SADASHIV DHONDIRAM PATILversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 93
- Decided
- 8 January 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A Village Police Patil is not a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, so the confession is admissible but, being vague and untrustworthy, cannot support a conviction, and the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
Summary
The appellant, Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil, was charged with murdering his wife Lata. The prosecution relied on an alleged extra‑judicial confession made to the village Police Patil, the discovery of an iron rod, motive, and the fact that the crime occurred inside the house. The trial court acquitted him, holding the confession inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, but the High Court reversed the acquittal, treating the village Police Patil as a police officer and convicting the appellant. The Supreme Court examined whether a Village Police Patil qualifies as a "police officer" for the purposes of Section 25 and held that he does not, making the confession admissible but requiring it to be trustworthy. The Court found the confession vague, the discovery panchnama unsupported, and motive insufficient, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appeal allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether a Village Police Patil is a 'police officer' within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
- Whether the alleged extra‑judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil is admissible and can be relied upon.
- Whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, including the credibility of the discovery panchnama and the relevance of motive.
- Whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act can shift the burden of proof onto the accused without the prosecution first laying foundational facts.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 25, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302
- Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967s. 13, s. 14, s. 15
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 592 : 2025 INSC 93
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil
v.
The State of Maharashtra
(Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017)
09 January 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether Village Police Patil is a Police Officer in terms
of s. 25 of the Evidence Act; and whether the High Court erred in
holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25, 106 – Extra judicial confession –
Admissibility – Extra judicial confession to Police Patil,
if admissible – Appellant-husband charged for the murder
of his wife – Extra judicial confession allegedly made by the
appellant to the village Police Patil – Trial court acquitted
the accused for the offence punishable u/ss.302 and 201
IPC holding that extra judicial confession allegedly made by
the appellant to Village Police Patil was inadmissible as per
s.25 – High Court set aside the acquittal and held the appellant
guilty of the offence of murder – Correctness:
Held: Police Patil of the Village cannot be termed as a Police
Officer for the purpose of s.25 – Extra-judicial confession alleged
to have been made by the accused before village Police Patil is
admissible in evidence and is not hit by s.25 – However, such
extra-judicial confession should be found to be true and trustworthy
before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty –
Extra-judicial confession should also be found to be free of any
inducement, coercion etc. and should be shown to have been
made by the accused on his own free will and volition – What
is alleged to have been conveyed cannot be said to be an
extra- judicial confession – Very omnibus and vague statement
seems to have been made – High Court erred in relying upon
the extra-judicial confession even while rightly holding that the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 593
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot
be said to be a Police Officer – Panch witnesses did not support
the prosecution case – Just because the panch witnesses have
turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be
disbelieved – However, I.O. cannot be said to be proving the
contents of the panchnama in accordance with law and the
circumstance of discovery cannot be relied upon – Motive cannot
be the sole basis for convicting the accused – Prosecution has to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Initial burden of proof
is always on the prosecution – However, in cases where husband
is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours and that too
within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has
to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and
if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against
him – Prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before
it seeks to invoke s.106 – It cannot straightaway invoke s.106
and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his
innocence – In view thereof, the High Court erred in holding the
appellant guilty of the offence of murder – Impugned judgment
set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201. [Paras 27, 31,
36-38, 42, 47-49, 50-51, 55, 56, 58]
Case Law Cited
Rajeshwer S/o Hiraman Mohurle v. State of Maharashtra (2009)
Criminal Law Journal 3816; C.K. Ravindra v. the State of Kerala
[1999] Supp. 5 SCR 140 : AIR 2000 SC 369; Ram Singh v. the
State of Maharashtra & Anr (1999) Criminal Law Journal 3763;
Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1995) Supplementary 4 SCC
259 – referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967.
List of Keywords
Extra judicial confession; Admissibility of extra judicial confession
to Police Patil; Police Patil, if termed as a Police Officer; Panch
witnesses; Motive.
