Holding

Section 94‑A authorises only direct delegation of powers; any sub‑delegation, such as that authorized by the 28 February 1976 resolution and the 3 May 1976 order, is ultra vires.

Summary

The Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) issued a resolution on 28 February 1976 delegating its power under Section 85‑B of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 to levy damages, to the Director General and authorising him to further delegate that power to any officer. The Director General subsequently authorized Regional Directors, who imposed damages on several employers, including Sahni Silk Mills, for delayed contributions. The employers challenged the validity of the delegation, arguing that Section 94‑A permits only direct delegation and not sub‑delegation. The Supreme Court held that Section 94‑A does not empower a delegate to further delegate the power, rendering the 28 February 1976 resolution and the 3 May 1976 order ultra vires. While the Court declared the sub‑delegation invalid, it limited relief to prevent disruption: no refund actions for damages already recovered, and any undischarged damages for the period 3 May 1976 to 19 February 1983 shall not be realised, with fresh notices permissible thereafter. The appellants' appeals were allowed and the corporation's appeals dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 94‑A of the Employees State Insurance Act authorises sub‑delegation of the power conferred by Section 85‑B(i).
Whether the resolution dated 28 February 1976 and the subsequent order dated 3 May 1976, which delegated and sub‑delegated the power to impose damages, are ultra vires.
Whether the orders passed by Regional Directors under the allegedly invalid delegation are void.
Whether the Supreme Court should set aside damages already recovered under the invalid delegation.

Legislation cited

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948s. 3, s. 4, s. 75, s. 82, s. 85-B, s. 94-A

Subjects

delegation of powersub‑delegationEmployees State Insurance ActSection 94‑ASection 85‑Badministrative lawultra viresdelegatus non potest delegaredamages recovery

Judgment

A SAHNI SILK MILLS (P) LTD. AND ANR. ETC. ETC.
v.
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION

JULY 14, 1994

B [KULDIP SINGH, P.B. SAWANT AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.J

Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 : Sections 85-B and 94-A-
Enzployees State Insurance Corporation-Power to levy and recover
damages-Delegation of-Resolution delegating power to Director General
C and authorising him to sub-delegate the said powei-Order by Director
General sub delegating power to Regional Directors-Permissibility of-Held
that part of resolution which authorises the Director General to authorise any
other officer to exercise the power and the consequential order by Director
General is invali<f-Section 94-A envisages only direct delegation by Corpora-
D tion and delegatee cannot further sub-delegate his power.
Administrative Law : Delegation of power-In the absence of a
statutory provision a delegatee cannot sub-delegate his power.

Maxim-'delegatus non potest de/egare'-Applicability of
E
In exercise of its power under section 94·A the Employees State
Insurance Corporation passed a resolution dated 28.2.76 delegating its
powe1, under Section 85(8) (i) to impose and recover damages, to the Direc·
tor General and also empowered him to authorise any other officer to
exercise the said power. Accordingly, the director General passed an order
F dated 3.5.76 authorising the Regional Directors to exercise the aforesaid
power and they passed orders against the appellants for recovery of
damages for the years 1979 to 1981. The appellants unsuccessfully chal·
lenged the orders before the Employees State Insurance Corporation and
the High Court.
G In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants
that (i) in exercise of its power under section 94-A, the Corporation could
not have delegated its power under section 85-B(i) of the Act, to be exercised
by any other officer authorised by the Director General inasmuch as in this
process there has been sub-delegation; (ii) when Parliament has specifically
H appointed authority to discharge a function, it cannot be readily presumed
626
SAHNI SILK MILLS v. INSURANCE CORPN. 627

that it has intended that its delegate should be free empower another A
person or body to act in its place.

The connected appeals have been filled by the Respondent- Corpora-
tion against judgmenw1Jassed by different High Courts holding that in
exercise of the power under section 94-A, the Corporation could not have
delegated its powers under Section 85- 8(i) to the Director General of the B
Corporation empowering him to authorsie any other officer to exercise the
aforesaid power.

