S SHOBHAversusMUTHOOT FINANCE LTD.

          [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1147 : 2025 INSC 117

                          S Shobha
                              v.
                     Muthoot Finance Ltd.
   (Special Leave Petition (C) No(s). 2625-2627 of 2025)
                          24 January 2025
        [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                      Issue for Consideration
Whether the respondent-Muthoot Finance Ltd. is a “State” within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore
amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution.

                             Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.12 and 226 – The Division Bench
of the High Court held that Muthoot Finance Ltd. is not a
“State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
and therefore not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of Constitution:
Held: (1) For issuing writ against a legal entity, it would have to
be an instrumentality or agency of a State or should have been
entrusted with such functions as are Governmental or closely
associated therewith by being of public importance or being
fundamental to the life of the people and hence Governmental;
(2) A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India may be maintainable against (i) the State Government;
(ii) Authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency
of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the
State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a
private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public
nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge
any function under any Statute, to compel it to perform such a
statutory function; (3) Although, a non-banking finance company
like the Muthoot Finance Ltd. is duty bound to follow and abide by
the guidelines provided by the Reserve Bank of India for smooth
conduct of its affairs in carrying on its business, yet those are of
regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guideline and
not a participatory dominance or control over the affairs of the
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    company; (4) A private company carrying on banking business
    as a Scheduled bank cannot be termed as a company carrying
    on any public function or public duty; (5) Normally, mandamus is
    issued to a public body or authority to compel it to perform some
    public duty cast upon it by some statute or statutory rule – In
    exceptional cases a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of
    mandamus may issue to a private body, but only where a public
    duty is cast upon such private body by a statute or statutory rule
    and only to compel such body to perform its public duty ; (6)
    Merely because a statue or a rule having the force of a statute
    requires a company or some other body to do a particular thing, it
    does not possess the attribute of a statutory body; (7) If a private
    body is discharging a public function and the denial of any rights
    is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the
    public law remedy can be enforced – The duty cast on the public
    body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such
    power is immaterial but, nevertheless, there must be the public law
    element in such action – The Division Bench of the High Court is
    right in taking the view that Muthoot Finance Ltd. is not a “State”
    within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore
    not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
    226 of Constitution – Thus, no case for interference made out.
    [Paras 3, 9]

                             Case Law Cited
    LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd. [1984] 3 SCR 643 : AIR 1986 SC
    1370 – referred to.

                      Books and Periodicals Cited
    Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol.30, 12 p.682.

                               List of Acts
    Constitution of India.

                             List of Keywords
    State; Article 12 of Constitution; Muthoot Finance Ltd.; Authority;
    Statutory body; Instrumentality or agency of the State; Company
    financed and owned by the State; Private body run substantially
    on State funding; Private body discharging public duty.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                        1149

                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


                           Case Arising From
     EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
     Petition(C) No(s). 2625-2627 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 24.07.2024 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA Nos. 418, 490 and 491 of 2024

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Petitioner:
     Brajesh Kumar, Saurav Kumar, Ms. Neha Kumari Singh, Sachin
     Verma.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Order

