Supreme Court of India
SANJAY KUMAR SHARMAversusSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 223
- Decided
- 11 March 2026
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SANJAY KUMAR
Holding
The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of credible dying declarations and given the grossly deficient investigation, the evidence failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore the High Court's acquittal was upheld.
Summary
The case involved the alleged arson and murder of an elderly couple whose shanty was set ablaze, resulting in the death of the husband and later his wife. The prosecution alleged that the younger son and his wife committed the crime, relying primarily on several dying declarations, motive stemming from a property dispute, and witness testimony. The trial court convicted the accused, but the High Court acquitted them, prompting a review by the Supreme Court on whether the dying declarations were credible and whether the investigation met procedural standards. The Court found the dying declarations unreliable due to the victims' severe injuries, lack of medical certification, inconsistent recordings, and the presence of villagers, and noted gross deficiencies in the police investigation, including no scene mahazar, no forensic examination, and delayed FIR registration. Consequently, the evidence did not satisfy the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal, dismissing the appeal.
Issues considered
- The credibility and admissibility of dying declarations made by severely injured victims without medical certification of fitness of mind
- Whether the prosecution's reliance on motive and dying declarations meets the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt
- Whether the deficiencies in the investigation (absence of scene mahazar, forensic examination, delayed FIR) vitiate the prosecution case
- Whether the failure to put all incriminating circumstances before the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC warrants reversal of conviction
- Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the accused despite the alleged dying declarations and witness testimony
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the accused despite the alleged dying declarations, motive and testimony of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution to establish the prosecution case. Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Shanty in which the old couple were residing gutted in a fire, killing the old man immediately and his wife died two days later in a hospital – Prosecution case that the younger son and daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous land disputes, torched the hut with the intention to
Subjects
Dying declarationEvidenceInvestigationCriminal procedureSection 313Burden of proofMotiveForensic examinationAcquittalAppeal
Judgment
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 556 : 2026 INSC 223
Sanjay Kumar Sharma
v.
State of Bihar & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1304 of 2026)
11 March 2026
[Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the High Court was justified in acquitting
the accused despite the alleged dying declarations, motive and
testimony of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution to establish
the prosecution case.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying declaration – Evidentiary
value – Shanty in which the old couple were residing gutted
in a fire, killing the old man immediately and his wife died two
days later in a hospital – Prosecution case that the younger
son and daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous land
disputes, torched the hut with the intention to murder the
parents – Trial court convicted the accused, however, the
High Court acquitted him – Correctness:
Held: In the totality of the circumstances as coming out from
the evidence, the High Court perfectly correct in acquitting the
accused – Unable to find that the dying declarations alleged to
have been made to the witnesses are credible or even probable,
especially considering the fact that the deceased is alleged to have
made the statement immediately after sustaining grievous burn
injuries – Investigation was a sham and was premeditated, throwing
to the winds every tenet of criminal jurisprudence informed by due
procedure – Prosecution, was a farce, parading witnesses whose
testimonies fell flat – Investigation and prosecution premised on
the motive alleged and nothing more – None of the incriminating
circumstances including that of the motive, the complaints filed by
the deceased against the accused, the various dying declarations
* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 557
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
and the medical evidence were put to the accused – Investigation
carried out grossly deficient – Scene mahazar not drawn up, no
forensic examination carried out at the scene of crime and no
independent witnesses arrayed – Causation of fire not investigated,
the presence of the accused in the vicinity of the crime scene not
established – Delay in registration of FIR despite the information
having been received at the police station earlier, and police
personnel including the I.O having visited the scene of occurrence
where number of villagers were present was a serious lapse –
Delay caused and the manner in which the FIS recorded throws
suspicion on the very conduct of the I.O – Dying declarations should
have been recorded with more caution and when taken inside the
hospital it should have ideally been recorded in the presence of
a Doctor, whose certification also ought to have been obtained –
Incriminating circumstances that come out in a trial are to be put to
the accused in its entirety, solemn duty enjoined both on the Court
and the Prosecutor equally, failing which the entire prosecution
may fail for that sole reason – There are lapses in investigation,
which could have been avoided. [Paras 26, 28, 31-33]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying declaration – Evidentiary
value – Important species of evidence – Explanation:
Held: Dying declaration is an important species of evidence
capable of proving the crime proper and identifying the accused,
an exception to hearsay having been provided by s.32 – Dying
declaration, for reliance should inspire confidence in the Court as to
its credibility – Court should be satisfied it is made by the deceased
without any prompting or tutoring or coercion or is a mere figment
