SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTAversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.

                          [2019] 9 S.C.R. 735                             735


                    SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA                                   A
                                  v.
         THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1081 of 2019)
                           JULY 25, 2019                                  B
        [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
                    INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
       Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000:
s.7A – Prosecution case was that son of the complainant was               C
murdered after a demand for ransom – Second respondent was
arrested during the course of investigation – Claim for juvenility
under 2000 Act – Basis was matriculation certificate issued by CBSE
– When matter travelled upto Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), the claim
of juvenility was rejected – JJB also observed that while obtaining
                                                                          D
a driving license and an Aadhaar card, second respondent had
declared his date of birth as 17.12.1995 and on that basis he was
not juvenile on the date of incident – On revision, High Court
allowed the claim of juvenility on the ground that matriculation
certificate issued by CBSE would have to be given precedence over
any other evidence of the date of birth by virtue of r.12(3)(a) –         E
Appeal by complainant – Held: Cl. (a) of r.12(3) provides that for
the purpose of seeking evidence in the enquiry, the documents that
have to be obtained are matriculation or equivalent certificate, if
available; and in its absence date of birth certificate from the school
first attended; and in its absence, birth certificate given by a
                                                                          F
corporation, municipal authority or panchayat – Thus, cl. (a) of
r.12(3) contains a hierarchical ordering, evident from the use of the
language “in the absence whereof” – This indicates that a
matriculation or equivalent certificate is given precedence – In the
instant case, the date of birth which was forwarded in the roll of
students of the school where the second respondent was a student          G
from Class V to Class X was the sole basis of date of birth recorded
in the matriculation certificate – The said date of birth was without
any underlying document, as stated by the Principal in the course
of the enquiry before the JJB and, therefore, cannot be accepted as
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                                 735
736            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     authentic or credible – The date of birth in the school first attended
      by second respondent and the transfer certificate of that school
      contained the date of birth as 17.12.1995 which matched with the
      the date of birth which was voluntarily disclosed by the second
      respondent while obtaining Aadhar card and also driving licence –
      Once it is held that the date of birth of the second respondent is
B
      17.12.1995, he is not entitled to the claim of juvenility as on the
      date of the alleged incident which took place on 18.08.2015 – The
      order passed by the Sessions Judge, confirming the decision of the
      JJB rejecting the claim of juvenility is accordingly maintained –
      Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 –
C     r.12(3).
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1. Section 7A of the Act of 2000 provides the
      procedure to be followed when a claim of juvenility is raised before
      a court. Upon a claim being raised that an accused was a juvenile
D     on the date of the commission of the offence, the Court is required
      to make an enquiry, take evidence and to determine the age of
      the person. The court has to record a finding whether the person
      is a juvenile or a child, stating the age as nearly as may be. Rule
      12(3) of the Rules of 2007 contains a procedural provision
E     governing the determination of age by the Court or by the Board.
      Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) provides that for the purpose of seeking
      evidence in the enquiry, the following documents would have to
      be obtained: matriculation or equivalent certificate if available;
      in the absence of (i), the date of birth certificate from the school
      first attended; and in the absence; (ii) the birth certificate given
F     by a corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. Clause (a) of
      Rule 12(3) contains a hierarchical ordering, evident from the use
      of the language “in the absence whereof”. The matriculation
      certificate is given precedence. It is in the absence of a
      matriculation certificate that the date of birth certificate of the
G     school first attended, can be relied upon. It is in the absence of
      both the matriculation and the birth certificates of the first school
      attended that a birth certificate issued by the corporation,
      municipal authority or panchayat could be obtained. [Para 10]
      [743-A, F; 744-F-H; 745-A-B]

H
     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                          737
                    PRADESH