1.   Delay condoned.
2.   The High Court in its impugned order has observed in para 5 as
     under:-
           “5. While the Court examined the appeals and considered
           the controversy raised in the petitions, a conspicuous
           aspect surfaced that the petitions were filed against the
           Company named Muthoot Finance Limited. Admittedly,
           the respondent – Company is a Company registered
           under the Companies Act, 1956. It does not answer the
           definition of “State” within meaning of Article 12 of the
           Constitution. Nor the transaction of loan by pledging gold
           between the petitioner and the respondent could be said
           to be involving any public function or could be said to be
           in the public realm. Also the Company is not discharging
           any function which has the trapping of sovereign function.
           Respondent – Company is a Private Company registered
           under the law. It is not a “State”.
           5.1 Once the above position is clear, the writ petitions
           would not lie against the respondent – Company. Learned
           Single Judge could not have, therefore, entertained the
           petitions on that ground alone.
           5.2 Noticeably, learned Single Judge was aware of the said
           aspect that the respondent – Company did not have the
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          status of the “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution.
          What was reasoned by the learned Single Judge to
          entertain the petitions notwithstanding the aforesaid aspect
          was that, since the financier had acted contrary to some
          interim order, the petitions merited entertainment. The
          Court does not endorse to the said view and to make the
          petitions maintainable on the said ground
          5.3 The following was observed by learned Single Judge,
          “Since on this fact the financier has acted contrary to the interim
          order, the petition merited entertainment notwithstanding the
          fact that the respondent is a private financier and would not
          completely answer its status as being a State under Article 12
          of the Constitution of India who performs public functions and
          loan is granted under the statutory requirement, as enunciated
          by Reserve Bank of India.
          On all these factors, the petitions are entertained. The
          amount of Rs.24,39,085/- is in deposit before this Court.”
          5.4 Thus, it is clear that though the learned Single Judge
          was well aware that the respondent – Company did not
          fall within the purview of the ‘state’ or its instrumentality
          under Article 12 of the Constitution, he proceeded to
          entertain the petitions and passed the order. The party-in-
          person submitted that it was a COVID-19 time when she
          approached the High Court by way of petitions, therefore,
          they ought to have been entertained. The Court is not
          impressed with the submission.
          5.5 The remedy for the petitioner may be to institute the
          civil suit and to seek appropriate relief. It was further
          pointed out by learned advocate for the appellant that the
          loan agreement between the Company and the petitioner
          contains an arbitration clause. The loan agreement
          figures on record (page No.88 onwards) which is found
          to be containing arbitration clause. Paragraph No.6 (page
          No.100) of the loan agreement is the arbitration clause.”
3.   The Division Bench of the High Court is right in taking the view that
     Muthoot Finance Ltd. is not a “State” within the meaning of Article
     12 of the Constitution and therefore not amenable to writ jurisdiction
     of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution.
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                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


4.   The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that
     although the Finance Company may not be strictly falling within
     the ambit of State yet being a non-banking financial institution is
     governed by the rules and regulations framed by the RBI and if the
     statutory rules and regulations framed by the RBI are breached by
     a non-finance banking company then as a statutory authority such
     finance company is amenable to writ jurisdiction.
5.   We are afraid the position of law is otherwise.
6.   In the case of LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd. reported in AIR 1986 SC
     1370, it was contended before this Court that the Life Insurance
     Corporation was an instrumentality of the State and was debarred
     by Article 14 from acting arbitrarily. It was also contended that it was
     obligatory upon the Corporation to disclose the reasons for its action
     complained of, namely, its requisition to call an extra-ordinary general
     meeting of the company for the purpose of moving a Resolution
     to remove some Directors and appoint others in their place. Such
     argument was opposed by the State, contending that the actions of
     the State or an instrumentality of the State, which do not properly
     belong to the field of public law but belong to the field of private law,
     were not subject to judicial review. Dealing with the said contentions,
     this Court observed:-
           “While we do find considerable force in the contention of
           the learned Attorney-General it may not be necessary for
           us to enter into any lengthy discussion of the topic, as
           we shall presently see. We also desire to warn ourselves
           against readily referring to English cases on questions of
           Constitutional law’ Administrative Law and Public Law as
           the law in India in these branches has forced ahead of the
           law in England, guided as we are by our Constitution and
           uninhibited as we are by the technical rules which have
           hampered the development of the English law. While we
           do not for a moment doubt that every action of the State
           or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by
           reason and that, in appropriate cases actions uninformed
           by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings
           under Art.226 or Art.32 of the Constitution, we do not
           construe Art.14 as a charter for judicial review of State
           actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions
           in its manifold activities by stating reason; for such actions.
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        For example, if the action of the State is political or
        sovereign in character, the Court will keep away from it
        ‘the Court will not debate academic matters or concern
        itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the
        action of the State is related to contractual obligation or
        obligations arising out of the contract, the Court may not
        ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law
        character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the Court will
        examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law
        domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to
        the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating
        the frontier between the public law domain and the private
        law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision
        and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be
        decided in each case with reference to the particular
        action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality
        of the State is engaged when performing the action, the
        public law or private law character of then action and a
        host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or
        an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate
        world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes
        to itself the ordinary role of a share holder, and dons the
        robes of a share-holder, with all the rights available to
        such a share-holder there is no reason why the State as
        a share-holder should be expected to state its reasons
        when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution
        of the Company, like any other shareholder..”
        Distinction between ‘public law’ and ‘private law’:
        Difficult as this distinction is and incapable of precise
        demarcation, it is yet necessary to keep the broad
        distinction in mind. Lord Denning in his book “The Closing
        Chapter” has this to say on the subject:
        “The first thing to notice is that public law is confined to
        ‘public authorities’. What are ‘public authorities’? There is
        only one avenue of Approach. It is by asking, in the words
        of Section 31(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1981:
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                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


