Holding

The termination orders were illegal as they were punitive, arbitrary, and violative of Article 311(2) and principles of natural justice, and therefore were set aside with reinstatement of the petitioners.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the termination of two women judicial officers, Sarita Choudhary and Aditi Kumar Sharma, who were dismissed during their probation on the basis of low case disposal rates, adverse Annual Confidential Report (ACR) remarks, and pending complaints. The petitioners argued that the adverse remarks were not communicated in time, that the complaints were either closed or advisory, and that the terminations were punitive, stigmatic, and violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution and principles of natural justice. The Court held that the terminations were indeed punitive and arbitrary, as the High Court had relied on undisclosed adverse remarks and complaints without affording the officers a fair hearing. Consequently, the termination orders, the High Court resolutions, and the State Government orders were set aside, and the officers were reinstated with seniority, though without back wages. The judgment also highlighted the need for gender‑sensitive considerations in evaluating women judicial officers, especially in the context of pregnancy, miscarriage, and the COVID‑19 pandemic.

Issues considered

The termination of probationary judicial officers is punitive and stigmatic, violating Article 311(2) and natural justice.
Whether adverse remarks in ACRs were communicated timely and whether the officers were given a chance to be heard.
Whether the High Court's reliance on complaints and performance metrics constituted an arbitrary discharge.
Whether gender‑related factors such as pregnancy, miscarriage, and pandemic‑related disruptions should influence the assessment of performance.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 311
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994s. Rule 11(a), s. Rule 11(b), s. Rule 11(c), s. Rule 11(d)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the correctness of order passed by the High Court terminating two women Judicial Officers from service during probation period; and whether the cessation of services of two Judicial Officers is punitive, arbitrary and thus, Judiciary – Subordinate judiciary – Judicial officers – Termination from service during probation – Six women Judicial Officers terminated on the recommendation of the Administrative Committee of High Court on the ground of low disposal rate of cases and

Subjects

Termination of Judicial OfficersWomen judicial officersProbationReinstatement in serviceAdministrative Committee of the High CourtTrainee judgeVacant courtFull CourtFailure to meet unit criteriaACRInappropriate behaviour with advocatesNot taking interest in judicial workProcedural lapses by trainee judgeFailed to monitor sensitive/suspicious filesGlobal pandemic COVID-19Annual Inspection reportJudge not recording statement of complainantCordial relations between bar and benchPortfolio judgeCreating influence on policeReleasing dogs behind complainantUnnecessary comments against advocate out of animosityInappropriate post on social mediaAdverse remarkStigmatic terminationNon-stigmatic terminationPendency and disposal of casesUnit value for criminal casesPrincipal Registrar (Vigilance)Punitive terminationSubstantive appointeeNon-communication of adverse remarksUnsatisfactory performance of probationerArbitrary or discriminatory dischargeInterpersonal skillsManagerial skillsCourt managementConduct of business in court and officePermission to take criminal action against judicial officerEntry of women in legal professionPromoting gender equalityGender stereotypesWomen’s representation in judiciaryDiscrimination against womenRight to workRight to equal treatmentEqual protection of laws during pregnancy and maternityPsychological consequences of miscarriageObstetrics complicationsInsidious patriarchal systemSensitive work environment for female judicial officersInternational Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979

Judgment

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1456 : 2025 INSC 289

Sarita Choudhary
v.
High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 142 of 2024)
28 February 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna* and
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the correctness of order passed by the High
Court terminating two women Judicial Officers from service during
probation period; and whether the cessation of services of two
Judicial Officers is punitive, arbitrary and thus, contrary to law.

Headnotes†
Judiciary – Subordinate judiciary – Judicial officers –
Termination from service during probation – Six women
Judicial Officers terminated on the recommendation of the
Administrative Committee of High Court on the ground of
low disposal rate of cases and alleged performance issue –
Supreme Court, in a suo moto writ petition, requested the Full
Court of the High Court to reconsider the termination order –
Consequently, only four officers reinstated – Two other officers-
petitioners due to low grades in ACRs, low unit value, and
complaints regarding management and interpersonal skills,
terminated from service during probation – Challenge to –
High Court did not deem proper to reinstate the petitioners –
Correctness:
Held: ACRs which were adverse in nature were either not
communicated in time and even after an explanation was received,
no effort to expunge the adverse remarks made in the said ACRs
on the basis of a consideration of the explanation, they were simply
rejected – Reference to the consistent “poor performance” not in
accordance with the record, the record speaks otherwise – Inherent
contradictions in the ACRs – ‘Other material’ - complaints were either
concluded or pending against them – If the complaints formed the
foundation for these officers to be terminated, an opportunity had
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1457

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

to be given before termination having regard to Art. 311 read with
relevant Conduct Rules – Termination of the two judicial officers
is punitive, arbitrary and thus, illegal – Terminations were by way
of punishment as the surrounding circumstances show that the
terminations were, inter alia, founded on the allegations of the
complaints of misconduct and “inefficiency” and were stigmatic in
nature – Even though many of the complaints against these officers
may have been closed or resulted in advisories/warnings, they
could not have been the basis for the impugned terminations –
Resolutions of the Administrative Committee followed by the
Resolution of the Full Court, orders of the High Court and the
Government Orders insofar as the two officers, illegal and contrary
to the established principles of law and, liable to be set-aside –
Thus, the termination orders vis-a-vis the petitioners set aside
including the Resolution and the order/letter of the High Court, order
of the State Government and all consequential adverse orders, if
any – Petitioners reinstated in their service with all consequential
benefits – Constitution of India – Art. 311 – Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
1994 – r.11(c). [Paras 16, 16.1, 18]

Service law – Probation – Services of a probationer – When,
non-stigmatic termination:
Held: Services of a probationer could result either in a confirmation
in the post or ended by way of termination simpliciter – However, if
a probationer is terminated from service owing to a misconduct as
a punishment, the termination would cause a stigma on him – If a
probationer is unsuitable for a job and has been terminated then
such a case is non-stigmatic as it is a termination simpliciter – Thus,
the performance of a probationer has to be considered in order
to ascertain whether it has been satisfactory or unsatisfactory – If
the performance of a probationer has been unsatisfactory, he is
liable to be terminated by the employer without conducting any
inquiry – No right of hearing is reserved with the probationer and
hence, there would be no violation of principles of natural justice
in such a case – Test is, whether, in a given case the termination
is simpliciter or by way of punishment – Even though a probationer
has no right to hold a post, it would not imply that the mandate
of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution could be violated inasmuch
as there cannot be any arbitrary or discriminatory discharge or
1458 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

an absence of application of mind in the matter of assessment
of performance and consideration of relevant materials – Thus,
in deciding whether, in a given case, a termination was by way
of punishment or not, the courts to look into the substance of
the matter and not the form – Constitution of India – Arts 14, 16.
[Paras 12, 12.3]

Gender justice – Women in Indian judiciary – Role in promoting
gender equality – Prevention of discrimination during
pregnancy and maternity – Consequences of miscarriage –
Elucidation:
Held: There has been entry of women into the legal profession,
the retention of women and growth of their numbers in the
profession, and the advancement of women to senior echelons of
the profession – Greater representation of women in the judiciary,
would improve the overall quality of judicial decision making –
Advancing women’s greater participation in the judiciary also plays
a role in promoting gender equality – Freedom from discrimination
or equal protection of the laws during pregnancy and maternity of
a woman are precious rights for women workforce – If pregnancy
results in the birth of a child, it brings not only joy to the parents
of the child but also sense of fulfilment to the young mother –
On the other hand, a pregnancy miscarriage has deep physical,
mental and psychological aftereffects on a woman – Though there
is varying amount of physical aftereffects, the psychological and
social effects may be more severe and long lasting – Miscarriage
affects a person’s identity, leading to disappointments and
challenges to motherhood identity and role, stigma and isolation,
amongst other aspects – It is not enough to find comfort solely in
the growing number of female judicial officers if a sensitive work
environment and guidance cannot be secured for them – High Court
erred in acting agnostic to, inter alia, claims of insubordination of
petitioner-S and acute medical and emotional conditions battled by
petitioner-A – Despite still reeling from the effects of a severe case
of Covid-19 and a miscarriage, the ACR for 2021 of petitioner-A was
downgraded by the Portfolio Judge from ‘B-Very Good’ to ‘C-Good’
only considering ‘pendency and disposal’ – While gender is not a
rescue for poor performance but it is a critical consideration which
must weigh for holistic decision-making at certain times and stages
of a woman judicial officer. [Paras 17-17.4, 17.7]
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1459