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Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1718 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.07.2015 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in CRLA No. 70 of 1994
Appearances for Parties
Sachin Patil, Geo Joseph, Risvi Muhammed, Rishabh Agarwal,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Aniruddha Joshi, Sr. Adv., Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya
Aniruddha Pande, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. This appeal arises from the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 3-7-2015 in Criminal
Appeal No.70/94 by which the High Court allowed the acquittal
appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra and thereby set aside
the Judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur dated
13-7-1993 in Sessions Case No.48/91 acquitting the appellant -
herein (original accused) for the offence punishable under
Sections 302 and 201 respectively of the Indian Penal Code (for
short, the “IPC”).
2. The case of the prosecution may be summarized as under:-
The deceased by name Lata was married to the appellant herein.
A son was born in the wedlock. However, it appears that marital life
was not happy. The appellant – herein was entertaining a doubt in
his mind as regards the chastity of his wife. One day all of a sudden,
the deceased went missing.
3. In such circumstances, the maternal uncle of the deceased by name –
Yashwant Ganpati Patil (PW 5) went to the house of Village Police
Patial by name Mr. Vasant Dattu Bhosale & informed him that his
niece had gone missing.
4. It appears that on 20-10-1990 at about 9.30 p.m. PW 5 brought to
the notice to PW 2 that his niece Lata was missing.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 595
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
5. The PW – 2, being the Village Police Patil, visited the house of the
appellant – herein and found that the dead-body of the deceased
lying in one corner of the house. The materials on record further
indicate that the brother of the appellant – herein by name Madhukar
and his wife Laxmi (PW 4) along with their daughter Mangal (PW 3)
were also residing in the same house but separately in one part.
6. Upon recovery of the dead-body of the deceased, the inquest
panchnama was drawn. The body of the deceased was sent for
postmortem examination. The postmortem examination report noted
that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. It is the
case of the prosecution that the appellant – herein strangulated his
wife to death with the help of an iron rod.
7. This iron rod is also stated to have been discovered from the place
of the incident itself by way of a discovery panchnama drawn by the
Investigating Officer in the presence of the panch witnesses.
8. The appellant was arrested in connection with the First Information
Report that came to be lodged by the PW-2 himself at the concerned
Police Station for the offence of murder.
9. Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer filed
charge-sheet for the offence enumerated above.
10. The case being exclusively triable by a Sessions Judge came to be
committed to the Court of Sessions.
11. The Trial Court framed charge vide order dated 20.02.1993 which
reads thus:
“CHARGE
I, V. B. Deshmukh, 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur
hereby charge you accused.
Shri. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil, Age-33 years, Resident
of Takali, Tal. Shirol, Dist. Kolhapur as follows:-
That you accused on or about 25.10.1990 at about 1.00
a.m. at Mouje Sainik Takali, Tal. Shirol, Dist. Kolhapur
did commit murder of your wife Sou. Lata Sadashiv Patil,
Age-25 years by pressing her neck and thereby committed
an offence punishable section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code.
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Secondly that you on aforesaid date, time and place
knowingly that certain offence, to wit that you committed
murder of your wife by pressing her neck and offence
punishable with death or imprisonment for life has been
committed, did cause of certain evidence of the said
offence to disappear to wit. that you put the dead body of
your wife in a gunny bag and thrown in the (iso) where the
food-grains are preserved with an intention to screening
yourself from legal punishment and thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 201 of the Indian Penal
code, and within my cognizance.
And, hereby I direct you that you be tried by me on
aforesaid charges.
Today this 20th day of February, 1993 at Kolhapur.
(V.B.Deshmukh),
4th Additional Sessions Judge,
Kolhapur..”
12. In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined the following
witnesses:-
1. Mr. Yeshvant Govind Chavan Exhibit 13
2. Mr. Vasant Dattu Bhosale (Patil) Exhibit 16
3. Ms. Mangal Exhibit 19
4. Ms. Laxmi wife of Madhukar Patil Exhibit 20
5. Mr. Yashvant Ganapati Patil Exhibit 21
6. Mr. Yamnappa Bhimrao Murali Exhibit 22
7. Mr. Amrut Rama Mane Exhibit 24
8. Dr. Shashikant Lakshman Pawar Exhibit 32
13. The prosecution also relied upon the following pieces of documentary
evidence:-
1. First Information Report (Exhibit 17)
2. Inquest Panchnama (Exhibit 8)
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3. Spot Panchnama (Exhibit 10)
4. Arrest Panchnama (Exhibit 11)
5. Memorandum of the Statement of accused
(Exhibit 14)
6. Seizure punchnama of iron-rod, Article No.1
(Exhibit 15)
7. Seizure punchnama of the clothes of the deceased
(Exhibit 12)
8. The Memorandum of Post-mortem examination
(Exhibit 33)
9. Advance Medical Certificate (Exhibit 9)
10. Seven photographs (Exhibit 37 to 43)
14. Upon closure of the recording of the evidence, the further statement
of the appellant – herein was recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
15. In the further statement, the appellant stated as under:-
Q.75 Do you want to say anything more about your
defence?
Answer : I am giving written statement.
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE ACCUSED
UNDER SECTION 313 of Cr. P.C.
Few months prior to death of my wife, I became disciple
of Shri Rane of Shirol. He told me not to sleep at home
for 6 months. Therefore I use to stay at night generally at
Shirol. If I am at Takali, then I use to sleep at Kalleshwar
temple. 2-3 days prior to missing of my wife from the
home, I was at Shirol. When I returned on Thursday or
Friday, I came to know about missing of my wife from the
home. I enquired with, her maternal uncle, but she did not
go there. I am implicated in the present case only on the
basis of doubt.
16. The Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral as well as the
documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the
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prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The Trial Court accordingly acquitted the appellant – herein.
17. It may not be out of place to state that at this stage that the Trial
Court looked into only one piece of circumstance, i.e., the extra
judicial confession alleged to have been made by the appellant –
herein before the (PW 2), i.e., the village Police Patil in the presence
of his sister-in-law (PW 4) – Laxmi.
18. It is also important to note that Madhukar (brother of the accused)
passed away during the course of trial and he could not have been
examined as one of the prosecution witnesses.
19. The Trial Court took the view that the extra-judicial confession alleged
to have been by the appellant – herein before (PW 2) could not be
said to be admissible in evidence being hit by Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act.
20. The Trial Court also disbelieved the discovery of the iron rod under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
21. The State, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the High Court.
22. The High Court reversed the acquittal and held the appellant – herein
guilty of the offence of murder and accordingly sentenced him to
undergo life imprisonment.
23. In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present appeal.
24. We have heard Mr. Sachin Patil, the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant and Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the respondent – State.
25. We take notice of the fact that the entire case hinges on circumstantial
evidence. The High Court relied upon the four pieces of incriminating
evidence for the purpose of holding the accused guilty of the offence
of murder of his wife:-
(i) extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the
appellant before (PW 2) on 29-10-1990
(ii) discovery of the weapon of offence, i.e., the iron rod;
(iii) motive to commit crime;
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 599
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
(iv) the incident occurred inside the house and, therefore, the
appellant could be said to be within the special knowledge as
to what had happened on the fateful day of the incident.
26. The High Court while reversing the acquittal invoked Section 106
of the Evidence Act and shifted the burden on the appellant –
herein to establish or rather explain what exactly had happened
with his wife.
27. It appears that when the Trial Court acquitted the appellant – herein,
the position of law as regards the admissibility of an extra-judicial
confession said to have been made before the Village Police Patil
was something different. A Division Bench of the High Court in
“Ram Singh vs. the State of Maharashtra & Anr” (1999) Criminal
Law Journal 3763 had held that a village Police Patil is a Police
officer and, therefore, any confession made to him is inadmissible
in evidence in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
28. In the said Judgment, the Division Bench also looked into & discussed
Section 14 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, under which
a Police Patil is appointed.
29. We quote the relevant observations of the said Judgment as under:-
13. Section 14 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967,
provides inter alia:
“(1) The Police Patil shall apprehend any person within
the limits of his village who he may have reason to believe
has committed any serious offence, and shall forward
such person, together with all articles likely to be useful
as evidence, to the Station Officer.
(2) Every person so apprehended shall within 24 hours
be produced before the nearest Magistrate, excluding the
time necessary for the journey from the place where he is
apprehended to the Court of the Magistrate.”