of imagination, then conviction can be based solely on the dying
declaration and there is no requirement of any corroboration – It
can be reduced to writing or can be oral, as testified by reliable
witnesses – It can be one or numerous and if more than one;
exculpatory and inculpatory, it is for the Court to find out which
is believable – It can be a lengthy one or a short one, so far as
the crime is spoken of and identification of the perpetrator comes
through – It can be a single narrative or in a question and answer
form – It can either have a history of the rancour between the
perpetrator and the victim or can be merely the brief statement of
the incident – Capacity of the injured to make the statement, both
physical and mental, need not be necessarily certified by a doctor
558 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and would rest again on the satisfaction of the Court on an analysis
of the testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence coming
forth in trial – If the Court is satisfied of the fit state of mind of
the injured from the evidence on record, contrary medical opinion
or absence of it will be inconsequential – It can be made before
Magistrate; Executive or Judicial, Doctor, Police Officer, relative or
third party whose presence is not doubtful – Desire of the declarant
to live, through the truth despite fear of imminent death cannot
be easily brushed aside – If the statement is doubtful then one or
more of the above aspects could result in dying declaration being
eschewed completely; based on the facts of each case. [Para 13]
Case Law Cited
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra [2002] Supp. 1 SCR 697 : (2002)
6 SCC 710; Sher Singh and Another v. State of Punjab [2008] 2
SCR 959 : (2008) 4 SCC 265; Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi
[2010] 9 SCR 993 : (2010) 9 SCC 1; Bhajju @ Karan Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR 37 : (2012) 4 SCC 327;
Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra [2013) 1 SCR 115 : (2013) 2 SCC
224; Satish Chandra v. State of M.P. [2014] 6 SCR 23 : (2014) 6
SCC 723; Amol Singh v. State of M.P. [2008] 8 SCR 956 : (2008)
5 SCC 468; Lakhan v. State of M.P. [2010] 9 SCR 705 : (2010)
8 SCC 514; Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [1957] SCR 953 :
AIR 1957 SC 637 – referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Investigation; Dying declarations; Conviction based solely on
dying declaration; Exculpatory and inculpatory; Complete chain of
circumstances; Memo of arrest; Sham investigation; Incriminating
circumstances; Finding of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1304 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.08.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in CRADB No. 1271 of 2017
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 559
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Smarhar Singh, Surjeet Singh, Rajesh Kumar, Ms. Shweta Kumari,
Pankaj Prakash, Mohd Asim, Manoj Kumar, Yash Thakur.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Vipin Sanghi, Sr. Adv., Azmat Hayat Amanullah, Ms. Rebecca
Mishra, Suraj Kundu, Ms. Vanshita Gupta, Ms. Ekta Kundu,
Om Prakash, Vikas Singh Jangra, Samar Vijay Singh, Bhakti
Vardhan Singh.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
K. Vinod Chandran, J.
Leave granted.
2. Overzealous investigation is as fatal to prosecution as are the lethargic
and the tardy. Framing a case on public perceptions and personal
predilections ends up in a mess, often putting to peril an innocent
and always letting free the perpetrator. Here, we have a case of
gruesome death of a couple when their house was gutted in a fire,
with the son and daughter-in-law accused of murder. The entire case
is founded on motive; the ill-will the son harbored against the father
for not having given him his due share in the ancestral property.
The entire village was against the son and the mishap ended in
an investigation where truth was sacrificed at the altar of perceived
vengeance, ably assisted by the Investigating Officer’s selective but
careless pursuits, derailing the entire prosecution.
3. On the early hours of 23.11.2016, a shanty in which a lawyer and his
wife were residing was gutted in a fire, killing the old man immediately
and his wife after two days in a hospital at Patna. It was alleged that
the younger son and daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous
enmity arising from land disputes, torched the hut with the intention
to murder the parents. In defense, as is permissible, inconsistent
stances were taken; of the neighbour, who was managing the
properties of the deceased, and the elder son having colluded to
murder the couple and an accidental fire, by reason of the cooking
560 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
gas cylinder bursting. The Trial Court convicted the accused, while
the High Court acquitted him. We are faced with the divergent
findings of the Trial Court and the High Court; that of the High Court
by its order of acquittal having fortified the presumption of innocence
available to the accused.
4. Sri Smarhar Singh, Advocate-on-Record, appearing for the petitioner,
the elder son of the deceased, argued that the High Court has
completely lost sight of the evidence in the case and entered an
acquittal totally ignoring the dying declarations. In addition to the
recorded dying declarations as coming out from the First Information
Statement (FIS) and that recorded by PW8, a Block Development
Officer (BDO), PWs 1 to 3, 5 and 6 also spoke of the statement
made by one of the deceased pinning the dastardly act of setting
ablaze the hut and murdering the parents on the accused. There
was sufficient evidence to prove the motive, which together with the
dying declarations ought to have persuaded the High Court to affirm
the conviction ordered by the Trial Court. The Doctor who carried
out the post-mortem spoke only of 60% burns and confirmed the
mental status of the deceased, who spoke about the cause of her
death and that of her husband. A number of decisions are placed
before us to put forth the contention that a dying declaration can
be solely relied on to enter a conviction. In the present case, there
was sufficient corroboration from the medical evidence, the motive
proved and the testimony of witnesses who reached the crime spot
immediately afterwards. The High Court ought to have ensured that
the parricide was not left unavenged, when egregiously the accused
were acquitted without a proper appreciation of the evidence.
