SAKINA SULTANALI SUNESARA (MOMIN)versusSHIA IMAMI ISMAILI MOMIN JAMAT SAMAJ & ORS

                 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1921 : 2025 INSC 570

                 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin)
                                  v.
           Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 6681-6682 of 2023)
                                 23 April 2025
            [Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether a litigant who was already a party to the suit,
       yet contests the fact or legality of a compromise embodied in a
       decree, is restricted to an application before the trial court under
       the proviso to Ord. XXIII r.3 CPC or may maintain a first appeal
       u/s.96 CPC notwithstanding s.96(3) CPC.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.96, Ord.XXIII r.3, Ord.XLIII
       r.1A(2), r.1(m) – Compromise of suit – Appeals from original
       decrees – Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal
       against decree – Dispute between parties regarding sale deeds
       of suit land – Suit by respondent against the appellants wherein
       compromise between the parties resulting in first consent
       decree, thereafter another compromise in the suit filed leading
       to second consent decree – Appellant’s case that she had
       no notice of either compromise and both consent decrees
       obtained by fraud – Appellant filed AOs against both decrees
       u/Ord.XLIII r.1A – Transferee purchasers lodged parallel AOs –
       Single Judge of High Court, acting on the pronouncement of
       the larger bench that party to suit must first invoke proviso
       to Ord.XXIII r.3 and r.1A itself creates no independent right of
       appeal, dismissed AOs – Interference:
       Held: High Court’s directions correctly apply the structure of the
       statute and does not call for interference – Larger Bench took the
       right view that such appeals are incompetent since 1976 – CPC,
       after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways – If a
       person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful
       compromise ever took place, CPC requires that person to go back
       to the trial court under the proviso to Ord.XXIII r.3 and ask that
       Court to decide whether the compromise is valid – Someone who
       was not a party to the suit, but whose rights are hurt by a consent
* Author
1922                                                           [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


    decree, may approach the appellate court in a first appeal u/s.96,
    but only after obtaining leave – Proviso to Ord. XXIII r.3 is not
    optional, it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record
    who denies the compromise – Ord. XLIII r. 1-A does not create a
    new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already before
    the appellate court, to attack the decree on the ground that the
    compromise should not have been recorded – When the fact of
    compromise is not disputed, the bar in s. 96(3) is absolute – On
    facts, the appellant never invoked the proviso to Ord.XXIII r.3 and
    instead lodged appeals from orders on the footing of the deleted
    Ord.XLIII r.1(m) – It cannot be said that fraud transform a consent
    decree to an ordinary decree – Fraud, want of authority or other
    vitiating elements are precisely the matters that the proviso directs
    the trial court to examine – Unless and until that route is pursued,
    the statutory bar in s.96(3) remains operative – Appellant was a
    party to the suits and cannot appropriate remedy reserved for third
    parties. [Paras 8, 11-17]

                              Case Law Cited
    Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh and others [2006] Supp.
    3 SCR 370 : (2006) 5 SCC 566; Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi and
    another [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 524 : (1993) 1 SCC 581; Triloki Nath
    Singh v. Anirudh Singh [2020] 4 SCR 650 : 2020 SCC Online
    SC 444; H.S. Goutham v. Rama Murthy and another [2021] 4
    SCR 996 : (2021) 5 SCC 241; Kishun Alias Ram Kishun (Dead)
    through LRS. v. Behari (Dead) By LRS. [2005] Supp. 2 SCR
    383 : (2005) 6 SCC 300; Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v.
    N. Sailesh Prasad and others [2022] 3 SCR 1081 : (2022) 5 SCC
    736 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

                             List of Keywords
    Consent decree; Compromise; No independent right of appeal;
    Order recording or refusing a compromise; No separate appeal;
    No appeal against consent decree; Fraud; Legality of compromise;
    Legality of compromise embodied in decree; First appeal;
    Compromise of suit; Sale deeds; First consent decree; Second
    consent decree; Transferee purchasers; Independent right of
    appeal; Remedy reserved for third parties.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                       1923

                  Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
              Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

                            Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 6681-6682
      of 2023
      From the Judgment and Order dated 28.08.2019 of the High Court
      of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in AFO Nos. 33 and 16 of 2017

                         Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant:
      Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Apurva Vakil, Ms. Anushree Prashit
      Kapadia, Ms. Rashmi Singh.
      Advs. for the Respondents:
      Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, Ms. Aarti Upadhyay Mishra,
      Harsh Som, Pankaj B. Velani.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

      Prasanna B. Varale, J.