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Case Law Cited
Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India [1984] 2 SCR 453 : (1984) 2
SCC 369; Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National
Centre for Basis Sciences, Calcutta [1999] 1 SCR 532 : (1999) 3
SCC 60; Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2024]
8 SCR 901 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2139; Registrar General,
High Court of Gujarat v. Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti [2013]
11 SCR 395 : (2013) 16 SCC 59; Khem Chand v. Union of India
[1958] SCR 1080; Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi
PGI of Medical Sciences [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 41 : (2002) 1 SCC
520; Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P [2000] 3 SCR 529 :
(2000) 5 SCC 152; Amar Singh v. Union of India [2011] 6 SCR
403 : (2011) 7 SCC 69; Dr. Vijayakumaran CPV v. Central University
of Kerala & Ors. [2020] 3 SCR 374 : (2020) 12 SCC 426; State
of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra [1971] 2 SCR 191 : (1970) 2
SCC 871; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 SCR 814 :
(1974) 2 SCC 831 : AIR 1974 SC 2192; Jagdish Mitter v. Union of
India, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 75 : AIR 1964 SC 449; Parshotam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36;
Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar v. Union of India (2009) 16 SCC 146;
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. Tarun Kanti
Sengupta [1986] 2 SCR 178 : (1986) 3 SCC 156; Ishwar Chand
Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana [1988] Supp. 1 SCR
396 : (1988) 3 SCC 370; High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Satya
Narayan Jhavar [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 532 : (2001) 7 SCC 161;
Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Senior Secondary School v. JAJ
Vasu Sena [2019] 12 SCR 881 : (2019) 17 SCC 157; Rajasthan
High Court v. Ved Priya [2020] 4 SCR 971 : (2021) 13 SCC 151;
High Court of Judicature at Patna v. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad
Sinha (1997) 10 SCC 409; Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of
Madhya Pradesh [1995] Supp. 5 SCR 679 : (1996) 1 SCC 560;
Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir [2010] 11 SCR
699 : (2010) 12 SCC 783; Registrar, High Court of Gujarat v. CG
Sharma [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 77 : (2005) 1 SCC 132; Rajesh
Kumar Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand [2011] 3 SCR 823 : (2011)
4 SCC 447; Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of
Oncology, Bangalore v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar [1992] Supp.
2 SCR 250: (1992) 4 SCC 719; Arundhati Ashok Walavalkar v.
State of Maharashtra [2011] 1 SCR 355 : (2011) 11 SCC 324; Ram
Murti Yadav v. State of U.P. [2019] 14 SCR 818 : (2020) 1 SCC
801; Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil v. State of Karnataka [2010]
1460 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

7 SCR 1061 : (2010) 8 SCC 155; State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore
Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 689; Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja v.
Rajkot Municipal Corporation [2007] 10 SCR 1124 : (2007) 10
SCC 71; Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Inter
College, Thora [1984] 3 SCR 752 : (1984) 3 SCC 384; Hindustan
Paper Corpn. v. Purnendu Chakrobarty & Ors. [1996] Supp. 8
SCR 159 : (1996) 11 SCC 404; Oil & Natural Gas Commission v.
Dr Md. S. Iskender Ali [1980] 3 SCR 603 : (1980) 3 SCC 428;
Principal, Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education & Research,
Pondicherry v. S. Andel & Ors. (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 609; Oswal
Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad v. Presiding Officer
(1998) 3 SCC 225; Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya [2020] 3
SCR 833 : (2020) 7 SCC 469; Nitisha v. Indian Army (2021) 15
SCC 125 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
V Klier, P Geller and J Ritsher, ‘Affective Disorders in the Aftermath
of Miscarriage: A Comprehensive Review’ (2002) 5 Archives of
Women’s Mental Health 129-149; Siobhan Quenby and others,
‘Miscarriage Matters: The Epidemiological, Physical, Psychological,
and Economic Costs of Early Pregnancy Loss’ (2021) The Lancet,
May; P Gerber-Epstein, RD Leichtentritt and Y Benyamini, ‘The
Experience of Miscarriage in First Pregnancy: The Women’s
Voices’ (2008) 33(1) Death Studies 1-29; OB Van den Akker, ‘The
Psychological and Social Consequences of Miscarriage’ (2011)
6(3) Expert Review of Obstetrics & Gynecology 295 – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994.

List of Keywords
Termination of Judicial Officers; Women judicial officers; Probation;
Reinstatement in service; Administrative Committee of the High
Court; Trainee judge; Vacant court; Full Court; Failure to meet unit
criteria; ACR; Inappropriate behaviour with advocates; Not taking
interest in judicial work; Procedural lapses by trainee judge; Failed
to monitor sensitive/suspicious files; Global pandemic COVID-19;
Annual Inspection report; Judge not recording statement of
complainant; Cordial relations between bar and bench; Portfolio
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1461

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

judge; Creating influence on police; Releasing dogs behind
complainant; Unnecessary comments against advocate out of
animosity; Inappropriate post on social media; Adverse remark;
Stigmatic termination; Non-stigmatic termination; Pendency and
disposal of cases; Unit value for criminal cases; Principal Registrar
(Vigilance); Punitive termination; Substantive appointee; Non-
communication of adverse remarks; Unsatisfactory performance
of probationer; Arbitrary or discriminatory discharge; Interpersonal
skills; Managerial skills; Court management; Conduct of business
in court and office; Permission to take criminal action against
judicial officer; Entry of women in legal profession; Promoting
gender equality; Gender stereotypes; Women’s representation in
judiciary; Discrimination against women; Right to work; Right to
equal treatment; Equal protection of laws during pregnancy and
maternity; Psychological consequences of miscarriage; Obstetrics
complications; Insidious patriarchal system; Sensitive work
environment for female judicial officers; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979.

Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 142 of 2024
(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
With
Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No. 2 of 2023 and Writ Petition (C) No.
233 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
By Courts Motion.
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Sumeer Sodhi.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Indira Jaising, R Basant, Sr. Advs., Aditya Vaibhav Singh,
Sarad Kumar Singhania, Arjun Garg, Ms. Kriti Gupta, Ms. Sagun
Srivastava, Brahma Prakash Soni, Ms. Christi Jain, Mann Arora,
Ms. Akriti Sharma, Harsh Jain, Om Sudhir Vidyarthi, Ojusya Joshi,
Prem Prakash, Sumeer Sodhi, Varun Tankha, Prasang Sharma,
Sadeeq Ur Rahman, Ms. Sandali Sharma, Bhanwar Pal Singh
1462 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Jadon, Mrs. Rekha Pandey, L C Patne, Gulab Sharma, Hitesh
Sharma, Raghav Pandey, Ms. Sharmishtha Chaudhury, Ms. Charu
Mathur, Gaurav Agrawal.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Nagarathna, J.
INDEX*

Introduction: ................................................................................ 3
Genesis of the Controversy: ...................................................... 3
Factual Backdrop: ....................................................................... 11
Re: Sarita Choudhary - W.P. (C) 142/2024: ....................... 11
Re: Aditi Kumar Sharma - W.P.(C) No. 233/2024: ............ 24
Submissions of learned Amicus Curiae – Sri Gaurav Aggarwal, 33
Senior Advocate: .........................................................................
Re: Sarita Choudhary: ........................................................ 33
Re: Aditi Kumar Sharma: ................................................... 38
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner-Sarita Choudhary: ... 42
Submissions on behalf of Petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma: ... 45
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent-High Court: ......... 60
Points for Consideration: ........................................................... 71
Discussion: ................................................................................... 76
Analysis: ....................................................................................... 90
Re: Sarita Choudhary: ......................................................... 90
Re: Aditi Kumar Sharma: .................................................... 101
Women Workforce: Women in the Indian Judiciary: .............. 118
Conclusion: ................................................................................... 123

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1463

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Introduction:
The careers of two women Judicial Officers out of six have to be
decided in these writ petitions filed by them as well as in Suo Moto
Writ Petition (Civil) No.2 of 2023. Out of six women Judicial Officers
who were terminated from service during their probation period, four
Judicial Officers have been reinstated pursuant to the resolution of
the Full Court of the respondent-Madhya Pradesh High Court dated
01.08.2024 on certain terms. However, insofar as two Judicial Officers,
namely, Ms. Sarita Choudhary and Ms. Aditi Kumar Sharma, there
has been no revocation of the earlier resolution and consequently,
their termination under challenge in these writ petitions have to be
decided by this Court.