Allowing the appellants' appeals and dismissing the appeals of
Respondent Corporation, this Court
c
HELD : 1. Section 94-A does not specifically provide that any officer
or authority subordinate to the Corporation to whom the power has been
delegated by the Corporation, may in his turn authorise any other officer
to exercise or perform that power or function. From the section it does not
appear that Parliament vested power in Corporation to delegate its powers D
on any of officer or authority subordinate to the Corporation, and also
vested power in the Corporation to empower such officer or authority, to
authorise any other officer to exercise the said power under Section 8508(1).
Thus the Parliament while introducing section 94-A only conceived direct
delegation by the Corporation to different officers or authorities , subor-
dinate to the Corporation, and there Is no scope for such delegate to E
sub-delegate that power, by authorising any other officer to exercise or
perform the power so delegated. Therefore, that part or the resolution
which authorises the Director General to permit any other officer to exer·
cise the power under Section 85-8(i) of the Act Is ultra vires Section 94-A. It
is not within the framework of section 94-A. [634·E·G]
F
Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, (1966] Supp. S.C.R.
311; Mangula/ Chunnilal v. Manila/ Magan/al, (1968] 2 S.C.R. 401 and
Harishankar Bag/a &Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 465,
referred to.
G
Rameshwar Jute Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1986) Patna 288;
Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Mis Dhanda Engineers Pvt. Ltd.
Faridabad, (1981) Labour and Industrial Cases 658, disapproved.

Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore v. Shoba En-
lf,neers, Bangalore, (1981) 59 Indian Factoris Joumal and Reports 343; H
62/i SUPREME COl IRT REPORTS J199-IJ SUPP. I S.C.R.

A approved.

H. Lavender & Sons Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Govem-
111ent, [1970] 3 All E.R. 871; Custo111s and Excise Co111rs. v. Cure and Deeley
Ltd., [1962] 1 QB 340 = [1961] 3 All E.R. 641; M1111goni v.AS.G. of No1them
Rhodesia, [1960] 1 All E.R. 446;Alla111 & Co. v. Europa Poster Services Ltd.,
B [1968] I All E.R. 626; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, (1934] 293 US 388 (F}
and Schechter v. United States, (1934] 295 US 495 (G), cited.

Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Vol. 1, referred to.

2. Consequently, the office order dated 3.5.1976 issued by the Direc-
c tor General also becomes invalid. The Regional Directors therefore could
not have passed the impugned orders. However, it will not be proper for
this Court to upset and unsettle the settled position at this late stage. Nor
is it in public interest to do so. The orders passed are in no way erroneous
on merits. Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, it is
D directed that no actions or proceedings shall be entertained fof refund of
amounts which have already been realised as damages from the employers ·
concerned. However, if from some employers, the damages under Section
85-B(i} on the basis of orders passed by the Regional Directors between
3.5.1~76 and 19.2.1983 have not yet been realised, they shall not be realised.
(637-D-F]
E
3. The Maxim Deiegatus non palest delegare was originally invoked in
the context of delegation of judicial powers saying that in the entire process
of adjudication a judge must act personally except in so far as he is
expressly absolved from his duty by a statute. The basic principle behind
the aforesaid maxim is that "a discretion con:erred by statute is prima facie
F intended to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has con-
ferred it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by
any contrary indications found in the language, scope or object or the
statute. [635-G]

G "Delegatus non poles/ delegare" 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257- 259, 1943,
ref{rred to.

4. The courts are normally rigorous in requiring the power to be
exercised by the persons or the bodies authorised by the statutes. It is
essential that that delegated power should be exercised by the authority
H upon whom it is conferred and by no one else. At the same time, in the
SAHNI SILK MILLS v. INSURANCE CORPN. [N.P. SINGH J.J 629

present administrative set-up extreme JU.di~ial aversion to delegation can- A
not be carried to an extreme. A public authority is at liberty to employ
agents to exercise its power. That is why in many statutes, delegation is
authorised either expressly or impliedly. Due to the enormous rise in the
nature of the activities to be handled by statutory authorities, the maxim
de/egatus non potest de/egare is not being applied specially when there is B
question of exercise of administrative discretionary power. (632-B-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2971-
2974 of 1989.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.83, 9.3.83 and 23.10 84 of
the Punjab & Haryana High Court in F.A.O. Nos. 581, 548 and 525/82 & C
L.P A. No. 675 of 1984.

With

C.A. Nos. 1689-1706/82, SLP(C) Nos. 1200/90, 3019/90, 1584/90,
15165/91, 4505-07/83, 5026-31/83, 12843-52/83 and C.A.No.1708-21/82. D
A.P. Bhandari and S.C. Patel for the Appellants in C.A. No. 2971-74.