5. Sri Amanullah, learned Counsel appearing for the State sought to
uphold the conviction of the Trial Court and reverse the order of
acquittal especially pointing out the dastardly crime. The testimonies
of the witnesses, the dying declaration and the motive proved ought
to have convinced the High Court about the culpability of the accused
is the contention.
6. Sri Vipin Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the accused pointed out
the lapses in the investigation and the concerted effort to somehow
punish the accused, by manufacturing evidence not only in the form of
inconsistent dying declarations but also by way of interested testimony
of the witnesses. There was a clear pick and choose employed in
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 561
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
bringing witnesses to the trial, all interested and by their testimony
validating the defense of a cooked-up prosecution story. The learned
counsel for the accused also urged the laxity with which the Trial
Court considered the matter. None of the incriminating circumstances
were put to the accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 19731 and the defense set up was given a complete go
by. The Trial Court proceeded on merely surmises and conjectures
without looking into the relevant aspects in the testimony of the
witnesses, which would validate the defense of the accused, either
of a motivated accusation having been levelled or an accidental fire
having occurred, the defense being entitled to take different pleas.
7. In the context of the divergent findings and the peculiar circumstance
of a son (A1) and daughter-in-law (A2) being accused of murdering
A1’s parents we have examined the records and the evidence with
a hawk’s eye. Since the learned counsel for the appellant had
relied primarily on the dying declarations, with reference to various
decisions we will have to first look at the decisions placed before
us. Laxman v. State of Maharashtra2 was a Constitution Bench
decision examining a reference based on two conflicting decisions.
The conflict was insofar as the certification of the doctor regarding
the condition of the patient who makes the dying declaration. While
one of the decisions held that the certification should be to the
effect that the person making that declaration is in a fit state of
mind, another coordinate Bench held that if the materials on record
indicate the deceased to be fully conscious, the declaration made
immediately prior to death cannot be ignored, merely for reason of
the absence of a certification by a doctor that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind to make such a declaration. The Constitution
Bench without relying on the moral premise that ‘no man would
like to meet his maker with a lie in his mouth’, based itself on more
practical grounds. Their Lordships relied on the juristic theory of
such declaration being made in extremity, at the time of imminent
death, when every hope in life is gone, every motive to falsehood
is silenced and the only inducement is the desire to speak truth.
However, it was observed that great caution has to be exercised
in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence
1 For brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.’
2 (2002) 6 SCC 710
562 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
on account of existence of many circumstances which may affect
the truthfulness and correctness of a statement made, the author
of which cannot be cross-examined. There is always the possibility
of tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination, which the
Court should be satisfied, does not exist. The Court also should be
satisfied as to the situation the injured is placed in to take stock of
the incident and identify the assailant as also the fitness of mind
& body to subsequently speak about it. Normally, Courts look for
medical evidence to assess the mental condition of the deceased
while making a dying declaration, but it is not a rigid rule. Where,
from the attendant circumstances, as spoken of by the witnesses
and brought out by valid evidence if the Court is able to satisfy itself
that the declaration was made in a fit and conscious state, then a
contrary medical opinion cannot prevail and even its total absence
would be inconsequential. The declaration made by a three Judge
Bench that in the absence of medical certification that the injured
was in a fit state of mind, it would be risky to accept the subjective
satisfaction of a Magistrate as to the state of mind was held to be
too broadly stated and not the correct enunciation of law; deprecated
as a hyper-technical view especially in that case where there was
available, certification of the doctor to the effect that the patient was
conscious, but without the injured being expressly stated to be in
a fit state of mind.
8. The law as elaborated in the Constitution Bench decision would
be sufficient to evaluate the dying declaration in the present case.
However, on the insistence made by the appellant, who had lost
both his parents in a fire, an alleged murder which the Trial Court
found established and the High Court reversed on reasonable doubt
expressed, we would look at the other decisions also.