Genesis of the Controversy:
2. On 23.05.2023, six women Judicial Officers serving in the State of
Madhya Pradesh (Civil Judges, Junior Division) were terminated on
the recommendation of the Administrative Committee of High Court of
Madhya Pradesh. Earlier that month, the Administrative Committees
of the High Court had met on 08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023 for
shortlisting of officers for confirmation of judicial officers on probation.
The shortlist were then recommended to the Full Court of the High
Court for confirmation. On 13.05.2023, the High Court issued an
order confirming a list of 403 Judicial Officers and recommending
termination of services, inter alia, of the petitioners herein. On the
basis of the aforesaid order issued by the High Court, the termination
order(s) in respect of, inter alia, the petitioners herein were passed
on 23.05.2023, thereby, discharging the petitioners from their duties.
2.1 On 02.09.2023, three women Judicial Officers of the District
Judiciary of the State of Madhya Pradesh made a representation
to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India alleging their termination
from service as illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to the Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 1994 (for short, “Recruitment Rules”). Upon
considering the said representation, Hon’ble the Chief Justice
of India, by an administrative Order dated 11.11.2023, directed
that the matter be registered by way of a suo moto writ petition
in respect of all six women judicial officers who were terminated
from service.
1464 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

2.2 By the time the matter was registered on 07.12.2023, one of
the Judicial Officers, Ms. Sonakshi Joshi, had filed Writ Petition
(C) No.849/2023 before this Court invoking Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. However, by Order dated 22.08.2023,
she withdrew the said writ petition with liberty to secure relief
from the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Similarly, three other
Officers, namely, (1) Ms. Rachna Atulkar Joshi; (2) Ms. Jyoti
Varkade; and (3) Ms. Priya Sharma, who had also filed Writ
Petition (C) Nos.1325, 1339 and 1357 of 2023 respectively
under Article 32 withdrew their writ petitions with liberty to
approach the Madhya Pradesh High Court vide order dated
08.12.2023.
2.3 However, as these four petitioners, who withdrew their writ
petitions from this Court, were not aware of the fact that this
Court had registered Suo Moto Writ Petition as Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India had already taken cognizance of their
grievance, we found it just that notice must be issued to them
in the suo motu writ petition.
2.4 On 23.07.2024, this Court had requested the Full Court of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh to reconsider the termination
of the six women judicial officers. Pursuant to our order dated
23.07.2024, the Full Court of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
re-considered its earlier resolutions and orders impugned in
the suo motu writ petition as well as the other writ petitions,
and consequently, in its 530th Full Court Meeting held on
01.08.2024, four officers, namely, Smt. Jyoti Varkade, Sushri
Sonakshi Joshi, Sushri Priya Sharma, and Smt. Rachna Atulkar
Joshi were considered for reinstatement. However, there was
no quietus to the controversy qua two other officers namely,
Sushri Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma as the
Full Court of the High Court did not deem it proper to reinstate
them. For ease of reference, the extract of the Minutes of 530th
Full Court Meeting dated 01.08.2024 at 5.00 P.M are extracted
as follows: -
“xxx
SUB NO.01. Consideration of the matter relating
to termination of 06 Civil Judges, Junior Division of
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1465

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ (C)
No. 2/2023 in Re: Termination of Civil Judge, Junior
Division has been pleased to pass following order
on 23.07.2024: -
“Learned senior counsel and Amicus
Curiae submitted that although earlier,
the concerned Committee had reviewed
the matter and had reiterated its earlier
resolution, nevertheless, the Full Court of
the High Court could reconsider the matter
and depending upon its resolutions, further
consideration of these matters could be
taken up. In the circumstances, we request
the Full Court of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh to reconsider its resolutions and
orders impugned in these suo moto writ
petition and other writ petitions filed by
the parties. On a reconsideration by Full
Court of the High Court, a copy of the
resolution could be placed before this Court
by learned counsel for the respondent-High
Court preferably within a period of four
weeks from today”.
In view of the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court,
Full Court considered the matter and resolves that
the termination of following 04 Civil Judges, Junior
Division be revoked with a condition that they be
posted as Civil Judge, Junior Division with a probation
period of one year without backwages and they be
placed at the bottom of their respective batch. They
will regain their original seniority subject to their
confirmation.
xxx
Full Court also considered the matter of Sushri Sarita
Choudhary, the then II-Civil Judge Junior Division,
Umaria and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma, the then
V-Civil Judge, Junior Division, Tikamgarh. After
considering their ACRs Gradings, Disposal Statistics,
1466 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Adverse Remarks, complaints made against them and
their overall performance, Full Court is of the view
that the termination of Sushri Sarita Choudhary and
Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma cannot be revoked. In
view thereof Full Court resolves to reiterate its earlier
resolution dated 11.05.2023 in respect of Sushri
Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma.
Full Court further resolves to place adverse remarks
and other material against them before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in a sealed cover.”
2.5 In these circumstances, the lis in respect of the four officers
stood closed and present adjudication remains only in respect
of petitioner-Sarita Choudhary and petitioner-Aditi Kumar
Sharma. For immediate reference, our order dated 03.09.2024
extracted as under:
“SMW(C) No.2/2023
Pursuant to our order dated 23.07.2024, the Full
Court of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has
re-considered its earlier resolutions and orders
impugned in the suo motu writ petition as well as
other writ petitions filed by the respective petitioners
which is evident by Minutes dated 01.08.2024 of
530th Full Court Meeting held on the said date. The
following four officers, namely, Smt. Jyoti Varkade,
Sushri Sonakshi Joshi, Sushri Priya Sharma and
Smt. Rachna Atulkar Joshi have been considered for
reinstatement subject to certain terms and conditions.
Insofar as two other officers are concerned, namely,
Sushri Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi Kumar
Sharma, there is no revocation of the earlier orders
and resolutions and the Full Court has also further
resolved to place the adverse remarks and other
materials against them before this Court in a sealed
cover.
For ease of reference, the extract of the Minutes of
530th Full Court Meeting dated 01.08.2024 at 5.00
P.M is extracted as follows: -
“xxx
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1467

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

SUB NO.01. Consideration of the matter
relating to termination of 06 Civil Judges,
Junior Division of Madhya Pradesh Judicial
Service.
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ
(C) No. 2/2023 in Re: Termination of Civil
Judge, Junior Division has been pleased
to pass following order on 23.07.2024:-
“Learned senior counsel and Amicus
Curiae submitted that although earlier,
the concerned Committee had reviewed
the matter and had reiterated its earlier
resolution, nevertheless, the Full Court of
the High Court could reconsider the matter
and depending upon its resolutions, further
consideration of these matters could be
taken up.
In the circumstances, we request the Full
Court of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
to reconsider its resolutions and orders
impugned in these suo moto writ petition
and other writ petitions filed by the parties.
On a reconsideration by Full Court of the
High Court, a copy of the resolution could
be placed before this Court by learned
counsel for the respondent-High Court
preferably within a period of four weeks
from today”.
In view of the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court,
Full Court considered the matter and resolves that
the termination of following 04 Civil Judges, Junior
Division be revoked with a condition that they be
posted as Civil Judge, Junior Division with a probation
period of one year without backwages and they be
placed at the bottom of their respective batch. They
will regain their original seniority subject to their
confirmation.
1468 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Sr. Name of the Officers whose termination is
No. to be revoked

