority and
powers. In the case of the functioning of the Council of Ministers there
is the Westministerial Convention crystallised into an.unquestionable
rule, to back it. We are not aware if there is any Election Commission
D in a similar Constih1tional framework as ours in any other part of the
world and of its composition and the manner of its working. But, if
there is one, the method of its working will be worth studying, in this
connection.

15. It is further an acknowledged rule of transacting business in
E a multi-member body that when there is no express provision to the
contrary, the business has to be carried on unanimously. The rule to
the contrary such as the decision by majority, has to be laid down
specifically by spelling out the kind of majority-whether simple,
special, of all the members or of the members present and voting etc.
In a case such as that of the Election Commission which is not merely
F an advisory body but an executive one, it is difficult to carry on its
affairs by insisting on unanimous decisions in all matters. Hence, a
realistic approach demands that either the procedure for transacting
business iS spelt out by a statute or a rule either prior to or simultane-
ously with the appointment of the Election Commissioners or that no
appointment of Election Commissioners is made in the absence of such
G procedure. In the present case, admittedly, no such procedure has
been laid down.

16. For this reason, again, we are not impressed by the stress
laid on behalf of the petitioner on the provisions of clause (4) of
Article 324 in relation to the appointment of the Regional Commis-
H sioners. The fact that the Regional Commissioners are to be appointed
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.J. [SAWANT. J.J 175

by the President in consultatioµ with the Commission to ·assist the
Commission to perform its functions, though places the Election Com,
missioners on a higher pedestal than the Regional Commissioners,
does not raise them to the status of the Chief Election Commissioner.
The provision is intended to vest the President with the powers of
appointment of the Regional Commissioners for a particular purpose,
and the framers of the Constitution, it appears, desired to give a con- 13
stitutional status to the Regional Commissioners also, as and when they
are appointed. The provision, though spells out the relationship bet-
ween Election Commission and Regional Commissioners, does not
help to throw light on the relationship between the Chief Election
Commissioner and Election Commissioners inter se. On the other
hand, clause (5) of the Article, by placing the Election Commissioners
and Regional Commissioners on par in tlie m.atter of service conditions
c
and their removability, reinforces the assumption that Election Com-
missioners do not en joy the same status and authority as that of the
Chief Election Commissioner.

17. The experience of the short period during which the
petitioner and the other Election Commissioners were in the Commis-
sion, as has been brought out in the petition and in the counter filed by
the then Chief Election Commissioner, shows that were it not for the
restraint and sagacity shown by the Chief Election Commissioner, the
work of the Commission would have come to a standstill and the
commission would have been rendered inactiye, E

18. In the first instance, the petitioner and the other Election
Commissioners were appointed when the work of the Commission did
. __,\ not warrant their appointrpent. The reason given by the 1st respoµdent
(Union of India), that on account of the Constitution (61st Amend-
ment) Act reducing the yotjng age and the Constitution (64th Amend- F
ment) and (65th Amendment) Bills relatmg to election to the Pancha-
yats and Nagar Palikas, the work of the Commission was expected to
irtci'ease and, therefore, there was need for more .Election Commis-
sioners, cuts no ice. As has been pointed out by the 2nd respondent,
the work relating to revision of electoral rolls on account of the reduc-
tion of voting age was completed in all the States except Assam by the G
end of July 1989 itself. and at the Conference of the Chief Electoral
Officers at Tirupati, the 2nd respondent had declared that the entire
preparatory work relating to the conduct of the then ensuing general
elections to the Lok Sabha would be completed py August iµ the whole
pf the country except Assam. Further, the, Constitution (64th and 65th
Amendment) Bills had already fallen in Parliament, before the H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

appointments. In fact, what was needed was more secretarial staff for
A
which the Commission was pressing, and not more Election Commis-
sioners. What instead was done was to appoint the petitioner and the
other Election Commissio:ier on 16th October, 1989. Admittedly,
further the views of the Chief Election Commissioner were not
ascertained before making the said appointments. In fact, he was pre-
B sented with them for the first time in the afternoon of the same day,
i.e., 16th October, 1989.