      2. The deposition of the school Headmaster indicated that         A
the second respondent was admitted to Secondary School,
Shikohabad in the fifth standard and was a student of the school
until he completed his matriculation. The second respondent
attended the first school until the fourth standard. The school
register and transfer certificate form of that school specifically
                                                                        B
contained an entry in regard to the date of birth of the second
respondent as 17 December 1995. The date of birth which was
recorded in the certificate of the first school completely matched
the date of birth which was voluntarily disclosed by the second
respondent both while obtaining his driving licence as well as
the Aadhaar card. In both those documents, the date of birth was        C
reflected as 17 December 1995. The driving license and the
Aadhaar card are not stand alone documents. The date of birth
in the records of school where the second respondent was a
student from Class V to Class X was without any underlying
document, as stated by the Principal in the course of the enquiry
                                                                        D
before the JJB. On the other hand, there was a clear and
unimpeachable evidence in the form of the date of birth which
was recorded in the records of first school attended which is
supported by the voluntary disclosure made by the second
respondent while obtaining both the Aadhaar card and the driving
licence. The High Court reversed the findings of the Sessions           E
Judge purely on the basis of the matriculation certificate. The
date of birth as reflected therein cannot be accepted as authentic
or credible. Once it is held that the date of birth of the second
respondent is 17 December 1995, he is not entitled to the claim
of juvenility as of the date of the alleged incident which took place
                                                                        F
on 18 August 2015. [Paras 14, 15] [751-G-H; 752-A-H]
      Prag Bhati v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 12 SCC
      744 : [2016] 2 SCR 1089 ; Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj
      Nath v. State of Assam (2001) 5 SCC 714 : [2001] 3
      SCR 669 ; Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya
      Pradesh (2012) 9 SCC 750 : [2012] 10 SCR 540 ;                    G
      Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain v. State of West
      Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 : [2012] 9 SCR 244
      – referred to.

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738                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A                                  Case Law Reference
      [2016] 2 SCR 1089                    referred to           Para 4
      [2001] 3 SCR 669                     referred to           Para 4
      [2012] 10 SCR 540                    referred to           Para 5
B     [2012] 9 SCR 244                     referred to           Para 7(iii)
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 1081 of 2019.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 14.11.2018 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in Crl. Revision No. 2952 of 2017.
C
             Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Dhananjay Garg, Baban Kr. Sharma,
      Ms. Rani Mishra, Jatinderpal Singh and Ms. Pratiksha Tripathi, Advs.
      for the Appellant.
           Ravindra Singh, Sr. Adv., Vishnu Shankar Jain, Raman Yadav,
D     Syed Mehdi Imam, Ms. Varnita Rastogi, Dr. Amarendra Pratap Yadav,
      Ms. Kritiya Pandey, Rupesh Kumar, Tara Chandra Sharma, Ms. Neelam
      Sharma and Ms. Pankhuri Shrivastava, Advs. for the Respondents.
                The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
E
            1. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad allowed a claim of
      juvenility in a decision of its Single Judge dated 14 November 2018. The
      judgment is challenged in this appeal1 by the complainant.
              2. On 28 October 2015, a First Information Report was lodged by
F     the appellant at PS Ekka in the district of Firozabad in Uttar Pradesh
      which was registered as Case Crime 252 of 2016 under Section 364 A
      of the Penal Code. The allegation is that the appellant received a call on
      his cell phone from an unknown number and the caller wished to speak
      to his son, claiming to be his teacher. The appellant’s son who was about
      thirteen years old was studying in the eighth standard in a public school
G     in Shikohabad. After calling back on the number, the appellant’s son left
      his shop after a conversation, never to return. The victim is alleged to
      have been murdered after a demand for ransom. His body was allegedly
      found in a canal. The second respondent was arrested during the course
      of the investigation.
H     1
          Criminal Revision 2952 of 2017
     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                739
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