           What is the ‘nature of the persons and bodies against
           whom relief may be granted by such orders’, that is, by
           mandamus, prohibition or certiorari?
           These are divided into two main categories:
           First, the persons or bodies who have legal authority to
           determine questions affecting the common law or statutory
           rights or obligations of other persons as individuals.
           That is the formula stated by Lord Justice Atkin in
           R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity
           Joint Committee Co., (1920) Ltd, (1924) 1 KB 171/205 as
           broadened by Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v. Mackman (1982)
           3, WLR 1096/1104).
           Second, the persons or bodies who are entrusted by
           Parliament with functions, powers and duties which involve
           the making of decisions of a public nature….To which I
           would add the words of Lord Goddard, C.J. in R. v. National
           Joint Council for Dental Technicians, ex parte Neate (1953)
           1 QB 704/707):
           “The bodies to which in modern times the remedies of
           these prerogative writs have been applied have all been
           statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred
           statutory powers and duties which, when exercised, may
           lead to the detriment of subjects who may have to submit
           to their jurisdiction”.
           But those categories are not exhaustive. The courts can
           extend them to any other person or body of a public nature
           exercising public duties which it is desirable to control by
           the remedy of judicial review.
           There are many cases which give guidance, but I will just
           give some illustrations.
           Every body which is created by statute and whose powers
           and duties are defined by statute is a ‘public authority’.
           So Government departments, local authorities, police
           authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations,
           are all ‘public authorities’. So are members of a statutory
           tribunal or inquiry, and the board of visitors of a prison. The
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        Criminal Injuries Compensation Board is a public authority.
        So also, I suggest, is a university incorporated by Royal
        charter; and the managers of a State School. So is the
        Boundary Commission: and the Committee of Lloyd’s.
        But a limited liability company incorporated under the
        Companies Acts is not a ‘public authority’; (see Tozer v.
        National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd. (1983) Times, 16
        May). Nor is an unincorporated association like the Jockey
        Club…”. (see pp. 122, 123, 124)
        38. Sir Harry Woolf, a Lord Justice of Court of Appeal,
        points out the distinction in the following words:-
        “I regard public law as being the system which enforces
        the proper performance by public bodies of the duties
        which they owe to the public. I regard private law as being
        the system which protects the private rights of private
        individuals or the private rights of public bodies.
        The critical distinction arises out of the fact that it is the
        public as a whole, or in the case of local government the
        public in the locality, who are the beneficiaries of what is
        protected by public law and it is the individuals or bodies
        entitled to the rights who are the beneficiaries of the
        protection provided by private law “. (see page 221 of
        his Article “Public Law Private Law: Why the Divide? A
        personal View (published in “Public Law” Summer (1986)”).
        The learned Law Lord stated further in the same Article,
        at page 223:
        “While public law deals only with public bodies, this does
        not mean that the activities of public bodies are never
        governed by private law. Like public figures, at least in
        theory, public bodies are entitled to have a private life. There
        have been suggestions that in the commercial field public
        bodies should adopt different and higher ethical standards
        than private individuals, but this is not yet required as
        a matter of law and in relation to purely commercial
        transactions the same law is applicable, whether or not
        a public duty is involved. Prima facie, the same is true
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1155