1. Smt. Jyoti Varkade, the then CJ, Jr. Division,
Timarni [Harda]

2. Sushri Sonakshi Joshi, the then V AJ To I
CJ, Jr. Division, Morena

3. Sushri Priya Sharma, the then I CJ,
Jr. Division, Dr. Ambedkar Nagar [Indore]

4. Smt. Rachna Atulkar Joshi, the then II CJ,
Jr. Division, Teonthar [Rewa]

Full Court also considered the matter of Sushri Sarita
Choudhary, the then II Civil Judge Junior Division,
Umaria and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma, the then
V Civil Judge, Junior Division, Tikamgarh. After
considering their ACRs Gradings, Disposal Statistics,
Adverse Remarks, complaints made against them and
their overall performance, Full Court is of the view
that the termination of Sushri Sarita Choudhary and
Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma cannot be revoked. In
view thereof Full Court resolves to reiterate its earlier
resolution dated 11.05.2023 in respect of Sushri
Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma.
Full Court further resolves to place adverse remarks
and other material against them before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in a sealed cover.”
Learned senior counsel Shri R Basant, appearing
for the aforesaid three officers, namely, Smt. Jyoti
Varkade, Sushri Priya Sharma and Smt. Rachna
Atulkar Joshi submitted that these officers have no
grievance with regard to the resolution passed as
such. The submission regarding payment of salary
from the date of termination till reinstatement is
rejected.
Shri R Basant, learned senior counsel urged that
the High Court may issue orders as expeditiously
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1469

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

as possible and within a period of four weeks from
today so that the aforesaid officers on reinstatement
may join their duties.
In the circumstances, the lis in suo motu writ petition
in respect of the four officers stand closed.
Ms. Tanvi Dubey, learned counsel, who appeared for
Sushri Sonakshi Joshi, also submitted that her client
has accepted the aforesaid resolution.
It is needless to observe that these officers on
regaining their original seniority as stated above, shall
be granted continuity in service and all consequential
benefits except back wages.
Insofar as Sushri Sarita Choudhary and Sushri Aditi
Kumar Sharma are concerned, the Full Court has
stated that Resolutions and Orders passed as against
them cannot be revoked.
We appreciate the assistance rendered by learned
senior counsel and learned Amicus Curiae and
learned counsel who have appeared for the respective
parties and particularly Shri Arjun Garg, who has
appeared for the High Court.
List the matter on 24.09.2024 to hear regarding the
case of other two judicial officers.”
3. We find it necessary to briefly enumerate the facts relevant to the
career trajectory and service details of the two petitioners and other
necessary facts relevant to the present adjudication.

Factual Backdrop:

Re: Sarita Choudhary - W.P. (C) 142/2024:
3.1 By Order Fa.No.3(B)3/2015/21-B(One), issued in December
2016, the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs of the
respondent-State appointed the Petitioner in W.P. (C) 142/2024
to the post of Civil Judge Class-II (Entry Level) in the Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service on probation of two years from the
1470 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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date she assumed charge. On 25.01.2017, the said petitioner
was appointed as Civil Judge, Class-2 on probation for two
years. Her initial positing as a trainee Judge was at Raisen,
Madhya Pradesh. For this period, the petitioner has drawn
our attention to the fact that for her first year as a trainee
judge i.e. for the period from 25.01.2017 to 31.12.2017, the
Annual Confidential Report (ACR) was initially graded by the
District Judge as “good” or “very good” and “satisfactory” on
all parameters. However, subsequently the Portfolio Judge
converted the grading to C (good). A perusal of the ACR
reveals that explicitly no shortcomings were found despite
the fact that an adverse entry was later communicated to the
petitioner on 28.08.2018.
3.2 In the following year, on 05.02.2018, High Court transferred
the petitioner to Shajapur as First Civil Judge Class-II on
independent charge in the regular vacant court. Her ACR for
the period from 01.01.2018 to 31.12.2018 recorded a final
grade of ‘B-Very Good’ and also noted that she had good
conduct, was sincere and polite, and her judicial work was
good in both quantity as well as quality. Pertinent to note is
that in this time period, she earned a total of 1233.96 units
within 220 standard working days; however, her civil units
earned stood at 83.05.
3.3 We note that during the aforesaid time period, the petitioner
was posted in a vacant court, which understandably does not
see a high disposal rate in civil matters as Judicial Officers are
required to re-initiate and kickstart the entire machinery of civil
suits, sometimes from the issuance of notice(s).
3.4 Notably, her ACR for the period 01.01.2019 to 31.12.2019
carried a demoted graded of ‘C-Good’. However, she was still
reported to display good conduct of business in court and in
office. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondent-
High Court that this degrading was due to three complaints
that were filed against the petitioner in the year 2019. These
complaints alleged that the petitioner had failed to conduct
proceedings as per law, and in a criminal case even passed
an order despite pendency of counter cases. Learned Amicus
and learned senior counsel for the petitioner highlighted that
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1471

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

despite the number or nature of these complaints, it was
considered just by the Chief Justice of the High Court to close
all three complaints simply with warnings to the petitioner. She
was noted to be an average judicial officer as far as sincerity
and punctuality were concerned and her quality of judgment
was appreciated to be good. Despite a nearly threefold jump
in units earned from 83.05 to 234.15, she had failed to earn
the prescribed civil units. It is pertinent to consider that the
ACR noted as improvable her management, initiative, planning,
relations with advocates, staff and colleague judicial officers.
In our view, equally relevant is a letter that was issued to the
petitioner on 27.11.2020 stating that the remarks in the ACR
for the year 2019 were only advisory in nature and meant for
future guidance. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
Petitioner, Sri Basant contended that this Court must be alive
to the fact that despite some complaints – which were closed
with only warnings - the ACR of the petitioner observed her
as a good judicial officer and all the adverse remarks were
admittedly only advisory in nature.
3.5 Petitioner-Ms. Sarita Choudhary was then transferred to
Goharganj (Raisen) as 2nd Civil Judge, where she joined on
25.11.2019. A perusal of her ACR for the period from 01.01.2020
to 31.12.2020 reflects that she was graded ‘D i.e. Average’.
Furthermore, her ACR noted that her conduct of business was
not satisfactory as she lacked effective control over staff and
did not take initiative to clear pending cases. The petitioner was
recorded to have failed to achieve her unit criteria and also
lacked in punctuality, seriousness, transparency, and quality in
judicial work, cordiality with staff and advocates, and team work.
Two complaints were also filed against the petitioner in 2020
for lack of punctuality and in respect of an error made by the
petitioner whilst granting bail in a non-bailable offence. Perusal
of material on record shows that both of these complaints were
met with warnings from the Chief Justice and finally closed.
Adverse remarks made in the ACR were replied to by the
petitioner through a representation.
3.6 After completion of three years of probation, the petitioner’s
case was considered for confirmation by the Administrative
1472 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Committee of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 24.07.2020,
but the same was deferred in view of the pending complaints.
3.7 It is also necessary to note that in March 2020, in the wake of
Covid-19 pandemic, the unit criteria – a quantitative metric used
to assess performance of Judicial Officers - applicable to District
Judiciary including Family Courts in Madhya Pradesh, was
suspended from 16.03.2020 till 31.03.2020. As the continuing
nature of the pandemic revealed itself, the unit criteria was
eventually suspended till 31.12.2020. Pertinent to note is that
throughout 2020, several circulars had been issued by Madhya
Pradesh High Court regulating the limited functioning of the
District Judiciary. It was only on 11.12.2020 that the Madhya
Pradesh High Court issued directions to start regular but limited
physical functioning in District Courts.
3.8 For the following year being 01.01.2021 to 31.12.2021, her ACR
grade again witnessed a decline to ‘E – Poor’. It was noted that
the judicial work of the officer was not up to the mark. Although
she was noted to be efficient and had good grasp over the
subject of law, the assessing officer recorded that she lacked
sincerity and did not fulfil her administrative tasks. It was noted
that she failed to meet her unit criteria. While she disposed of
124 cases pending for more than three years, achieved 756.5
units, and also achieved 122 units through ADR, it was noted
that she failed to dispose of even a single contested civil case.
Upon comparing this ACR to the year prior, it will be seen that
the ACR noted that she had good personal relationships and
good team work. This finding in the ACR merits consideration
as it finds place despite two complaints filed in 2021 alleging
misbehaviour with colleagues, advocates, staff, parties/witness/
prosecution. Pertinently, both complaints were closed with
advisories to the petitioner from the Chief Justice of Madhya
Pradesh High Court.
3.9 Our attention was drawn to the improvement of her ACR for
the period from 01.01.2022 to 31.12.2022. This ACR assigned
to petitioner was a significant improvement from ‘E – Poor’ to
grade ‘C – Good’. It was noted that her understanding of law
and application in her judgments was appropriate and well-
reasoned. Her ability to efficiently dispose of the cases was
seen as reflective of her good legal knowledge.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1473