       3. On 9 December 2015, the accused filed an application claiming       A
to be a juvenile on the date of the incident under the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act 20002. He submitted that on the
date of the alleged offence he was sixteen years ten months and eleven
days old. In support of the claim, he relied on a matriculation certificate
issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education3, Delhi reflecting
                                                                              B
his date of birth as 17 December 1998.
       4. By an order dated 2 July 2016 the Juvenile Justice Board4
allowed the application of the second respondent – accused and declared
him to be a juvenile on the date of the alleged offence. The appellant
instituted a criminal appeal before the Court of the Sessions Judge,
Firozabad5. On 16 September 2016, the Sessions Judge remanded the             C
case to the JJB for determination of the age of the second respondent
upon medical examination. The Chief Medical Officer, Agra constituted
a Medical Board which in its report dated 19 November 2016 found that
the age of the second respondent was about nineteen years. Aggrieved
by the order of the Sessions Judge, the second respondent filed a revision6   D
before the High Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 4 January
2017. He instituted a petition7 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 19738 which was disposed of by the High Court on 17 April
2017 directing the early disposal of the pending application of the second
respondent. On 1 July 2017, the JJB rejected the claim of juvenility on
the basis of the medical report. The JJB also observed that the second        E
respondent had filed an application for obtaining a driving license and an
Aadhaar card in which he had declared his date of birth as 17 December
1995. On this basis, the JJB held that the second respondent was an
adult on the date of the incident. The second respondent filed an appeal
against the order of the JJB before the Sessions Judge, Firozabad9. The       F
Sessions Judge rejected the appeal by an order dated 2 August 2017
observing, on the basis of the decision of this Court in Prag Bhati v
State of Uttar Pradesh10 that the credibility and authenticity of the
2
  Act of 2000
3
  CBSE                                                                        G
4
   JJB
5
  Criminal Appeal 41 of 2016
6
  Revision Petition 3246 of 2016
7
  Petition No 12801 of 2017
8
  CrPC
9
  Criminal Appeal 27 of 2017
10
    (2016) 12 SCC 744                                                         H
740             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     documents depends upon the circumstances of each case and that in a
      case involving conflicting school certificates, a further inquiry would be
      required. The Sessions Judge also placed reliance on the decision of this
      Court in Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath v State of Assam11.
              5. Aggrieved by the decision of the Sessions Judge, the second
B     respondent moved the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in a Criminal
      Revision. The High Court allowed the revision and declared that on the
      date of the alleged offence, the second respondent was a minor. In coming
      to this conclusion, the High Court adverted to the provisions contained in
      Section 7 A of the Act of 2000 and Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
      and Protection of Children) Rules 200712 as interpreted by this Court in
C     Ashwani Kumar Saxena v State of Madhya Pradesh13. The High
      Court held that the matriculation certificate issued by the CBSE would
      have to be given precedence over any other evidence of the date of
      birth, having due regard to the provisions contained in Rule 12(3)(a). It
      held that the validity of the matriculation certificate issued by the CBSE
D     had not been disputed but what was in dispute was the date of birth
      which was recorded in the certificate. The Court took notice of the fact
      that during the course of the investigation, the investigating officer had
      collected the driving licence, Aadhaar card, voter’s ID and eighth standard
      mark sheets which indicated that the date of birth of the second
      respondent was 27 December 1995. The matriculation certificate
E     indicated that the date of birth was 17 December 1998. According to
      the medical report, the second respondent was about nineteen years of
      age on 9 November 2016. Ultimately, in the view of the High Court,
      precedence would have to be given to the date of birth which was
      indicated in the matriculation certificate. The decision of the JJB, as
F     affirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge, was set aside and the claim of
      juvenility was allowed.
              6. Notice was issued in the Special Leave Petition was instituted
      before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution on 14 January
      2019. On 16 April 2019, this Court issued notice to the CBSE and directed
G     it to produce all necessary records pertaining to the second respondent.
      CBSE was directed to file an affidavit explaining the basis on which the
      date of birth was recorded in the matriculation certificate. On 6 May
      2019 after the records were produced before this Court an affidavit was
      11
         (2001) 5 SCC 714
      12
         Rules of 2007
H     13
         (2012) 9 SCC 750
     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  741
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

filed by CBSE. An opportunity was given to the parties to respond.              A
After the parties have filed their affidavits and responses, the proceedings
have been taken up for final disposal.
      7. Ms Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant submitted that:
      (i) There is a serious dispute in regard to the authenticity of the       B
date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate issued by CBSE.
Buttressing this submission, the learned counsel submitted that:
      (a) the date of birth in the school register of Saket Vidya Sthali,
      Jedajhal, Ekka, Firozabad where the second respondent studied
      from Kindergarten to the fourth standard is 17 December 1995;             C