9. Sher Singh and Another v. State of Punjab3 was a case of bride-
burning with multiple dying declarations, the first exonerating the
accused, and then more, in one voice implicating them. The first
dying declaration recorded by a police officer was in the presence of
the mother-in-law, which was resiled from in the declaration recorded
by the Executive Magistrate after two days. The earlier statement
was stated to be due to a threat that she would not be taken to the
3 (2008) 4 SCC 265
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 563
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
hospital unless she spoke of an accidental fire. This was repeated
in the subsequent oral dying declarations, to her uncle, and a Sub-
Inspector which were believed by this Court.
10. Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi4 was a murder by a lady and
her son of the second wife and two children. The conviction was on
the sole basis of the dying declaration made by the stepdaughter who
was admitted to the hospital with grievous injuries in the nature of
stab wounds. On an analysis of various decisions of this Court, the
principles were encapsulated in paragraph 22 which reads as under:
“22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that:
(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction
if it inspires the full confidence of the court.
(ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement
and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination.
(iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is
true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any
further corroboration.
(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law
that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.
(v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not
be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such
as the deceased was unconscious and could never make
any statement cannot form the basis of conviction.
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain
all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.
4 (2010) 9 SCC 1
564 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not
in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration,
medical opinion cannot prevail.
(x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is
true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to
make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent,
there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of
conviction, even if there is no corroboration.”
Therein the dying declaration, which was the FIS was recorded by
an Inspector in the presence of a doctor and then registered as an
FIR, signed also by the doctor certifying her fit mental state.
11. Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 was again
concerned whether a death by burning in the marital house, was
accidental or homicidal. After the dying declaration recorded by the
Executive Magistrate within two hours of the incident, an affidavit
was sworn to by the deceased exonerating the in-laws. Death having
occurred a month after the incident, the first declaration was held
truthful, which stood corroborated by PW2 and PW3 who took the
deceased with 60% burns to the hospital. The dying declaration
by the injured; burnt at only the lower part of the body was found
to be reliable since it gave a cogent and possible scenario of the
occurrence further corroborated by stab wounds.
12. Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra6 dealt with four dying declarations
which consistently spoke about the role played by the mother-in-law
and the sister-in-law in torching the injured. The mere fact that in
one of the statements, two others were implicated was found to be
not sufficient to discard the role of the in-laws. Satish Chandra v.
State of M.P.7 dealt with a suicide in which the dying declaration
was made as a continuous narrative. It was held that though this
Court had found that statements in the form of question and answer
would be more appropriate, a credible declaration should not be
eschewed on the grounds of existence of more details or presence
of family members, when there is no indication of tutoring by the
5 (2012) 4 SCC 327
6 (2013) 2 SCC 224
7 (2014) 6 SCC 723
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 565
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
family. Amol Singh v. State of M.P.8 and Lakhan v. State of M.P.9
clarified that it is not the plurality of dying declarations that matter,
but the reliability, which is the significant aspect. Any inconsistency
would only compel the Court to examine it carefully, as to whether
those are material or not.
13. From a conspectus of the above decisions, it is clear: That, a dying
declaration is a very important species of evidence capable of proving
the crime proper and identifying the accused, an exception to hearsay
having been provided by Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. That,
a dying declaration, for reliance should inspire confidence in the Court
as to its credibility. That, the Court should be satisfied it is made
by the deceased without any prompting or tutoring or coercion or is
a mere figment of imagination. That, then conviction can be based
solely on the dying declaration and there is no requirement of any
corroboration. That, it can be reduced to writing or can be oral, as
testified by reliable witnesses. That, it can be one or numerous and if
more than one; exculpatory and inculpatory, it is for the Court to find
out which is believable. That, it can be a lengthy one or a short one,
so far as the crime is spoken of and identification of the perpetrator
comes through. That, it can be a single narrative or in a question
and answer form. That, it can either have a history of the rancour
between the perpetrator and the victim or can be merely the brief
statement of the incident. That, the capacity of the injured to make
the statement, both physical and mental, need not be necessarily
certified by a doctor and would rest again on the satisfaction of the
Court on an analysis of the testimony of the various witnesses and
the other evidence coming forth in trial. That, if the Court is satisfied
of the fit state of mind of the injured from the evidence on record, a
contrary medical opinion or an absence of it will be inconsequential.
That, it can be made before a Magistrate; Executive or Judicial, a
Doctor, a Police Officer, a relative or a third party whose presence is
not doubtful. That, the desire of the declarant to live, through the truth
despite fear of imminent death cannot be easily brushed aside. The
decisions also caution us that if the statement is doubtful then one
or more of the above aspects could result in the dying declaration
being eschewed completely; based on the facts of each case.