What follows is more instructive and interesting for it lends con-
siderable force to what the 2nd respondent has stated in this connec-
tion in his reply. Barely 24 hours after the appointment of the Election
Commissioners, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minfster called
c on the 2nd respondent in the forenoon of 17th October, 1989 and
conveyed to him the desire of the Prime Minister that the general
elections to the Lok Sabha should be held on a particular date and that
the announcement in that behalf should be made by the Commission
forthwith and before 2 p.m. on that day, in any case. It appears that
D the 2nd respondent took the stand that it was for the Commission and
not for the Government to fix the date of the election. The new Elec-
tion Commissioners joined issue with him with regard to his said stand •
and insisted that the Commission forthwith make an announcement of
the date of election as desired by the Prime Minister.

E 19. We do not propose to refer to all the other disputes which
arose between the Chief Election Commissioner on the one hand and
the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner on the other. But
it appears from the contents of the petition and of the reply filed by the
2nd respondent that the petitioner and the other Election Commis-
sioner probably misunderstood their role and thought that they were
F appointed to control the Chief Election Commissioner at every-stage.
This is evident from two instances, among others. It appears that a
Writ Petition No. 3205 of 1989 [Indian Nati<'nal Congress v. F;Iection
Commission and Ors.] was filed in the Delhi High Court on November
9, 1989, and a notice of the same was received by the Commission at
about 6 p.m. on the same day. According to the said notice, the writ
G petition was scheduled to come up for hearing before the High Court
on the following day, i.e., November 10, 1989. By the time the notice
was received in the office of the Commission, the 2nd respondent as
well as the Election Commissioners had left the office. The Deputy
Election Commissioner contacted the 2nd respondent at his residence
over the phone and mentioned the names of some counsel and also
H referred to the consistent practice of the Commission not to engage as
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.[ 177

its counsel law officers of the Government of India in cases where the
A
party in power is a party to the suit. To the 2nd respondent it was a
matter of a routine nature in view of the established practice of the
Commission, and he suggested the name of one more counsel in addi-
tion to the names mentioned by the Deputy Election Commissioner.
Accordingly, a senior advocate, Shri V (we are not mentioning the full
names of the Counsel here although they are candidly disclosed in the B
reply) was engaged, and he was briefed in the matter from about 8
p.m. to 9 p.m. on that day, i.e., 9th November, 1989. Later on, the
petitioner herein rang up the 2nd respondent to say that Shri D, the
.then Additional Solicitor General be engaged to represent the Com-
mission and he also told him that he was so advised by the Union Law
Secretary. The 2nd respondent told him that firstly it was too late and
secondly it was contrary to the practice of the Commission. Later on, it c
transpire a that the petitioner rang up the other Election Commissioner,
Shri V .S. Seigell and thereafter rang up the Deputy Election Commis-
sioner and directed him to withdraw the brief from Shri V with a view
to entrust it to Shri D. In order to avoid any controversy, the 2nd
respondent acquiesced in the proposed appointment of Shri D. In the D
morning of 10th November, 1989, Shri D was approached to act as
Commission's counsel. He, however, expressed his inability to do so.
In the meanwhile, the petitioner had sent a note against the alleged
violation of the procedure in that he and his other colleague were not
consulted while appointing Shri V. The withdrawal of the brief from
Shri V and the refusal of Shri D to appear in the matter placed the E
Election Commission in an embarrassing position before the High
Court since the Commission was not represented by any counsel as
none of the standing counsel of the Central Government at the Delhi
High Court was also willing to act as the Commission's counsel. An
application for adjournment of the matter to the following day, i.e.,
11th November 1989 was made on behalf of the Commission which was F
reluctantly granted by the Court as the following day happened to be a
non-working day of the Court. It appears that confronted with the said
situation, the petitioner and the other Commissioner realised their
mistake and later agreed to the engagement of any other suitable
counsel. Thereafter, Shri R, .another senior advocate was engaged who
represented the Commission before the High Court on 11th G
November, 1989.