      (b) The date of birth in the learner’s driving license, driving licence
      and Aadhaar card of the second respondent is reflected as 17
      December 1995;
      (c) The driving licence as well as the Aadhaar card have been             D
      obtained after the second respondent voluntarily disclosed the date
      of birth as 17 December 1995;
      (d) During the course of the inquiry the Headmaster of Maa Anjani
      Public School, Shikohabad deposed before the JJB on 22 January
      2016 that the date of birth of 17 December 1998 had been recorded
                                                                                E
      on the information given by the parent and though an affidavit is
      generally obtained at the time of admission, this had not been
      done at the time of the admission of the second respondent.
      Moreover, no record in respect of the date of birth had been
      produced by the father of the second respondent at the time of
      admission; and                                                            F
      (e) The affidavit which was filed in these proceedings by CBSE
      indicates that the date of birth in its records was adopted only on
      the basis of the roll submitted by the concerned school while sending
      up its students for the matriculation examination without any further
      enquiry by CBSE;                                                          G
       (ii) In the present case, the material on the record, including the
record which was obtained by the investigating officer during the course
of the investigation, clearly indicates that the date of birth of the second
respondent is 17 December 1995;
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742                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A            (iii) The decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) of a two
      judge Bench of this Court cannot be considered in isolation in view of a
      subsequent decision of a three judge Bench in Abuzar Hossain alias
      Gulam Hossain v State of West Bengal14 and of a two judge Bench
      in Parag Bhati (supra). The last of the three decisions considers both
      the earlier two decisions; and
B
             (iv) The Act of 2000 has been repealed by the Juvenile Justice
      (Care and Protection of Children) Act 201515. The Act of 2015 came
      into force on 31 December 2015. Section 94 of the Act of 2015 does not
      give precedence to the matriculation certificate to determine the age of
      the person. Since Section 94 deals with a matter of procedure. Hence,
C     though the incident took place on 18 August 2015, the application filed
      by the second respondent claiming the benefit of juvenility will have to
      be decided in terms of the provisions contained in Section 94 of the Act
      of 2015. Having regard to the incontrovertible material on the record,
      the date of birth of the second respondent is 17 December 1995.
D           8. On the other hand, Mr Ravindra Singh, learned senior counsel
      appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that:
            (i) The JJB after a detailed enquiry came to the conclusion that
      the date of birth of the second respondent is 17 December 1998;

E            (ii) The date in the Aadhaar card or in the driving licence issued
      by the RTO may have been given wrongly by the accused for seeking
      an undue advantage. For this, he may face consequences under the law
      but that by itself does not negate the claim of juvenility where, it is found
      to be substantiated in the date of birth recorded in the matriculation
      certificate;
F
             (iii) The date recorded in the matriculation certificate must prevail
      by virtue of Rule 12(3); and
              (iv) The cross-examination of the witness, Dr Udayvir Singh Yadav,
      who was a former Principal/Manager of Saket Vidya Sthali, Jedajhal
      contains several inconsistencies consequent upon which, the certificate
G
      issued by the school cannot be regarded as of any significance. Hence,
      it is urged that the judgment of the High Court should not, in the facts of
      the present case, be interfered with.

      14
           (2012) 10 SCC 489
      15
H          Act of 2015
     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                743
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

      9. The rival submissions fall for consideration.                        A
      10. Section 7 A of the Act of 2000 provides the procedure to be
followed when a claim of juvenility is raised before a court. Section 7 A
provides thus:
      “S.7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised
      before any court.—(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised          B
      before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person
      was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court
      shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary
      (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person,
      and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a        C
      child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be:
      Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court
      and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of
      the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the
      provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder,         D
      even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of
      commencement of this Act.
      (2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
      commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward
      the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the        E
      sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no
      effect.
       Upon a claim being raised that an accused was a juvenile on the
date of the commission of the offence, the Court is required to make an
enquiry, take evidence and to determine the age of the person. The            F
court has to record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child,
stating the age as nearly as may be. Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007
contains a procedural provision governing the determination of age by
the Court or by the Board. Rule 12(3) stipulates thus:
      “12 Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.
                                                                              G
      …
      (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with
      law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court

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744               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A           or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
            evidence by obtaining—
            (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and
            in the absence whereof;
            (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play
B           school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
            (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
            authority or a panchayat;
            (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)
C           above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted
            Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.
            In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
            the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons
            to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit
            to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
D           within the margin of one year.
            and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into
            consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical
            opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age
            and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),
E           (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive
            proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict
            with law.”
            Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) provides that for the purpose of seeking
      evidence in the enquiry, the following documents would have to be
F     obtained:
            (i)    matriculation or equivalent certificate if available;
            (ii) in the absence of (i), the date of birth certificate from the
                 school first attended; and
G           (iii) in the absence; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation,
                  municipal authority or panchayat.
            Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) contains a hierarchical ordering, evident
      from the use of the language “in the absence whereof”. This indicates
      that where a matriculation or equivalent certificate is available, the
H
     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                   745
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