8 (2008) 5 SCC 468
9 (2010) 8 SCC 514
566 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
14. As a corollary, it also has to observed: That, if there is an iota of
suspicion the Court has to look for corroboration. That, the medical
certification as to the physical and mental state always aids in arriving
at a satisfaction. That, in the wake of multiple grievous injuries or
a higher percentage of burns, the declaration could be in question
and answer form, lending more credence as actually spoken of by
the injured as opposed to a long drawn out narrative, which could
be mistook as supplied by interested related parties. That, a dying
declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, adds credence
since they are trained to record such declarations. That, as far as
possible, the recording is to be done in the presence of the Doctor
and definitely not in the presence of numerous bystanders; which
could lead to a defence being raised of prompting and tutoring. That,
the veracity of the declaration has to come forth from the attendant
circumstances as brought out in evidence.
15. We cannot but notice that in the present case, there is a plethora
of dying declarations which we will examine one by one. There are
two dying declarations reduced to writing and quite a few oral ones,
testified by the witnesses, the written ones being examined first. The
FIS itself is by the victim recorded by PW7, PSI of the jurisdictional
Police Station, in the presence of PW1, the witness who came to
the crime scene on hearing a shout and saw the villagers trying to
put out the fire. The evidence of PW7 indicates that he was informed
of the fire in the village Mahadeopur by the SHO of Banmankhi
Police Station. PW7 immediately rushed to the crime scene with
the SHO and a Sub-Inspector and found the house of the deceased
completely gutted. The body of Sarangdhar Singh was found burnt
and his wife, Kamala Devi, as informed by the villagers, was taken
to the hospital for treatment.
16. Neither is evidence led of a diary entry made in the police station,
of the phone call to the SHO nor is the SHO examined to speak
on the phone call received. Strangely, despite the SHO, the Sub-
Inspector and the PSI; PW7, having reached the scene there is no
FIS recorded from any of the persons who were at the spot, including
the witnesses paraded before Court, PW2, PW4 and PW5 who had
not accompanied the injured lady to the hospital. PW1 is said to
have taken the injured lady to the hospital along with his brother
Nirmal, Nirdhan and Ajay Yadav. PW7 deposed that he went to the
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 567
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
hospital, after carrying out the inquest of Sarangdhar Singh, where
the FIS was recorded as the statement of the injured victim, Kamla
Devi. The FIR narrates about the details of her family, the enmity
with the younger son, and the crime, alleged on the younger son
and the daughter-in-law at 1.30 am. PW7, Investigating Officer (I.O)
took the thumb impression of PW1 and the deceased in the FIS.
17. Interestingly, the FIR was registered at 9.00 am on 23.11.2016 while
the police party had been to the scene of occurrence where the
villagers including the close relatives of the deceased were gathered,
when the fire was raging. Even at the hospital where Kamala Devi
was under treatment the villagers and relatives had gathered and
there was no valid cause to record an FIS from the victim, who was
grievously scorched. If it had to be done, then it was expedient that
a medical certification was taken. The FIS has a long narrative of the
history of the family dispute, highly improbable from a lady burned
seriously. The FIS was admittedly recorded when the villagers and
relatives of the deceased were standing around. These aspects
considered in the given circumstances puts to peril the veracity
of the FIS. Admittedly the deceased were inside the house and
presumably sleeping, given the time of the incident. There is little
possibility of the inmates of the house having seen the crime proper
and the possibility is more that the villagers who gathered there could
present a better picture, especially the woman whose shouts woke
the neighbours. The attempt of the prosecution to give the FIS an
elevated status of a dying declaration hence falls flat on that count
too as it does not inspire confidence.
18. We then come to the statement recorded by the BDO, PW8 at
11.30 am on the same day at Sadar Hospital, Araria. There, the
narration about the history/motive was far lesser but as earlier, the
crime proper is said to have been perpetrated by the younger son
who came along with his wife and two other unknown persons and
set fire to the residential house. PW7, I.O in his testimony before
Court, on questioning by the Court, stated that the dying declaration
is in his handwriting and the BDO signed it. PW7 & PW8, the BDO,
an Executive Magistrate spoke of the villagers and relatives of the
injured being present when the statement was recorded and that
PW8 read over the statement to the persons present. No invalidity
perse comes forth from that, but it raises questions, with reference
to the overall circumstances and the lurking suspicion of a false
568 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
accusation in the form of a declaration made by another person
or through prompting. The BDO also spoke of having taken down
the statement himself quite contrary to the statement of the IO. It
was deposed that a doctor was taking care of the injured in which
circumstance a certification could have been obtained about the fit
state or at least the consciousness of the injured. Neither was such a
medical certification taken nor does PW8 speak of the doctor having
informed him about the physical and mental condition of the injured.
The circumstances as coming out from the testimony of PW7 and
PW8 persuade us to disbelieve the second dying declaration also
for that too inspires no confidence.
19. Now, we come to the testimonies of the witnesses as to the incident
itself. PW1 testified that he came out of his house on hearing the
shouts of the wife of Vido Yadav, at his door steps and saw the house
burning down. The husband had died and the wife, Kamla Devi was
alive but “burnt little”. The dying declaration made by Kamla Devi to
PW1 was that Soni, her daughter-in-law had poured hot water on
her body and A1 having put their house on fire. PW2 testifies that
he woke up on hearing Anmol Yadav’s wife shout and on coming
out of his house witnessed the burning down of the house. It was
his deposition that Kamla Devi was inside the house and he along
with PW1 and Ajay Kumar tore the window and took Kamla Devi
out, not spoken of by PW1. PW2’s deposition is that Kamla Devi told
them that “you people should immediately go and save Dadaji, Mukul
and his wife will kill him” (sic-as available from the translation from
the records). PW1 and PW2 testified that they along with Ajay took
Kamla Devi to the hospital in a tempo. PW3 spoke of coming out of
the house when Munnar Yadav’s daughter-in-law started shouting.
His testimony was that “the old lady said that Mukul and his wife
set the house on fire” (sic deposition of PW3).
20. PW4 came out of his house on hearing a commotion and tried to
douse the fire. He spoke of many villagers having gathered at the
scene. He also spoke of Kamla Devi having been burnt badly and
found mumbling in a weak state. Contrary to his statement under
Section 161, Cr. PC, he denied Kamla Devi having made a dying
declaration. PW5 was the brother of Sarangdhar Singh, who spoke
of Kamla Devi having come out after breaking the latch, with the help
of the villagers. He also spoke of a dying declaration made by the
injured, that Saurabh Kumar alias Mukul and his wife Soni burned
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 569
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
herself and her husband. PW6, the elder son of the deceased also
deposed that when he saw his mother at the hospital she made a
statement about the culpability of his brother and sister-in-law. PW7,
I.O however stated that no such statement was recorded from PW6
under Section 161, in his cross-examination.
21. We would not discard the oral dying declarations for reason of the
inconsistency in narration. There cannot be any insistence that the
exact words of the victim should come out from the witnesses. What
has been narrated conveys the culpability, if it can be believed.
That being said we cannot but notice that all the witnesses arrayed
before the Trial Court spoke of the villagers having reached the spot
before them. Three witnesses specifically spoke of the shouts of a
lady having woken them up. They described the lady, differently,
as Vido Yadav’s wife, Anmol Yadav’s wife and the daughter-in-law
of Munnar Yadav, from which we can infer that there were at least
two persons who saw the fire, before the witnesses paraded before
Court. Even if it is assumed that the lady spoken of by the three
witnesses was the very same person, she was the best witness who
could have been examined with respect to the first indication of the
crime. In fact, PW2 and PW3 specifically speak of that lady having
been engaged in threshing paddy. There was every possibility of
her having witnessed the fire breaking out and could have better
explained the causation. The non examination of the crucial witness,
spoken of by the witnesses who reached the place later, on hearing
her shouts, is a very serious lacuna in prosecution.
22. In this context, we have to specifically notice the defence; that
PW1, who was managing the properties of the deceased had an
eye on it and he, in collusion with PW6 had connived to exclude
A1 from his due share. PW5, the brother of the deceased husband
also is alleged to have aligned with the other son to exclude A1
from his inheritance. PW1, PW5 & PW6, hence, according to the
accused are interested witnesses. PW2 is the nephew of PW1 and
PW3 is the brother of PW1 again disclosing an interest against the
accused . PW4, the grandnephew of the deceased husband spoke
only of having witnessed the fire and the death of his granduncle
and denied the dying declaration, quite contrary to the version of
the other witnesses. All the witnesses spoke of a motive of the
accused which was the exclusion of due share in the properties of
570 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the deceased. PW6, the other son of the deceased in answer to a
question put by the Court categorically stated that he and his brother
will have 50% share in the property and that he is willing to give the
due share of the property to the accused, which he had obtained
through a partition suit; thus demolishing the motive projected by
the prosecution. In the totality of the circumstances, we are unable
to find that the dying declarations alleged to have been made to
the witnesses are credible or even probable, especially considering
the fact that the deceased is alleged to have made the statement
immediately after sustaining grievous burn injuries.
23. The postmortem report of the deceased husband indicates that he
sustained 100% burns. The degree of the burn injuries suffered
by the deceased wife is not mentioned in the report prepared by
PW10, the doctor who carried out the postmortem. However, he
stated that she had sustained 60% injuries, which is stated for the
first time before Court and without the same being recorded in the
report. Surprisingly, PW10 also stated, on a specific query made by
the Court that looking at the postmortem report, the victim would
have been in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. We
are unable to find any credence to the said certification which a
pathologist cannot discern by merely looking at the postmortem
report. The burn injuries, pertinently are not confined to the lower
body. The injuries interalia are stated to be:
“Epidermal to Dermo Epidermal burn injury over both
lower thigh and lower limb upto ankle, both upper limb,
back of chest, abdomen, part of pelvis, right side face and
neck with line of redness, hyperemia and areas of hyper
coagulated tissues and blister formation at place.”
The injuries thus were not confined to the lower body and even a
medical expert examining the cadaver cannot come to the conclusion
that, when alive the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a
dying declaration.
24. PW6 attempted to establish the enmity between his father and
brother by production of Exhibit P4 to P10, complaints made by his
deceased father and mother against his brother. Exhibit P4 to P9
which were partially burnt were said to have been obtained from
the crime scene. It is pertinent here to notice that PW7, the I.O.
did not think it fit to even draw up a scene mahazar of the crime
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 571
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
scene. From the evidence, it is clear that the house was thatched
and had bamboo doors, good tinder for fire. The witnesses had
spoken of a gas connection in the house and the defence was also
that the fire was caused when the gas cylinder burst. There was
no investigation on that count and the I.O. did not even carry out a
forensic examination of the site to find out the cause of fire, whether
it was arson or accidental. In fact the I.O in his evidence as PW7
stated that there were no half-burnt items found in the crime scene
which he had visited four times. PW5, the brother of the deceased
husband had also stated in response to the query made by Court
that the entire goods of the house were burnt. It was stated that the
police had made a list of the goods that were saved from burning and
that the list was prepared in his presence. The witness also deposed
that since the goods were burnt, the police had left them as such.
25. Exhibit P4 to P9, partially burnt complaints, according to PW6 were
recovered from the crime scene which he did not think fit to handover
to the I.O. The reliance placed by the trial court on the documents
produced by PW6 cannot be accepted, for its genuineness being
suspect and the same having been not produced before Court as
required in a criminal trial, after drawing up a seizure mahazar, as
recovered from the crime scene or even handed over by one of
the witnesses and the same being made a part of the record of
incriminating documents handed over to the accused.
26. In the totality of the circumstances as coming out from the evidence,
we are convinced that the High Court was perfectly correct in
acquitting the accused. Rather than providing a complete chain of
circumstances, with the connecting links establishing the guilt of
the accused and bringing forth no hypothesis other than the guilt of
the accused, here the circumstances bring out a conscious effort to
nail the accused with the crime of arson and pre-meditated murder.
Except PW4, the other witnesses spoke of bitterness between the
father and the son due to property disputes. PW6, the son of the
deceased and the brother of A1 though spoke of the bitterness
between his father and brother, in the same breath deposed that
he was willing to give 50% share of the properties to his brother; in
which event, there is no cause for enmity between the father and the
son. The testimonies of the witnesses paraded before Court was that
the entire village was against the conduct of the younger son of the
572 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
deceased. However, this was spoken of by the interested witnesses
as alleged by the defence. PW1 was alleged to be interested in the
properties of the deceased and PW1, PW2 and PW3 were closely
related. PW5 is said to have aligned himself with PW6, the other
son of the deceased. PW4, another close relative did not speak of
enmity between the father and the son of such a gravity to motivate
the son to kill his father.
27. Further, PW1 himself stated that the second accused and the children
stayed at the house of the deceased for 20 days before the incident.
It is also deposed that 17 days prior to the incident the police took the
deceased husband and his son to the police station for counselling,
not spoken of by the I.O who was a PSI in the jurisdictional Police
Station. Pertinent is the fact that none of the witness spoke of the
presence of the accused in the village at any time contemporaneous
to the incident, especially when admittedly the accused along with
their children were staying at a different location. The memo of arrest
is not available in the records and the I.O makes a casual reference
to the arrest having been made on the road going from Purnia to
Banmankhi, near village Dhima. The accused were alleged to have
resided in the house of one Lali @ Lalwa, two weeks back when
they came to the village, who was not examined by the police or
arrayed as a witness in the prosecution launched.
28. The entire village had gathered at the scene of occurrence and
the witnesses paraded were not the persons who reached there
first. The lady spoken of by PW1 to PW3 whose shouts woke them
up, had not been examined. PW2, PW4 and PW5 also spoke of
the deceased Kamla Devi having been removed to the hospital by
PW1 along with one Nirdhan Yadav and Ajay Yadav, both of whom
were not examined before Court. There was a concerted effort by
the I.O not to bring any independent witnesses to the stand. The
investigation, according to us was a sham and was pre-meditated,
throwing to the winds every tenet of criminal jurisprudence informed
by due procedure. The prosecution, hence, was a farce, parading
witnesses whose testimonies fell flat. The investigation and the
prosecution was premised on the motive alleged and nothing more.