The second instance gives a glimpse of a still more contentious
attitude adopted by the petitioner. It appears that a "closed door"
meeting of the Chief Electoral Officers was held on December 14,
1989 and the Chief Election Commissioner in his inaugural speech had H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

referred to the policies, procedures and practices to be followed. The
A
petitioner objected to this speech insisting that before making the
speech he should have been consulted. He also objected to the manner
in which the Chief Election Commissioner handled the subjects and
the decisions were taken in the meeting. This was so in spiie of the fact
that the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner had partici-
pated in the Conference, and everyone participating in it including the
juniormost Chief Election Officer was free to express his opinion on
the matters covered in the address and the decisions were arrived at on
the basis of the views expressed by the majority of the Chief Election.
Officers.

20. Although the whole foundation of the conteutions advanced
t on behalf of the petitioner is the need to safeguard the independence
of the Commission, we are afraid that the manner of appointment of
the petitioner and the other Election Commissioner, and the attitude
adopted by them in the discharge of their functions was hardly
calculated to ensure free and independent functioning of the Commis-
b sion, much less its smooth working. In the circumstances and in the
absence of rules to regulate the relationship between the Chief Elec-
tion Commissioner and the other Election Commissioners no one need
shed tears that the posts were abolished.
,.
21. There is no doubt that two heads arc better than one, and
particularly when an institution like the Election Commission is
entrusted with vital functions, and is armed with exclusive uncontrol-
led powers to execute them, it is both necessary and desirable that the
powers are not exercised by one individual, however, all-wise he may
be. It ill-conforms the tenets of the democratic rule. It is true that the
independence of an institution depends upon the persons who man it
F and not on their number. A single individual may sometimes prove
capable of withstanding all the pulls and pressures, which many may
not. However, when vast powers are exercised by an institution which
is accountable to none, it is politic to entrust its affairs to more hands
than one. It helps to assure judiciousness and want of arbitrariness.
The fact, however, remains that where more individuals than one, man
G an institution, their roles have to be clearly defined, if the functioning
of the institution is not to come to a naught.

22. It is true that the Union of India in their reply have not been
all that candid with the reasons for the abolition of the posts. They
have merely stated that since the Constituti(\11 (64th & 65th Amend-
H ment) Bills had lapsed and the revision of ekctoral rolls on account of
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 179

the lowering of the age was also completed before the general elet~
A
tions which took place in November, 1989, the reasons and evenis
which occasioned the appointment of the Election Commissioners
ceased to exist, and the Government on assessing the prevailing posi-
tion bona fide came to the conclusion that the volume of work iri the
changed context and circumstances did not warrant the continliarice of
ihe posts. These reasons are not convincing since, as we have pointed B
out earlier from the contents of the .reply filed by the 2nd respondent,
they had ceased to be relevant even before the appointment of the two
Commissioners was made on 16th October, 1989. Yet, the appoint-
ments were made and the rules governing their service conditions were
also promulgated simultaneously, which assured them the tenure of
five years or upto the superannuation age of 65 years whichever hap-
pened earlier. The facts as they appearfrom record, therefore, show c
thai the then Government .had thought it fit to make the two appoint-
ments although there was no need to do so. What other considerations
weighed with the then Government in making the appointments is
anybody's guess, and we do not propose to go into them. But we
expected that the. Union of India would candidly admit the initial D
mistake of making the said appointments rather than defend them on
non-existent grounds. It appears that there is an impression in some
quarters that if the·Government adinits its mistake whether it is com-
mitted by the same Government or the earlier Government, it loses its
face. Nothing can be farther from reality. In a democratic regime, the
Government represents the people. It adds to its respectability and E
credibility, if the Government also owns its mistakes frankly. The
truth of the matter as is apparent from the record is that not only there
was no need fot the said appointments, but the appointments in the
absence of the definition of their roles in the Commission, was creating
an untoward and unworkable situation rendering the Commission in-
ternally torn and ineffectual in its functioning. There was, of course, F
an Option before the Government, viz., to continue with the experi-
ment of the multi-member Commission by defining the roles of the
ncW Cominissioners. This course, however, might have required either
framitig of the rules of business or enactment of a statute or an ameoo-
ment to the provisions of Article 324 in view particularly of the provi-
sions of the 2nd proviso to clause (5) thereof. We express no opinion G
on the same except stating that if the said course was thought of, it
might have iaken a considerable time. In the meanwhile, the intract-
able situation in the Commission's working would have continued and
might even have deteriorated.