documents adverted to in (ii) and (iii) cannot be relied upon. The               A
matriculation certificate, in other words, is given precedence. It is in the
absence of a matriculation certificate that the date of birth certificate of
the school first attended, can be relied upon. It is in the absence of both
the matriculation and the birth certificates of the first school attended
that a birth certificate issued by the corporation, municipal authority or
                                                                                 B
panchayat could be obtained. This facet of Rule 12(3) was noticed in
the two judge Bench decision of this Court in Ashwani Kumar Saxena
(supra). Justice KSP Radhakrishnan, while holding that the procedures
laid down in the CrPC cannot be imported while making an enquiry in
regard to a claim of juvenility under the Rules of 2007 observed:
      “32. ”Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section 7-             C
      A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the
      court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain
      the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in
      the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the
      court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school        D
      first attended other than a play school. Only in the absence of
      matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate
      from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth
      certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a
      panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The
      question of obtaining medical opinion from a duly constituted              E
      Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are
      unavailable. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done,
      then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered
      necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering
      his or her age on lower side within the margin of one year.”               F
       The Court took notice of the fact that there could be situations in
which the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate, or for
that matter in the other certificates referred to in Rule 12(3)(a) may not
be correct. The Court held that where it was only when those documents
are found to be fabricated or manipulated could the date of birth as             G
reflected be discarded. The Court held:
      “34. ...There may be situations where the entry made in the
      matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate
      from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given
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746            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A           by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not
            be correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee
            functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a
            roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the
            correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of
            business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates
B
            are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile
            Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for
            age determination.”
              In the view of the Court, it was only if the above conditions were
      fulfilled, that a medical report could be called.
C
             11. The decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) was
      rendered on 13 September 2012. Soon thereafter, a three judge Bench
      of this Court considered the provisions of Section 7 A and Rule 12 in
      Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain (supra). Justice RM Lodha
      (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for himself and Justice
D     Anil R Dave observed:
            “39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court
            and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be
            catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be
            given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to
E           raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in
            Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima
            facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent
            necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement
            recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may
F           not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of
            juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents
            like the school leaving certificate or the voters’ list, etc. obtained
            after conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of
            each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they
            must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar
G           Sheikh [(2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431]
            and Pawan [(2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] these
            documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra
            Singh [(2010) 13 SCC 523 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857] the documents
            viz. school leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report
H
     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  747
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

      were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of      A
      the appellant’s age. If such documents prima facie inspire
      confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents
      for the purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for
      determination of the age of the delinquent.”
       The above decision in Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain                 B
(supra) was rendered on 10 October 2012. Though the earlier decision
in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) was not cited before the Court, it
appears from the above extract that the three judge Bench observed
that the credibility and acceptability of the documents, including the school
leaving certificate, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no hard and fast rule as such could be laid down. Concurring           C
with the judgment of Justice RM Lodha, Justice TS Thakur (as the learned
Chief Justice then was) observed that directing an inquiry is not the
same thing as declaring the accused to be a juvenile. In the former the
Court simply records a prima facie conclusion while in the latter a
declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Hence the approach at the         D
stage of directing the inquiry has to be more liberal:
      “48. If one were to adopt a wooden approach, one could say
      nothing short of a certificate, whether from the school or a municipal
      authority would satisfy the court’s conscience, before directing
      an enquiry. But, then directing an enquiry is not the same thing as       E
      declaring the accused to be a juvenile. The standard of proof
      required is different for both. In the former, the court simply records
      a prima facie conclusion. In the latter, the court makes a declaration
      on evidence, that it scrutinises and accepts only if it is worthy of
      such acceptance. The approach at the stage of directing the
      enquiry has of necessity to be more liberal, lest, there is avoidable     F
      miscarriage of justice. Suffice it to say that while affidavits may
      not be generally accepted as a good enough basis for directing an
      enquiry, that they are not so accepted is not a rule of law but a
      rule of prudence. The Court would, therefore, in each case weigh
      the relevant factors, insist upon filing of better affidavits if the      G
      need so arises, and even direct, any additional information
      considered relevant including the information regarding the age
      of the parents, the age of siblings and the like, to be furnished
      before it decides on a case to case basis whether or not an enquiry