V.C. Mahajan, Mrs. Anil Katiyar and AK. Srivastava for the Appel-
lants in C.A.No. 1689-1706/82.
E
V.J. Francis V.Subramaniam for the petitioner in SLP. No. 1200,
3019, 1584/90 and 15165/91.

C.V.S. Rao for the Petitioners in SLP. Nos. 4505-07, 5026-31 &
12843-52/83 and C.A.No. 1708-21/82 in Petitioner/Appellant.
F
M.L. Verma, V.J. Francis, V. Subramaniam for the Respondent in
C.A. Nos. 2971-74/89.

K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondent in C.A. No. 1692/82, S. Balak-
rishanan and M.K.D. Namboodri for the Respondent in SLP. No. 3019/90.
G
A.T.M. Sarnpath for the Respondent in S.L.P. No. 15165/91.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.P. SINGH, J. The Regional Directors of the Employees State
Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') issued H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A notices under section 85-B of the Employees Insurance Act, 1948
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to the appellants between the years
1979 to 1981, stating that they proposed to impose damages against the
appellants because there had been delay on the part of the appellants in
making payment of the contribution, in accordance with the provisions of
the said Act. Different amounts were.!lnentioned in the said notices which
B were to be imposed, as damages against the different appellants. The
appellants in pursuance to the notices aforesaid submitted their explana·
tions indicating the reasons and circumstances, because of which the delay
had occurred. The Regional Directors passed orders on different dates
against the different appellants imposing damages, for the period in ques-
C tion. Being aggrieved by those orders the appellants filed petitions under
section 75 of the Act before the Employees Insurance Court. The
Employees Insurance Court dismissed the petitions. Thereafter appeals
were filed under Section 82 of the Act before the High Court which were
dismissed in limine,
D Before this Court, the validity of the impugned orders. has been
questioned on the ground that the power under Section 85-B could not
have been exercised by the Regional Directors of the Corporation; it could
have been exercised either by the Corporation or by the director General
of the said Corporation.
E
Section 3 of the Act provides for the establishment of the Employees
State Insurance Corporation and Section 4 provides for constitution ,of
Standing Committee for the Corporation. Section 85-B vests power in the
Corporation to recover from the employer such damages as it may think
fit, whenever an employer fails to pay the amount due in respect of any
F contribution or any other amount payable under the said Act. Section 85-B
on the relevant date was as follows :

"85·B. Power to recover damages

1. Where an employer fails to pay the amount due in respect of
G any contribution or any other amount payable under this Act, the
Corporation may recover from the employer such damages, not
exceeding the amount of arrears as it may think fit to impose :

Provided that before recovering such damages, the employer
/
H shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
SAHNI SILK MILLS v. INSURANCE CORPN. [N.P. SINGH J.] 631

2. Any damages recoverable under sub-section (1) may be A
recovered as an arrear land revenue.

In view of Section 94A the Corporation may delegate any of its power to
any officer or authority subordinate to the Corporation.

94-A. Delegation of powers. B
The Corporation, and subject to any regulations made by the
Corporation in this behalf, the ~landing Committee may direct that
all or any of the powers and functions which may be exercised or
performed by the Corporation or the Standing Committee, as the
case may be, may, in relation to such matters and subject to such C
conditions, if any, as may be specified be also exercisable by any
officer or authority subordinate to the Corporation."

In the present case, the power of the Corporation to recover the
damages under Section 85-B has not been questioned. The controversy is D
as to whether this power could have been delegated under Section 94-A
aforesaid to the Regional Directors. It may be mentioned that in exercise
of the power under Section 94-A the Corporation delegated its power to
impose and recover damages from the employers by a resolutiOn dated
28.2.1976.
E
"Resolved that for purposes of levy of damages under Section 85-B
(1) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, as amended
up-to-date, the Director General or any other officer authorised by
him may levy and recover damages from the employer/s not ex-
ceeding the rates as per Table annexed."
F
(emphasis supplied)

It was pointed out that when Section 94-A provides that the Corporation
may direct that all or any of the powers and functions which may be
exercised or performed by the Corporation may subject to such conditions, G
if any, as may be specified 'be also exercisable by any officer or authority
subordinate to the Corporation', the Corporation could not have delegated
its power under Section 85-B (i) of the Act, to be exercised by any other
officer authorised by the Director General. In this process there has been
a sub-delegation, because the Director General in his turn can authorise
any other officer to exercise that power. Such other officer has neither been H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A named nor has been described by designation in the resolution of the
Corporation.