23. in the view that we have taken, namely, that there was Tio H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A need for the posts of the Election Commissioners at the time the
appointments were made and that in the absence of a clear definition
of their role in the Commission, particularly, vis-a-vis the Chief Elec·
tion Commissioner, the appointments were an oddity, the abolition of
the posts far from striking at the independence of the Commission
paved the way for its smooth and effective functioning. In view further
B of the fact that for reasons stated above, it is not possible to hold that
the Election Commissioners have the same powers and the authority
as the Chief Election Commissioner, and it may well be that the Chief
Election Commissioner has the power to disregard and override the
views of the Election Commissioners, the abolition of their posts least
infringed on the independence of the Commission. Hence, we are not
enamoured of the second contention advanced on behalf of the
c petitioner, viz. that the abolition of the posts tampered directly or
indirectly with the.independence of the Commission. ·

24. As regards the first contention, namely, t.hat in view of the
service rules, the Election Commissioners were entitled to remain in
D their posts for a period of five years or till they attained the age of 65
years whichever event occurred earlier, we are of the view that this is
not a case of a premature termination of service. It is a clear case of the
abolition of posts on account of the reasons stated ea.rlier and the
termination of the service is a consequence thereof. Hence, the termi-
nation of service is not open to challenge on the ground of any illegal-
E ity. For the same reason, we are also not attracted by the argument
that the notifications abolishing the two posts and removing the
petitioner and the other Election Commissioner were issued ma/a fide
at the instance of the Chief Election Commissioner who allegedly
wanted to get rid of them. We are satisfied, on the basis of the record,
that the Chief Election Commissioner had never recommended their
F removal. In fact, the petitioner himself has admitted that his removal
and the removal of the other Election Commissioner was not on the
recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner under the 2nd
proviso to clause (5) of Article 324. There is further nothing brought
on record by the petitioner to show that even otherwise the Govern-
ment while abolishing the posts had acted on the suggestion of the
G Chief Election Commissioner. On the other hand, it is clear from the
contents of the petition as well as the reply filed by the 2nd respondent
that although there were bickerings even on petty issues, all the deci-
sions were taken ultimately unanimously. It is., however, another thing
that this unison ili working, in the circumstai:ices, could not have been
guaranteed for all time to come, and the Government if they desired
H the contimrance of the two Commissioners has an option to make the
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.[ 181

rules of business etc. as stated earlier. That the Government chose 0ne
A
rather than the other option is no ground to allege ma/a fides against
them and much less against the Chief Election Commissioner. It may
be pointed out in this connection that as admitted by the petitioner
himself although the earlier three Chief Election Commissioners had
opined against a multi-mem.ber Commission .• the second respondent·
Chief Election Commissioner was inclined in favour of the concept. B
Hence, the allegations of ma/a fides against the Chief E'.lection Com-
missioner are hard to accept.