29. We would also notice with some anguish the manner in which the
trial court examined the accused under Section 313, Cr. PC. There
were only four questions put to both the accused. Question No.1
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 573
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
was with respect to the allegation that on 23.11.2006 at around
1:30 in the night, the accused together went to the house of the
father of the first accused with common intention and killed them
by putting the house to fire. The second question was about the
allegation of the house of Sarangdhar Singh having been torched
and the dying declaration made by Kamla Devi that the accused,
together with two unknown persons put the house on fire and thus
murdered Sarangdhar Singh. Question No.3 was with respect to the
allegation that 15 days before the incident, the accused had gone
to Mahadeopur village and stayed in the house of Lali @ Lalwa and
that four days before the incident they went to their parents’ house.
Question No.4 was as to the defence. Both the accused replied in the
negative to the first three questions and the first accused in defence
stated that PW1, the one who managed his father’s properties, his
elder brother PW6 and his uncle PW5, were attempting to grab his
property after excluding him from the same.
30. We cannot but notice that none of the incriminating circumstances
including that of the motive, the complaints filed by the deceased
against A1, the various dying declarations and the medical evidence
were put to the accused. We had, in the very same context in Criminal
Appeal No.860 of 2026, Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar &
Ors. dated 12.02.2026 (authored by one of us, Sanjay Kumar, J.)
with respect to the scanty questioning under Section 313, Cr. PC
without putting all the incriminating circumstances to the accused,
held as under:-
“Needless to state, the afore stated casual examination of
the accused falls woefully short of the required standard,
as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point,
time and again. We may refer to the recent judgment of this
Court on this point in “Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh”
(2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court
observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist
the trial court in recording the statement of the accused
under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put
any material circumstances brought on record against
the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the
notice of the court while the examination of the accused
is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the
574 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of
the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of
the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his
duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct
of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused.
We may also note the earlier decision of another 3-Judge
Bench of this Court in “Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs.
State of Maharashtra” (1973) 2 SCC 793 , wherein the
in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under
consideration and it was observed that great care is
expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to
collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the
accused even though at the end of the long trial, the judge
may be a little fagged out.
In the light of the aforestated settled legal principle, we
are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to
the appellants in the course of their examination under
Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were
put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence
adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court
based on such inadequate examination of the accused,
therefore, cannot be sustained.
In the cited case, we had remanded the matter and restored it to
the files for resuming the trial from the stage of questioning under
Section 313, Cr.P.C. However, in this case, we do not think such a
measure is warranted, especially when the evidence falls short of the
standard required in a criminal trial which is not a mere suspicion,
a ‘maybe true’ but a ‘must be true’, evidently a long distance to
travel, the whole of this distance being paved with legal, reliable
and unimpeachable evidence resulting in a finding of guilt beyond
all reasonable doubt, as held in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab10.
31. We have found that the investigation carried out is grossly deficient.
The scene mahazar was not drawn up, no forensic examination was
carried out at the scene of crime and no independent witnesses were
arrayed. The causation of fire not investigated, the presence of the
10 AIR 1957 SC 637
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 575
Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar & Ors.
accused in the vicinity of the crime scene not established. The delay
in registration of FIR despite the information having been received at
the police station earlier, and the police personnel including the I.O
having visited the scene of occurrence where a number of villagers
were present was a serious lapse. The delay caused and the manner
in which the FIS was recorded in the present case throws suspicion
on the very conduct of the I.O. The dying declarations should
have been recorded with more caution and when taken inside the
hospital it should have ideally been recorded in the presence of a
Doctor, whose certification also ought to have been obtained. The
incriminating circumstances that come out in a trial are to be put to
the accused in its entirety, a solemn duty enjoined both on the Court
and the Prosecutor equally, failing which the entire prosecution may
fail for that sole reason. We reiterate these aspects only to point
out the lapses in investigation, which could have been avoided, to
provide some guidance at least in the future.
32. A couple, at the fag end of their lives were burnt to death and the
cause, whether it’s a homicide or accidental death, eludes civil society
and throws a pall of suspicion on their own son and his family, who
will always carry the yoke of dishonour. The son and daughter-in-
law were accused of parricide and were convicted by the trial court,
later acquitted by the High Court, which acquittal is now affirmed by
us. The trauma of arrest, incarceration and trial will always scar the
couple and more so their children who were left orphaned, during
the time when their parents were imprisoned. We cannot but caution
the investigators and the Courts to strive to do better and follow
accepted practises and procedural rules to the hilt, when lives are
lost or taken and there is a possibility of false accusations being
made, putting to peril the reputations of the living.
33. The appeal is dismissed.
34. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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