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748            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A           under Section 7-A ought to be conducted. It will eventually depend
            on how the court evaluates such material for a prima facie
            conclusion that the court may or may not direct an enquiry.”
           Both these judgments have since been considered by a two judge
      Bench of this Court in Prag Bhati (supra), where it was observed:
B           “36. It is settled position of law that if the matriculation or equivalent
            certificates are available and there is no other material to prove
            the correctness of date of birth, the date of birth mentioned in the
            matriculation certificate has to be treated as a conclusive proof of
            the date of birth of the accused. However, if there is any doubt or
C           a contradictory stand is being taken by the accused which raises
            a doubt on the correctness of the date of birth then as laid down
            by this Court in Abuzar Hossain[Abuzar Hossain v. State of
            W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] , an enquiry for
            determination of the age of the accused is permissible which has
            been done in the present case.”
D
            12. The Act of 2015 came into force on 15 January 2016. Section
      111 repeals the earlier Act of 2000 but stipulates that despite the repeal,
      anything done or any action taken under the said Acts shall be deemed
      to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the
      new legislation. Section 94 contains provisions in regard to the
E     determination of age, is in the following terms:
            “94. Presumption and determination of age.- (1) Where, it is
            obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance
            of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this
            Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said
F           person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such
            observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and
            proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the
            case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.
            (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds
G           for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child
            or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall
            undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence
            by obtaining —

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     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                  749
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

      (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation   A
      or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board,
      if available; and in the absence thereof;
      (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
      authority or a panchayat;
      (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be         B
      determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age
      determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or
      the Board:
      Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of
      the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen              C
      days from the date of such order.
      (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the
      age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this
      Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
                                                                                D
       Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate
from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the
concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above).
In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth
certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is
only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of          E
medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant
change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of
the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i)
the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it
was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date      F
of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In
Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well
as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same
category.
       13. Ms Jaiswal submitted that Section 94 deals with a matter of
                                                                                G
procedure. Hence, it was urged that though the incident in the present
case is alleged to have taken place on 18 August 2015 and the application
claiming the benefit of juvenility was submitted on 9 December 2015,
the application should be governed by the provisions of Section 94 and
not by Section 12(3) of the Rules of 2007. For the purpose of the present
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750             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     case, we have proceeded to analyse the facts on the basis of the provisions
      of Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007 (as was urged on behalf of the second
      respondent). We have, as will be analysed hereafter, come to the
      conclusion that even on that basis, the second respondent was not a
      juvenile on the date of the incident. In other words, whether the case is
      approached from the stand point of Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007 or
B
      Section 94(2) of the 2015 Act does not ultimately make any difference
      to the conclusion.
             14. Now it is in this background that it becomes necessary for the
      Court to determine whether the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional
      jurisdiction, was justified in reversing the view of the learned Sessions
C     Judge that the second respondent was not a juvenile on the date of the
      incident. In seeking to place reliance on the date of birth (17 December
      1998) recorded in the CBSE matriculation certificate, learned counsel
      appearing on behalf of the second respondent has submitted that under
      the provisions of Rule 12(3)(a) the said certificate has precedence over
D     any other evidentiary document. In the course of the hearing of the
      appeal, we directed the CBSE to produce its records and to file an affidavit
      indicating the basis on which the date of birth was recorded in the
      matriculation certificate. The affidavit filed by the CBSE indicates that
      the date of birth in the records maintained by the CBSE was recorded
      purely on the basis of the final list of students forwarded by Maa Anjani
E     Senior Secondary School, Etah Road, Shikohabad. The affidavit of the
      Assistant Secretary, CBSE states:
            “… Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Etah Road, Shikohabad,
            sent Final list of Students registered for Class IX (2011-12) as
            (Eligible for Class X Examination Year 2013) of the School to the
F           Central Board of Secondary Education, Regional office, Allahabad.
            In the said Final List of Students registered for Class IX (2011-
            12) (Eligible for Class X Examination for year – 2013) at Serial
            No 00068 shows the name of Puneet Yadav son of Shri Rameshwar
            Singh and Smt Vishesh Devi and his date of birth has been shown
G           as 17.12.1998 which contain the Signature and Photograph of
            Puneet Yadav. The date of Entry has been shown as 08.09.2011.”
            …
            “... the Principal, Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School,
            Shikohabad, vide letter dated 04.02.2013 sent Roll Number – wise
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     SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                                    751
    PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

