Created byFuzzy Cloud

Supreme Court of India

SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIMversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

Citation
2023 INSC 687
Decided
8 August 2023
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The Supreme Court held that FIR No. 175/2022 must be quashed insofar as the appellant is concerned.

Summary

The victim Husna filed FIR No.175/2022 alleging that several persons threatened her to withdraw an earlier FIR against her father‑in‑law. The appellant, Salib alias Salu, was not named in the original FIR but his name appeared for the first time in the informant’s further statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR, arguing that no allegation in the FIR pertained to him and that the case was fabricated. The High Court refused to quash the FIR, but the Supreme Court examined whether the FIR should stand in view of the lack of any substantive charge against the appellant, the absence of ingredients for offences under Sections 195A and 386 IPC, and the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal for quashing frivolous or malicious proceedings. The Court held that the FIR was manifestly frivolous, vexatious and motivated by personal vendetta, and therefore must be quashed as to the appellant. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the criminal proceedings arising from FIR No.175/2022 were dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The FIR should be quashed for the appellant who was not named in the original FIR and whose name appears only in a later further statement.
  • Whether the allegations disclose the ingredients of offences under Sections 195A and 386 IPC.
  • Whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the FIR.

Legislation cited

Subjects

FIR quashSection 482 CrPCfrivolous proceedingsvexatious proceedingsfalse implicationSection 195A IPCSection 386 IPCBhajan Lal parametersHigh Court orderSupreme Court judgment

Judgment

                    [2023] 11 S.C.R. 58 : 2023 INSC 687



                               CASE DETAILS

                        SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM
                                         v.
                         STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 2344 of 2023)
                              AUGUST 08, 2023
              [B. R. GAVAI AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]

                                HEADNOTES

        Issue for consideration : In a case where in the further statement of the
first informant’s name of the appellant surfaced for the first time, the appellant not
named in the FIR as one of the accused persons and no allegation worth the name
in the entire FIR against him, whether the High Court was justified in declining
to quash the FIR.
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Quashing of FIR, when in
the further statement of the first informant’s name of the appellant surfaced
for the first time – High Court declining to quash the FIR – Correctness:
        Held : Appellant not named in the FIR as one of the accused persons – No
allegation worth the name in the entire FIR against him – First informant in her
further statement made out altogether a different story than what she narrated in
the FIR – No offence u/s. 195A and s. 386 made out – Entire case put up by the
first informant appears to be concocted and fabricated – Multiple FIRs registered
over a period of time which attract wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge – In view thereof, the FIR is quashed and the order passed by the High
Court is set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 147, 148, 149, 195A, 386, 504 and
506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss. 7, 8. [Paras
10, 14, 16 and 24-27]
      Penal Code, 1860 – s. 195A – Invocation of, by the investigating agency
– Correctness:
       Held : To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle
the dispute would not attract s. 195A – None of the ingredients to constitute
                                       58
     SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                            59


the offence punishable u/s. 195A disclosed, on plain reading of the FIR and the
further statement of the first informant including the statement of the so-called
eye witness – Nothing to indicate that the accused persons threatened the first
informant with intent that the first informant gives false evidence before the Court
of law. [Paras 15 and 16]
      Penal Code, 1860 – s. 386 – Extortion by putting a person in fear
of death or grievous hurt – Invocation of – Necessary ingredients:
       Held : Victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property
or valuable security, etc – Delivery of the property must be with consent
which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury – Forcibly
taking any property will not come under this definition – It has to be shown
that the person was induced to part with the property by putting him in fear
of injury – On facts, nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of
possession of property (money) by the person put in fear – In the absence
of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a
particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence u/s. 386
can be said to have been made out. [Paras 22 and 24]
      FIR – Quashing of – Invocation of inherent powers u/s. 482 CrPC
or extraordinary jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution – Duty of
the court:
       Held : Whenever an accused seeks quashing of the FIR or the
criminal proceedings essentially on the ground that such proceedings are
manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance, in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look
into the FIR with care and a little more closely – It would not be just enough
for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone
for the purpose of the alleged offence are disclosed or not – In frivolous
or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above
the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read
in between the lines – Court is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. [Para 26]
60             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 11 S.C.R.



         LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

       Ramyad Singh v. Emperor Criminal Revision No. 125 of 1931 (Pat)
– referred to.

         OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
                ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.2344 of 2023.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMWP No.13339 of 2022.
         Appearances:
      Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Mohd. Zahid Hussain, Ms. Jemtiben A.O,
Utsav Sehgal, Ms. Mumtaz Javed Shaikh, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Ms. Garima Prasad, Sr. A.A.G., Brijendra Chahar, Sr. Adv., Vishwa
Pal Singh, Aviral Saxena, Rabindra Lokhare, Ms. Shweta Yadav, Abhinav
Agrawal, Harsh Pratap Shahi, Ms. Manvi Dikshit Sharma, Ashutosh
Bhardwaj, Prateek Rai, Shubham Saxena, Akash, Naman Raj Singh, Ashish
Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.

          JUDGMENT/ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                 JUDGMENT
         J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
         1. Leave granted.
       2. This appeal is at the instance of an accused charged with the
offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short,
“IPC”) in connection with the First Information Report (FIR) No. 175 of
2022 dated 11.08.2022 registered with the Mirzapur Police Station, District
Saharanpur, State of U.P. and is directed against the order passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 17.10.2022 passed in the Criminal
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 13339 of 2022 filed by the appellant herein
for quashing of the aforesaid FIR by which the High Court rejected the Writ
Petition and thereby declined to quash the FIR referred to above.
         3. The FIR dated 11.08.2022 lodged by the respondent No. 3 herein reads
thus:-
     SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                        61
                  [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

     “To, the S.H.O., Police Station Mirzapur Paul, District Saharanpur.
     Respectfully submitted that the applicant Husna wife of Irafan resident
     of village Mirzapur Paul police station Mirzapur Paul, District
     Saharanpur had submitted an application in Mahila thana against
     Iqbal @ Bala and his associates being Case Crime No. 122/22 u/s
     376D, 323, 120B, 452 IPC which is under investigation. Due to this
     reason Khursheed son of Asagar and Farooq son Mustak and Maharaj
     wife of Faroq residents of Shahpur Gadda, Police Station Mirzapur
     Paul, District Saharanpur are threatening me the complainant. They
     told me on phone and face to face that if you have not settled this
     case then you and your family will be killed and Suleman Kabadi has
     shown me pistol and told that we are companions of Iqbal @ Balla.
     If there has not been any decision then should remain ready to suffer
     consequences. Your are requested to take legal action. I shall remain
     obliged.”
       4. Thus it appears on a plain reading of the aforesaid FIR that the
victim namely Husna (respondent No.3 herein) had earlier lodged an FIR No.
122 of 2022 for the offences punishable under Sections 376D, 323, 120B,
354A and 452 resply of the IPC and under Sections 7 and 8 resply of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against Haji Iqbal
@ Bala (father-in-law of the appellant herein), Mehmood, Javed, Alishan,
Afjal and Dilshad. It is alleged that while the investigation of the FIR No.
122 of 2022 referred to above was going on, the accused persons namely
Khurshid, Farukh, Maharaj and Suleman had telephonically as well as in
person threatened the victim saying that they are the associates of Iqbal alias
Bala and that if she would not withdraw the said FIR No. 122 of 2022, then
she as well as her family members would be killed.
      5. The appellant herein went before the High Court by way of filing
the Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 13339 of 2022 with a prayer
to quash the FIR lodged against him. The High Court declined to quash
the FIR vide the impugned order dated 17.10.2022. The order reads thus:-
           “Heard Shri Indra Bhan Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner,
     Sri Namit Srivastava for the complainant and learned A.G.A, for the
     State respondents.
62           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      The relief sought in this petition is for quashing of the impugned FIR
dated 11.08.2022 registered as Case Crime No.175 of 2022 under Section
506 IPC Police Station Mirzapur, District Saharanpur.
      Further prayer has been made not to arrest the petitioner in the
aforesaid case.
      Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned FIR has
been lodged on false/ vexatious/ mischievous allegations, and no offences
are made out against the petitioner.
      Learned AGA opposed the prayer for quashing of the FIR, which
discloses cognizable offence.
       Perusal of the impugned first information report prima facie reveals
commission of cognizable offence. The correctness of the allegations would
have to be tested on the basis of the materials collected during the course
of investigation as by insertion of notification No.1058/79-V-1-19-1 (Ka)-
20-2018 dated 6th June 2019 and therefore, in view of the law laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan
Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 and M/s Neeharika Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918 and in Special Leave
to Appeal (Crl.) No.3262/2021 (Leelavati Devi @ Leelawati & another vs.
the State of Uttar Pradesh) decided on 07.10.2021, no case has been made
out for interference with the impugned first information report.
        Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed leaving it open for the
petitioner to apply before the competent court for anticipatory bail/bail as
permissible under law and in accordance with law.
       It is made clear that we have not adjudicated the contentions raised
by learned counsel for the petitioner and the same are left open for the
petitioner to raise at an appropriate stage in an appropriate proceeding,
in accordance with law.”
      6. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present appeal.
    SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                        63
                 [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

      SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
      7. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant herein in his written submissions has stated as under:-
      “a) It is respectfully submitted that the Petitioner is not named in the
     present FIR but subsequently during the course of investigation he
     was named for the first time in the statement of the alleged eye-witness
     Salman recorded under Section 161 CRPC on 12.08.2022, who gave
     an improved version of the alleged incident and on the basis of the
     said statement, vide G.D. Entry No. 30 dated 12.08.2022 the offence
     under Sections 147, 148, 149, 195-A, 386, 504 and 506 IPC was added
     in the FIR No. 175/2022. It is pertinent to submit that nowhere in the
     FIR has the Complainant mentioned about the presence of the alleged
     eye-witness Salman at the time and place of incident.
     b) The allegations in the First Information Report are not only
     absurd but also highly improbable given that there is no mention
     of the date and time of incident in the FIR. Moreover apart from
     omnibus allegations there is no specific allegation against the accused
     persons. The Petitioner was not present at the time and place of the
     incident namely, Village Mirzapur, District Saharanpur, and in fact
     the Petitioner is permanently residing in Kunjagrant, Vikasnagar,
     Dehradun, Uttarakhand.
     c) It is respectfully submitted that the alleged First Information Report
     is absolutely false and frivolous, and on a reading of the said FIR, the
     offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 195-A, 386, 504 and 506 of IPC
     is clearly not made out against the Petitioner. The entire allegation in
     the FIR revolves around an earlier FIR No.122/2022 dated 21.06.2022
     lodged by the Complainant against Haji Iqbal alias Bala (Petitioner’s
     father-in-law) and his family members under Sections 376, 323, 354
     (A) IPC and Section 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
     Offences Act, 2012. It is submitted that the Petitioner is not an accused
     in the said FIR No.122/2022 and there was therefore no question of
     the Petitioner having threatened the Complainant to withdraw the
     said FIR No.122 of 2022.
64            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     d) That the Complainant is in a habit of making similar baseless and
     false allegations against other persons and has lodged the present FIR
     at the behest of the present ruling party in the State of Uttar Pradesh to
     settle political scores with the Petitioner’s father-in-law Haji Iqbal as
     he belongs to a rival political party and he was a Member of Legislative
     Council from 2011 to 2016.
     e) It is submitted that the Respondents have incorrectly stated that the
     Petitioner is involved in multiple criminal cases without mentioning
     the cases allegedly registered against the Petitioner. The Petitioner
     is not a member of any Gang and he is being falsely implicated in the
     present case simply because he is the son-in-law of Haji Iqbal alias
     Bala and also the pairokar of the family members of Haji Iqbal alias
     Bala is some cases pending before the Learned Trial Court and the
     Hon’ble High Court.
     f) It is respectfully submitted that the Petitioner has no criminal
     antecedents and apart from the present FIR No. 175 of 2022 there are
     no other criminal cases registered against him.
     g) The allegations made in the First Information Report do not prima
     facie constitute any offence or make out a case under Sections 147,
     148, 149, 195-A, 386, 504 and 506 IPC of IPC against the Petitioner
     and thus, the FIR is liable to be quashed. It is pertinent to mention that
     even after the charge sheet has been filed, the petition for quashing of
     a FIR is well within the powers of a court of law [Please see: ANAND
     KUMAR MOHATTA & ANOTHER VS. STATE (NCT OF DELHI),
     DEPARTMENT OF HOME & ANOTHER (2019) 11 SCC 706 at
     paragraph 14 & 16].
     h) For the reasons mentioned above, the Special Leave Petition may
     be allowed and the order of the Hon’ble High Court refusing to quash
     the FIR No. 175 of 2022 dated 11.08.2022 be set aside.”
      SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
      8. Ms. Garima Prasad, the learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State of U.P. in her written submissions has stated as under:-
SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                   65
             [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

“a) That the petitioner being the family member of the gang and
the other members of the gang are criminal minded persons and
indulge in anti social activities and the petitioner is also involved
in the various illegal work.
b) That initially the name of the petitioner was not in the FIR;
however, the investigating agency, during the investigation added
147, 148, 149, 195A, 386, 504,506 IPC has been added and the
name of the petitioner was added.
c) After registration of the FIR, the investigation was conducted by
the Investigation Officer, during investigation, number of notices
under section 41A Cr.P.C. was issued to the Petitioner but he did
not give any heed on it and not reply the notices and he did not
co-operate with the investigation to find the actual truth. Further,
it was that the Petitioner is absconding and he is suspected to have
left the country.
d) During investigation, the statement of Complainant was recorded
under section 161 Cr.P.C. and other material evidence was collected
wherein the claim of the complainant is proved.
e) In the above FIR/Crime No. 175/2022 U/s 147, 148, 149, 195A,
386, 504,506 IPC, registered at P.S. Mirjapur, District Saharanpur,
there are total four (4) accused persons namely Khurshid, Farukh,
Maharaj, Suleman Kabadi. Further during the investigation,the
name of the petitioner was also added but only the petitioner come
before this Hon’ble Court to quash the said FIR.
f) The Investigation has been completed and chargesheet is ready to
file against the Petitioners but due to stay order dated 02.01.2023
of this Hon’ble Court, the chargesheet could not be submitted.
g) During investigation, the statement of Complainant/Victim under
section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein the victim has revealed
that she was pressurized to make settlement in the aforementioned
FIR No. 122 of 2022 by the Gang members of the Petitioner No. 1
Mohd. Iqbal. Further, it was also informed that Khurshid S/o Asgar,
Farooq S/o Mutaaq, Mehraj S/o Farooq and Suleman Kabadi S/o
Khurfan has threaten the victim and Suleman Kabadi has shown the
66           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     pistol and warned that if she has not settled the issues, she would
     have to face the consequences.
     In view of the aforementioned factual & legal submissions, it is most
     respectfully submitted that the present special leave petition of the
     Petitioners is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost and the
     impugned order dated 17.10.2022 passed by the Hon’ble High Court in
     Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 13339 of 2022 is liable to be upheld.”
      ANALYSIS
      9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls
for our consideration is whether the FIR should be quashed so far as the
appellant herein is concerned?
      10. We take notice of the following facts:-
           1.The appellant herein has not been named in the FIR as one of
           the accused persons. There is no allegation worth the name in
           the entire FIR against the appellant herein.
           2.It appears that further statement of the first informant was
           recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
           and in the said statement, the name of the appellant herein
           surfaced.
       11. The first informant in her further statement dated 12.08.2022
stated thus:-
     “… Yesterday morning at around 7.00 am I along with my daughter
     Salia was going to Shahpur Gada to see my brother at my mother’s
     house as soon as I reached ahead of the petrol pump, then a Bolero
     car colour white number unknown came and stopped next to me, the
     people sitting in it lowered the glass of the car. So I recognized that this
     is Suleman kabaadi. That’s why Suleman, sitting on the front seat, got
     down from the car and said that you did not understand after saying it
     repeatedly. We had also explained to you that do not complain about
     the decision taken by Haji Iqbal. But after abusing you, you did not
     agree. Now about 10 lakh rupees will be spent on our jail and court.
     What will your father give you? Then all the people sitting in the car
    SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                  67
                 [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

     got down and surrounded me. Rashid Pradhan Mahmudpur said
     either withdraw the complaint now or give Rs 10 lakh. Otherwise
     you will definitely die. Your family will also die with you. That’s
     why Aslam alias Shubha resident of Shahpur Gada took out a
     pistol from his pocket and pointed at me and said that you have
     heard, give us at least 10 lakh rupees. Otherwise withdraw the
     case. Otherwise, you know that nothing will be known about you.
     And tell your family not to testify against us. Otherwise everyone
     be ready to die. Seeing the pistol, me and my daughter started
     running away in fear. Even our voice could not come out. Rao Atif
     of Raipur said where will she go after running away. And how
     long will it run? Will either take a decision or give Rs. 10 lakh
     or die. The person standing nearby, Salib alias Salu s/o Dilshad,
     resident of Kunja Grant Vikas Nagar, Dehradun, who is also
     the nephew and son-in-law of Iqbal alias Bala, was repeatedly
     saying that surround her in the car. Either she will decide or
     give money or she will die today itself. Only then Salman’s son
     Latif of village Mirzapur whom I already knew. He came on
     his bike and stopped near us and asked what happened…..So
     Suleman Kabaadi said that it has been a long time now, people
     have started coming and going. Saying this, people sat in the car
     and ran towards Shahpur Gada. I sat here on the road. I could
     not understand anything. I told all these things to Salman’s son
     Latif, Mr. Khursid, Farooq, Maharaj who belong to my family.
     These people threaten me by talking to my family members over
     the phone to get a decision in the case against Iqbal alias Bala
     and his family. Sir I am very worried please help me. Here is
     my statement. Sir, the persons whose names I have told you used
     to visit Iqbal alias Bala’s house, that is why I know them from
     before. …”
      12. With the recording of the further statement referred to above,
the investigating agency added Sections 147, 148, 149, 195A, 386
and 504 of the IPC.
     13. We may also refer to one police statement of so-called eye
witness namely Salman. The statement reads thus:-
68          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     “Statement Eyewitness…Salman s/o Latife resident of Kalyav police
     station Mirzapur district Saharanpur told on being asked that
     11.06.2022 morning around 7.00 am he was going from his home
     Mirzapur to Shahpur Gada for some work, then on the way I saw
     that our own village some people are standing around Mrs. Husna
     on the road. Those who are around us. Whom I know very well,
     one of whom is Suleman Kabaddi, son of Furkan, resident of village
     Mirzapur Paul, police station Mirzapur Paul, district Saharanpur,
     town Mirzapur and the other person, Rashid’s son Mohd. Resident
     Shahpur Gada police station Mirzapur district Saharanpur and
     name of the fourth person Atif son of Hameed resident Raipur
     police station Mirzapur district Saharanpur and the name of the
     fifth person is Salib alias Salu s/o Dilshad resident Kunja Grant
     Vikas Nagar Dehradun who is a relative of Haji Iqbal alias Bala,
     everyone is a respectable person, everyone keeps coming and going
     in our village Mirzapur. These people were abusing and threatening
     Husna wife Irfan resident of village Mirzapur Paul police station
     Mirzapur district Saharanpur to take a decision in the case written
     against Haji Iqbal alias Bala and his family members. And were
     demanding money for the expenses to be incurred in the written
     case. When I reached here, all these people sat in their Bolero car
     and went towards Shahpur Gada. Where Mrs. Husna was sitting
     there in a bod mood. When I asked her about what happened,
     Husna Devi told me all these things on the spot. Sir, it is true that
     when I reached there with a motorcycle, these people surrounded
     Husna and were standing on the road in front of the petrol pump
     and were threatening her. Of these Aslam also had a pistol in his
     hand. I am giving this statement without any pressure. I have told
     you what I have seen. I have nothing to do with anyone. This is
     my statement.”
      14. It appears from the aforesaid that the first informant in her
further statement made out altogether a different story than what she
narrated in the FIR. We would not go to the extent of saying that since
the name of the appellant herein does not figure in the FIR and it came
to be disclosed only for the first time in the further statement of the
victim that itself can be a ground to quash the FIR. However, there are
     SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                          69
                  [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the
case which indicates that the case on hand is one of false implication.
Just because the appellant herein happens to be the son-in-law of a very
hardened criminal as alleged by name Iqbal @ Bala, he has also been roped
in by way of further statement. It is pertinent to note that the victim in her
FIR has not even remotely referred to the presence of Salman s/o Latife
at village Mirzapur Paul. We are highlighting all this only to demonstrate,
how the entire case was fabricated step by step.
       15. There is a different angle to this matter. It appears that the
investigating agency has invoked Section 195A of the IPC. Section 195A
of the IPC reads thus:-
           “Section 195A. Threatening any person to give false evidence.
     Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or
     property or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person
     is interested, with intent to cause that person to give false evidence
     shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
     which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both;
            and if innocent person is convicted and sentenced in consequence
     of such false evidence, with death or imprisonment for more than seven
     years, the person who threatens shall be punished with the same
     punishment and sentence in the same manner and to the same extent
     such innocent person is punished and sentenced.”
       16. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that if any
individual is threatened with any injury to his person, reputation or property
and such threats are administered with intent to cause that person to give false
evidence, the same would constitute an offence under Section 195A of the IPC.
In our opinion, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under
Section 195A of the IPC are disclosed, on plain reading of the FIR and the
further statement of the first informant including the statement of the so-called
eye witness. The allegation in the FIR is that the accused persons threatened
and pressurised the first informant to withdraw her first FIR bearing No. 122 of
2022 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376D, 323, 120B,
354A and 452 resply of the IPC. There is nothing to indicate that the accused
persons threatened the first informant with intent that the first informant gives
false evidence before the Court of law. The later part of Section 195A makes
70          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 11 S.C.R.


it very clear that false evidence means false evidence before the Court
of law. On such false evidence if a person is convicted and sentenced,
then the person found guilty of administering threats would be liable to
be punished with the same punishment and sentence in the same manner
and to the same extent as such innocent person is punished and sentenced.
The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with
what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter
XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice. Thus, even
if we believe the allegations levelled in the FIR to be true, none of the
ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 195A are
disclosed. To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or
settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC.
      17. In the aforesaid context, we must look into Section 195A of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Section 195A of the CrPC
reads thus:-
     “Section 195A. Procedure for witnesses in case of threatening,
     etc.—A witness or any other person may file a complaint in relation
     to an offence under section 195A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
     1860).”
       18. The plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that
if a witness or any other person receives threats and such threats are
administered with an intent to cause that person to give false evidence
before the Court, then such witness or person can fi le a complaint in
relation to the offence under Section 195A of the IPC. It goes without
saying that such complaint has to be lodged before the Court recording
the evidence. Section 195A of the CrPC provides a remedy of fi ling
a complaint. “Complaint” means as defined under Section 2(d) of the
CrPC which reads thus:-
     “Section 2(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in
     writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this
     Code,that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed
     an offence, but does not include a police report.
     Explanation.—A report made by a police officer in a case which
     discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable
    SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                       71
                 [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

     offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by
     whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;”
       19. We are conscious of the fact that Section 195A of the IPC
is a cognizable offence. In a cognizable offence, police has power to
investigate. We are not going into the question whether the bar of Section
195 of the CrPC would apply to Section 195A of the IPC as we have taken
the view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable
under Section 195A of the IPC are disclosed in the facts of the present case.
      20. We take notice of the fact that Section 386 of the IPC has also
been invoked. Section 386 of the IPC relates to extortion by putting a
person in fear of death or grievous hurt. Section 386 of the IPC runs as
follows:—
     “Section 386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or
     grievous hurt. —Whoever commits extortion by putting any person
     in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other,
     shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
     which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
     21. “Extortion” has been defined in Section 383 of the IPC as
     follows:—
     “Section 383. Extortion.—Whoever intentionally puts any person
     in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby
     dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person
     any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which
     may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion.
      Illustrations
     (a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless
     Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has
     committed extortion.
     (b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z’s child in wrongful confinement,
     unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay
     certain monies to A. Z signs and delivers the note. A has committed
     extortion.
72           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     (c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z’s field unless Z will
     sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver
     certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the
     bond. A has committed extortion.
     (d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z
     to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs
     and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be
     converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion.”
       22. So from the aforesaid, it is clear that one of the necessary
ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced
to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. That is to
say, the delivery of the property must be with consent which has been
obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury. In contrast to theft,
in extortion there is an element of consent, of course, obtained by putting
the victim in fear of injury. In extortion, the will of the victim has to
be overpowered by putting him or her in fear of injury. Forcibly taking
any property will not come under this definition. It has to be shown that
the person was induced to part with the property by putting him in fear
of injury. The illustrations to the Section given in the IPC make this
perfectly clear.
      23. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the following
observations made by a Division Bench of the High Court of Patna in
Ramyad Singh v. Emperor Criminal Revision No. 125 of 1931 (Pat):-
     “If the facts had been that the complainant’s thumb had been forcibly
     seized by one of the petitioners and had been applied to the piece
     of paper notwithstanding his struggles and protests, then I would
     agree that there is good ground for saying that the offence committed
     whatever it may be, was not the offence of extortion because the
     complainant would not have been induced by the fear of injury but
     would have simply been the subject of actual physical compulsion.”
     It was held:-
     “It is clear that this definition makes it necessary for the prosecution
     to prove that the victims Narain and Sheonandan were put in fear
     of injury to themselves or to others, and further, were thereby
    SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                        73
                 [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

     dishonestly induced to deliver papers containing their thumb
     impressions. The prosecution story in the present case goes no
     further than that thumb impressions were ‘forcibly taken’ from them.
     The details of the forcible taking were apparently not put in evidence.
     The trial Court speaks of the wrists of the victims being caught and
     of their thumb impressions being then ‘taken’ ……. The lower Courts
     only speak of the forcible taking of the victim’s thumb impression;
     and as this does not necessarily involve inducing the victim to deliver
     papers with his thumb impressions (papers which could no doubt be
     converted into valuable securities), I must hold that the offence of
     extortion is not established.”
        24. Thus, it is relevant to note that nowhere the first informant has
stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons. To put
it in other words, there is nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery
of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear. In the absence
of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with
a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under
Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.
       25. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by the first
informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At
this stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for
quashing of an FIR in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters
are:-
     “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
     or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
     accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
     or make out a case against the accused.
     (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
     other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
     cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
     under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
     Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
     (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
     complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
74            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
     the accused.
     (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
     offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
     is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
     contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
     (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
     and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can
     ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
     against the accused.
     (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
     provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
     proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
     proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
     the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
     the aggrieved party.
     (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
     and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
     motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
     him due to private and personal grudge.”
       In our opinion, the present case falls within the parameters Nos. 1, 5
and 7 resply referred to above.
       26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes
a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so
because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an
ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure
that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings.
The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint
     SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.                         75
                  [J. B. PARDIWALA, J. ]

are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the
averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are
disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty
to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record
of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution
need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take
into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration
of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.
Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over
a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration
of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking
vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
       27. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion
that the FIR No. 175 of 2022 dated 11.08.2022 deserves to be quashed in
so far as the appellant herein is concerned. It is so apparent that as the State
believes that the father-in-law of the appellant namely Iqbal @ Bala is a very
hardened criminal, his son-in-law i.e. the present appellant who has been
implicated in the further statement of the first informant is also a criminal.
       28. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is
hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 175 of
2022 dated 11.08.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur,
State of U.P. are hereby quashed.
       29. It is needless to clarify that the observations made in this judgment
are relevant only for the purpose of the FIR in question and the consequential
criminal proceedings. None of the observations shall have any bearing on
any of the pending criminal prosecutions or any other proceedings.

Headnotes prepared by:                                            Appeal allowed.
Nidhi Jain


Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "FIR quash"Sign in to search

For a digitally signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's own website. Only the court can issue one.