Holding

The conviction under Section 302 IPC stands; the trial and High Court judgments are not infirm, and the appellant’s contentions regarding witness credibility, FIR omissions, and the falsus maxim are rejected.

Summary

Four accused were convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Khaja Saheb. The prosecution relied mainly on the testimony of PW‑3, a close relative of the deceased, while other eye‑witnesses (PW‑1, PW‑2, PW‑4) either gave only partial support or later retracted their statements. The appellants contended that PW‑3’s relationship rendered his evidence unreliable, that the absence of a source‑of‑light description in the FIR vitiated the case, and that the maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” should invalidate all testimony. The Supreme Court held that a witness’s relationship does not per se affect credibility, that the omission of light‑source details in the FIR is immaterial, and that the maxim is not a mandatory rule of evidence. Consequently, the Court found the trial and High Court judgments well‑reasoned and upheld the convictions.

Issues considered

The credibility of a witness who is a close relative of the deceased and whether his testimony requires corroboration.
Whether the testimony of a single eye‑witness (PW‑3) can sustain a conviction when other eye‑witnesses are unreliable or contradictory.
Whether the non‑mention of the source of light in the FIR defeats the prosecution’s case.
The applicability of the maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” to discredit all evidence.
Whether the High Court’s judgment is infirm on any of the above points.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murdereyewitness testimonywitness credibilityrelative witnessfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusFIR omissionsSection 302 IPCconviction upheld

Judgment

S. SUDERSHAN REDDY & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JULY 20, 2006

[ARIJITPASAYAT ANDR.V. RAVEENDRAN,JJ.] B

.'· . Criminal Law:
Evidence-Testimony of related witness-Held, relationship is not a
factor to affect credibility of a witness-Judgment of High Court affirming C
conviction and sentence u/s 302, as recorded by trial court, does not suffer
from any infirmity to warrant interference-Penal Code, 1860-s. 302-
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 136.
Evidence-Source of light-Not mentioned in FIR-Held, is non-
consequential-It is not necessary that minutest details should be stated in D
FIR-For lodging FIR, more particularly, in a murder case, stress must be on
prompt lodging of FIR-However, evidence of one of the witnesses is
categorical that he saw the attack in the light of scooter head light-FIR-
Contents of
Legal Maxim :
E
"Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus "-Held, the maxim has not received
general acceptance in India nor has it came to occupy the status of rule of
law.
Appellants were prosecuted for offence punishable u/s 302 IPC. The
prosecution case was that on the day of incident PWs 1 to 3 and one 'K' were F
on their way on two-wheelers. At about 8.30 PM an auto rickshaw overtook
them in such a way that the two-wheeler which was being driven by 'K' with
PW-1 as pillion rider fell down. The four accused came out of the auto
rickshaw and attacked 'K'. Consequently 'K' died on the spot Before the trial
court out of ten witnesses PWs I to 3 and PW 4, the auto rickshaw driver,
were produced as eye witnesses. PW-3 fully supported the prosecution case, G
-~ whereas PW-1 did not support in full; PW-2 did not support the prosecution
case at all and PW-4 though initially supported the prosecution case in full,
totally resiled from his earlier version when he was recalled for further cross-
examination by the defence after a month. The trial court convicted all the
743 H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A four accused and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. The High Court
affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In the present appeal filed by the accused, it was contended that since
PWs I, 2 and 4, produced by prosecution as eye-witnesses did not support the
prosecution case, the courts below should not have relied on the evidence of
B PW 3 who was closely related to the deceased; that no source of light was
mentioned in the FIR; and, therefore, in the circumstances, the courts below
should not have recorded conviction.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court ..
'
C HELD: I. The ground that the witness being a close relative and
consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no
substance. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is
more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of
D false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful
approach and analyse the evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.
[748-G; 749-E)
Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State ofPunjab, AIR (1953) SC 364; Masalti
and Ors. v. State of U.P.. AIR (1965) SC :?02; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh.
E AIR (1973) SC 2407 and Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002) 3 SCC 76, relied
on.
Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, [1974) 3 SCC 698 and
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614, referred to.
2.1. The plea that since PWs I, 2 and 4 did not support the prosecution
F case, the testimony of PW-3 should not be accepted and the entire prosecution
case should be thrown out, is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of
evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of
an accused, conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate
grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open
to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence of
G some of the witnesses has been found to be deficient. Falsity of particular
material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning
to end. [748-C; 750-D-E)
2.2. The maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in
India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim has not received
H general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of
S. SUDERSHAN REDDY v. ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 745
law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases A
testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The
doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court

- may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a
mandatory rule of evidence'. [750-E-GI

Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1957) SC 366 and Sucha B
Singh and Anr. v. State of Purrjab, (2003) 6 JT SC 348, referred to.

3.1. Non-mention in the FIR about the source of light is really non-
consequential. It is well settled that FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the facts
concerning the crime. Merely because minutest details of occurrence were C
not mentioned in the FIR, the same cannot make the prosecution case doubtful.
It is not necessary that minutest details should be stated in the FIR. Therefore,
mere absence of indication about the source of light does not in any way affect
the prosecution version. Besides, such a plea wa.s not taken before the courts
below. [751-A; C-DI
D
Bol/auaram Pedda Narsi Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
[1991[ 3 sec 434, distinguished.

Krishnan and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, [1996110 SCC 508, relied on.

4. The judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity E
to warrant interference.

NathuniYadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., (199819 SCC 238;
Bharasi and Ors. v. State ofMP., [200217 SCC 239 and Krishnan and Anr. v.
State of Kera/a, [1996110 SCC 508, referred to.
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 639 of
2005.

From the Judgment and Order 3.2.2004 of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 194/2002.

D. Rama Krishna Reddy, Ch. Leela Saarveswar and Abhijit Sengupta for G
the Appellants.

Manoj Saxena, Rajneesh Kr. Singh, Sameena Ahmed, Rahul Shukla and
T.V. George for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered
by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the
conviction of the four appellants under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (in short the 'lPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded by
learned Principal Sessions Judge, Kumool.

B Accusations which led to trial of the appellants was that on 27.4.1999
at about 8.30 p.m. they caused homicidal death of one Khaja Saheb (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Deceased') by hacking and stabbing with sickles and
knives.

Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
c
On 27.4.1999, sometime prior to the occurrence, Khaja Saheb (the
deceased) S. Venkateswara Reddy, G. Thirumalesh Gowd and T. Sreenivaslu
(PWs. I, 2 and 3) were at a place called "Ramesh Hotel" near the Silver Jubilee
College of Kurnool Town. Thereafter they started on 2 two wheelers i.e. the
D deceased and PW! on the first vehicle, followed by PWs. 2 and 3 on another
vehicle. The deceased was driving the first of the above mentioned two
wheelers. PW! was the pillion rider. When the deceased and PW! reached
near the railway gate located on their way, an auto-rickshaw overtook them.
In that process, the deceased lost the control of the vehicle and they fell
down. According to Ex.Pl complaint, lodged by PWI which was received by
E Sub-inspector (PW8) at about l 0.'.30 AM on the very same night, all the four
appellants herein got down from the above mentioned auto rickshaw, attacked
the deceased. As a result of the said attack, the deceased breathed his last
on the spot. In fact, from the evidence of Dr. M.S. R.K. Prasad, the doctor
(PWIO) who conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased,
F there were number of cut and stab injuries on the body classified under ten
heads. Immediately, after the incident, PWl went to the residence of the
deceased, informed the kith and kin of the deceased around 8.45 P.M. e'
Afterwards, PWI went to the police station and lodged Ex.Pl complaint.

PW8 the Sub-Inspector of Police who received Ex.P 1 at about 10.30
G P.M., registered Crime No. l 13of1999 under Section 302 !PC. He also informed
the Inspector of Police, (PW9) Kumool Town at that relevant point of time.
On receipt of the information, PW9 went to the scene of offence, posted
guard at the scene of offence and on the next morning i.e., 28.4.1999, PW9
secured the presence of witnesses PWs. I, 2 Sayed Bade Bi (PW5) and B.
H Hussainappa (PW6) commenced the inquest around 7.30 A.M. He seized
S. SUDER SHAN REDDYv. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [PASAYA T, J.] 747

MOs. 1 to 3 - the apparels of the deceased and after conclusion of the A
inquest, the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination.
On 8.5.1999 he arrested all the appellants at a place called "Papaji Dabha".
During the course of interrogation the accused are said to have made a
confessional statement, which led to the recovery of M.Os. 7 to 10 under the
cover of Ex.P.14 Mahazir. The charge sheet was filed by the successor in the B
office of PW 9.

In order to establish the guilt oftht appellants, the prosecution examined
I0 witnesses, proved 15 documents and exhibited I0 M.Os. Of the I0 witnesses
examined, PWs. I, 2, 3 and 4 were cited as eye witnesses. PW! did not support
the prosecution case in full. Therefore, the prosecution cross-examined him. C
PW2 did not support the prosecution case at all. Mala Venkateswarulu the
(PW4) - auto rickshaw driver - though initially supported the prosecution case
in full, made a volte-face and totally resiled from his earlier version when he
was recalled for further cross-examination by the defence a month after his
initial examination. He was at that stage cross-examined by the prosecution.
D
Similarly, T. Krishna (PW?) who was the panch witness for Ex.P 13 i.e.,
arrest Mahazir of the appellant - accused, did not support the prosecution
case. The learned Sessions Judge on elaborate consideration of the evidence
brought on record, came to the conclusion that the appellants - ac~used were
guilty for the offence with which they stood charged and convicted and
sentenced each to suffer life imprisonment. E
Questioning correctness of the decision rendered by the trial court, an
appeal was preferred before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by the accused
persons. Primary stand of the appellants before the High Court was that PWs.
I, 2, 4 and 7 did not support the prosecution version and departed from the F
statement purportedly given during investigation; and that only on the basis
of the evidence of PW 3, the conviction should not have been recorded.
Though PW 3 claimed to be an eye witness to the occurrence, his conduct
was very abnormal and unusual as he did not inform the police and did not
also tell about the incident to any other person. Though he claimed to be
present at the time of inquest, his statement was not even recorded at the time G
of inquest. Furthermore, being closely related to the deceased his evidence
should not have been acted upon without corroboration.

On the contrary, stand of the State was that in the Ex. Pl, complaint
which was lodged immediately after the occurrence, name of PW3 as an eye
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A witness was mentioned. Though PWs I, 2 and 4 did not support the
prosecution version, on a close reading of their evidence it is clear that the
version of PW 3 is established. Further PW4 who was examined on 1.11.2001
fully supported the prosecution version. He was cross-examined by the
defence. Strangely after about the month of the said cross examination, an
B application was filed without indicating any reason to recall him for further
cross examination. The trial court without assigning any reason permitted
farther cross examination in which he substantially departed from what he had
stated earlier.

The High Court after analyzing the evidence in detail concurred with the
C findings of the trial court and upheld with the conviction and sentence.
. .

In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that as the so called eye witnesses PWs. I, 2 and 4 did not support the
prosecution version, the trial court and the High Court should have held that
it would be extremely hazardous to rely on the uncorroborated testimony of
D PW 3 who was closely related to the deceased. The source of light for
identification of the accused, was not indicated in the FIR. For the first time
the witness PW3 indicated the source of light for identification. Therefore, the
trial court and the High Court should not have held the appellants guilty.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that
E the trial court and the High Court have analysed the evidence in great detail
and also considering the contention of the accused persons that PW 3 was
related to the deceased, made an elaborate analysis of the evidence and found
PW3 to be a truthful witness. Therefore, the conviction cannot be faulted.
Additionally, the plea relating to absence of the source of light in the FIR was
F not pleaded before the Courts below. In any event FIR was not required to
indicate the minutest details. Therefore, it was submitted the appeal deserves
to be dismissed.

We shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the
witnesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor to
G affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would
not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.
Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases,
the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out
whether it is cogent and credible.

H In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1953) SC 364 it
S. SUDERSHANREDDYv. STATEOFANDHRAPRADESH [PASAYAT.J.] 749
.." has been laid down as under:- A
"A witness is nonnally to be considered independent unless he or she
springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually
means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the
accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation
would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an B
innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal
cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent
person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty,
., but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of
relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of
truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization.
c
Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only
-· made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as
a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case
must be limited to and be governed by its own facts."
D
The above decision has since been followed in Gu/i Chand and Ors.
v. State of Rajasthan, [1974] 3 SCC 698 in which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of
" Madras, AIR (I 957) SC 614 was also relied upon.

We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close
relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied E
upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as
in Dalip Singh 's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the
impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that
relative.; were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J.
it was observed:
F
"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court
that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If
the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the
witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their
testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason
G
that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur.
;) This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which
another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar
v. State of Rajasthan' AIR ( 1952) SC 54 at p.59. We find, however, that
it unfc tunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts,
~··
H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A at any rate in the arguments of counsel."

Again in Masaiti and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 202 this Court
observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):

"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence
B given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it
is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ....... The mechanical
rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would
invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid
down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial
approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the
c plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan
cannot be accepted as correct."

To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR
( 1973) SC 2407 and lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002] 3 SCC 76). Stress was
D laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered
by PW3 to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case.
In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "fals1ts in uno falsus in omnibus"
(false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even
if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is
sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, conviction can be maintained. It is the
E duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from
grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding
the fact that evidence of some of the witnesses has been found to be
deficient. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not
ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno fal~us in omnibus"
F has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The
maxim "Jal.ms in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance
nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a
rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may
be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely
involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a
G given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule
of evidence'. (See Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR (1957) SC 366).
(Also see: Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2003) 6 JT SC 348).

Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the non-mention
about the source of light in the FIR is clearly fatal to the prosecution case.
H Strong reliance is placed on the decisions in Bollauaram Pedda Narsi Reddy
S. SUDERSHAN REDDY v. STA TEOF ANDHRA PRADESH [PASA YAT. J.] 751

and Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh, [1991] 3 SCC 434. As has rightly P,ointed A
out by the learned counsel for the Respondent - State such a plea was not
taken before either the trial court or the High Court. It is interesting that in
the cross examination of the witnesses, the defence has suggested that the
light was dim because the scooter had practically stopped moving and there
was only idling of the engine. PW 2's evidence is categorical that he saw the B
attack in the light of the scooter head light. This was stated in the cross
examination by the accused persons. Similarly PW 3 was asked as to whether
he could tell the number of blows each accused gave. He answered in the
·. affirmative. Indirect suggestion therefore was that though the blows were
there, he could not tell the number. To say the least this is irresponsible cross
examination. Though for that alone the prosecution case does not get C
strengthened yet this is a factor which can be taken note of. Non mention
in the FIR about the source of light is really non - consequential. It is well
settled that FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the facts concerning the crime
Merely because of minutest details of occurrence were not mentioned in the
FIR, the same cannot make the prosecution case doubtful. It is not necessary
that minutest details should be stated in the FIR. It is sufficient if a broad D
picture is presented and the FIR contains the broad features. For lodging FIR,
in a criminal case and more particularly in a murder case, the stress must be
"· on prompt lodging of the FIR. Therefore, mere absence of indication about
the source of light does not in any way affect the prosecution version.
Additionally the decision in Bollanaram 's case (supra) is really of no assistance E
to'the appellant. It is apparent that the observation regarding the non-mention
about the source of light in that case was by way of description of the factual
scenario. It was noted by the court that victims were strangers to the accused.
In that background the source of light was found to be of some importance.

In Nathuni Yadav and Ors. v. State ofBihar and Anr., [1998] 9 SCC 238 F
this Court observed that under what circumstances the lack of moon light or
artificial light does not per se preclude identification of the assailants. It was
noted as follows :-

"Even assuming that there was no moonlight then, we have to
gauge the situation carefully. The proximity at which the assailants G
would have confronted with the injured, the possibility of some light
reaching there from the glow of stars, and the fact that the-murder was
committed on a roofless terrace are germane factors to be borne in
mind while judging whether the victims could have had enough visibility
to correctly identify the assailants. Over and above those factors, we H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A must bear in mind the further fact that the assailants were no strangers
to the inmates of the tragedy-bound house, the eyewitnesses being
well acquainted with the physiognomy of each one of the killers. We
are, therefore, not persuaded to assume that it would not have been
possible for the victims to see the assailants or that there was
possibility for making a wrong identification of them. We are keeping
B in mind the fact that even the assailants had enough light to identify
the victims whom they targeted without any mistake from among
those who were sleeping on the terrace. If the light then available,
though meager, was enough for the assailants why should we think
that the same light was not enough for the injured who would certainly
c have pointedly focused their eyes on the faces of the intruders
standing in front of them. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander."

In the instant case, the time was about 7 P.M. in the evening in the
month of April. The position was again reiterated in Bharasi and Ors. v. State
D of MP .. [2002) 7 sec 239. It was inter alia noted as follows :

"In relation to the identificatio11 of the accused in the darkness,
the High Court has clearly stated that in the month of April, the sun
sets at about 7.00 p.m. in the evening, the accused were known to the
witnesses and could be identified even in faint darkness. Here again,
E the High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case
of Nathuni Yadav v. Stat<! ofBihar, [1998) 9 SCC 238. The High Court
has also noticed that the enmity between the deceased and the
appellants was not disputed."

F In Krishnan and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, [1996) 10 SCC 508 it was
observed as follows :

"After giving our careful consideration to the facts and
circumstances of the case and the evidence adduced, we do not find
any reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment passed by the
High Court in convicting appellant-2 Vijaykumar. So far as the
G contention of insufficient light is concerned, we may indicate that in
an open field on a cloudless starry night, there was no difficulty in
identifying the victim by the assailants because of existence of some
light with which identification was possible. PW! being a close relation
of both the accused, there was no difficulty for PW I to identify them.
H The accused were also known to the other witness for which he could
S. SUDERSHAN REDDY v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [PASAYA T, J.] 753

also identify them. So far as appellant- Vijaykumar is concerned, PWJ A
' had physically prevented him from causing further injury on the
deceased and there was a tussle between the two. Hence there was
no difficulty for PW I to identify Accused 2- Vijaykumar. His _deposition
gets corroboration from the deposition of PW3 who had seen
Vijaykumar at the place of occurrence. PW3 had not seen Vijaykumar B
causing any injury on the deceased because by the time PW3 came
near the place of the incident and noticed the incident, Vijaykumar had
been prevented by PWI and his knife had fallen on the ground."

Appeal is dismissed. Looked at from any angle, the judgment of the
High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. C
RP. Appeal dismissed.

..