       List of 248 candidates for class X-2013 to the Assistant Secretary         A
       (Examination), C.B.S.E., Allahabad. Name of Puneet Yadav son
       of Rameshwar Singh and Mrs Vishesh Devi, Roll No 5156848
       has been shown with date of birth as 17.12.1998 at page No 896
       of the List, with the signature of Puneet Yadav.”
       …                                                                          B
        “… the Certificate for Secondary School Examination (Session
       2011-13) (true copy of which was been appended as Annexure
       CA-1 received by the Central Board of Secondary Education with
       the Order dated 16.04.2019 of this Hon’ble Court) showing the
       Date of Birth of Puneet Yadav as 17.12.1998 was issued on the              C
       basis of aforementioned records of the Central Board of Secondary
       Education.”
       CBSE has stated before this Court that the date recorded in the
matriculation certificate was purely on the basis of the final list of students
forwarded by the Headmaster of Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School,                D
Shikohabad. The Headmaster of the Maa Anjani Senior Secondary
School, Shikohabad deposed during the enquiry before the JJB, Firozabad.
In the course of her examination, Headmaster Dipti Solanki stated:
       “...We note down the date of birth of the student at the time of
       admission as per the information given by the parents and at the           E
       same time we obtain an affidavit but we could not procure an
       affidavit from this student. I have committed a mistake by not
       procuring an Affidavit from this student. The date of birth was
       entered on the basis of the information given by the parent/father.”
       The Headmaster further stated:                                             F
       “...The father did not produce any record at the time of admission
       in respect of the date of birth of the student. They would have
       been asked to produce the record of class 4 at the time of admission
       but they did not. I cannot tell the reason thereof. The students are
       admitted without any document upto class 5.”
                                                                                  G
       The above deposition indicates that the second respondent was
admitted to Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Shikohabad in the
fifth standard and was a student of the school until he completed his
matriculation. The second respondent attended the Saket Vidyasthali,
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752             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     Jedajhal, Firozabad until the fourth standard. The school register and
      transfer certificate form of that school specifically contains an entry in
      regard to the date of birth of the second respondent as 17 December
      1995. Mr Ravindra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
      the second respondent has urged that the discrepancies which have been
      brought out in the course of the cross-examination of the former Manager
B
      of the school would indicate that there is a doubt in regard to the
      authenticity of that certificate. However, in our view, what must weigh
      against the second respondent’s submission is that the date of birth which
      has been recorded in the certificate of the Saket Vidya Sthali completely
      matches the date of birth which was voluntarily disclosed by the second
C     respondent both while obtaining his driving licence as well as the Aadhaar
      card. In both those documents, the originals of which were seized during
      the course of the investigation and have been produced before this Court,
      the date of birth is reflected as 17 December 1995. The driving license
      and the Aadhaar card are not standalone documents. The submission of
      the learned senior counsel that the date of birth in those documents may
D
      have been furnished by the accused to obtain an undue advantage cannot
      simply be accepted since it tallies with the date of birth indicated in the
      school records of Saket Vidya Sthali school. It is evident from the above
      analysis that the date of birth which was forwarded in the roll of students
      of Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School, Shikohabad was the sole basis
E     of the date of birth which was recorded in the matriculation certificate.
      The date of birth in the records of Maa Anjani Senior Secondary School
      where the second respondent was a student from Class V to Class X is
      without any underlying document, as stated by the Principal in the course
      of the enquiry before the JJB. On the other hand, there is a clear and
      unimpeachable evidence in the form of the date of birth which has been
F
      recorded in the records of Saket Vidya Sthali school which is supported
      by the voluntary disclosure made by the second respondent while
      obtaining both the Aadhaar card and the driving licence. The High Court
      reversed the findings of the Sessions Judge purely on the basis of the
      matriculation certificate. For the reasons which we have indicated, the
G     date of birth as reflected therein cannot be accepted as authentic or
      credible. Once we come to the conclusion, as we have, that the date of
      birth of the second respondent is 17 December 1995, he was not entitled
      to the claim of juvenility as of the date of the alleged incident which took
      place on 18 August 2015.
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      SANJEEV KUMAR GUPTA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR                             753
     PRADESH [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

      15. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the      A
impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 14 November
2018. Criminal Revision 2952 of 2017 shall in consequence stand
dismissed. The order passed by the Sessions Judge, confirming the
decision of the JJB rejecting the claim of juvenility is accordingly
maintained. The second respondent shall accordingly be dealt with in
                                                                            B
accordance with law on the basis of the finding recorded in the present
judgment, rejecting the claim of juvenility.


Devika Gujral                                             Appeal allowed.

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