                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


           in relation to employment. The servant employed by a
           public body ordinarily has the same private rights as any
           other servant “.
           The position may, however, be different pointed out the
           learned Law Lord if such relationship is circumscribed by
           a statutory provision.
           39. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to two
           important English decisions, where a public duty was
           implied even in the absence of a statutory provisions. They
           are R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte
           Lain (1967) 2 All ER 770, and R. v. Panel on take-overs
           (1987) 1 All ER 564. In Criminal Injuries Compensation
           Board, the relevant facts are the following: In the year 1964
           the Government of Great Britian announced a Scheme
           in both Houses of Parliament providing for compensation
           to victims of violence and persons injured while assisting
           the police. It was a non-statutory scheme under which
           compensation was to be paid ex gratia. The scheme
           was to be administered by a Board, who were to be
           provided with money through a grant-in-aid, out of which
           payment would be made when the Board was satisfied
           that the compensation was justified. The widow of a Police
           Constable who was shot in the face by a suspect whom he
           was about to question, and who subsequently shot himself,
           applied to the Board for compensation. The Board awarded
           compensation, but made certain deductions, which was
           questioned by way of certiorari. The first question before
           the Court was “whether the Board are a body of persons
           amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court?”. For
           the Board reliance was placed upon the well-known words
           of Atkin, L.J., in’ R. v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB
           171, at p. 205 to the effect that the body of persons to be
           amenable to writ jurisdiction must have the legal authority
           to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and
           who are under a duty to act judicially. The Court held that
           the said words of Atkin. L. J., were not supposed to be
           exhaustive of the situation where a certiorari may issue,
           and pointed out that the Board, though not set up under
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        a statute, is set up by the executive Government, i.e.,
        under the prerogative, and that its acts are no less lawful
        on that account. The Court observed:
        “Indeed, the writ of certiorari has been issued not only
        to courts set up by statutes but also to courts whose
        authority was derived, inter alia, from the prerogative.
        Once the jurisdiction is extended, as it clearly has been,
        to tribunals as opposed to courts, there is no reason why
        the remedy by way of certiorari cannot be invoked to a
        body of persons set up under the prerogative. Moreover,
        the Board, though set up under the prerogative and not
        by statute, had in fact the recognition of Parliament in
        debate and Parliament provided the money to satisfy the
        Board’s awards….”.
        It was further observed:
        “We have, as it seems to me, reached the position when
        the ambit of certiorari can be said to cover every case
        in which a body of persons, of a public as opposed to a
        purely private or domestic character, has to determine
        matters affecting subjects provided always that it has a
        duty to act judicially. Looked at in this way, the Board in my
        judgment comes fairly and squarely within the jurisdiction
        of this Court. The Board are, as counsel for the Board
        said, “a servant of the Crown, charged by the Crown, by
        executive instructions, with the duty of distributing the
        bounty of the Crown”. The Board are clearly, therefore,
        performing public duties. Moreover, the Board are quite
        clearly under a duty to act judicially”.
        The same idea was put forward by Diplock, L.J., in his
        separate opinion, where he said:
        “If new tribunals are established by acts of Government,
        the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court extends to
        them if they possess the essential characteristics on which
        the subjection of inferior tribunals to the supervisory control
        of the High Court is based…”. Ashworth, J., justified the
        issue of certiorari in that case on the following basis:
        “They (Board) were set up by the executive after the
        proposal to set them up had been debated in both Houses
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                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