1.    These appeals filed by Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (“the appellant”)
      assails the judgment dated 28.08.2019 rendered by a Larger Bench
      of the High Court of Gujarat on a reference arising out of Appeal from
      Order1 Nos. 16 and 33 of 2017 and cognate AOs. The High Court
      concluded that a litigant who was already a party to the suit, but
      disputes the existence or validity of a compromise recorded under
      Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19082 must first
      approach the Trial Court; a First Appeal under Section 96 of the
      CPC, it held, is available only to a person who was not on the record
      of the suit. Following that pronouncement, the Single Judge of the
      High Court dismissed every pending AO on 06.09.2019 for want of
      maintainability. Both the reference judgment and the consequential
      order are impugned in these appeals.



1    AO
2    CPC
1924                                                         [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


2.    The factual matrix giving rise to the appeal is as follows:
      2.1. Three contiguous parcels of non‑agricultural land at Siddhpur,
           District Patan, city survey Nos. 321, 322 and 323, together
           36,354 sq. m., originally belonged to Moosabhai Mooman. On
           his death they devolved on his widow Noorbanu, his sons Sultan
           and Shaukatali (respondent no. 3) and his daughter Mumtaz
           (respondent no. 7). Sultan predeceased, leaving behind the
           appellant and two children, Salma (respondent no. 5) and Altaf
           (respondent no. 6) as his legal heirs.
      2.2. Mumtaz executed an irrevocable General Power of Attorney3
           in favour of Hassan Ali Lad (respondent no. 4) on 15.02.2002;
           a second joint PoA dated 08.02.2005 in his favour was signed
           by the appellant, Salma, Altaf and Noorbanu.
      2.3. On 09.03.2007, Shaukat Ali and Hassan Ali (purporting to act for
           all other co‑owners) agreed to sell 28,978.51 sq. m. (“the suit
           land”) to ten individuals styling themselves ‘Shia Imami Ismaili
           Momin Jamat, Siddhpur’ (respondent no. 1) for ₹ 2.51 crore.
           Only ₹ 15 lakh was paid; a notice terminating the agreement
           issued in August 2011.
      2.4. Up until 2012, Salma, Altaf and Mumtaz conferred individual PoAs
           on the appellant; two of the original ten proposed purchasers
           had by then died. On 10.01.2013 the eight survivors executed
           a deed cancelling the agreement to sell and an indemnity bond.
           The appellant asserts custody of the originals of both joint PoAs,
           the agreement, the cancellation deed and the bond.
      2.5. Later in 2013, Shaukat Ali, Salma, Altaf and Mumtaz relinquished
           their undivided interests in favour of the appellant; four mutation
           entries were certified, leaving her the sole recorded owner.
      2.6. In August 2015, the appellant executed three registered sale
           deeds: two dated 10.08.2015 conveying 3,272 sq. m. and
           6,385 sq. m. to Platinum Tradex Private Limited and one dated
           12.08.2015 conveying 6,567 sq. m. to four individuals. Two of
           those individuals had themselves been among the original ten
           vendees.



3    PoA
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                        1925

                  Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
              Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

      2.7. Later in 2015, Hassan Ali, accompanied by two of the original
           vendees, persuaded another member of that group, Kurban
           Momin, to revive the terminated transaction. On 24.11.2015
           three revenue appeals were filed before the Deputy Collector,
           Siddhpur, challenging the mutation entries reflecting the
           appellant’s sale deeds. The appellant and Shaukat Ali were
           cited as respondents.
      2.8. Regular Civil Suit No. 5 of 2016 (“the first suit”) was instituted
           on 5 January 2016, seeking a declaration that respondent no. 1
           possessed the suit land. On 21.01.2016 respondent no. 1,
           through Kurban, filed Special Civil Suit No.6 of 2016 (“the
           second suit”) in Patan for specific performance of the cancelled
           agreement, showing the appellant and her two children through
           Hassan Ali and joining Shaukat Ali personally.
      2.9. A compromise dated 12.03. 2016, signed by respondent nos. 1
           and 2 (a trust said to represent the Jamat) on one side and
           Shaukat Ali and Hassan Ali on the other, was recorded on
           15.03.2016, resulting in a first consent decree. Relying on
           that decree, the plaintiff withdrew the first suit unconditionally
           on 23.04.2016.
     2.10. Respondent no. 1 then instituted Special Civil Suit No. 19 of
           2016 (“the third suit”), again suing the appellant and her children
           through Hassan Ali. A further compromise dated 12.11.2016 led
           to a second consent decree on 17.12.2016.
     2.11. The appellant maintains that she had no notice of either
           compromise and that both decrees were procured by fraud.
           She therefore filed AO No. 16 of 2017 against the first consent
           decree and AO No. 33 of 2017 against the second, invoking
           Order XLIII Rule 1‑A. Transferee purchasers lodged parallel AOs.
     2.12. The Single Judge of the High Court, noting conflicting Division
           Bench views on the powers of Rule 1‑A, referred three questions
           to a Larger Bench, which held that a party to the suit must
           first invoke the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and that Rule
           1‑A itself creates no independent right of appeal. Acting on
           that pronouncement, the Single Judge dismissed all AOs on
           06.09.2019.
3.    Being aggrieved by the decision of the Larger Bench dated
      28.08.2019, the appellant has filed the present civil appeal claiming
1926                                                          [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


      that Section 96 of the CPC permits a direct First Appeal even where
      the compromise itself is in dispute.
4.    Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has
      rendered the following submissions in brief:
      4.1. Prior to the 1976 amendment to the CPC, Order XLIII Rule 1(m)
           permitted an Appeal from Order against an order recording or
           refusing a compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3. Amendment
           Act No.104 of 1976 deleted that clause and, in the same breath,
           introduced Order XLIII Rule 1-A(2). The new rule shifts the
           challenge to the decree and preserves a first appeal under
           Section 96; no separate Appeal from Order now lies.
      4.2. The impugned judgment accords two avenues to a non‑party
           (review or First Appeal with leave under Section 96) but limits
           a party on record to an application under the proviso to Order
           XXIII Rule 3. Such a view defeats the purpose of Rule 1‑A(2),
           enacted to ensure that any litigant disputing a compromise may
           contest it directly in appeal.
      4.3. The counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the
           ratios laid down in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs.
           Rajinder Singh and others,4 Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi
           and another5 and Triloki Nath Singh vs Anirudh Singh6 are
           not correctly and completely considered by the Larger Bench
           of the High Court. It is submitted that in the case of Banwari
           Lal (supra) this Court in Paragraphs 9 and 13 has observed
           as follows:
                    “ 9.[.....]But after the amendments which have been
                    introduced, neither an appeal against the order
                    recording the compromise nor remedy by way of
                    filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A
                    of Order 23. As such a right has been given under
                    Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who challenges
                    the recording of the compromise, to question the
                    validity thereof while preferring an appeal against


4    (2006) 5 SCC 566
5    (1993) 1 SCC 581
6    2020 SCC Online SC 444
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                           1927

                     Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
                 Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

                    the decree. Section 96(3) of the Code shall not be
                    a bar to such an appeal because Section 96(3) is
                    applicable to cases where the factum of compromise
                    or agreement is not in dispute.
                    ………….
                    13. [.......] Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been
                    deleted under which an appeal was maintainable
                    against an order recording a compromise. As such
                    a party challenging a compromise can file a petition
                    under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal
                    under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can
                    now question the validity of the compromise in view
                    of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

      4.4. The observation in Banwari Lal (supra) has been relied upon
           and approved in the case of H.S. Goutham Vs. Rama Murthy
           and another7 as well. The High Court relied on a solitary
           sentence in paragraph 17 of Pushpa Devi (supra) that “the
           only remedy … is to approach the court which recorded the
           compromise”. Counsel contends that the remark is per incuriam:
           it neither notices Banwari Lal (supra) nor distinguishes the later
           three-Judge Bench ruling in Kishun Alias Ram Kishun (Dead)
           through LRS. v Behari (Dead) By LRS.,8 which expressly
           recognises a first appeal where the compromise itself is disputed.
5.    On the other hand, Mr. Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, learned
      counsel for the Respondents has made the following main
      submissions:
      5.1. The respondents support the High Court’s conclusion that a
           party to the suit cannot invoke a first appeal. A consent decree,
           they urge, operates as estoppel and may be questioned only
           by an application to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order
           XXIII Rule 3; Section 96(3) bars an appeal and the deletion of
           Order XLIII Rule 1(m) removes the earlier avenue of an appeal
           from order.


7    (2021) 5 SCC 241
8    (2005) 6 SCC 300
1928                                                         [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


      5.2. Reliance is placed on Pushpa Devi (Supra), especially para
           17, which summarises:
             ●      “No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree in
                    view of Section 96(3).”
             ●      “No appeal survives against the order recording the
                    compromise after the omission of clause (m) of Order
                    XLIII Rule 1.”
      5.3. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Triloki Nath Singh (Supra),
           after considering Pushpa Devi (supra) and R Rajanna (supra),
           holds that post 1976 “neither an appeal nor a separate suit is
           maintainable” to impeach a compromise decree; Order XLIII
           Rule 1 A(2) is available only when the Trial Court has first
           decided, under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3, whether a
           compromise exists.
      5.4. Any apparent divergence between Banwari Lal (supra) and
           Pushpa Devi (Supra) was resolved in Sree Surya Developers
           & Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad and others9, which affirmed
           that the Court passing the decree is the proper forum to examine
           the validity of the compromise. Paragraphs 9 and 13 of Banwari
           Lal (supra)-quoted by the appellant-must be read in that light.
6.    Having perused the record and having considered the rival
      submissions, the primary question before us is whether a litigant who
      was already a party to the suit, yet contests the very fact or legality
      of a compromise embodied in a decree, is restricted to an application
      before the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 or may,
      at her election, maintain a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC
      notwithstanding Section 96(3).
7.    We believe it is first necessary to look at the impact of the Amendment
      Act 104 of 1976 to CPC. Prior to 01.02.1977 an order “recording or
      refusing to record” a compromise was itself appealable under Order
      XLIII Rule 1(m). The Parliament removed that clause and, in the
      same breath, introduced four companion provisions:
      •      Proviso and Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3 – obliging the
             Trial Court to decide, forthwith and itself, any objection to the
             fact or lawfulness of a compromise;


9    (2022) 5 SCC 736
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                        1929

                 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
             Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

     •     Rule 3A of Order XXIII – barring a separate suit to avoid a
           compromise decree;
     •     Order XLIII Rule 1A – permitting an appellant who is already
           in a competent appeal against a decree to contend that the
           compromise “should, or should not, have been recorded”; and
     •     Section 96(3) (as renumbered) – prohibiting an appeal from a
           decree “passed with the consent of parties”.
8.   In our opinion, the interpretation of these provisions is quite clear and
     coherent. A party that accepts the compromise is bound by it and
     cannot appeal (Section 96(3)). A party that denies the compromise
     must first raise that dispute before the Trial Court (proviso to Order
     XXIII Rule 3). A fresh suit is no longer possible (Order XXIII Rule
     3A). If, and only if, the Trial Court decides the objection and passes
     a decree adverse to the objector, a first appeal lies under Section
     96(1); in that appeal the appellant may, by virtue of Order XLIII Rule
     1A(2), challenge the recording of the compromise.
9.   The above reading stands affirmed in a catena of judgements
     passed by this Court. In Banwari Lal (Supra), this Court held that,
     post-1976, the aggrieved party possesses two concurrent but
     sequential remedies:
     •     an application under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 before
           the Trial Court; or
     •     a first appeal under Section 96(1) after the Trial Court has
           recorded its finding.
10. More importantly, in Pushpa Devi (Supra) this Court, after surveying
    the amendments, stated four propositions, chief among them that
    a consent decree is binding “unless set aside by the Court which
    recorded the compromise on an application under the proviso to
    Rule 3”. The relevant paras of Pushpa Devi (supra) are reproduced
    hereunder:
           “17. The position that emerges from the amended
           provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
           (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree
           having regard to the specific bar contained in Section
           96(3) CPC.
1930                                                    [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


        (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the
        court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
        compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule
        1 Order 43.
        (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a
        compromise decree on the ground that the compromise
        was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.
        (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is
        valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which
        passed the consent decree, by an order on an application
        under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
        Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent
        decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the
        court which recorded the compromise and made a decree
        in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise.
        In that event, the court which recorded the compromise
        will itself consider and decide the question as to whether
        there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because
        a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties
        superimposed with the seal of approval of the court.
        The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the
        validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is
        made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent
        compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she
        filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on
        21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise
        in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other
        defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons
        best known to herself, the second defendant within a few
        days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and
        chose not to pursue the application filed before the court
        which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the
        second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to
        the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.
        Re: Point (ii)
        18. Order 23 deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits.
        Rule 3 relates to compromise of suits, relevant portion of
        which is extracted below:
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            1931

                 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
             Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

                “3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved
                to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has
                been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful
                agreement or compromise, in writing and
                signed by the parties or where the defendant
                satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or
                any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the
                court shall order such agreement, compromise
                or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass
                a decree in accordance therewith so far as
                it relates to the parties to the suit, whether
                or not the subject-matter of the agreement,
                compromise or satisfaction is the same as the
                subject-matter of the suit:”
           The said Rule consists of two parts. The first part provides
           that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court
           that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any
           lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed
           by the parties, the court shall order such agreement or
           compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in
           accordance therewith. The second part provides that where
           a defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole
           or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall
           order such satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a
           decree in accordance therewith. The Rule also makes it
           clear that the compromise or agreement may relate to
           issues or disputes which are not the subject-matter of
           the suit and that such compromise or agreement may be
           entered not only among the parties to the suit, but others
           also, but the decree to be passed shall be confined to the
           parties to the suit whether or not the subject-matter of the
           agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the
           subject-matter of the suit. We are not, however, concerned
           with this aspect of the Rule in this appeal.
           19. What is the difference between the first part and the
           second part of Rule 3? The first part refers to situations
           where an agreement or compromise is entered into in
           writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or
           compromise is placed before the court. When the court
1932                                                       [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


        is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly
        or in part by such agreement or compromise in writing
        and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree
        follows in terms of what is agreed between the parties.
        The agreement/compromise spells out the agreed terms
        by which the claim is admitted or adjusted by mutual
        concessions or promises, so that the parties thereto can
        be held to their promise(s) in future and performance can
        be enforced by the execution of the decree to be passed
        in terms of it. On the other hand, the second part refers
        to cases where the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff
        about the claim. This may be by satisfying the plaintiff
        that his claim cannot be or need not be met or performed.
        It can also be by discharging or performing the required
        obligation. Where the defendant so “satisfies” the plaintiff
        in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nothing further
        remains to be done or enforced and there is no question
        of any “enforcement” or “execution” of the decree to be
        passed in terms of it. Let us illustrate with reference to
        a money suit filed for recovery of say a sum of rupees
        one lakh. Parties may enter into a lawful agreement or
        compromise in writing and signed by them, agreeing that
        the defendant will pay the sum of rupees one lakh within
        a specified period or specified manner or may agree that
        only a sum of Rs 75,000 shall be paid by the defendant in
        full and final settlement of the claim. Such agreement or
        compromise will fall under the first part and if the defendant
        does not fulfil the promise, the plaintiff can enforce it by
        levying execution. On the other hand, the parties may
        submit to the court that the defendant has already paid
        a sum of rupees one lakh or Rs 75,000 in full and final
        satisfaction or that the suit claim has been fully settled by
        the defendant out of court (either by mentioning the amount
        paid or not mentioning it) or that the plaintiff will not press
        the claim. Here the obligation is already performed by the
        defendant or the plaintiff agrees that he will not enforce
        performance and nothing remains to be performed by the
        defendant. As the order that follows merely records the
        extinguishment or satisfaction of the claim or non-existence
        of the claim, it is not capable of being “enforced” by levy of
        execution, as there is no obligation to be performed by the
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                             1933

                 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
             Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

           defendant in pursuance of the decree. Such “satisfaction”
           need not be expressed by an agreement or compromise in
           writing and signed by the parties. It can be by a unilateral
           submission by the plaintiff or his counsel. Such satisfaction
           will fall under the second part. Of course, even when
           there is such satisfaction of the claim or subject-matter of
           the suit by the defendant and the matter falls under the
           second part, nothing prevents the parties from reducing
           such satisfaction of the claim/subject-matter, into writing
           and signing the same. The difference between the two
           parts is this: where the matter falls under the second part,
           what is reported is a completed action or settlement out
           of court putting an end to the dispute, and the resultant
           decree recording the satisfaction, is not capable of being
           enforced by levying execution. Where the matter falls
           under the first part, there is a promise or promises agreed
           to be performed or executed, and that can be enforced
           by levying execution. While agreements or compromises
           falling under the first part can only be by an instrument
           or other form of writing signed by the parties, there is no
           such requirement in regard to settlements or satisfaction
           falling under the second part. Where the matter falls
           under the second part, it is sufficient if the plaintiff or the
           plaintiff’s counsel appears before the court and informs
           the court that the subject-matter of the suit has already
           been settled or satisfied.”
11. The path is therefore settled: the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3
    is not optional; it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on
    record who denies the compromise. Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not
    create a new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already
    before the Appellate Court, to attack the decree on the ground that
    the compromise should not have been recorded. When the fact of
    compromise is not disputed, the bar in Section 96(3) is absolute.
12. The present appellant was a defendant-of-record in Special Civil
    Suit No. 6 of 2016 and Special Civil Suit No. 19 of 2016. Both
    decrees rest on written compromise terms signed by counsel who
    held unquestioned vakalatnamas. The signature of duly authorised
    counsel is the signature of the party. The decrees are therefore
    consent decrees within the meaning of Section 96(3). The appellant
1934                                                        [2025] 4 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     never invoked the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3; instead, she lodged
     Appeals from Orders on the footing of the deleted Order XLIII Rule
     1(m). The Larger Bench of the High Court was correct in holding
     that such appeals are incompetent since 1976.
13. The appellant’s submission that allegations of fraud transform a
    consent decree into an ordinary decree cannot be accepted. Fraud,
    want of authority or other vitiating elements are precisely the matters
    that the proviso directs the Trial Court to examine. Unless and until
    that route is pursued, the statutory bar in Section 96(3) of the CPC
    remains operative.
14. It must also be noted that the presence of subsequent purchasers
    does not assist the appellant. Those purchasers were never parties
    to the suits; they have, with leave, instituted first appeals in the High
    Court, a course that Section 96(1) of the CPC permits to nonparties.
    The appellant, by contrast, was a party to the suits and cannot
    appropriate the remedy reserved for third parties. Both suits were
    eventually compromised before a Lok Adalat. Section 21(2) of the
    Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 interdicts any appeal from the
    award of a Lok Adalat. The limited supervisory jurisdiction under
    Article 227 of the Constitution of India remains available, but has
    not been invoked.
15. We are satisfied that the Larger Bench took the right view. It noticed
    that the CPC, after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways.
    If a person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful
    compromise ever took place, the CPC requires that person to go
    back to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and
    ask that Court to decide whether the compromise is valid. On the
    other hand, someone who was not a party to the suit, but whose
    rights are hurt by a consent decree, may approach the Appellate
    Court in a First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, but only after
    obtaining leave. Order XLIII Rule 1A does not create an independent
    appeal at all; it merely says that, once an appeal is otherwise before
    the Court, the appellant may argue that the compromise should, or
    should not, have been recorded. Seen in that light, the High Court’s
    directions correctly apply the structure of the statute and do not call
    for interference.
16. For the reasons recorded above, the civil appeals fail and are
    dismissed.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                   1935

                    Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v.
                Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.

17. The judgment dated 28.08.2019 of the Larger Bench of the High
    Court of Gujarat, as well as the consequential order of the Single
    Judge dated 06.09.2019, are affirmed.
18. It is open to the appellant, if so advised, to invoke the proviso to
    Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC before the Trial Court. We express
    no opinion on the merits of any such application.
19. There shall be no order as to costs.
20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain