SANJAY DUBEYversusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 519
- Decided
- 11 May 2023
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- KRISHNA MURARI
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction for departmental action was unnecessary because the Superintendent of Police had already initiated an enquiry, and therefore the appeal is dismissed.
Summary
The appeal concerned an Inspector, Sanjay Dubey, who was found prima facie guilty of dereliction of duty for failing to ensure DNA testing in a sensitive case involving offences under the IPC, POCSO Act, SC/ST Act and IT Act. While the High Court, hearing a bail application under Section 439 CrPC, directed departmental action against the Inspector, the Supreme Court examined whether such a direction was within the High Court's jurisdiction. The Court held that the High Court possesses wide powers under Articles 226 and 227, but in this instance the superior officer had already initiated a disciplinary enquiry, rendering the Court's additional direction unnecessary. The Court clarified that the High Court may, however, use its constitutional powers to initiate separate proceedings if warranted, but it should not duplicate actions already taken by the police hierarchy. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, vacated the interim stay, and clarified that the High Court’s observations would not prejudice the ongoing departmental proceedings.
Issues considered
- Whether a High Court, while entertaining a bail application under Section 439 CrPC, can issue directions for departmental action against a police officer.
- Scope of the High Court's powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to intervene in investigation matters during bail proceedings.
- Whether the direction for departmental enquiry is ultra vires when the superior officer has already initiated disciplinary action.
- Applicability of precedents (Sangitaben Datanta v. State of Gujarat and State v. M. Murugesan) to the present facts.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 439
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376, s. 506
- Information Technology Act, 2000s. 67, s. 67A
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 3, s. 4
- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(W)(ii), s. 3(2)(V)
Subjects
Judgment
[2023] 4 S.C.R. 939 939
SANJAY DUBEY A
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 1466 of 2023)
MAY 11, 2023 B
[KRISHNA MURARI AND
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]
Constitution of India – Articles 226, 227 – Power of High
Court to issue additional directions/orders in bail pleas – FIR was
C
filed against accused u/ss.376, 506, IPC; POCSO Act, SCST Act
and IT Act –FSL Report was forwarded to the appellant-
Inspectorwith a note that DNA examination as per guidelines be
undertaken however, the DNA examination was not carried out –
In the meantime, the accused filed his bail plea – High Courtcalled
for the case-diary, but the FSL Report was not included therewith – D
Appellant was found guilty of dereliction of dutyand direction
wasissued for holding departmental proceedings against him – On
appeal, held: High Court is a Constitutional Courtpossessing wide
repertoire of powers – It has original, appellate and suo motu powers
u/Articles 226 and 227 which are meant for taking care of situations
E
where the High Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are
required in the interest of justice – However, in the present case,
since the Superintendent of Police, the officer superior to the
appellant had himself stated that he would take action against the
appellant and was initiating enquiry for imposition of major penalty,
therefore, there was no occasion for the High Court to further issue F
direction for action against the appellant –However,since the case
is sensitive and prima facie there was callousness on the part of the
police officer(s) concerned, including the appellant, in conducting
a proper investigation,on facts, the impugned judgment not interfered
with–Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Penal Code, 1860
G
–ss.376, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012– Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Information Technology Act, 2000.
Administration of Justice–Administration of CriminalJustice
–Significance of investigation – Discussed.
H
939
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A Practice and Procedure – Judgments – Interpretation of –
Held: Judgments are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems –They are
not to be construed as statutes andspecific cases are authorities
only for what they actually decide.
Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v State of Gujarat
B (2019) 14 SCC 522; State Represented by Inspector of
Police v M Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251 : [2020] 2
SCR 553 – distinguished.
B S Hari Commandant v Union of India 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 413; Sidhartha Vashist v State (NCT of
C Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 : [2010] 4 SCR 103; Manoj v
State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) 2 SCC 353; State of
Gujarat v Kishanbhai (2014) 5 SCC 108 : [2014] 1
SCR 197– relied on.
Sreenivasa General Traders v State of Andhra Pradesh,
D (1983) 4 SCC 353 : [1983] 3 SCR 843; M/s Amar Nath
Om Prakash v State of Punjab (1985) 1 SCC 345 :
[1985] 2 SCR 72; BGS SGS Soma JV v NHPC Limited
(2020) 4 SCC 234 : [2019] 17 SCR 742; Chintels India
Limited v Bhayana Builders Private Limited (2021) 4
SCC 602– referred to.
E
Case Law Reference
[2020] 2 SCR 553 distinguished Para 8
[1983] 3 SCR 843 referred to Para 18
[1985] 2 SCR 72 referred to Para 18
F
[2019] 17 SCR 742 referred to Para 18
[2010] 4 SCR 103 relied on Para 22
[2014] 1 SCR 197 relied on Para 23
G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1466 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2022 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MCRC No. 43998 of
2022.
H
SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND 941
ANOTHER
Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Awanish Kumar, Siddharth Kumar A
Sharma, S. K. Pandey, Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi, Anshul Rai, M/
s. Dharmaprabhas Law Associates, Advs. for the Appellant.
Mukul Singh, A.A.G., Mrinal Gopal Elker, Rajan Chourasia, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
C
3. The present appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order
dated 21.09.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”)
rendered by a learned Single Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
at Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in MCRC No.
43998 of 2022, in which a finding, albeit prima facie, of being guilty of
dereliction of duty against the appellant has been recorded. Further, it D
was observed in the Impugned Judgment that the appellant is not fit to
be assigned any important responsibility in the Police Department and is
unfit to hold any responsible post. It has further been noted that the
Superintendent of Police, Katni had already line-attached the appellant
and was initiating enquiry for imposition of major penalty, for which he E
would get conducted a preliminary enquiry by the Additional
Superintendent of Police and forward the report to the Disciplinary
Authority for imposition of a major penalty.
4. The Impugned Judgment also records a ‘direction’ issued to
take appropriate action against the appellant for dereliction of duty, F
insubordination and causing undue disruption in the proceedings of the
High Court.
THE FACTUAL PRISM:
5. The Appellant was an Inspector of Sleemanabad Police Station,
Katni where FIR No. 424 of 2021 dated 18.07.2021 was registered G
against the accused therein, one Shiv Kumar Kushwah (hereinafter
referred to as the “accused”) under Sections 376 & 506 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), Sections 3 and
4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
(hereinafter referred to as the “POCSO Act”), Sections 3(1)(W)(ii) and
H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A 3(2)(V) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Sections 67 and 67A of the Information
Technology Act, 2000. The Forensic Science Laboratory Report
(hereinafter referred to as the “FSL Report”) was forwarded to the
office of the Superintendent of Police, Katni on 25.10.2021. The FSL
Report was forwarded to the appellant with a note that DNA examination
B
as per guidelines be undertaken. However, the DNA examination was
not carried out. In the meantime, the accused filed MCRC No.43998 of
2022 seeking bail before the High Court.
6. During the proceedings, the High Court called for the case-
diary, but the FSL Report was not included therewith. This led the High
C
Court to seek the personal appearance of the Superintendent of Police,
Katni and the In-charge of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory,
Jabalpur. On 21.09.2022, the duo mentioned supra appeared before the
High Court, and informed that the FSL Report was sent to the office of
Superintendent of Police, Katni on 25.10.2021. The Superintendent of
D Police, Katni stated that the FSL report was forwarded to the appellant
along with communication dated 27.10.2021, with a note that DNA
examination as per guidelines be carried out. However, the same was
not done, as the appellant took the stand that the concerned Woman
Sub-Inspector had not brought the FSL Report to his knowledge.
E 7. The learned Government Advocate for the State stated before
the High Court that the case-diary had been received in the Office of
the learned Advocate General on 13.09.2022, but the FSL Report was
not included therewith. This prompted the High Court to pass the
Impugned Judgment, as discussed above.
F SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the
accused had filed MCRC No.43998 of 2022 under Section 439 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
“Code”), which only relates to grant of bail to an accused in custody.
G Thus, the direction to take action and hold a departmental enquiry as
also the recording of finding against the appellant cannot be sustained.
In support of his contention, learned counsel referred to and relied upon
the decisions of this Court in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v State
of Gujarat, (2019) 14 SCC 522 and State Represented by Inspector
of Police v M Murugesan, (2020) 15 SCC 251. It was contended
H
SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND 943
ANOTHER [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
that no matter how laudable the object, while deciding an application for A
bail, the Court cannot enter into any other realm.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that the
appellant had, clearly, exhibited insubordination, incompetence and,
dereliction of duty in an important matter and thus, in any way, was B
liable to be proceeded against. It was submitted that the Departmental
Committee concerned had also conducted an enquiry where the appellant
and some other officials were found negligent in performing their duties
in providing the FSL Report along with the case-diary besides suppressing
material documents. Learned counsel added that due to an interim stay C
apropos the departmental proceedings against the appellant, granted vide
Order dated 23.11.2022, the matter could not be taken to its logical end.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
10. Having given the matter our anxious and thoughtful
consideration, though the appellant may have a point that, stricto sensu, D
in a petition under Section 439 of the Code, the concerned Court ought
not to travel beyond considering the specific issue viz. whether to grant
bail or reject bail to an accused in custody, it cannot be lost sight of that
the Court concerned herein was not a ‘Court of Session’ but the High
Court for the State of Madhya Pradesh, established under Article 214 of E
the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”).
11. This singular fact, for reasons elaborated hereinafter, leads us
to decline interfering with the Impugned Judgment, but for different
reasons. We have no hesitation in stating that had the Impugned Judgment
been rendered by a Court of Session, the factors that would have weighed F
with us would be starkly different.
12. A little digression is necessitated. The High Court is a
Constitutional Court, possessing a wide repertoire of powers. The High
Court has original, appellate and suo motu powers under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution. The powers under Articles 226 and 227 of
G
the Constitution are meant for taking care of situations where the High
Court feels that some direction(s)/order(s) are required in the interest of
justice. Recently, in B S Hari Commandant v Union of India, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 413, the present coram had the occasion to hold as
under:
H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A “50. Article 226 of the Constitution is a succour to remedy
injustice, and any limit on exercise of such power, is only
self-imposed. Gainful refer- ence can be made to, amongst
others, A V Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani,
(1962) 1 SCR 573 and U P State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v.
Kamal Swaroop Tandon, (2008) 2 SCC 41. The High Courts,
B
under the Constitutional scheme, are endowed with the ability
to issue prerogative writs to safeguard rights of citizens. For
ex- actly this reason, this Court has never laid down any strait-
jacket principles that can be said to have “cribbed, cabined
and confined” [to borrow the term employed by the Hon.
C Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in E P Royappa v. State of
Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555] the
extraordinary powers vested under Arti- cles 226 or 227 of
the Constitution. Adjudged on the anvil of Nawab Shaqafath
Ali Khan (supra), this was a fit case for the High Court to
D have examined the matter threadbare, more so, when it did
not involve navigating a factual minefield.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Returning to the present case, though usually the proper course
of action of the High Court ought to have been to confine itself to the
E acceptance/rejection of the prayer for bail made by the accused under
Section 439 of the Code; however the High Court, being satisfied that
there were, in its opinion, grave lapses on the part of the police/
investigative machinery, which may have fatal consequences on the justice
delivery system, could not have simply shut its eyes.
F 14. We are of the view that the learned Single Bench could have
directed institution of separate proceedings taking recourse to Article
226 of the Constitution, after formulating reasons and points for
consideration. Thereafter, the matter should have been referred to the
learned Chief Justice of the High Court for placing it before an appropriate
Bench, which would proceed in accordance with law, of course, after
G
affording adequate opportunity to the person(s) proceeded against.
15. With regard to the High Court’s justified concern to prevent
miscarriage of justice, separate/fresh proceedings could have been
instituted as indicated above. We hasten to add that our observations are
not to be construed to imply that the High Courts should delve into the
H
SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND 945
ANOTHER [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
efficacy of investigation at the stage of bail, and the present judgment is A
not to be misread to haul up the investigative agencies/officers in all
cases.
16. This Court could have interfered with the ‘direction’ for
departmental proceedings against the appellant, as learned counsel for
the appellant advanced, had been so done in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai B
Datanta (supra) and M Murugesan (supra). However, it would be
proper to take note that in the aforesaid two cases, the factual positions
were quite different. In Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta (supra),
the Court took note of the fact that in the case involving rape of a minor,
the High Court ordering the accused and the appellant therein, who was
the grandmother of the victim along with parents of the victim to undergo C
scientific tests viz. lie detection, brain-mapping and narco-analysis was
not only in contravention of the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence
but also a violation of statutory requirements and thus, the bail granted to
the accused was cancelled. The facts of the instant case are quite
different, and ergo, Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta (supra) does D
not aid the appellant.
17. In M Murugesan (supra), it was noted that the jurisdiction
of High Court is limited to grant or refuse to grant bail pending trial and
such jurisdiction ends when the bail application is finally decided. In this
background, the High Court, after taking a decision on the bail application, E
having retained the file and directing the State to constitute a Committee
and seek its recommendation on reformation, rehabilitation and re-
integration of convicts/accused persons and best practices for improving
the quality of investigation and also to obtain District-wise data from
State and upon submission of final data, after reviewing the same, making
such data a part of the order after decision on bail application, was held F
to be beyond jurisdiction. In the present case, on the date of passing of
the Impugned Judgment, the bail application was still at large, and had
not yet been decided one way or the other.
18. There is no quibble with the propositions lucidly enunciated in
Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta (supra) and M Murugesan (supra). G
Yet, as our discussions in the preceding paragraphs display, the same
are inapplicable to the extant factual matrix. It is too well-settled that
judgments are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems; they are not to be
construed as statutes, and; specific cases are authorities only for what
they actually decide. We do not want to be verbose in reproducing the H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A relevant paragraphs but deem it proper to indicate some authorities on
this point – Sreenivasa General Traders v State of Andhra Pradesh,
(1983) 4 SCC 353 and M/s Amar Nath Om Prakash v State of Punjab,
(1985) 1 SCC 345 – which have been reiterated, inter alia, in BGS
SGS Soma JV v NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234, and Chin- tels
India Limited v Bhayana Builders Private Limited, (2021) 4 SCC
B
602.
19. In the present case, the judgment impugned was passed before
the final disposal of the bail application by the High Court. On a closer
scrutiny of the judgment impugned, it is clear that the Superintendent of
Police, Katni, while appearing in person on 21.09.2022 had submitted
C that he had already line-attached the appellant vide an order dated
20.09.2022 and was initiating enquiry for imposition of major penalty.
The High Court was informed that the Superintendent of Police, Katni
would “get conducted preliminary enquiry in the hands of the
Additional S.P. and forward the report to the disciplinary authority
D of the T.I.to initiate inquiry for major penalty.”
20. The aforenoted was only reiterated by the High Court in the
latter portion of the judgment impugned, in the following terms:
“Let DNA report be now produced within a period of three
weeks by the concerned Officer for which Superintendent of
E Po- lice, Katni shall personally monitor that sample is sent in
time to the concerned DNA Testing Laboratory and report is
ob- tained besides taking appropriate action against the
concerned T.I. Shri Sanjay Dubey for dereliction of duty,
insubordi- nation and causing undue disruption in the
F proceedings of the High Court.” (sic)
(emphasis supplied)
21. A combined reading of the afore-extracted snippets makes it
crystal clear that the Superintendent of Police, Katni, who was the officer
superior to the appellant, himself had stated that he would take action
G against the appellant and was initiating enquiry for imposition of major
penalty, which statement was a suo motu act and not upon or flowing
from any direction of the Court. Therefore, there was no occasion for
the High Court to further observe for action against the appellant to be
taken, as already, the Superintendent of Police, Katni had taken a decision
to initiate enquiry against the appellant for imposition of major penalty.
H
SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND 947
ANOTHER [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
22. Be that as it may, the facts of the case prima facie disclose A
that in such an important and sensitive case, there had been, at least
prima facie, callousness on the part of the police officer(s) concerned,
including the appellant, in conducting a proper investigation to bring on
record all relevant materials in support of the truth. Amidst such backdrop,
the chances of undue benefit accruing to the accused, leading to
B
miscarriage of justice, cannot be ruled out, and may, in fact, have
increased. The significance of the investigative component cannot be
emphasised enough, and the views of this Court on such aspect have
been brought to the fore in Sidhartha Vashist v State (NCT of Delhi),
(2010) 6 SCC 1 and Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2
SCC 353. C
23. In this connection, on a slightly different but connected context,
it would be apposite to refer to the judgment in State of Gujarat v
Kishanbhai, (2014) 5 SCC 108, wherein the Court opined and directed
as under:
“22. Every acquittal should be understood as a failure of the D
justice delivery system, in serving the cause of justice.
Likewise, every acquittal should ordinarily lead to the
inference, that an innocent person was wrongfully prosecuted.
It is therefore, essential that every State should put in place a
procedural mechanism which would ensure that the cause of E
justice is served, which would simultaneously ensure the
safeguard of interest of those who are innocent. In furtherance
of the above purpose, it is considered essential to direct the
Home Department of every State, to examine all orders of
acquittal and to record reasons for the failure of each
prosecution case. A standing committee of senior officers of F
the police and prosecution departments, should be vested with
the aforesaid responsibility. The consideration at the hands
of the above Committee, should be utilized for crystallising
mistakes committed during investigation, and/or prosecution,
or both. The Home Department of every State Government G
will incorporate in its existing training programmes for junior
investigation/prosecution officials course-content drawn from
the above consideration. The same should also constitute
course-content of refresher training programmes for senior
investigating/prosecuting officials. The above responsibility
H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
A for preparing training programmes for officials, should be
vested in the same Committee of senior officers referred to
above. Judgments like the one in hand (depicting more than
10 glaring lapses in the investigation/prosecution of the case),
and similar other judgments, may also be added to the training
programmes. The course content will be reviewed by the above
B
Committee annually, on the basis of fresh inputs, including
emerging scientific tools of investigation, judgments of courts,
and on the basis of experiences gained by the Standing
Committee while examining failures, in unsuccessful
prosecution of cases. We further direct, that the above training
C programme be put in place within 6 months. This would ensure
that those persons who handle sensitive matters concerning
investigation/prosecution are fully trained to handle the same.
Thereupon, if any lapses are committed by them, they would
not be able to feign innocence, when they are made liable to
suffer departmental action, for their lapses.”
D
(emphasis supplied)
24. While respectfully reiterating the above, drawing an analogy
therefrom, as the lapses are grave, and additionally, but importantly, the
factum that the authority viz. the Superintendent of Police, Katni, itself
E realised lapses had crept into the investigation, and decided to initiate
proceedings against the appellant (and others), the operative portion of
the judgment impugned by the High Court, becomes, merely reiterative,
perhaps in more direct terms, of what had been stated before it. As
such, purely, in the extant facts and circumstances, the Impugned
Judgment does not warrant any interference by this Court. We propose
F no order as to costs.
25. In sum, on an overall circumspection, and in view of the
discussion in the preceding paragraphs, the instant appeal deserves to
be, and is, dismissed, with the caveat that the High Court’s observations
are not to be treated as findings against the appellant.
G
26. Interim order dated 23.11.2022, in the present case, is vacated.
However, it is made clear that any observation(s) made by the High
Court in relation to the appellant in the judgment impugned shall not
cause any prejudice to him in the departmental proceedings, which shall
take its own course, in accordance with law, and after providing full and
H effective opportunity to the appellant.
SANJAY DUBEY v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND 949
ANOTHER [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
27. The appellant would be entitled to raise all grounds and A
contentions, as may be available to him, in facts and law, in the
departmental proceedings. Our observations aforesaid, equally,
will not prejudice the appellant, nor shall they be used against the
accused.
B
Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)
C
D
E
F
G
H
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