14. Sub-section (1) of S. 13 of the Maharashtra Village
Police Act, 1967, provides:
“The Police Patil shall forthwith proceed to the place of incident
and call upon two or more intelligent persons belonging
to the village or neighbourhood, who shall investigate the
causes of death and all the circumstances of the case, and
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make a written report of the same, which the Police Patil
shall cause to be forthwith delivered to the Station Officer.”
15. Section 15 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967,
provides inter alia:
“(1) The Police Patil, in making any investigation coming
within the scope of his duty, shall have authority to call
and examine witnesses, and record their statement, and
to search for concealed articles, taking care that no search
be made in a dwelling-house between sunset and sunrise
without urgent occasion.
(2) The Police Patil shall also have authority, in carrying out
any search or any pursuit of supposed criminal, to enter
and act within the limits of other villages, being bound
however to have immediate information to the Police
Patil thereof, who shall afford him all the assistance in his
power, and be immediately responsible for continuing the
search and pursuit.”
16. On plain reading of these provisions under the
Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, it will be clear that
the Police Patil has power to apprehend a person, if he
suspects that a person has committed serious offence. He
has to send report to the Police Station and the person
is required to be produced within 24 hours from the time
and Police Patil apprehend such person. Not only that a
preliminary investigation with respect to such crime also
can be made by the Police Patil and he can even chase the
accused and apprehend the accused. So, it is obvious that
the observations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge
quoted above are made without reading the appropriate
provisions. Before making any such observations in the
judgment, the Judge, at least, of the cadre of Additional
Sessions Judge, is expected to go through the relevant
provisions of law. Sweeping observations should not be
made just to boost the reasoning which is being given in
the judgment.
17. In the light of the provisions of the Maharashtra Village
Police Act, 1967, it has to be seen whether any confession
made before the Police Patil is hit by Section 25 of the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 601
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
Evidence Act. The powers of the Police Patil which are
referred to above clearly indicate that when any offence
takes place, he can act as a Police Officer. He is not a
mere spectator or informant. So, for all practical purposes,
he is a Police Officer and, therefore, any confession made
before the Police Patil would become inadmissible in
evidence as being made before a Police Officer.
18. In this respect, we would like to refer two rulings of our
High Court. The first is, in the case of Queen Empress v.
Bhima ((1894) ILR 17 Bom 485), and the other is in the case
of Vistari Narayan Shebe v. The State of Maharashtra 1978
Cri LJ 891. It is observed in the case of Vistari Narayan
Shebe by the Division Bench, as follows (at page 895):
“In our opinion, it is fairly well established that the police
patil is a police officer within the meaning of Sec. 25 of
the Evidence Act. As early as in 1893 this Court held in
Queen Empress v. Bhima ((1894) ILR 17 Bom 485), that
a police patil is a police officer within the meaning of Ss.
25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. A confession made
to a police patil is inadmissible in evidence. It must be
remembered that the words “a police officer” found in S. 25
of the Indian Evidence Act should not be read in any strict
technical sense but according to its more comprehensive
and more popular meaning. Nor is the term confined to
a person actually in charge of investigating the offence
under the Cr. P.С.”
19. Thus, it will be very clear that any confessional
statement made by the accused before the Police Patil is not
admissible in evidence. If the learned Additional Sessions
Judge had considered this aspect in that perspective, he
would not have relied upon the evidence of the Police
Patil to hold that the extra judicial confession made by
the accused before the Police Patil could be sufficient to
convict the accused. The deposition of the Police Patil as
well as the F.I.R. which include this confessional statement
are inadmissible in evidence and, therefore, this evidence
brought on record by the prosecution has to be excluded
altogether”.
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30. In the year 2009, a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, answered
a reference titled “Rajeshwer S/o Hiraman Mohurle vs. State of
Maharashtra” reported in (2009) Criminal Law Journal 3816. The
Full Bench was called upon to answer whether a Village Police Patil
is a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence
Act or not.