The courts are normally rigorous in requmng the power to be
exercised by the persons or the bodies authorised by the statutes. It is
essential that the delegated power should be exercised by the authority
B upon whom it is conferred and by no one else. At the same time, in the
present administrative set-up extreme judicial aversion to delegation can-
not be carried to an extreme. A public authority is at liberty to employ
agents to exercise its powers. That is why in many statutes, delegation is
authorised either expressly or impliedly. Due to the enormous rise in the
C nature of the activities to be handled by statutory authorities, the maxim
delegatus non potest delegare is not being applied specially when there 1s
question of exercise of administrative discretionary power.

By now it is almost settled that the legislature can permit any
D statntory authority to delegate its power to any other authority, of course,
after the policy has been indicated in the statute itself within the framework
of which such delegatee is to exercise the power. The real problem or the
controversy arises when there is a sub-delegation. It is said that when
Parliament has specifically appointed authority to discharge a function, it
cannot be readily presumed that it had intended that its delegate should
E be free to empower another person or body to act in its place. In Barium
Chemicals Limited. v. Company Law Board, AIR (1967) SC 295 = [1966]
.supp. SCR 311 this Court said in respect of sub-delegation :

"Bearing in mind that the maxim delegatus non potest delegare sets
F out what is merely a rule of construction, sub-delegation can be
sustained if permitted by express provision or by necessary implica-
tion.n

Again in Mangulal Chuni/a/ v. Mani/al Magan/al, AIR (1968) SC 822
[1968] 2 SCR 401 while considering the scope of Section 481 (l)(a) of
G the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (59 of 1949) this Court
said that Commissioner of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had
delegated his power and function under the aforesaid Section to a
Municipal, Officer to launch proceedings against a person charged with
offences under the Act or the rules and that officer to whom such functions
H were delegated could not further delegate the same to another.
SAHNI SILK MILLS v. INSURANCE CORPN. [N.P. SINGH J.] 633

In Halsbury' s Laws of England, 4th edition, volume-I in respect of A
sub-delegation of powers it has been said :

"In accordance with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, a
statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in
whom it has been confided , H. Lavender & Sons Ltd. v. Minister
of Housing and Local Government, (1970] 3 All ER 871 unless B
sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or
necessary implication (Customs and Excise Comrs. v. Cure and
Deeley Ltd., 1962 (1) QB 340k, (1961] 3 All ER 641 and Mungoni
v. AS.G. of Northern Rhodesia, (1960] 1 All ER 446 PC etc. There
is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, C
judicial, or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delega-
tion; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of
which the designated body should address its own mind Allam &
Co. v. Europa Poster Services Ltd., (1968] 1 All ER 626 ......"

In the case of Harishankar Bag/a & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, D
AIR [1954] SC 465 at 468, while examining the scope of Section 4 of the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers ) Act, 1946 it was said :

"Section 4 of the Act was attacked on the ground that it empowers
the Central Government to delegate its own power to make orders E
under Section 3 to any officer or authority subordinate to it or the
Provincial Government or to any officer or authority subordinate
to the Provincial Government as specified in the direction given
by the Central Government. In other words, the delegate has been
authorized to further delegate its power in respect of the exercise
F
of the powers of Section 3. Mr. Umrigar contended that it was for
the Legislature itself to specify the particular authorities or officers
who could exercise power under Section 3 and ii was not open to
the Legislature to empower the Central Government to say what
officer or authority could exercise the power.
G
Reference in this connection was made to two decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States of America - 'Panama
Refining Co. v. R);an; (1934] 293 US 388 (F) and - 'Schechter v.
United States', f1934] 295 US 495 (G). In both these cases it was
held that so long as the policy is laid down and a .standard H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the
making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the deter-
mination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature
is to apply. These decisions in our judgment do not help the
B contention of Mr. Umrigar as we think that Section 4 enumerates
the classes of persons to whom the power could be delegated or
sub-delegated by the Central Government and it is not correct to
say 'that the instrumentalities have not been selected by the Legis-
lature itself."