           of Parliament, and the money needed to satisfy their
           awards is drawn from sums provided by Parliament. It can
           therefore be said that their existence and their functions
           have at least been recognized by Parliament, which to
           my mind has a twofold consequence: in the first place it
           negatives any notion that the Board are a private tribunal,
           and secondly it confers on the Board what I may call a
           public or official character. The number of applications for
           compensation and the amounts awarded by the Board
           alike show how greatly the general public are affected by
           the functioning of the Board ….”.
           40. This decision has since been followed and applied
           in several English decisions. It would suffice to refer to
           R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex Parte Datafin
           (1987) 1 All ER 564. The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers
           was a self-regulating unincorporated association which
           devised and operated the City Code on Take-overs and
           Mergers prescribing a Code of Conduct to be observed in
           the take-overs of listed public companies. The panel had
           no direct statutory, prerogative or common law powers,
           nor were its powers based solely on consensus; its acts
           were supported and sustained by certain statutory powers
           and penalties introduced after the inception of the Panel. A
           decision of the panel was sought to be questioned by way
           of certiorari. One of the objections of the respondents was
           that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court was confined
           to bodies whose power was derived solely from legislation
           or the exercise of the prerogative, and that the power of
           judicial review did not extend to a body such as the Panel
           on Takeovers. Overruling this objection, it was held that
           in determining whether the decisions of a particular body
           were subject to judicial review, the Court was not confined
           to considering the source of that body’s powers and duties,
           but could also look to their nature. Accordingly, if the duty
           imposed on a body, whether expressly or by implication,
           was a public duty and the body was exercising public
           law functions, the Court had jurisdiction to entertain an
           application for judicial review of that body’s decisions. It
           was held that, having regard to the wide-ranging nature
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        and importance of the matters covered by the City Code on
        Take-overs and Mergers and to the public consequences
        of noncompliance with the Code, the Panel on Takeovers
        and Mergers was performing a public duty when prescribing
        and administering the Code and its rules and was subject
        to public law remedies. Accordingly, it was held that an
        application for judicial review would lie in an appropriate
        case. The approach to be adopted in such cases, it was
        stated by Sir John Donaldson, M.R., is “to recognize the
        realities of executive power”. This is what the learned
        Master of Rolls stated:-
        “In fact, given its novelty, the panel fits surprisingly well into
        the format which this court had in mind in R. v. Criminal
        Injuries Compensation Board (1967-2 QB 867). It is without
        doubt performing a public duty and an important one. This
        is clear from the expressed willingness of the Secretary of
        State for Trade and Industry to limit legislation in the field
        of take-overs and mergers and to use the panel as the
        centerpiece of his regulation of that market. The rights of
        citizens are indirectly affected by its decisions, some, but
        by no means all of whom, may in a technical sense be
        said to have assented to this situation, e.g., the members
        of the Stock Exchange. At least in its determination of
        whether there has been a breach of the Code, it has a duty
        to act judicially and it asserts that its raison d’etre is to do
        equity between one shareholder and another. Its source of
        power is only partly based on moral persuasion and the
        assent of institutions and their members, the bottom line
        being the statutory powers exercised by the Department
        of Trade and Industries and the Bank of England. In this
        context I should be very disappointed if the courts could
        not recognize the realities of executive power and allowed
        their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and sometimes
        complexity of the way in which it can be exerted…”.
        This rule was reiterated in yet another decision of the Court
        of Appeal in R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex
        parte Guinness, (1989) 1 All ER 509. This was indeed the
        approach indicated by Mathew, J. in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram,
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                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