25. The last of the contentions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner is in two parts. The first part relates to the material loss on
i!CCount of the cutting short .of the tenure of the petitioner. Such loss is
not unknown in a service career and is one of the exigencies of employ-
c
mept. The creation and abqlition of post is the prerogative of the
executive, and in the present case of the President. Articl~ 324(2)
., leaves it to the President to fix and appoint such number of E'.lection
Commissioners as he may from time to time determine. The power to
create the posts is unfettered. So also is the power to reduce or abolish D
.:hem. If, therefore, the President, finding that there Was no work for
the E!e.ction Commissioners 0r that the Election Commission could
not fullction, decided to abolish the posts, that was an exigency of the
office .held by the petitioner. In fairness to the petitioner, we may
record here that Shri Gop.al Subramaniam appearing for him made it
clear at the very outset that the petitioner had n0t approched the court E
to make a grievance of his material loss but to assert tJ!e principle that
the independence of the Election Commission should not be permitted
to be tampered with, either directly or indirectly by the su~\{11ge of
the abolition ,of the posts. We have dealt with this aspect earlier in
.quite some detail. .
• F
26. We, however, find, some force in the second part of the
contention. The petitioner in paragraph 30 of his petition has averred
as follows:

"The abolition of the post of Election Commissioners was
(lead news) in the Doordarshan Hindi News Bulletins at G
7.30 pm and 8.40 pm with photos of the two 'removed'
Commissioners being flashed on the TV screen. They
quoted the Government Press Note which sought to justify
abolition of the two posts on the basis of a review of the
work of the Election Commission but before that an earlier
left-out shot of the Prime Minister's P~ess Conference was H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.
\
shown in which viewers were mad·e t~ hear a qt.iestioii of a
A
Press report casting aspersions on 'the two newly appointed
Election Commissioners with the Prime Minister answering
that the Government would review these appointments
along with other electoral reforms. This 'was clearly defa-
matory and it was cle.ar to every viewer that the two Elec-
B tion Commissioners had been 'removed' for the reasons
contained in the insinuation of the press reporter and the
· official reasons justifying abolition of the posts were a mere
eye-~ash . ........ "

In their reply to this paragraph the lJni~n of India in paragraph 27
have stated: • · · -
c
"With reference to para 30, it is submitted that the
allegations and contentions contained ·therein are irrele-
vant and have no bearing on· the issues arising in the writ
petition. The said allegations in any event are not admitted.
D and the petitioner is put to strict proof thereof."

Although we do not find any substance in the grievance of the )·-
petitioner against the answer given by the Prime Minister to the Press
Reporter in the Press Conference, we do find that the flashing of the
photos of the petitioner arid the other Election Commissioner iri their
E Hindi News Bulletin at 7.30 pm and 8.40 pm by the Doordarshan was
clearly uncalled for. There is nothing on record to show at whose
instance it was done. But the act deserves condemnation in the
strongest language. This may probably be the first instance where· the
photos of the officers whose services were terminated had been flashed
, on the TV screen. That the Government should casually dismiss this
F incident by a mechanical den.ial of it, adds poignancy to the episode.
We wish that the Government had adopted a.reasonable attitude and
. given a plausible answer to the allegation. It was within their powers to
investigate the incident. Instead, they have non-chalantly stated in the
reply that "the said allegations in any event are not admitted and the
petitioner is put to strict proof thereof'. We must record our strong
G disapproval of the attitude adopted by the Government towards the ,,_
erstwhile public servants. It has neither enhanced the prestige of the
Government nor of the public service. That the flashing of the photos
· on the TV screen had nothing to do with the validity of the abolition of
the posts· and the consequential termination_ of the services of the
petitioner and the other Election .Commissioner-is ~J) argument to
H justify the event. Government could have offered io investigate the

'
S.S. DHANOA v. U.0.1. [SAWANT. J.] 183

event and to make proper amends to the petitioner and the other A
Election Commissioner. This event was cited by the petitioner as a
proof of vindictiveness of the Jan ta Dal which was a partner in the then
Government and which was allegedly aggrieved by the stand taken by
the two Commissioners in the dispute relating to its symbol in the 1989
elections. It was, therefore, all the more necessary to deal with it
B
seriously. We, however, leave the matter here because for the reasons
we have discussed earlier, the incident has no bearing on the result of
the petition.

.• 27 .. The petition, thus, fails and the rule is discharged. In the
circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
c
T.N.A. Petition dismissed.