C In the aforesaid case, the sub-delegation was upheld because Section 4
itself enumerated the classes of persons to whom the power could be
delegated or sub-delegated by the Central Government.

So far as the present Section 94-A is concerned, it says that the
D Corporation subject to any regulation made by the corporation in that
behalf, may direct that particular or any of the powers and functions which
may be exercised or performed by the Corporation may, in relation to such
matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified 'be also
exercisable by any officer or authority subordinate to the corporation.'
E Section 94-A does not specifically provide that any officer or authority
subordinate to the Corporation to whom the power has been delegated by
the Corporation, may in his turn authorise any other officer to exercise or
perform that power or function. But by the resolution dated 28.2.1976 the
Corporation has not only delegated, its power under Section 85-B (i) of
the Act to the Director General, but has also empowered the Director
F General to authorise any other officer to exercise the said power. Unless
it is held that Section 94-A of the Act, enables the Corporation to delegate
any of its powers and functions to any officer or authority subordinate to
the Corporation, and he in his turn can sub-delegate the exercise of the
said power to any other officer, the last part of the resolution dated
G 28.2.1976 cannot be held to be within the framework of Section 94-A.
According to us, the Parliament while introducing Section 94-A in the Act,
only conceived direct delegation by the Corporation to different officers or
authorities, subordinate to the Corporation, and there is no scope for such
delegate to sub-delegate that power, by authorising any other officer to
H exercise or perform the power so delegated.
SAHNI SILK MILLS v. INSURANCE CORPN. [N.P. SINGH J.] 635

It may be mentioned that on 19.2.1983 the corporation by another A
Resolution in supersession of resolution dated 28.2.1976 has delegated its
powers under Section 85-B to recover damages in the following terms:

"Resolved that the power to levy and recover damages from the
employer (s) under Section 85-B of the ES! Act, 1948, as amended B
up-to-date, may be exercised by the Director General, all Regional
Directors, Joint Regional Directors, Deputy Regional Directors,
Assistant Regional Directors, Director Sub-Regional Office, Pune
and Deputy Regional Director Incharge Sub-Regional Office Nag-
pur.u
c
In this resolution the Corporation has delegated the power to recover
damages under Section 85-B to the Director General all Regional Direc-
tors, Joint Regional Directors, Deputy Regional Directors, Assistant
Regional Directors and other officers mentioned in the Resolution by
designations. Neither any grievance has been made nor can it be made so D
far as this Resolution is concerned because the Corporation has directly
delegated its power under Section 85-B to different officers with reference
to their designations, throughout the country, and no power is given in this
Resolution to the Director General to authorise any other officer to levy
and recover damages from the employers.
E
It has to be born in mind that the exercise of the power under Section
85-B(i) is quasi Judicial in nature, because there is always a scope for
controversy and dispute and that is why the section itself requires that
before recovering any such damages, a reasonable opportunity of being
heard shall be given to the employer. The employer is entitled to raise any F
objection consistent with the provisions of the Act. Those objections have
to be considered. After consideration of objections, if any, an order for
recovery of damages has to be passed. The maxim delegatus 11011 potest
delegare was originally invoked in the context of delegation of judicial
powers saying that in the entire process of adjudication a Judge must act
personally except in so far as he is expressly absolved from his duty by a G
statute. The basic principle behind the aforesaid maxim is that "a discretion
conferred by statute is prima facie intended to be exercised by the authority
on which the statute has conferred it and by no other authority, but this
intention may be negatived by any contrary indications found in the lan-
guage, scope or object of the statute.". (Vide John Willis, "Delegatus non H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

'
A potest delegare" (1934) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257, 259).

It cannot be disputed that by the impugned resolution dated
28.2.1976 the Corporation not only delegated its power under Section
85-B(i) of the Act to the Director General, but also left it to the Director
General to authorise any other officer to exercise the power under Section
B 85-B(i). From Section 94-A it does not appear that Parliament vested
power in Corporation to delegate its power on any of officer or authority
subordinate to the corporation, and also vested power in the Corporation
to empowered such officer or authority, to authorise any other officer to
exercise the said power under Section 85-B(i). If Section 94-A had a
C provision enabling the corporation not only to d~legate its power to any
other officer or authority subordinate to the Corporation, but also to
empower such officer or authority in its own turn to authorise any other
officer to exercise that power, the resolution could have been sustained on
the principle indicated in the cases Harishankar Bag/a v. State of Madhya
D Predesh (supra) and Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board
(supra). As such it has to be held that the part of the resolution dated
28.2.1976, which authorises the Director General to permit any other
officer to exercise the power under Section 85-B(i) of the Act is Ultra Vires
Section 94-A.

E It is an admitted position that the Regional Directors have exercised
the power under Section 85-B(i) of the Act while passing the impugned
orders for recovery of the damages from the appellants. The Regional
Directors had been authorised to be do so by the Director General of the
Corporation by an office order dated 3.5.1976 made on the basis of the
F aforesaid resolution of the Corporation dated 28.2.1976. Once that part of
the earlier resolution is held as invalid, the office order dated 3.5.1976
issued by the Director General also becomes invalid. The Regional Direc-
tors therefore could not have passed the impugned orders on the basis of
the invalid office order dated 3.5.1976.

G Hence the view taken in the case of Ramashwar Jute Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India, AIR (1986) Patna 288 by the Full Bench of the Patna High
Court as well as in the case of Employees' State Insurance Corporation v.
Mis. Dhanda Engineers Pvt. Ltd., Faridabad, 1981 Labour and Industrial
Cases 658 by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
H upholding the resolution dated 28.2.1976 and office order dated 3.5.1976

(
SAHNI SILK MILLS v. INSURANCE CORPN. [N.P. SINGH).] 637

cannot be sustained and the opinion expressed in the case of Employees' A
State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore v. Sh ob a Engineers, Bangalore,
(1981) 59 Indian Factories Journal and Reports 343, by a Division Bench
of the Karnataka High Court, that the aforesaid resolution dated 28.2.1976
and office order dated 3.5.1976 was invalid has to be upheld.

Unfortunately these appeals have remained pending in this Court for B
the last many years and in the meantime, on the basis of the resolution
dated 28.21976 and office order dated 3.5.1976 the different regional
Directors of the Corporation in different parts of the country have exer-
cised power under Section 85-B(i) of the Act for recovery of the damages
from different employers. That exercise of power had been upheld by a C

-· Full Bench of Patna High Court and a Division Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court referr~d to above. In this background, it be improper
to declare all such actions taken by the different Regional Directors as
invalid. The Corporation has itself, later by its resolution dated 19.2.1983
superseded and recalled the aforesaid resolution dated 28.2.1976. As such, D
any exercise of power by the Regional Directors on and from 19.2.1983
cannot be questioned. The disputed period is only between 28.2.1976 and
19.2.1983. According to us, it will not be proper for this Court to upset and
unsettle the settled position at this late stage. Nor is it in public interest to
do so. The orders passed are in no way erroneous on merits. Taking all
facts and circumstances into consideration, we direct that no actions or E
proceedings shall be entertained for refund of amounts which have already
been realised as damages from the employers concerned. However, if from
some employers, the damages under Section 85-B(i), on the basis of orders
passed by the Regional Directors between 3.5.1976 and 19.2.1983 have not
yet been realised, they shall not be realised. In such cases, it will be open
for the Regional directors to issue fresh notices and assess and recover the
F
damages, if any.

The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall
be no orders for the cost.
G
C.A. No. 1689-1706/82, 1708 to 1721/82, SLP (C) Nos. 1200/90, 3019/90,
1584/90, 15165/91, 4505 to 4507/83, 5026 to 5031/83, 12843-52/83.

These appeals and special leave petitions have been filed on behalf
of the Employees State Insurance Corporation for setting aside the judg-
ments of the different High Courts holding that in exercise of the power H
638 SUPREME.COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A under Section 94-A of the Act, the Corporation could not have delegated
its power under Section 85-B(i) by the aforesaid resolution dated 28.2.1976
to tlfe Director General of the Corporation empowering him to authorise
any other officer, to exercise the power under Section 85-B(i) of the Act.

In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 2971 to 2974 of 1989,
B these appeals and special leave petitions are dismissed. But in the facts and
.circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appellants Appeals allowed.
Respondents appeals dismissed.