31. The Full Bench of the High Court overruled the above referred Division
Bench Judgment and took the view that a Village Police Patil is not
a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence
Act and any confession made before him would be admissible in
evidence as an extra-judicial confession. We may quote the relevant
paragraphs of the said Full-Bench Judgment as under:-
“18. Upon objective analysis of the principles aforestated,
it can be stated with some certainty that merely because a
person is appointed to a post which vests him with limited
powers of Investigation and inquiry or any power ancillary
thereto or empowers him to prevent commission of crime
in an area would not per se make him a Police Officer in
law so as to attract the bar contained in section 25 of the
Evidence Act. We have already noticed in some detail
that the powers vested in Police Patil under the Village
Police Act are expected to be exercised for performance
of duties and functions stated under section 6 of that Act.
The duties and functions of the Police Patil are of a very
restricted nature and do not vest in him all the powers
including the power to file a charge-sheet under section 173
of the Criminal Procedure Code which a Police Officer
under the Code possess. On the contrary, he is expected
to assist the Police Officers when called upon by them
in performance of their duties. He has to act under the
orders of the District Magistrate and even is expected to
collect and communicate to the Station Officer intelligence
affecting the public peace. The basic and primary distinction
between the powers of the Police Officer under the Code
and the power and duties of the Police Patil under the
Village Police Act, is that while the investigating officer or
Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is duty bound
in, law to conduct inquiry or, investigation in a just, proper
and fair manner independently being uninfluenced by
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any other facts. There the restricted duties and powers
relating to investigation and even otherwise vested in the
Police Patil are to be exercised under the supervision of
higher authorities as indicated in the provisions of the
Village Police Act. Police Patil is required to perform his
functions and discharge his duties subject to the orders
of the Magistrate and is also required to assist and help
the Police Officers in discharge of their duties. In these
circumstances, it will be a far fetched submission that
the Police Patil has to be treated as a Police Officer in
law for all intent and purposes. The consistent view of
the Supreme Court as is evident from the above referred
judgments is that the officer, other than a police officer,
invested with powers of an officer -In-charge of a Police
Station is not entitled, to exercise all the powers under
Chapter XII of the Code Including the power to submit a
report or charge-sheet/challan under section 173 of the
Code. This feature has been the hallmark and is held to
be determinative factor by the Supreme Court. Once this
aspect is missing from the ambit of the powers vested in
the officer, he cannot be stated to be a Police Officer for
the purposes of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The Police Patil under the Village Police Act is also not a
Police Officer on the deeming fiction of law as there is no
provision in the Statute which specifically or even otherwise
requires the Police Patil to be treated as a Police Officer
for all intent and purpose.
19. It will be useful to refer to the reasoning recorded
by the Supreme Court in the case of Badku Joti Savant
(supra) even at the cost of repetition. In paragraph 9 while
discussing section 21 of the Central Excise Act which
states that a Central Excise Officer under the Act has all
the powers of an officer in-charge of a Police Station under
Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court
rejected the contention that therefore he should be deemed
to be a Police Officer within the meaning of section 25 of
the Evidence Act. Reference was made to the provisions
of section 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1955
and section 77 of that Act which stated that Excise Officer
empowered under the provisions shall be deemed to be
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the officer in-charge of a Police Station and shall have the
power of such officer to investigate a cognizable case. But
even there the Supreme Court held that this power does
not include the power to submit a charge-sheet under
section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code under the
Excise Act unlike the Bihar and Orissa Act and thus held
that Central Excise Officer is not an officer deemed to be
in-charge of a Police Station. In other words, the Supreme
Court declined to accept the applicability of the deemed
fiction of law to the extent of terming the Central Excise
Officer as a Police Officer for the purpose of section 25
of the Evidence Act.
20. The distinction between the powers of investigation
given to a Police Officer under the Code and that of a
Police Patil under the Village Police Act is quite obvious
from the provisions of the two Statutes. Police Patil has
been vested with very limited powers that too under the
control and for the benefit of the Executive Magistrate/
Police Officer and his duties are primarily to ensure that
offences and public nuisance are not committed in the
village and to bring the offenders to justice. The expression
“bringing the offenders to justice” appearing in section 6 of
the Village Police Act along with its other provisions has to
be given its normal and plain meaning. There is no need,
keeping in view the scheme of the Act or the legislative
intent, to expand the meaning of this expression and
enlarge the scope of provisions of this section on certain
presumption of law. The powers of the Police Patil as stated
under section 13 to 15 of the Village Police Act, are to
be read and construed ejusdem generis to the provisions
of section 6. The bare reading of these provisions show
that Police Patil is not vested with the powers of preparing
and filing a charge-sheet before the Court of competent
jurisdiction. The powers of Police Patil to investigate and
control over the apprehended persons are very limited in
contradistinction to powers of a Police Officer under the
Code. In terms of section 156 of the Code, a Police Officer
is vested with the power to investigate any cognizable case
under the provisions of Chapter XIII even without orders
of the Magistrate. On the other hand, when a Police Patil
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apprehends a person in exercise of his powers vested
under section 14(i) of the Village Police Act, he has to
forward such person to the Station Officer, who in turn shall
produce such person before the Magistrate within twenty
four hours. Thus Legislative intent behind section 6 appears
to be that Police Patil is a person responsible primarily
for village surveillance, prevention of crime and providing
his assistance and help to the police in discharge of his
duties. Even above all this, his duties and functions have
been made subject to orders of the District Magistrate. The
Police Patil does not enjoy absolute freedom in relation
to investigation, apprehending the suspect and even in
exercise of other powers vested in him under law. The
powers to be exercised and duties and functions to be
performed by him are under the supervisory control of the
stated authorities. The duties, functions and powers vested
in an authority by a Statute are relatable to the source
which prescribes such functions and powers. The ambit,
scope and effect of exercise of such power can be tested
by two different concepts i.e. quo modo and actio quaelibet
it suia via. In what manner the powers are to be exercised
as per the prescribed procedure, the performance or action
must follow its prescribed procedure. On applying the
above stated principles and testing them with reference to
the maxims stated (supra), it is not possible for the Court
to hold that either the manner of functions and powers of
Police Patil or method in which they are to be performed
are equitable to the authority, powers and functions of a
Police Officer, in law. Therefore, we are unable to contribute
to the view that Police Patil is a Police Officer in law for
all intent and purpose and confession before him would
attract the bar contemplated under section 25 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
21. In view of our above discussion, now we proceed to
record the answer to the question of law framed by the
Division Bench. Our answer is as follows:-
“We are of the considered view that the Police Patil
appointed under the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967
is not a ‘Police Officer’ for the purposes of section 25 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872”.
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32. It appears that the High Court while reversing the acquittal relied upon
the above-referred Full Bench Decision for the purpose of taking the
view that the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant – herein
before PW 2 could be said to be admissible in evidence.
33. One interesting question that arises for our consideration at this
stage is that at the relevant point of time i.e., in 1993 when the Trial
Court acquitted the appellant – herein the position of law was that an
extra-judicial confession said to have been made by an accused
before a village Police Patil could be said to be inadmissible in
evidence being hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
34. In the year 2009, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court while
answering a reference held that a Village Police Patil is not a Police
Officer. Therefore, if the accused herein had stood acquitted having
regard to the position of law prevailing at the relevant point of time
then relying on a subsequent decision taking a contrary view whether
the accused could have been held guilty?
35. It could be argued that the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High
Court came to be delivered in the year 2009 whereas the appellant
was acquitted by the Trial Court sometime in the year 1993. The
position of law till 2009 was that a Village Police is a Police Officer
and therefore, any confession made to him would be inadmissible in
evidence in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, more particularly
in view of the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court
rendered in Ram Singh (supra). We do not propose to consider the
question whether the High Court could have relied upon the Full Bench
decision after the appellant came to be acquitted by the Trial Court
in 1993 thereby giving retrospective effect as regards its applicability.
36. We proceed on the footing that PW 2 – Vasant Dattu Bhosale,
Police Patil of the Village cannot be termed as a Police Officer for
the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. We also proceed on
the footing that the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been
made by the accused before PW 2 is admissible in evidence and
is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. However, such extra-
judicial confession should be found to be true & trustworthy before
it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty.
37. Besides, the above such extra-judicial confession should also be
found to be free of any inducement, coercion etc. and it should be
shown to have been made by the accused on his own free will and
volition.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 607
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
38. We requested the learned counsel appearing for the State to show
us from the oral evidence on record, more particularly, the deposition
of PW 2 as well as the deposition of PW 5, the exact words alleged
to have been uttered by the appellant – herein in the form of an
extra-judicial confession.
39. We on our own also looked into and are convinced that what is
alleged to have been conveyed cannot be said to be an extra-judicial
confession. A very omnibus & vague statement seems to have been
made as deposed by both the witnesses in their oral evidence.
40. This Court in “C.K. Ravindra vs. the State of Kerala” AIR 2000 SC
369 had held that before placing reliance upon the extra-judicial
confession, the Court must be convinced as regards the exact words
or even the words as nearly as possible. This Court took the view
that it would be difficult to rely upon the extra-judicial confession if
the exact words or even the words as nearly as possible have not
been reproduced, the said statement cannot be said to be voluntary.
In such circumstances, the same may have to be excluded from the
purview of consideration.
41. This Court in “Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab” (1995)
Supplementary 4 SCC 259 had held that an extra-judicial confession
by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires
appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where extra-
judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its
credibility becomes doubtful and would lose its importance.
42. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that the
High Court fell in error in relying upon the extra-judicial confession
even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence
as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer.
43. We now come to the second piece of the circumstance relied upon.
44. It is the case of the prosecution that after the arrest of the appellant –
herein, he is said to have on his own free will and volition made a
statement before the Investigating Officer and he was ready and
willing to point out the place where he had concealed the weapon,
i.e., the iron rod.
45. Accordingly, the Investigating Officer along with two independent
witnesses in the form of panchas went to the place as led by the
appellant – herein.
608 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
46. The place was the house itself where the incident had occurred.
According to the Investigating Officer, the appellant pointed out the
iron rod which was lying in one corner of the house. The same was
seized in the presence of the panch witnsses and was sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis.
47. In this regard, we may only say that panch witnesses have not
supported the case of the prosecution. They failed to prove the
contents of the discovery panchnama.
48. If the panch witnesses are declared hostile then the prosecution
is obliged to prove the contents of the said discovery panchnama
through the evidence of the Investigating Officer. The question is
how is the I.O. expected to prove the contents of the panchnama.
49. The position of law in this regard is very clear. Just because the panch
witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery
should be disbelieved. From the plain reading of the oral evidence
of the Investigating Officer if the discovery is believable and inspires
confidence, the same can definitely be looked into as one of the
incriminating pieces of evidence against the accused.
50. However, unfortunately in the case on hand, all that the I.O. did
was to depose that he had drawn the panchnama and in the end
identified his signature on the same and that of the panch witnesses.
This cannot be said to be proving the contents of the panchnama
in accordance with law. In such circumstances, the circumstance of
discovery also cannot be relied upon.
51. We are now left with motive. Motive is a double-edged weapon.
Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused and that
too for a serious offence like murder. Motive may be considered along
with other pieces of reliable evidence in the form of incriminating
circumstances.
52. We now come to the last part of the matter.
53. The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the
dead body of the deceased was recovered from the house itself,
i.e., the place where the family was residing. He would submit that
in normal circumstances, the husband could be said to be the best
person to explain as to what had happened to his wife on the date
of the incident.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 609
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra
54. According to the learned counsel, when an offence is committed
within the four walls of the house and that too in secrecy, it is difficult
for the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt
and, therefore, under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it is for the
accused to explain what had actually happened and in the absence
of any such explanation, it could be said that the accused committed
the crime as alleged.
55. The law in the aforesaid regard is well-settled. Prosecution has to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt & that too on its own legs.
The initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution. However, in
cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night
hours & that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the
husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually
happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this
can go against him. However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act is
subject to one well-settled principle of law. The prosecution has to
first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke Section 106
of the Evidence Act. If the prosecution has not been able to lay the
foundational facts for the purpose of invoking Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, it cannot starightaway invoke the said Section and
throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence.
56. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High
Court committed error in holding the appellant guilty of the offence
of murder.
57. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
58. The impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court is
hereby set aside.
59. We are informed that the appellant has been enlarged on bail by
this Court. His bail bonds stand discharged.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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