           AIR 1975 SC 1331, when the learned Judge spoke of
           “the governing power, wherever located” being subjected
           to “fundamental constitutional limitations”. The learned
           Judge felt that “the need to subject the power centres to
           the control of the Constitution requires an expansion of
           the concept of State action”. (see para 93 at p. 1352).
7.   Applying the above test, the respondent herein cannot be called a
     public body. It has no duty towards the public. It’s duty is towards
     its account holders, which may include the borrowers having availed
     of the loan facility. It has no power to take any action, or pass any
     order affecting the rights of the members of the public. The binding
     nature of its orders and actions is confined to its account holders
     and borrowers and to its employees. Its functions are also not akin
     to Governmental functions.
8.   A body, public or private, should not be categorized as “amenable”
     or “not amenable” to writ jurisdiction. The most important and
     vital consideration should be the “function” test as regards the
     maintainability of a writ application. If a public duty or public function
     is involved, any body, public or private, concerned or connection with
     that duty or function, and limited to that, would be subject to judicial
     scrutiny under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of Article 226 of the
     Constitution of India.
9.   We may sum up thus:
     (1)   For issuing writ against a legal entity, it would have to be
           an instrumentality or agency of a State or should have been
           entrusted with such functions as are Governmental or closely
           associated therewith by being of public importance or being
           fundamental to the life of the people and hence Governmental.
     (2)   A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may
           be maintainable against (i) the State Government; (ii) Authority;
           (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the
           State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the
           State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding;
           (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation
           of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability
           to discharge any function under any Statute, to compel it to
           perform such a statutory function.
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     (3)   Although a non-banking finance company like the Muthoot
           Finance Ltd. with which we are concerned is duty bound to
           follow and abide by the guidelines provided by the Reserve
           Bank of India for smooth conduct of its affairs in carrying on
           its business, yet those are of regulatory measures to keep a
           check and provide guideline and not a participatory dominance
           or control over the affairs of the company.
     (4)   A private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled
           bank cannot be termed as a company carrying on any public
           function or public duty.
     (5)   Normally, mandamus is issued to a public body or authority to
           compel it to perform some public duty cast upon it by some statute
           or statutory rule. In exceptional cases a writ of mandamus or a writ
           in the nature of mandamus may issue to a private body, but only
           where a public duty is cast upon such private body by a statute or
           statutory rule and only to compel such body to perform its public duty.
     (6)   Merely because a statue or a rule having the force of a statute
           requires a company or some other body to do a particular thing,
           it does not possess the attribute of a statutory body.
     (7)   If a private body is discharging a public function and the denial
           of any rights is in connection with the public duty imposed on
           such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty
           cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise
           and the source of such power is immaterial but, nevertheless,
           there must be the public law element in such action.
     (8)   According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol.30, p.682,
           “a public authority is a body not necessarily a county council,
           municipal corporation or other local authority which has public
           statutory duties to perform, and which perform the duties and
           carries out its transactions for the benefit of the public and not
           for private profit”. There cannot be any general definition of
           public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide
           the point.
10. Even while rejecting the writ petition on the ground of its maintainability,
    the High Court has protected the interest of the parties by observing
    in paras 6.1 as under:-
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                    S Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.


           “6.1 Following order shall govern,
           (i) It would be open for the respondent – original petitioner
           to have recourse to civil remedy before
           the appropriate Court in relation to the claim and grievance
           which she agitated by filing the writ petitions.
           (ii) The appellant-Company is not precluded from taking
           any recourse in law, if it is of the view that it has any claim
           against the respondent – party-in-person.
           (iii) It is also open to either side to invoke arbitration clause
           and engage in the process of arbitration to resolve the
           disputes.
           (iv) The amount of Rs.24,39,085/-, which has been realized
           from sale of the gold pursuant to the auction conducted
           by the appellant-Company, shall remain deposited with
           the Registry of this Court.
           (v) The Registry shall invest the said amount in a Fixed
           Deposit in a Nationalized Bank initially for a period of one
           year and renewable.
           (vi) Such Fixed Deposit shall continue to renew for a
           maximum period of three years.
           (vii) The amount of interest which may accrue on such
           deposit shall be receivable by the respondent–petitioner.
           (viii) However, the petitioner shall not be entitled to raise
           any loan on the Fixed Deposit.
           (ix) The Fixed Deposit kept shall remain in custody of the
           Registry of this Court.
           (x) It would be open for either party to take recourse of
           civil remedy or before the arbitration within a period of
           three months from today.”
11. No case is made out for interference.
12. The petitions are dismissed. However, if the petitioner has any
    grievance to redress against the finance company it shall be open
1162                                                     [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


     for the petitioner to avail appropriate legal remedy before the
     appropriate forum in accordance with law including approaching the
     Ombudsman of the RBI.
13. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

     Result of the case: Petitions dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan