Holding

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as amended in 2006 and the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, are constitutionally valid and cannot be struck down.

Summary

The Supreme Court heard a batch of writ petitions challenging Sections 2(k), 2(1), 15, 16, 17, 19 and 21 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, on the ground that the age limit of 18 years for juveniles was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, especially in the wake of the 2012 Delhi gang‑rape involving a 17‑year‑old. The petitioners argued for a reduction of the age of criminal responsibility to 16 years and for the Act to be brought in line with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules. The Court examined the legislative intent, international conventions, scientific data on brain development, and crime statistics showing that juveniles account for only about 2% of offences. It held that the Act, as amended in 2006 and the 2007 Rules, are based on sound international and constitutional principles and represent the collective wisdom of Parliament. The Court found no sufficient data to justify altering the age limit and emphasized the rehabilitative, not retributive, purpose of the legislation. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, leaving the Juvenile Justice framework intact.

Issues considered

The constitutional validity of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 15, 16, 17, 19 and 21 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
Whether the age limit of 18 years for juveniles violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
Whether the Act should be amended to reduce the age of criminal responsibility to 16 years
Whether the Act conforms to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Beijing Rules
Whether the amendment to Section 15(1)(g) post‑2006 correctly addresses sentencing of juveniles who attain majority

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 82, s. 83
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 19, s. 2(1), s. 21, s. 2(k)
Pre-conception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Subjects

Juvenile Justice Actage of criminal responsibilityconstitutional validityrehabilitationUN Convention on the Rights of the ChildBeijing RulesArticle 14Article 21heinous offencessentencing of juveniles

Judgment

[2013) 13 S.C.R. 1020

A SAUL BALI
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(Writ Petition (C) No. 10 OF 2013)
JULY 17, 2013
B
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI, SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR
AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

Juvenile Justice (Protection and Care of Children) Act,
C 2000 - s. 2(k) and (/) and s. 15 - Provisions under - Need
to strike down - In view of the fact that criminal offences
committed by persons within range of 16 to 18 years are on
rise - Held: The Act as amended in 2006, and the Rules
framed thereunder are based on sound principles
D recognized internationally and contained in the provisions "' ~
of the Constitution - As per the reports of the Crimes Record
Bureau, the number of crimes committed by juveniles comes
to only about 2% of the country's crime rate - In the recent
years there has been spurt in criminal activities by adults
E and not by juveniles - In absence of proper data, it would
not be wise to deviate from the provisions of the Act, which
represent collective wisdom of Parliament - Juvenile Justiee
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. "'- ....
Present petitions were filed seeking re-
F consideration of s. 2(k), 2(1) and 15 of Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, in the light
of spurt in criminal offences being committed by
persons within the range of 16 to 18 years, such as the
gang rape inside a moving vehicle on 16 December, ,,. '
G 2012, wherein alongwith others, a juvenile, who had
attained the age of 17% years was being tried separately
under the provisions of 2000 Act. The petitioners prayed
for striking down the provisions of s. 2(k) and 2(1) of
the Act; and to bring the Act in conformity with the
H provisions of the Constit~1dmD and to direct the Central
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1021

Government to make changes in the Act, to bring it in A
line with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for administration of Juvenile Justice.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. There is a definite thought process, which
B
went into the enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the Rules
subsequently framed thereunder in 2007. It cannot be
questioned that children are amongst the most
vulnerable sections in any society. They represent
almost one-third of the world's population, and unless C
they are provided with proper opportunities, the
opportunity of making them grow into responsible
citizens of tomorrow will slip out of the hands of the
present generation. [Paras 40 and 41] [1045-G, H; 1046-
A-B] D
2. India developed its own jurisprudence relating to
children and the recognition of their rights. With the
adoption of the Constitution on 26th November 1949,
constitutional safeguards, as far as weaker sections of E
the society, including children, were provided for. The
Constitution has guaranteed several rights to children,
f such as equality before the_ law, free and compulsory
•• )>
primary education to children between the age group
of six to fourteen years, prohibition of trafficking and
forced labour of children and prohibition of employment F
of children below the age of fourteen years in factories,
mines or hazardous occupations. The Constitution
enables the State Governments to make special
provisions for children. To prevent female foeticide, the.
Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques G
(Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act was enacted in 1994.
One of the latest enactments by Parliament is the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
[Para 43] [1047-D-G]
H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 3. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, is in tune with the provisions of the
Constitution and the various Declarations and
Conventions adopted by the world community
represented by the United Nations. The basis of fixing
8 of the age till when a person could be treated as a child
at eighteen years in the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was Article 1 of the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The description
in Article 1 of th~ Convention was a contradiction in
C terms. While generally treating eighteen to be the age
till which a person could be treated to be a child, it also
indicates that the same was variable where national laws
recognize the age of majority earlier. In this regard, one
of the other considerations which weighed with the
legislation in fixing the age of understanding at eighteen \

D years is on account of the scientific data that indicates
that the brain continues to develop and the growth of a
child continues till he reaches at least the age of
eighteen years and that it is at that point of time·,~hat he
can be held fully responsible for his actions. Along with
·E physical growth, mental growth is equally important, In
assessing the maturity of a person below the age of
eighteen years. [Para 44) [1047-H; 1048-A-E]
4. There is little doubt that the incident of gang rape,
F which occurred on the night of 16th December, 2012,
was not only gruesome, but almost maniacal in Its
content, wherein one juvenile, whose role is yet to be
established, was involved, but such an ·incident, in
comparison to the vast number of crimes occurring in
G India, makes it an aberration rather than the Rule. If what
has come out from the reports of the Crimes Record
Bureau, is true, th.en the number of crimes committed
by juveniles comes to about 2% of the country's crime
rate.[Para 39) [1045-D-F]
H t
I

,-
SALIL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1023

5. In any event, in the absence of any proper data, A
it would not be wise to deviate from the provisions of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, which represent the collective wisdom of·
Parliament. It may not be out of place to mention that in
lthe Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, male children above the B
age of sixteen years were considered to be adults,
whereas girl children were treated as adults on attaining
the age of eighteen years. In the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, a conscious
decision was taken by P.arliament to raise the age of c
I male juveniles/children to eighteen years.[Para 45] [1048-
\
F-H]

6. In recent years, there has been a spurt in criminal
activities by adults, but not so by juveniles, as the
materials produced before the Court show. The age limit D
which was raised from sixteen to eighteen years in the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, is a decision which was taken by the Government,
which is strongly in favour of retaining Sections 2(k) and
2(1) in the manner ln which it exists in the Statute Book. E
[Para 46] [1049-A-B]

7. The general understanding of a sentence that can
be awarded to a juvenile under Section 15(1 )(g) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, F
2000, prior to its amendment in 2006, is that after
, attaining the age of eighteen years, a juvenile who is
found guilty of a heinous offence is allowed tq go free.
It was generally perceived that a juvenile was free to
go, even if he had committed a heinous crime, when he G
ceased to be a juvenile. The said under- standing
needs to be clarified on account of the amendment
which came into force with effect from 22.8.2006. The
aforesaid amendment now makes it clear that even if a:
juvenile attains the age of eighteen years within a period
;of .one vear. he would still have to underao a sentence H
. ·~

1024 su·PREME COURT REPnRTS (2013) 13 S.C.R.

A of three years, which could spill beyond the period of
one year when he attained majority. [Para 47] [1049-C-,
D, H; 1050-A-D]-

8. There is yet another consideration which appears
B to have weighed with the worldwide community,
including India, to retain eighteen as the upper limit to
which persons could be treated as children. In the Bill
brought in Parliament for enactment of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2000, it
C has been indicated ·that the same was being introduced
to provide for the care, protection, treatment,
development and rehabilitation of neglected or
delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication of certain
matters relating to and disposition of delinquent
juveniles. The essence of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
D Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the Rules framed
thereunder in 2007, is restorative and not retributive,
providing for rehabilitation and re-integration of children
in conflict with law into mainstream society. The age of \
eighteen has been fixed on account of the .
E understanding of experts in child psychology and
behavioural patterns that till such an age the children
in conflict with law could still be redeemed and restored
to mainstream society, instead of becoming hardened
criminals in future. There are, of course, exceptions
F where a child in the age group of sixteen to eighteen
may have developed criminal propensities, which would
make it virtually impossible for him/her to be re-
integrated into mainstream society, but such examples
are not of such propemions as to warrant any change
G in thinking, since it is probably better to try and re-
integrate children with criminal propensities into
mainstream society, rather than to allow them to develop
into hardened criminals, which does not augur well for
the future. [Para 48f [1050-E-H; 1051-A-B]
H
SALIL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA

9. This being the understanding of the Government A
behind the enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the amendments
effected thereto in 2006, together with the Rules framed
thereunder in 2007, and the data available with regard
to the commission of heinous offences by children, B
within the meaning of Sections 2(k) and 2(1) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, no interference is necessary with the' provisions·
of the Statute till such time as sufficient data is available
to warrant any change in the provisions of the aforesaid c
Act and the Rules. On the other hand, the
implementation of the various enactments relating to
children, would possibly yield better results. [Para 49]
[1051-C-E]

10. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of D
Children) Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, and the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules,
2007, are based on sound principles recognized
internationally and contained in the provisions of the
Indian Constitution. [Para 38] [1045-C-D] E

Avishek Goenka vs. Union of India (2012) 5''SCC 321:
2012 (4) SCR 35; Abuzar Hossain vs. State of West Bengal
(2012) 10 SCC 489: 2012 (9) SCR 244; BALCO Employees
Union vs. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333: 2001 (5) Suppl. F
SCR 511; State of Tamil Nadu vs. K. Shyam Sunder (2011)
8 SCC 737: 2011 (11) SCR 1094 - referred to.

Case Law Reference:
2012 (4) SCR 35 referred to Para 19 G
2012 (9) SCR 244 referred to Para 19
2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 511 referred t_o Para 28
2011 (11) SCR 1094 referred to Para 29
H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORrs [20'f3J 13 S.G.R.

A CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
10 of 2013;

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

WITH
B
W.P. (C.) Nos. 14, 42, 85, 90, 182, of 2013,
W.P. (Crl.) No. 6 of 2013, T.C. (C) No. 82 of 2013
Sidharth Luthra, ASG, V.C. Mahajan, Sukumar, Depak
c Goel, Vijay K. Jain, R.K. Kapoor, Rajat Kapoor, Shweta
Kapur, Parikshit Mahipal, Shiwani Mahipal, Anis Ahmed Khan,
P.O. Sharma, Shiva Pujan Singh, Mohinder Jit Singh, Vivek
Narayan Sharma, Ajay Singh, Ashish Azad, R.P. Wadhwani
(Intervenor-in-person ), Anant Kumar, Asthana, lmran Ali,
0 Amod Kr Kanth, A.K. Singh, Y.P. Mahajan, R.Nedumaran,
V.P.Mahajan Sunita Sharma, G.S. Bedi, Charul Sarin, Supriya
Juneja , Sushma -Suri, D.S. Mahra, for the appearing parties
Salil Bali, Petitioner-In-Person, Kamal Kumar Pandey in
Person.
E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. Seven Writ Petitions and one
Transferred Case· have been. taken up together for
consideration in view of the commonality of the grounds and
F reliefs prayed for therein. While in Writ Petition (C) No. 14 of
2013, Saurabh Prakash Vs. Union of India, and Writ Petition
(C) No. 90 of 2013, Vinay K. Sharma Vs. Union of India, a
common prayer has been made for declaration of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as ultra
vires the Constitution, in Writ Petition (C) No. 10 of 2013,
G Salil Bali Vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 85 of 2013,
Krishna Deo Prasad Vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No.
42 of 2013, Kamal Kumar Pandey & Sukumar Vs. Union of
India and Writ Petition (C) No. 182 of 2013, Hema Sahu Vs.
Union of India, a common prayer has inter alia been made to
H strike down the provisions of Section 2(k) and (I) of the above
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1027
{ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

- Act, along with a prayer to bring the said Act in conformity A
with the provisions of the Constitution and to direct the
Respondent -No. 1 to take steps to make changes· in the
Juvenile Ju~tice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,
to bring it in line with the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for administration of juvenile justice. In addition to the B
above, in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 6 of 2013, Shi!pa Arora
Sharma Vs. Union of India, a prayer has inter alia been made
to· appoint a panel of criminal psychologists to determine
through clinical methods whether the juvenile is involved in
the Delhi·gang rape on 16.12.2012. Yet, another relief which c
has been prayed for in ·common ·during the oral .submissions
made on behalf of the Petitioners was that in offences like
rape a'nd murder, juveniles should be tried under the normal
law and not under the aforesaid Act and protection granted
to·persons up to the age of 18 years under the aforesaid Act 0
inaY, be remoyed alJd that the investigating agency should be .
permitted to keep the record of the juvenile offenders to take
preventive measures to enable them to detect repeat
offenders and to bring them to justice. Furthermore, prayers
have also been made in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 6 of 2013
and ·writ. Petition '(C) No.
. 85 of 2013, which are' .
personal to E
the juvenile accus~d in the Delhi gang rape case of
16.12.2612, not' ~o release him and to keep him in custody
or any place. of strict qetention, after he was found to be a
mentaliy abnormal. psychic 'person and that proper and
de.tailed investigation be conducted by the CBI to ascertain F
his qorrect age by examining his school documents and-other
records and to further declare that prohibition in Section 21
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, be declaJed unconstitutional.
G

• 2. Ip most of the matters, the Writ Petitioners appeared
in-person, in support of their in.dividual cases.

3'. Writ Petition (C) No.1 O of 2013, filed by Shri Salil Bali,
was taken up as the first matter in the bunch. The Petitioner H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A appearing in-person urged that it was necessary for the
provisions of Section 2(k), 2(1) and 15 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children~ Act, 2000, to be
reconsidered in the light of the spurt in criminal offences being
committed by persons within the range of 16 to 18 years,
B such as the gang rape of a young woman inside a moving
vehicle on 16th December, 2012, wherein along with others,
a juvenile, who had attained the age of 17% years, was being
tried separately under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice /
1' ....
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
c 4. Mr. Bali submitted that the age of responsibility, as
accepted in India, is differene from what has been accepted
by other countries of the world. But, Mr. Bali also pointed out
that even in the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in India, the
age of responsibility of understanding the consequences of
D one's actions had been recognized as 12 years in the Indian·
Penal Code. Referring to Sectipn &2 of the Code, Mr. Bali
pointed out that the same pr~vides that nothing i!:l an offence
which is done by a child under seven years of age. Mr. Bali
also referred to Section. 83 of the Code, which provides that
E nothing is an offence which is done by a child aoove seven
years of age ·and un,der twelve, who has not attained ~ufficient
maturity of understanding to judge the nature ana
consequences of his conduct on a 'Particular occasion. Mr.
Bali, therefore, urged that even under· the Indian Cfiminal
F Jurisprudence the age of understanding has been fixed at
twelve years, which according to him, was comrnensu(ate with
the thinking of other countries, s1Jch as the United States of
America, Great Britain anq Canada.

5. In regard to Canada, Mr. Bali referred to the· Youth .,..
G Criminal Justice Act, 2003, as amended from time to time,
where the age of criminal responsibility has been fixed at
twelve years. Referring to Sectio.n 13 of the Criminal Code
of Canada, Mr, Bali submitted that the same is in pari materia
with the provisions of Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code.
H
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1029
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
.,_. In fact,· according to the Criminal Justice Delivery System in A
Canada,-~ youth between the age of 14 to 17 years may be
tried and sentenced as an adult in certain situations. Mr. Bali
also pointed out that .even in Canada the Youth Criminal
Justice Act governs the application of criminal and correctional
law to thOSE;l who are twelve years old 9r older, but younger B
than 1a· at the time of committing the offence, and that,
although, trials were to take place in a Youth Court, for certain
offences and in certain circumstances, a youth may be
aw.arded arr adult sentence.

6. Comparing the position in USA and the Juvenile C
JuStice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 1974, he urged that
while in several States, no set standards have been provided,
reliance is placed on the common law age of seven in fixing
the age of crimin.al responsibility, the lowest being six years
in -Nof'!:h Carolina. The general practice in the United States D
of America, however, is that even for such children, the courts
are entltled to impose life sentences in respect of· certain
types of offences, but such life sentences without parole were
ri'of· permitted for those under the age of eighteen years
convicted of murder or offences· involving violent crime~ and E
weapo!'ls violations.

7. In England and Wales, children accused of crimes are
geneFally tried under th~ Children and Young Persons Act,
1933, as amended by Section 16(1) of the Children and Young F
Persons Act, 1963. Under the' said laws, the minimum age
of criminal respo11sibility in England and Wales is ten years
and those below the said age are considered to be doli
incapax and, thus, incapable of having any mens rea, which
is similar to the provisions of Sections 82 and 83 of Indian G
Penal Code. ·

· 8. Mr. Bali has also referred to the legal circumstances
prevailing in other part$ of the world wherein the age of
criminal responsibility has been fixed between ten to sixteen
years. M[.( Bali contended that t~ere was a general worldwide H
.····)~.~·· \·~·w; ... ---~ .. r.-:"'•.--C--•

1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 s.c.R:

A concern over the rising graph of criminal activity of juvenil~s.
below the age of eighteen years, which has been accepted
wom.iwide to be the age limit under which all persons were
to be treated as children. Mr. Bali sought to make a distinction
. in regard to the definition of children as such in Sections 2(k)~
B and 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, and the level of maturity of the ch.ild who
is capable of understanding the consequences>of his actions. ·
He, accordingly, urged that the provisions of Sections 15 and
16 of Jhe Act needed to be reconsidered and appropriate
c orders were required to be passed in regard to the level of
punishment in respect of heinous offe.nces committed by
children below the age of eighteen years, such as· ri1urd~r.
rape, dacoity, etc. Mr. Bali submitted that allowing perpetra~ors
of such crimes to get off with a sentence of three years at
the maximum, was not justified and a correctional course was
0
required to be undertaken in that regard.

·9. Mr. Saurabh Prakash, Petitioner in \Nrit Petition (C}
No. 14 of 2013, also appeared in-person and, while endorsing
the submissions made by Mr. Bali, went a step further in
E suggesting that in view of the provisions of Sections 15 and
16 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and_ Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, children, as defined in the above Act,. were not
only taking advantage of the same, but were also being used
by Criminals for their own ends. The Petition~r reiterated Mr.
F Bali's submission that after being awarded ·a maximum
sentence of three years, a juvenile ·convicted of heinous
offences, was almost likely to become a monster in society
and pose a great danger to others, in view of his criminal
propensities. Although, _in the prayers to the Writ Petition; one
G of the reliefs prayed for was for quashing the provisio{.ls $f
the entire Act, Mr. Saurabh Prakash ultimately urged that
some of the provisions thereof were such as could be
segregated and struck down so as to preser\te the Act as a
whole. The Petitioner urged that, under Article· 21 of the·
H. Constitution, every citizen has .a fundamental right t!) live i~.
SALll 'SAU v. UNION"c:fF INDIA
. [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

dignity a~<l peace, without being subjected to violence· by f1.
9ther members of society_ and th~t by shielding juvenil~s, wt:ip
were fully capable of understanding the consequence_s oftheir
actions, from the sentences, as could be awarded under the
Indian Penal Code, as far as adults are concerned,: the $tate
was creatin·g a class of citizens who were not only prone to · e
criminal activity, but in whose cases restoration or ·.
rehabilitation was r.iot possible. Mr. Saurabh. Prakash
' '( submitted that the. provisions of Sections .15 a.nd 16 of the .
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, .·
a
violated the· rights guaranteed to citizenunder Arti~ 21 of c
the Constitution and were, therefore, liable to be str~ck down,

10. Mr. Saurabh Prakash' also submitted. that 'the
provisions of Section 19 of the Act, which pfovided for
removal of disqualification attaching· to conviction, were:also.
illogical and were liable.to be ~truck down. If was,. submitted D
that in order to prevent repeated offences by an individual,Jt
was ·necessary to .maintain the records, ofttie inquiry.
1

conducted by the ·Juvenile Justice Board: in.·relation to
juveniles so that, such records would enable the;;.'alithorities
concerned. to assess the criminal propensity ofan individual, E
which would call for' a different approach to. be taken atcthe
time of inquiry.' Mr. Sa.urabh Prakash urged this c'ourt· to :giVe
a -direction·· to the effect that the Juvenile Justice Board or
co·u·rt,s or. other high public authorities would have the ,
discretion to direct that in a particular case, the provisions of F'
the general taw would apply to a juvenile and not those. of.the
Act. . . . ·· . .

11. · Mr. Vivek Narayan· Sharma, learned Advocate,.
appeared for the petitioner. in Writ Petition ·(Crt) No. 6 -of G
2013, filed by one Shilpa Arora Sharma, and ·submitted that
the Juvenile Justice Board should be vested with the discretion
to impose punishment beyond three years,· as limited by
Section 15 of the JuvenHe Justice (Car~ and~Protectionof
Children) Act, 2000,. in c~ses wner~·ji 'chJI~~ ihavi~Q.Juu H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A knowledge of t~e consequences of his/her actions, commits
a heinous offence punishable either with life imprisonment or
death. Mr. Sharma submitted that such a child did not deserve
to be treated as a child and be allowed to re-mingle in sociefy,
particularly when the identity'. of the child is to be kept a secret
B unaer Sections 19 and 21 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Mr. Sharma submitted that
in many .cases children between the ages of sixteen to
eighteen years were, in fact, being exploited by adults to
commit heinous offences who knew full well that the
c punishment therefor would not exceed three years.

12. Mr: Sharma urged that without disturbing (he other
beneficient provisions of the Juvenile Justice {Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, some of the gray areas
pointed out could be addressed in such" a manner as would
D make the Juvenile Justice· (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, more effective and prevent the misuse thereof.

1·3. In Writ Petition (C) No. 85 of 2013, filed by Krishna
Deo Prasad, Dr. R.R. Kishor appeared for the Petitioner and
a
E gave detailed account of the manner in which the Juvenile
Justice Delivery System had evolved. Referring to the doctrine
of doli ir:icapax, rebuttable presumption and adult
responsibility, Dr; Kishor contended that even Article 1 of the "· /
UN C()nvention on the Rights of the Child defines a child in
F the followi11g t~rms:

"Ar:ti9le . i

For the purposes of the present Conventi()n, a child
means every human being below the age of eighteen
years '1n1ess unqer the law applicable to the child,
majority ·is attained earlier."

14. Dr. Kishor contended that, as pointed out by Mr.. Salil
Bali, the expression "child" has been defined in various ways
H i.n different countries all over the world. Accordingly, the
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1033
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
....;; ..,._ definition of a child in Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice A
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, would depend
on the existing laws in India defining a child. Dr. Kishor
referred to the provisions of the Child Labour (Prohibition and
Regulation) Act, f986, as an example, to indicate that children
up to the age of fourteen years were treated differently from B
children between the ages of fourteen to eigl'lteen, for the
purposes of employment in hazardous industries. Dr. Kishor
re-asserted the submissions made by Mr. Bali and Mr.
,. '( Saurabh Prakash, in regard to heinous crimes committed by
children below the age of eighteen years, who were capable c
of understanding the consequences of their acts.

15. Dr. Kishor also referred to the provisions of Sections
82 and 83 of the Indian Penal Code, where the age of
responsibility and comprehensiofr has been fixed at twelve
years a·nd below. Learned counsel submitted that having 0
• regard to the above-mentioned provisions, it would have to
be seriously considered as to whether the definition of a child
in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, required reconsideration. He urged that because a
person under the age of 18 years was considered to be a E
child, despite his or her propensity to commit criminal
offences, which are of a heinous and even gruesome nature,
such as offences punisbable under Sections 376, 307, 302,
' ,-" 392, 396, 397 and 398 IPC, the said provisions have been
1

mi sused and exploited by criminals and people having their F
own scores to settle. Dr. Kishor urged that the definition of a
"juvenile" or a "child" or a. "juvenile in conflict with law"; in
Sections 2(k) and 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was liable to be struck down
.., and replaced with a more meaningful definition, which would
""'!' G
exclude such juveniles.

16. Mr; Vikram Mahajan, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the Petitioner, Vinay K. Sharma, in Writ Petition
(C) No. 90 of 2013, urged that the right given to a citizen of
H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R. ,..

A India under Article 21 of the Constitution is impinged upon ·-;-;;....
by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000. Mr. Mahajan urged that the Juvenile Justice (Care and r-
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, operates in violation of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and that Article 13(2),
B which relates to post Constitution laws, prohibits the State
from making a law which either takes away totally or
abrogates in part a fundamental right. Referring to the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against

c
Women, adopted by the General Assembly on 20th
December, 1993, Mr. Mahajan pointed out that Article 1 of " •
the Convention describes "violence against women" to mean
any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely
to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering
to women. Referring to the alleged gang rape of a 23 year
old para-medical student, in a moving bus, in Delhi, on 16th
D
December, 2012, Mr. Mahajan tried to indicate that crimes
committed by juveniles had reached large and serious "
proportions and that there was a need to amend the law to
ensure that such persons were not given the benefit of lenient
punishment, as contemplated under Section 15 of the Juvenile
E Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. From
the figures cited by him, he urged that even going by statistics,
1% of the total number of crimes committed in the country
would amount to a large number and the remedy to such a
.~ !
problem would lie in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958,
F which made the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, redundant and ultra vires
Article 21 of the Constitution.
17. Ms. Shweta Kapoor appeared in Transferred Case
G No. 82 of 2013 in-person and questioned the vires of Sections
r
.....
16(1), 19(1), 49(2) and 52(2)(a) of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and submitted that they
were liable to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution.
Referring to Section 16 of the aforesaid Act, Ms. Kapoor
submitted that even in the proviso to Sub-section (1) of
H
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1035
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI:]

~ Section 16, Parliament had recogniz~d the distinction A
between a juvenile, who had attained the age of sixteen years,
but had committed an offence which was so serious irr nature
that it would not be in his interest or in the interesf'of .other
juveniles in a special home, to send him to such special home.
Considering that none of the other measures provided under B
the Act was suitable or sufficient, the Government· had
empowered the Board to _pass an order for the juvenile to be
.,. kept in such place of safety and in such manner as it thought
fit. Ms. Kapoor submitted that no objection· could be taken to
the said provision except for the fact that in the proviso to c
Section 16(2), it has been add~d that the period of detention
order would not exceed, in any case, the maximum limit of
punishment, as provided under Section 15, which is three
years.

18. Ms. Kapoor contended that while the provisions of D
' ;.
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, are generally meant for the benefit of the juvenile
· offenders, a serious attempt would have to be made to grade
the nature of offences to suit the reformation contemplated
by the Act. E

19. As part of her submissions, Ms. Kapoor referred to
the decision of this Court in Avishek Goenka Vs. Union of
... .
;+ India [(2012) 5 SCC 321], wherein the pasting of black films
on glass panes were banned by this Court on account of the F
fact that partially opaque glass panes on vehicles acted as
facilitators of crime. Ms. Kapoor urged that in the opening
paragraph of the judgment, it ha'S been observed that
"Alarming rise in heinous crimes like kidnapping, sexual
- ~
assault on w.omen and dacoity have impinged upon the right
G
to life and. the right to live in a safe environment which are
within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution of India".
Ms. Kapoor also referred to another decision of this Court in
Abuzar Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal [(2012) 10 SCC
489], which dealt with a different question regarding the
H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A provisions of Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and ~
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the right of an accused
to raise the claim of juvenility at any stage of the proceedings
and even after the f"rnal disposal of the case.

20. In conclusion, Ms. Kapoor reiterated her stand that
8
in certain cases the definition of a juvenile in Sections 2(k)
and 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, would have to be considered differently.

21. The next matter which engaged our attention is Writ
C Petition (Civil) No.90 _of 2013 filed by one Vinay Kumar
Sharma, praying for a declaration that the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 200(); be declared ultra
vires the Constitution and that children should also be tried
along with adults under the penal laws applicable to adults.
D
22. Writ Petition (Civil) No.42 of 2013 has been filed by
Kamal Kumar Pandey and Sukumar, Advocates, inter alia,
for an appropriate writ or direction declaring the provisions
of Sections 2(1 ), 10 and 17 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
E and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, to be irrational,
arbitrary, without reasonable nexus and thereby ultra vires and
unconstitutional, and for a Writ of Mandamus commanding
the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Law and
Justice, Government of India, to take steps that the aforesaid
Act operates in conformity with the Constitution. In addition,
F a prayer was made to declare the provisions of Sections 15
and 19 of the above Act ultra vires the Constitution.

23. The main thrust of the argument advanced by Mr.
Pandey, who appeared in person, was the inter-play between
G International Conventions and Rules, such as the Beijing Rules,
1985, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989,
and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000. While admitting the salubirous and benevolent and
progressive character of the legislation in dealing with children
H in need of care and protection and with children in conflict
4' SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1037
[ALTAMAS KABIR,. CJI.]
with law, Mr. Pandey contended that a distinction was required A
to be made in respect of children with a propensity to commit
heinous crimes which were a threat to a peaeeful social order.
\ Mr. 'Pandey reiterated the submissions made earlier that it
was unconstitutional to place all juveniles, irrespective of the
. gravity of .the offences, in one bracket. Urging that Section B
'2(1) of the Juvenile Justice {Care and Protection of Children)
·Act,··2000, ought not to have placed all children in conflict
.with la~·witi)inth.e same bracket, Mr. Pandey submitted that
_f y th~ ~arne iS ultravires Article 21 of the Constitution. Referring
to the report of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) c
'for the years 2001 _to 2011, Mr. Pandey submitted that
betWeen · 200.1 · ancf'2011, tlie involvement of juveniles in
cognizable crimes was onthe rise. Mr. Pandey urged that it
was a well-established medical~psychological fact that the level
of understanding of a. 16 year~old·was ~fpar with that· of 0
adults. · . ··

24. Mr. Pandey's next volley was directed towards
Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
-· Children) Act, 2000, Whi9h provides· for the removal of any
disqualification attached to an offence of any nature. Mr. E
Pandey submitted th~t the 1'said provisions do not take into
account the fact relafing ·to repeated offences ·being
perpetrated by a juveni.le whose records of previous offences
> ,+ are removed. Mr. Pandey co,nte.nded that Section 19 of the
'' Act' was required to be amended to enable the concerned F
authorities to retain records pf previous offences committed
by a juvenile for the purposes of identification of a juvenile
)
~ with a propensity to repeatedly commit offences of a grievous
or heinous nature.
" G
--":"
25. Mr. Pandey submitted that Parliament had exceeded'
its mandate by blindly adopting eighteen as the upper limit in
categorising a juvenile or a child, in accordance wit'1· the
.Beijing Rules, 1985, and the U.N. Convention, 1989, without
faking into account the socio-cultural economic conditi.ons and
H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R. ~

A the legal system for administration of criminal justice in India. -;-- ,
..
Mr. Pandey urged that the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was required to operate in
conformity with the provisions of the Constitution of India.

26. Ms. Hema Sahu, the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) >·
B
No. 182 of 2013, also appeared in person and restated the
....
·views expressed by the other petitioners that the United ....
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of t
Juvenile Justice, commonly known as the "Beijing Rules", /

'y ..l
recognized and noted the difference in the nature of offences
c committed by juveniles in conflict with law. Referring to the .,
decision of this Court in the case commonly known as the
"Bombay Blasts Case", Ms. Sahu submitted that a juvenile
who was tried and convicted along with adults under the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), was denied
D the protection of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, on account of the serious nature of the " "'
offence. Ms. Sahu ended on the note that paragraph 4 of the
1989 Convention did not make any reference to age.
•
E 27. Appearing. for the Union of India, the Additional
Solicitor General, Mr. Siddharth Luthra, strongly opposed the »-
submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners to either
declare the entire Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Childten) Act, 2000, as ultra vires the Constitution or parts ,, ..
F thereof, such as Sections 2(k), 2(1), 15, 16, 17, 19 and 21.
After referring to the aforesaid provisions of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the
learned ASG submitted that Parliament consciously fixed ~

eighteen years as the upper age limit for treating persons as •
juveniles and children, taking into consideration the general
G r
trend of legislation, not only internationally, but within the
country as well.

28. The learned ASG submitted that the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was enacted
H
- ~
~·
SAUL BALI v, UNION OF INDIA
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
1039

after years of deliberation and in conformity with inte·rnational A
standards as laid down in the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child, 1989, the Beijing Rules, 1985, the Havana Rules
and other international instruments for securing the best
interests of the child with the primary object of social
reintegration of child victims and children in conflict with law, B
without resorting to conventional judicial proceedings which
existed for adult criminals. In the course of his submissions,
the learned ASG submitted a chart of the various Indian
.
• statutes and the manner in which children have been excluded
from liability under the said Acts upto the age of 18 years. In c
most of the s~nactnients, a juvenile/child has been referred
to a person who 1~low 18 years of age. The learned ASG
submitted that in pursuance of international obligations, the
Union of ln"dia after due deliberation had taken a conscious
policy decision to fix the·age of a child/juvenile at the upper D
.... > limit of 18 years. The learned ASG urged that the fixing of
the age when a ct:iild ceases to be a child at 18 years is a
matter of policy which could not be questioned in a court of
law, unless the same could be shown to have violated any of
the funtjamen.tal rights, ahd in particular Articles 14 and 21 of.
E
the Constitution. Referring to the decision of this Court in
BALCO Employees Union Vs. Union of India [(2002) 2 SCC
·333], the le.~rned ASG submitted that at paragraph 46 of the
• ..t· said· judgm.ent it had been observed that it is .neither within
the domain of the Courts nor the scope of judicial review to
embark upon an enquiry as to whethe~ a particular public F
policy was wise or whether something better could be evolved.
It was further observed t~at the Courts were reluctant to strike
down a policy at th~ behest of a Petitioner merely because it
has been urged that a differentpolicy would have been fairer
~
or wiser or more scientific or more logical. The learned ASG G
further. urged that Article 15(3) of the Constitution empowers
the State to enact special provisions for women and children,
which reveals that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000, was in conformity with the provisions
of the Constitution. H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 29. The learned ASG submitted that in various judgments,
this Court and the High Courts had recognised the fact that
juveniles were required to be treated differently from adults
so as to give such children, who for some reason had gone
astray, an opportunity to realize their mistakes and to
B rehabilitate themselves and rebuild their lives. Special mention
was made with regard to the decision of this Court in Abuzar
Hossain (supra) in this regard. The learned ASG also referred
to the decision of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. K.
Shyam Sunder ((2011) 8 SCC 737], wherein it had been
c observed that merely because the law causes hardships or
sometimes results in adverse consequences, it cannot be held
to be ultra vires the Constitution, nor can it be struck down.
The learned ASG also submitted that it was now well-settled
that reasonable classification is permissible so long as such
classification has a rational nexus with the object sought to
0
be achieved. This Court has always held that the; presumption
is always in favour of the constitutionality of arr enactment,
since it has to be assumed that the legislature understands
and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and
E its discriminations .are based on adequate grounds,

30. Referring to the Reports· of the National Crime
Reports Bureau, learned ASG pointed out that the percentage
of increase in the number of offences committed by juveniles
was almost negligible and the general public perception in
F such matters was entirely erroneous. In fact, the learned ASG
pointed out that even the Committee appointed to review the
amendments to the criminal law, headed by former CJI, J.S.
Verma, in its report submitted on 23rd January, 2013, did
not recommend the reduction in the age of juveniles in conflict
G with law and has maintained it at 18 years. The learned ASG
pointed out that the issue of reduction in the age of juveniles
from 18 to 16 years, as it was in the Juveniles Justice Act of
1986, was also raised in the Lok Sabha on 19th March, 2013,
during the discussion on the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill,
H 2013, but was rejected by the House.
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1041
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
31. The learned ASG submitted that the occurrence of A
16th December, 2012; involving the alleged gang rape of a
23 year old girl, should not be allowed to colour the decision .
taken to treat all persons below the age of 18 years, as
children.
B
32. Mr. Anant Asthana, learned Advocate appearing for
HAQ : Centre for Child Rights, submitted that the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as
amended in 2006 and 2011, is a fairly progressive legislation,
largely compliant with the Constitution of India and the
minimum standards contained in the Beijing Rules. Mr. C
Asthana contended that the reason for incidents such as the
16~h December, 2012, incident, was not on account of the
provisions of the aforesaid Act, but on account of failure of
the administration in implementing its provisions. Learned
counsel submitted that all the Writ Petitions appeared to be D
based on two assumptions; namely, (i) that the age of 18
years for juveniles is set C!rbitrarily; and (ii) that by reducing
the age for the purpose of defining a child in the aforesaid
Act, criminality amongst children would reduce. Mr. Asthana
subJ'!litte.d that such an approach was flawed as it had been E
incorrectly submitted that the age of 18 years to treat persons
as children was set arbitrarily and that it is so difficult to
comprehend the causes and the environment which brings
children into delinquency. Mr. Asthana submitted that the
answer' lies in effective and sincere implementation of the F
different laws aimed at improving the conditions of children
in need ef care and protection and prqv,iding such protection
to children at risk. Mr. Asthana urged that the objective with
which the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, was enacted was not aimed at delivering retributive G
justice, but to allow a rehabilitative, reformation-oriented
approach in addressing juvenile crimes. Learned counsel
submitted' tha} the apathy of the administration towards
juveniles and the 111anner in which they are treated would be ,
evident from the facfthat by falsifying the age of juveniles, · H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.G.R.

A they were treated as adults and sent to jails, instead of bein~
produced before the Juvenile Justice Board or even before
the Child Welfare Committees to be dealt with in a ·manner
provided by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, for the treatment of juveniles.
B
33. Mr. Asthana submitted that even as recently as 26th
April, 2013, the Government of India has adopted a new
National Policy for Children, which not only recognises that a
child is any person below the age of eighteen years, but also
states that the policy was to guide and inform people· of laws,
C policies, plans and programmes affecting children. Mr.
Asthana urged that all actions and initiatives of the national,
State and local Governments in all sectors must respect and
uphold the principles and provisions of this policy and it would
neither be appropriate nor possible for the ~nion of India to
D adopt a different approach in the matter. Mr. Asthana, who
appears to have made an in-depth study of the matter,
submitted that on the question of making the provisions in
the ·Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, conform to the provisions of the Constitution and to
E allow the children of a specific age group to be treated as
adults, it would be appropriate to take note pf General
Comment No.10 made by the U.N. Committee on the rights
of the· child on 25th April, 2007, which specifically dealt with
the upper age limit for juveniles and it was reiterated .. that
F where it was a case of a child being' in need of care and
protection or in conflict with law, every person under the age
of 18 years at the time of commission of the alleged offence
must be treated in accordance with the Juvenile Justice Rules.
Mr. Asthana submitted that any attempt to alter the upper limit
G of the age of a child from 18 to 16 years would have
disastrous consequences and would set back the attempts
made over the years to formulate a restorative and
rehabilitative approach mainly for juveniles in conflict with law.

34. In Writ Petition (Civil) No.85 of 2013, a counter
H
1
f!/:,AL1L BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1043
. [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
~
' affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Ministry of Women A
and Child Development, Government of India, in which the
submissions made by the AS.G, Mr. Siddharth Luthra, were
duly reflected. In paragraph I of the said affidavit, it has been
pointed out that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, provides for a wide range of reformative B
measures .under Sections 15 and 16 for children in conflict
with law - from simple warning to 3 years of institutionalisation
in a Special Home. In exceptional cases, provision has also
been made for the juvenile to be sent to a place of safety
where intensive rehabilitation measures, such as counselling, c
psychiatric evaluation and treatment would be undertaken.

35. In Writ Petition (C) No.10 of 2013 filed by Shri Salil
Bali, an application had been niade by the Prayas Juvenile
Aid Centre (JAC), a Society whose Founder and General
Secretary, Shri Amod Kanth, was allowed to appear and D
address the Court in person. Mr. Amod Kanth claimed that
he was a former member of the Indian Police Service and
Chairperson of the Delhi Commission for the Protection of
Child Rights and was also the founder General Secretary of
the aforesaid organisation, which came into existence in 1998 E
as a special unit associated with the Missing Persons Squad
of the Crime and Railway Branch of the Delhi Police of which
> ~ Shri Amod Kanth was tile in-charge Deputy Commissioner
of Police. Mr. Amod Kanth submitted that Prayas was created
in order to identify and support the missing and found persons, F
including girls, street migrants, homeless, working and
delinquent children who did not have any support from any
· organisation in the Government or in the non-governmental
......., organisation sector.
G
36. Mr. Kanth repeated and reiterated the submissions
made by the learned ASG and Mr. Asthana and also
highlighted the problems faced by chttdren both in conflict with
law and in need of care and protection. Mr. Kanth submitted
that whatever was required to be done for the rehabilitation
H
and restoration of juveniles to a normal existence has, to a
. . \
1044 SUPREME COURF'REPORTS · [2013] 13 S.O.R.

A large· extent, been defeated since the various provisions of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 and the Rules of 2r107, were not being seriously
impiemented. Mr. Kanth urged that after the ratification by India
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
B on 11th December, 1992, serious thought was given to the.
enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children Act), 2000, which came to replace the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986. Taking a leaf out of Mr. Asthana's book,
Mr. Kanth submitted that even after thirteen years of its
c existence, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, still remained
unimplemented in major areas, which made it impossible for
the provisions of the Act to be properly coordinated. Mr. Kanth
submitted that one of the more important features of juvenile
law was to provide' a child-friendly approach in the
0
adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of
children and for their ultimate rehabilitation through various
institutions established under the Act. Submitting that the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,
E was based on the provisions of the Indian Constitution, the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989,
the Beijing Rules and the United Nalions Rules for the
ProtectionOt the Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, 1990,
Mr. Kanth urged that the same was in perfect harmony with
the provisions of the Constitution, but did not receive the
F attention it ought to have received while dealing with a section
of the citizens of India comprising 42% of the country's
population.

37. Various measures to deal with juveniles in conflict
G with law have been suggested by Mr. Kanth, which requires
serious thought and avoidance of knee-jerk reactions to
situations which could set a dangerous trend· and affect
millfons of children in need of care and protection. Mr. Kanth
submitted that any change in the law, as it now stands,
H
SALIL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1045
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.] ,;

resulting in the reduction of age to define a juvenile, will not A
only prove to be regressive, but would also adversely affect
India's image as a champion of human rights.

38. Having regard to the serious nature of the _issues
raised before us, we have given serious thought to the
B
submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and
also th.ose advanced on behalf of certain Non-Government
Organizations and have also considered the relevant extracts
from the Report of Justice J.S. Verma Committee on
"Amendments to the Criminal Law" and are convinced that
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, C
2000, as amended in 2006, and the Juvenile Justi<;:e (Care
and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, are based on sound
principles recognized internationally and contained in the
provisions of the Indian Constitution.
D
39. There is little doubt that the incident, which occurred
on !he night of 16th December, 2012, was not only gruesome,
but almost maniacal in its content, wherein one juvenile, whose
role is yet to be established, was involved, but such an
incident, in comparison to the vast number of crimes occurring E:
in India, makes it an aberration rather than the Rule. If what
has come out from the reports of the Crimes Record Bureau,
J- is true, then the number of crimes committed by juveniles
comes to about 2% of the country's crime rate.

40. The lear~ed ASG along with Mr. Asthana and Mr. F
Kanth, took us through the history of the enactment of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,
and the Rules subsequently framed thereunder in 2007. There
is a definite thought process, which went into the enactment
of the aforesaid Act. In order to appreciate the submissions G
made on behalf of the respective parties in regard to the
enactment of the aforesaid· Act and the Rules, it may be
,,' appropriate to explore the background of the laws relating to
child protection in India and in the rest of the world.
H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 41. It cannot be questioned that children are amongst
the most vulnerable sections in any society. They represent
almost one-third of the world's population, and unless they
are provided with proper opportunities, the opportunity qf
making them grow into responsible citizens of tomorrow will
B slip out of the hands of the present generation. International
community has been alive to the problem for a long time.
After the aftermath of the First World War, the League of
Nations issued the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the
Child 'in 1924. Following the gross abuse and violence of
c human rights during the Second World War, which caused
the death of millions of people, including children, the United
Nations had been formed in 1945 and on 10th December,
1948 adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. While Articles 1 and 7 of the Declaration
proclaimed that all human beings are born free and equal in
D dignity and rights and are equal before the law, Article 25 of
the Declaration specifically provides that motherhood and
childhood would be entitled· to special care and assistance.
The growing consciousness of the world community was further
evidenced by the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which
E came to be proclaimed by the United Nations on 20th
November, 1959, in the best interests of the child. This was
followed by the Beijing Rules of 1985, the Riyadh Guidelines
of 1990, which specially provided guidelines for the prevention -t.
of juvenile delinquency, and the Havana Rules of 14th
F December, 1990. The said three sets of Rules intended that
social policies should be evolved and applied io prevent
juvenile delinquency, to establish a Juvenile Justice System
for juveniles in conflict with law, to safeguard .fundamental rights
and to establish methods for social re-integration of young
G people who had suffered incarceration in prison or other
corrective institutions. One of the other principles which was
sought to be reiterated and adopted was that a juvenile should
be dealt with for an offence in a manner which is different
from an adult. The Beijing Rules indicated ·that efforts should
H be made by member countries to establish within their own
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1047
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
7 national jurisdiction, a set of laws and rules specially A
applicable to juvenile offenders. It was stated that the age of
1
criminal responsibility in legal systems that recognize the
concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles
lshould not be fixed at too low an age-level, keeping in mind
the emotional, mental and intellectual maturity of children. B

42. Four years after the adoption of the Beijing Rules,
the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of
the Child vide the Resolution of the General Assembly No.
44/25 dated 20th November, 1989, which came into)orce on
2nd September, 1990 .. India is not only a signatory to the
c
said Convention, but has" also ratified the same on 11th
December, 1992. The said Gon_vention sowed the seeds of
the enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000, by the Indian Parliament.
' D
43. India developed its own jurisprudence relating to
children and the recognition of their rights. With the adoption
of the Constitution on 26th November 1949, constitutional
safeguards, as far as weaker sections of the society, including
children, were provided for. The Constitution has guaranteed E
·several rights· to children, such as equality before the law, free
and compulsory primary education to children between the
age group of six to fourteen years, prohibition of trafficking
,# r and forced labour of children and prohibition of employment
of children below the age of fourteen years in factories, mines F
or hazardous occupations. The Constitution enables the State
Governm.ents to make special provisions for children. To
prevent female foeticide, the Pre-conception and Pre-natal
Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act was
enacted in 1994. One of the latest enactments by Parliament
G
is the Protection of Children·from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

44. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000, is in tune with the provisions of the Constitution
and the various Declarations and Conventions adopted by
H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 s.c:R.

A the world community represented by the United Nations. The
basis of fixing of the age till when a person could be treated
as a child at eighteen years in the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was Article 1 of the
Convention of the Rights of the Child, as was brought to our
s notice during the hearing. Of course, it has been submitted
by Dr. Kishor that the description in Article 1 of the Convention
was a contradiction in terms. While generally treating eighteen
to be the age till which a person could be treated to be a
child, it also indicates that the same was variab1e where
c national laws recognize the age of majority earlier. In this
regard, one of the other considerations which weighed with
the legislation in fixing the age of understanding at eighteen
years is on account of the scientific data that indicates that
the brain continues to develop and the growth of a child
continues till he reaches at least the age of eighteen years
0
and that it is at that point of time that he can be held fully
responsible for his actiOlils. Along with physical growth, mental
growth is equally important, in assessing the maturity of a
person below the age of eighteen years. In this connection,
reference may be made to the chart provided by Mr. Kanth,
E wherein the various laws relating to children generally
recognize eighteen years to be the age for reckoning a
person as a juvenile/ child including criminal offences.

45. In any event, in the absence of any proper data, it
F would not be wise on our part to deviate from the provisions
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, which represent the collective wisdom of Parliament. It
may not be out of place to mention that in the Juvenile Justice
Act, 1986, male children above the age of sixteen years were
G considered to be adults, whereas girl children were treated
as adults on attaining the age of eighteen years. In the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,
a conscious decision was taken by Parliament to raise the
age of male juveniles/children to eighteen years.
H
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1049
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.}
46. Jn recent years, there has been a spurt in criminal A
t activities by adults, but not so by juveniles, as the materials
produced before us show. The age limit which was raised
from sixteen to eighteen years in the Juvenile Justice (Care
and--Protection of Children) Act, 2000, is a decision which
was taken by the Government, which is strongly in favour of B
retaining Sections 2(k) and 2(1) in the manner in which it exists
in the Statute Book.

• 47. One misunderstanding of the law relating to the
sentencing of juveniles, needs to be corrected. The general
understanding of a sentence that can be awarded to a juvenile
c
under Section 15(1)(g) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, prior to its amendment in
2006, is that after attaining the age of eighteen years, a
juvenile who is found guilty of a heinous offence is allowed to
go free. Section 15(1)(g); as it stood before the amendment D
> came into effect from 22nd August, 2006, reads as follows:

"15(1 )(g) make an order directing the juvenile to be sent
to a special home for a period of three years:
E
(i) in case of juvenile, over seventeen years but less than
eighteen years of age, for a period of not less than two
years;
.. )' (ii) in case of any other juvenile for the period until he
ceases to be a juvenile: F
....
,
Provided that the Board may, if it is satisfied that
having regard to the nature of the offence and the
circumstances of the case, it is expedient so to do, for
reasons to be recorded, reduce the period of stay to such G
period as it thinks fit."

It was generally perceived that a juvenile was free to go,
even if he had committed a heinous crime, when he ceased
to be a juvenile.
H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A The said understanding needs to be clarified on account ~
of the amendQ'lent which came into force with effect from
22.8.2006, as a result whereof Section 15(1 )(g) now reads
as follows:

"Make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a
B
special home for a period of three years:

·Provided that the Board may if it is satisfied that
having regard to the nature of the offence and the
circumstances of the case, it is expedient so to do, for
c reasons to be recorded reduce the period of stay to such
period as it thinks fit."

The aforesaid amendment now makes it clear that even
if a juvenile attains the age of eighteen years within a period
0 of one year he would still have to undergo a sentence of three
years, which could spill beyond the period of one year when
he attained majority.

48. There is yet another consideration which appears to
have weighed with the worldwide community, including India,
E to retain eighteen as the upper limit to which persons could
be treated as children. In the Bill brought in Parliament for
enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act of 2000, it has been indicated that the same
was being introduced to provide for the care, protection,
F treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or;
delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication of certain matters
relating to and disposition of delinquent juveniles. The
essence of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of·
Children) Act, 2000, and the Rules framed thereunder in 2007, .
G is restorative and not retributive, providing for rehabilitation·
and re-integration of children in conflict with law into
mainstream society. The age of eighteen has been fixed on
account of the understanding of experts in child psychology
and behavioural patterns that till such an age the children in
H
SAUL BALI v. UNION OF INDIA 1051
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

conflict with law could still be redeemed and ;tored to A
mainstream society, instead of becoming hardened criminals
in future. There are, of course, exceptions where a child in
the age group of sixteen to eighteen may have developed
criminal propensities, which would make it virtually impossible
for him/her to be re-integrated into mainstream society, but B
such examples are not of such proportions as to warrant any
change in thinking, since it is probably better to try and re-
integrate children with criminal propensities into mainstream
society, rather than to allow them to develop into hardened
criminals, which does not augur well for the future. c
49. This being the understanding of the Government
behind the enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the amendments
effected thereto in 2'006, together with the Rules framed
thereunder in 2007, and the data available with regard to the D
commission of heinous offences by children, within the
meaning of Sections 2(k) and 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, we do not think that
any interference is necessary with the provisions of the Statute
till such time as sufficient data is available to warrant any F
change in the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules.
On the other hand, the implementation of the various
enactments relating to children, would possibly yield better
'
results.
F
50. The Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case are,
therefore, dismissed, with the aforesaid observations. There
shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Writ Petitions & Transferred Cases dismissed.
G