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

3.10 Per contra, it was highlighted that several complaints were
filed against the petitioner in 2022.
(i) Complaint No. 81/2022 dt. 12.01.2022 alleged procedural
lapses and inappropriate behaviour with advocates, parties
or witnesses. Vide Order dt.22.03.2023, the Chief Justice
of the High Court warned the petitioner to be careful in
future and to ensure that lapses should not be repeated.
(ii) Similar was the outcome of Complaint No.877/2022 dt.
29.09.2022 which was filed alleging misbehaviour by
petitioner in RCT No.310/2019, titled “State vs. Kanhaiya
Lal”.
(iii) However, in respect of 2022, one Complaint bearing
No.992/2022 (21.12.2022) wherein it was alleged that
petitioner failed to monitor 321 sensitive/suspicious files/
cases and keep track of those files, the file was kept in
abeyance by order dated 28.06.2023 of the Chief Justice
of Madhya Pradesh High Court.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner highlighted that
321 suspicious cases were indeed discovered in an almirah
(cabinet/storage) in the court room but those cases were
related to predecessor judges. A departmental inquiry was
conducted targeting the clerical staff involved, and one specific
staff member D.R. Ahirwar at position Execution Clerk was
identified and found guilty of dereliction of duty.
3.11 During her posting at Raisen, the petitioner failed to achieve
unit criteria as she achieved only 3.36 units per day. Similarly,
petitioner failed to achieve the target on civil side as she
achieved only 30.80 units. However, out of 25 targeted old
cases, the petitioner successfully disposed of 100% cases.
3.12 Dissecting and inferring from these facts, learned senior
counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the fact
that the latest ACR immediately before her termination in
2023 had in fact noted her to be a ‘Good’ judicial officer and
even observed that she had good decisive nature, managerial
skill, and that she maintained good relationships in the team.
3.13 Soon thereafter, on 10.04.2023, Ms. Sarita Choudhary
was again transferred to Umaria as 2nd Civil Judge, Junior
1474 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Division. Only a month thereafter, on 13.05.2023, the Madhya
Pradesh High Court recommended termination of services
of the petitioner. This was followed by Termination Order dt.
23.05.2023 which was received by petitioner on 26.05.2023.
Surprisingly, on 09.10.2023 i.e. several months after her
termination, adverse remarks made in petitioner’s ACR for the
year 2021 were communicated to the Judicial Officer.
3.14 For ease of reference, relevant information pertaining to
Petitioner-Sarita Choudhary are tabulated hereunder:

ACR GRADING TABLE

PERIOD GRADE
25.01.2017 to 31.12.2018 C- Good
01.01.2018 to 31.12.2018 B- Very Good
01.01.2019 to 31.12.2019 C-Good
01.01.2020 to 31.12.2020 D-Average
01.01.2021 to 31.12.2021 E-Poor
01.01.2022 to 31.12.2022 C-Good

UNIT VALUE

YEAR VALUE
2017 Trainee Judge
2018 7.11
2019 8.53
2020 3.72
Learned Amicus emphasized before this Court
that for the pre-Covid period, her unit value
was 9.3 as per page 73 of reply.
2021 6.47
2022 3.36
(3.64 as per page 108 of reply)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1475

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

LIST OF COMPLAINTS

S. COMPLAINT COMPLAINT ACTION
NO NO. & DATE
2019
1 26/2019 dt. In Case Complaint disposed
10.01.2019 No.369/2016, titled of by Hon’ble Chief
“Vipin Bedle vs. Justice by order
Rajesh Malviya” dated 25.01.2020.
the petitioner did
not proceed as per
law
2 311/2019 dt. Cases not Warning by Hon’ble
24.04.2019 & conducted as per Chief Justice
407/2019 dt. law vide order dated
07.06.2019 19.09.2021.
3 408/2019 dt. No.1501281/2016 Non-recordable
07.06.2019 (State of MP vs. Warning dated
Umaravlal)- Passed 19.09.2021 by
orders in Cr. Non- Hon’ble Chief
recordable Case Justice.
despite counter
cases are pending
adjudication.
2020
4 354/2020 dt. Remained not Advised not to leave
24.07.2020 punctual despite the headquarters
repeated warnings without prior
permission and
to sit on the dais
on time and not
to leave the dais
before court working
hours vide order
dated 28.01.2023
by Hon’ble Chief
Justice.
1476 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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S. COMPLAINT COMPLAINT ACTION
NO NO. & DATE
5 495/2020 dt. Granted bail in Warned to remain
09.10.2020 a non-bailable careful and vigilant
offence and making in future while
alteration in the passing the bail
order sheet orders and not to
repeat the mistake
as committed by her
while passing bail
order for offence u/s
304 IPC in Crime
No. 122/2020 of PS
Obedullaganj, vide
order 14.02.2023
by Hon’ble Chief
Justice.
2021
6 127/2021 dt. Misbehaviour File the complaint
24.02.2021 towards colleagues with an advice to Ms.
and seniors Sarita Choudhary
that she mend her
behavior towards her
seniors and should
remain careful in
future, vide order
dated 03.08.2022
by Hon’ble Chief
Justice.
7 130/2021 dt. Rude behaviour Advised to be careful,
02.03.2021 with advocates, vigilant while dealing
staff, parties/ with the cases and
witness/prosecution to make sincere
including not taking efforts to dispose of
interest in judicial the same as early as
work. possible, vide order
dated 22.03.2023
by Hon’ble Chief
Justice.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1477

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

S. COMPLAINT COMPLAINT ACTION
NO NO. & DATE
8 Registrar Order 05.08.2020
General – case deferred
note-sheet and a special report
12.11.2021 called for from the
concerned District
and Sessions Judge.
Report sent to
Joint Registrar on
04.12.2021
2022
9 81/2022 dt. Procedural lapses Warned to be
12.01.2022 and inappropriate careful in future
behavior with and lapses should
advocates, parties/ not be repeated in
witnesses affecting future, vide order
dignity of the court. dated 22.03.2023
by Hon’ble Chief
Justice.
10 468/2022 dt. Complaint by As per note-sheet
17.05.2022 Advocate that dated 30.09.2022,
Petitioner has done the Hon’ble Chief
work against the Justice directed that
dignity of the Court the complaint be
on 19.04.2022 filed.
Petitioner contends
that this complaint
was never
communicated to
her and cannot
be used to her
detriment
11 877/2022 dt. Re: Misbehaviour Advisory by Hon’ble
29.09.2022 with the Chief Justice to
Advocate in RCT maintain cordiality
No.310/2019 (State vide Order dated
vs. Kanhaiya Lal) 27.04.2023
1478 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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S. COMPLAINT COMPLAINT ACTION
NO NO. & DATE
12 992/2022 dt. Failed to monitor File be kept in
21.12.2022 sensitive/ abeyance by order
suspicious files/ of Hon’ble Chief
cases Justice dated
28.06.2023
2023
13 174/2023 dt. Inappropriate post File be kept in
in social media abeyance by order
15.03.2023
(Facebook) of Hon’ble Chief
Justice dated
28.06.2023
14 271/2023 dt. Certain acts of the File be kept in
Judicial Officer abeyance by order
29.04.2023
affecting the dignity of Chief Justice
of the post dated 14.05.2023
15 286/2023 dt. Unauthorized Matter/Complaint be
absence from kept in abeyance
08.05.2023
office. as per note dated
14.05.2023 of PPS.

Re: Aditi Kumar Sharma - W.P.(C) No. 233/2024:
4. It is pertinent to narrate the facts relevant to the career trajectory and
termination of Petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma in W.P(C) No.233/2024.
On 25.10.2018, Petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma was appointed and
later posted as Trainee Judge at Rajgarh, Madhya Pradesh on
probation for two years or till further orders. The petitioner’s ACR for
the period 01.01.2019 to 31.12.2019 was graded with a final grade
of ‘B – Very Good’. It was observed that the petitioner possessed
good capacity to do judicial work, good reputation and character,
and was overall a very good Judge.
4.1 The Petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma was appointed as First Civil
Judge, Class-II, at Satna in the regular court on 22.06.2020. In
ACR for the period being 01.01.2020 to 31.12.2020, the petitioner
was graded ‘C-Good’. The petitioner’s marshalling of evidence,
legal reasoning and consideration of law was appreciated. It was
also observed that petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma had made
sincere efforts to minimize pendency of civil and criminal cases.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1479

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

4.2 A perusal of the ACR for 01.01.2021 to 31.12.2021 reveals
that this petitioner was again awarded the grade ‘C – Good’
for the year. While the District and Principal Sessions Judge
had awarded the grade ‘B-Very Good’, notably, the Portfolio
Judge (High Court Judge) lowered the grading to ‘C – Good’
considering the pendency and disposal.
4.3 ACR for the year 2021 also notes that the petitioner-Aditi Kumar
Sharma exhibited good conduct of business in court and with
the office staff. However, a complaint bearing no.75/2021 dated
01.02.2021 was filed alleging the petitioner wrongfully adjourned
Civil Suit No.4A/2015 titled, “Ramashankar Pandey vs. Beva
Rachil”. The inquiry Officer found the allegation to be not proved.
4.4 The same ACR also appreciated her to be a sincere and punctual
judicial officer who successfully ensured regular entry and
uploading of accurate and complete data. Her quality of judgments
was also appreciated to be very good. Additionally, her capacity to
lead, manage, plan and decision making was noted to be good.
4.5 It must also be noted that the petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma
earned total 220.50 units within 162 standard working days.
However, she earned only 22.9 civil units.
4.6 For a contextual appreciation of the unit value earned by the
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma, our attention was drawn to
the fact that the she had a tumultuous time in the year 2021.
At that point, she was given charge of a vacant court whose
effective functioning even worsened due to the global pandemic.
In 2020, this petitioner got married on a short notice and was
hospitalized in ICU for treatment of Covid at Chirayu Hospital,
Bhopal. The petitioner was hospitalized for a period of eleven
days with further prescription of bed rest for more than ten
days after getting discharged. Furthermore in 2021, in the
month of January, the petitioner’s brother was diagnosed with
blood cancer and soon thereafter, in the month of March, the
petitioner herself suffered a miscarriage. Such practical realities
both inside and outside the courtroom would certainly merit
consideration of this Court.
4.7 Our attention was drawn by learned counsel for the respondents
to the fact that her ACR for the period 01.01.2022 to 31.12.2022
witnessed a demotion to the grade of ‘D – Average’. While the
1480 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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ACR for 2022 noted that although petitioner had been at the
same posting from 26.05.2020, a total of only 28 contested
regular cases were disposed of in 2022 and no remarkable work
was noticed in her duties as junior-in-charge of filing section.
4.8 It was also noted that despite 1500 number of cases on average
pending for adjudication before her Court, the total number
of contested and uncontested cases disposed of by her in
the entire year of 2022 was less than 200. To explain the low
disposal rate and less units earned, the petitioner attributed
the same to less number of cases ready for disposal, absence
of witnesses, non-service of notices, warrants, etc. However,
these reasons were found to be not satisfactory in relation to
lesser units earned by her.
4.9 In 2022, following complaints were registered against the
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma which merit our perusal.
(i) Complaint No. 251/2022 dated 24.02.2022 was filed
alleging that the name of the petitioner was mentioned in
Crime No.284/2021 registered on behalf of the petitioner’s
sister to create influence on the police.
(ii) It was alleged in another Complaint No.664/2022 dt.
28.07.2022 that in response to objections raised against
petitioner’s dogs defecating in front of complainant’s house,
the petitioner used abusive words and released her dogs
behind the complainant. Vide Order dt. 17.12.2022, the
Chief Justice of the High Court directed that permission
regarding taking criminal action against the petitioner may
not be given.
(iii) Complainant in Complaint No.775/2022 dt. 22.09.2022
alleged that the petitioner did not record the statement of
complainant in UNCR 27/2022.
(iv) Complaint No.776/2022 dated 22.09.2022 again alleged
misconduct in the courtroom. It was alleged therein that
in UNCR 25/2022 & 26/2022, unnecessary comments
were recorded by the petitioner in the order sheet due
to sheer animosity. As a consequence, petitioner was
advised to mend her behaviour in order to maintain cordial
relations with the Bar. Files for both these complaints
alleging poor conduct in the courtroom were kept in
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1481

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

abeyance by order of the Chief Justice of High Court
dated 26.07.2023.
4.10 On 23.12.2022, the sitting Principal District & Sessions
Judge prepared an Annual Inspection Report which recorded
this petitioner’s marshalling and appreciation of evidence
as proper and generally observed that judicial work of the
petitioner appeared to be ‘excellent’. However, on the very
next day another complaint dt. 24.12.2022 was filed against
the petitioner. We need not delve into the same as it was not
considered by the Full Court in coming to its decision.
4.11 During the year 2022, petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma earned
only 44.16 units towards civil cases and 269 units for criminal
cases. Cumulatively, her unit value, a measure of work done,
was 1.68 units per day for 228 working days. Post adjusting
a total of thirteen days as medical leave and 01 day for
training out of 220 working days, her final work done was
1.86 units per day, which the ACR notes to fall under the
‘poor category’.
4.12 Notably, the Portfolio Judge, commenting on her ACR,
specifically recorded that the petitioner lacked in her
management skills and must drastically improve to achieve
targets. Subsequently, on 31.03.2023, the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh transferred the petitioner to District Tikamgarh, where
she assumed charge and served as V Civil Judge, Junior
Division until her termination.
4.13 For ready reference, petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma’s Unit
Value for each ACR is tabulated as under:

UNIT VALUE

YEAR UNIT VALUE
2019 Trainee Judge
2020 1.95
2021 1.36
2022 1.86
2023 4.80
1482 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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LIST OF COMPLAINTS

SR. COMPLAINT COMPLAINT ACTION
NO. NO. & DATE
2021
1 Complaint Judicial officer was Inquiry Officer had
No. 75/2021 alleged to have not found allegation
dt. wrongfully deferred/ be proved.
01.02.2021 adjourned Civil
Suit No.4A/2015,
titled ‘Ramashankar
Pandey vs. Beva
Rachi’
2022
2 Complaint In Crime File to be kept in
No. No.284/2021, ‘Anjali abeyance as per
251/2022 Chakravarti vs. order of the Chief
dt. Subrat Chakravarti’, Justice dated
24.02.2021 name of Aditi Singh 27.06.2023
Kumhare (Sharma)
Civil Judge Class-
II, Satna who is
the sister of Anjali
Chakravarti is
mentioned in the FIR
to create influence
on the police
3 Complaint Complainant Chief Justice
No. objected to the act vide order dated
664/2022 dt. of allowing dogs 17.12.2022 directed
28.07.2022 of Ms. Aditi Kumar that permission
& Sharma, Judicial regarding taking
26.04.2023 Officer directed criminal action
that permission to against the judicial
defecate in front of officer may not
complainant’s house. be given and the
On 22.07.2022 complaint be filed.
around 8:00 pm,
Since terminated,
she used abusive
hence, file be
words and released
kept in abeyance
her dogs behind
by Order of Chief
the complainant by
Justice dated
untying the rope.
05.08.2023.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1483

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

SR. COMPLAINT COMPLAINT ACTION
NO. NO. & DATE
4 Complaint In UNCR 27/2022 File be kept in
No.775/2022 judicial officer is abeyance by order
dt. alleged to have not of Chief Justice
22.09.2022 recorded statement dated 27.06.2023
of the claimant
and also erred in
functioning of the
court.
5 Complaint In UNCR 25/2022 PR(V) proposed to
No.776/2022 & 26/2022, judicial advise Sushri Aditi
dt. 22.09.222 officer recorded Sharma, I-CJ. Jr.
unnecessary/ Division, Satna to
uncalled for mend her behavior
comments against in order to maintain
the advocate in the cordial relations
order sheet due to between the Bar
animosity. and Bench.
File be kept in
abeyance by order
of Hon’ble Chief
Justice dated
27.06.2023
6 Complaint In Civil Suit The 6th complaint
No.10/2023 No.26/2014, titled dated 24.12.2022
dt. ‘Kali Prajapati vs. does not appear
24.12.2022 Soniya Prajapati’ the to be part of the
judicial officer failed consideration by
to pass judgment the administrative
since February, side.
2022 despite written
arguments filed by
both parties.

Submissions of learned Amicus Curiae – Sri Gaurav Aggarwal,
Senior Advocate:
5. In Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.2 of 2023, Sri Gaurav Aggarwal
was appointed as the Amicus to assist this Court by the order of the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. He has made his submissions in
respect of both petitioners.
1484 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Re: Sarita Choudhary:
5.1 Learned Amicus submitted that Ms. Sarita Choudhary was
appointed as a Civil Judge, Class-II (Entry level) vide order
dated 28.12.2016 in Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service for two
years or on temporary basis till further orders. Initially, she was a
trainee Judge and was posted to a regular court with effect from
05.02.2018. In July, 2020, her confirmation was deferred owing
to pending complaints and on 26.05.2023, she was terminated
from service. Thus, she served for a period of six years and four
months on probation. That the State Government order dated
13.05.2023 recorded that the concerned judicial officer had not
utilised her probation period successfully and satisfactorily and
having regard to the record of her ACRs, assessment chart
and other materials, the services of the judicial officer were
dispensed with. Pursuant to the direction of this Court, the Full
Court of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reconsidered the matter
and noted that there were complaints made against Ms. Sarita
Choudhary and therefore, the earlier view of termination could
not be revoked and hence, it resolved to reiterate the resolution
dated 13.05.2023.
5.2 Referring to the ACRs for the years 2017 to 2022, learned Amicus
contended that the adverse remarks for the year 2020 ought not
to have been taken into consideration as the representation given
by the concerned judicial officer was pending at the time when
the decision was taken by the Full Court on 13.05.2023. The
representation was rejected on 13.12.2023 i.e. after termination.
The adverse remarks for the year 2021 ought not to have been
taken into consideration as the said adverse remarks were
communicated to the judicial officer on 09.10.2023 i.e. after
her termination. It is contended that the non-communication of
the adverse remarks in the ACRs was arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
5.3 It was further submitted by learned Amicus that the ACR of Ms.
Sarita Choudhary had substantially improved which fact ought to
have weighed with the Full Court on 01.08.2024 when there was
a reconsideration of her case pursuant to the order of this Court.
5.4 It was next submitted that the unit value of the judicial officer in
the year 2022 was lesser than the previous years for which there
was an explanation offered by her citing the following reasons:
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(i) that number of civil cases in court was very less and all of
them were transferred to another court.
(ii) the number of criminal cases in her court also reduced.
(iii) that on 18.01.2022, there was an order for transfer of criminal
cases from her court to another court from November, 2019,
when the officer had already conducted the proceedings.
(iv) that the above factors affected the workload making it
difficult to reach the target unit value. Most of the cases
pending in her court were at preliminary stage.
(v) Also, due to non-allotment of the police station, fresh cases
could not be allotted to her thereby the unit points earned
was reduced.
(vi) Securing the presence of the parties especially retired
persons and migrant labourers became difficult as the
parties were residing in other States.
(vii) Therefore, it was the submission that the low unit value of the
year 2022 could not have been the basis for holding that the
judicial officer had not completed her probation satisfactorily.
5.5 With regard to the complaints made against Ms. Sarita
Choudhary, it was contended that the Full Court Resolution
dated 01.08.2024 has referred to the said complaints. Two
complaints are pending and nine complaints have been closed
in the form of advisories, non-recordable warnings or warnings.
That none of the complaints could have been the basis for the
termination of the judicial officer. That the pending complaints
are not serious inasmuch as the first complaint concerned the
non-monitoring of the work of the two clerks in the court and
the second related to an innocuous facebook post.
5.6 In the above context, reliance was placed on Anoop Jaiswal vs.
Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369 (“Anoop Jaiswal”)
to contend that it is open for the court to go behind the form
and ascertain the true character of the termination order to
see whether in reality, it is a cloak for an order of punishment.
This is because in the case of misconduct, Article 311(2) of the
Constitution would be attracted and an inquiry has to be conducted
in the first instance. The aforesaid decision has been followed
by this Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath
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Bose National Centre for Basis Sciences, Calcutta, (1999)
3 SCC 60 (“Dipti Prakash Banerjee”), and recently in Swati
Priyadarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 2139 (“Swati Priyadarshini”).
5.7 It was submitted by the learned Amicus that possibly the warnings
and advisories given to the concerned judicial officer may have
been the basis for the termination which is founded on alleged
misconduct. That this judicial officer had worked for over six years
and her unit value was also good. There was no doubt on her
integrity and her work also improved in the year 2022. Therefore,
this officer ought to be given an opportunity just as other four
judicial officer have been given by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
5.8 It was submitted that the non-confirmation of a judicial officer
who is on probation and consequent termination is subject to
judicial review.

Re: Aditi Kumar Sharma:
6. Learned Amicus Curiae submitted that Ms. Aditi Kumar Sharma joined
duty on 30.11.2018 as a trainee judicial officer appointed as Civil Judge
Class-II. She was posted in regular court from 22.06.2020 and was
terminated on 26.05.2023. That on 08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023, the
Administrative Committee of the Madhya Pradesh High Court met to
discuss the performance of 393 Civil Judges which resulted in the
termination of this judicial officer, amongst others.
6.1 Learned Amicus submitted that for the year 2019, this petitioner
received “B-Very Good” grading and for the years 2020 and
2021, “C-Good” grading, while for the year 2022, the grading
was “D-Average”. The said grading could not have been taken
into consideration as the same was approved by the Chief
Justice of the High Court on 11.07.2023 i.e. after the termination
dated 26.05.2023. The adverse remark for the year 2022 was
communicated to this officer by letter dated 23.01.2024, six
months after her termination.
6.2 Insofar as the low unit value of this officer is concerned, the
following submissions were advanced:
(i) That for the years 2020 and 2021, despite the disposal
rate being 1.95 and 1.36, this judicial officer had “C-Good”
in the said years.
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(ii) That owing to Covid-19 pandemic, the High Court had
waived the target of the requisite unit value vide Circular
of the High Court dated 03.12.2020.
(iii) For the year 2021, the High Court reduced the unit value
requirement to 50 per cent. Moreover, this judicial officer
had submitted her detailed explanation for the low disposal
in the year 2021. Similarly, an explanation was offered for
the year 2022.
(iv) From January to April, 2023, the unit value of this
judicial officer was 4.80 (for four months only). Thus, the
performance of this officer had improved considerably.
6.3 It was submitted that if the conduct and the quality of performance
of the officer has been good and her reputation is also good,
mere low disposal should not be the reason for termination.
The High Court ought to have made a concession for newly
appointed judicial officer. Hence, this Court may consider the
correctness of the termination of this officer and give another
opportunity to her to prove herself.
6.4 As far as the complaints against this officer are concerned, the first
complaint was by one Ramashankar Pandey and on a discrete
enquiry conducted by District Judge (I) Inspection, Jabalpur,
this officer was advised to maintain cordial relations between
the Bench and the Bar. This advice had been approved by the
Portfolio Judge and the file has not yet been placed before the
Chief Justice of the High Court. This advice has neither been
communicated to this officer nor has she had an opportunity to
represent against the proposed advice.
6.5 The second complaint was made by one Devrath Chakraworthy
who is a litigant and an inquiry into the same was found to be
baseless. Therefore, this complaint could not have been the
basis for consideration of the case of the judicial officer. The
third complaint made by one Advocate Sukhendra Kumar Pandey
was that the statement of the complainant was not recorded.
No steps has been taken on the said complaint.
6.6 It was next submitted that the order of the termination of this
officer is not termination simpliciter but appears to be stigmatic.
Therefore, this case would call for closer scrutiny. It was further
submitted that the termination of this officer must be vitiated as
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despite having very good and good ACRs for the initial years and
for the year 2022, the grade ‘D-Average’ was not communicated
to her. Consequently, this officer has been denied the opportunity
to represent against adverse remarks. Since, this officer had
shown remarkable improvement in the year 2023, the low rate
of disposal of cases could not have been the sole factor for
termination of this officer.
6.7 Further, the complaints could not have been the basis for
termination inasmuch as if the allegation against misconduct
of the judicial officer is not followed by an inquiry but is the
basis of termination then, the purported termination simpliciter
could be interfered with. The court could go behind the form
and ascertain the true character of the order by lifting the veil.
In this case, it was also contended that the protection of Article
311(2) ought to have been provided to this officer as has been
held in Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat vs. Jayshree
Chamanlal Buddhbhatti, (2013) 16 SCC 59 (“Jayshree
Chamanlal Buddhbhatti”).
6.8 Learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the cases of both the
aforesaid officers may be considered favourably by setting
aside the termination order and granting them an opportunity
to fare themselves better by allowing these writ petitions with
appropriate conditions.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner-Sarita Choudhary:
7. Learned senior counsel, Sri Basant appearing for the petitioner,
at the outset, contended that the High Court was not right in not
declaring the successful completion of probation of the petitioner-
Ms. Sarita Choudhary and consequently, she has been subjected
to discrimination and arbitrary action on the part of the High
Court.
7.1 We might note at the outset that learned senior counsel for the
petitioner drew our attention to Rule 11 of the Recruitment Rules
which provides that the probation period ‘shall’ not be extended
beyond three years from the date of appointment/joining.
7.2 Sri Basant contended on behalf of the petitioner-Sarita Choudhary
that the low unit value for year 2022 being 3.35 can be explained
inter alia, by several reasons; firstly, the number of civil cases
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1489

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in the court were very less and absolutely NIL after transfer of
cases; secondly, the criminal matters which she had brought to
the stage of disposal since November 2019 were transferred to
another Court on January 18, 2022 and the remaining matters
could not be disposed of by the petitioner; thirdly, no police
station was allotted to the petitioner which curtailed new and
miscellaneous judicial work, and resultantly new charge sheets
and summary cases were not filed. Consequently, there was
reduction in units earned. Furthermore, petitioner submitted that
most of the cases (3 years or less than 3 years old) pending in
her court were at the preliminary stage. It was also contended
that for the year 2022, the petitioner was not in charge of any
section till December 7th, 2022. The efficiency of the petitioner was
even hampered due to court employees regularly taking casual
leave without prior notice. Similarly, there was only one typist at
the dais in the court which severely hurdled court proceedings.
Petitioner’s learned senior counsel further submitted that despite
being directed, the execution clerk would not facilitate referral
of mediation cases. Furthermore, it is also submitted that it was
laborious and time-consuming to seek the presence of parties, as
several were migrant labourers and drivers working in areas other
than Raisen district, and employees residing in other States, etc.
7.3 As far as the ACR for the year 2020 is concerned, it was submitted
that petitioner had given a representation against said ACR but
it was pending consideration as on the date of her termination. It
was also contended that the actions of Respondent-High Court
are in violation of principles of natural justice as the ACR for
2021 was communicated to the officer only after her termination.
7.4 Inferring from the reply of the respondent-High Court filed before
this Court, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended
that it was mentioned before the Administrative Committee that
two complaints were pending against the petitioner. In respect of
the first complaint, the petitioner has voraciously highlighted that
although the subject matter of the complaint is grave as it involves
321 suspicious cases the allegation qua the petitioner is only of
not monitoring the work of execution clerks. The petitioner was
given an opportunity to explain and the same was submitted on
06.04.2023. As for the pending complaint concerning the post
put up by the petitioner on WhatsApp, it was contended that no
explanation was called from her.
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Submissions on behalf of Petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma:
8. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner-
Ms. Aditi Kumar Sharma, in the first instance, contended that her
party has been subjected to discrimination inasmuch as four of the
Judicial Officers have been reinstated but not her by the High Court.
8.1 Learned senior counsel sought to contend that a holistic perusal
of the petitioner’s ACRs would establish that the petitioner
indeed was suitable for confirmation and that the failure to
confirm her by relying on irrelevant and insufficient material is
bad in law. Learned senior counsel also contended that any
conclusion drawn must not be punitive and be based upon a
holistic appreciation of petitioner’s service record. It is therefore
prayed that this Court may quash and set aside the impugned
order of termination for being perverse and illegal; direct the
petitioner’s reinstatement as a permanent judicial officer with
full back wages, continuity in service and seniority.
8.2 Emphasizing on the integral and compendious nature of ACRs as
the primary documents determining a public servant’s suitability
in services, the petitioner emphasized that, notably, there are
no minimum criteria for earning units that must be fulfilled for
an officer to be confirmed.
8.3 The manner of preparation and approval of an ACR was adverted
to. Upon filling up of the ACR by a judicial officer based on his/
her self-assessment, it is graded by the reporting authority i.e.
the Principal District Judge. Thereafter, the same is reviewed
by the Portfolio Judge who is a High Court Judge. Finally, the
ACR is placed before the Chief Justice for acceptance.
8.4 It was submitted in respect of the ACR for 2019 that after
approval from the Portfolio Judge and the Chief Justice the
petitioner was finally graded ‘B-Very Good’ in the year 2019.
For the year 2020, the petitioner was graded ‘C-Good’ in the
ACR and she is aggrieved by alleged ‘incorrect and misleading
data’ presentation of disposal units in the Assessment Chart
placed before the Administrative Committee. The Assessment
Chart showed the disposal rate for the entire year of 2020 as
1.95 units. The petitioner contended that an accurate picture
is gleaned from the distribution between pre-Covid (from 1st
January to 11th June 2020) and post-Covid (from 13th June to
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31st December 2020). Our attention was drawn to the adverse
remarks column in the Assessment Chart which records the pre-
Covid disposal as 0.24 and post-Covid disposal to be 0.67. It
was however contended that disposal for the post-Covid period
should accurately reflect 6.99 units earned by the petitioner which
would, as per the relevant circular, fall under the category of
“Very Good”. Reliance in this regard is placed on the ‘Statement
Showing the Net Disposal’ forming part of the ACR for year 2020.
8.5 It was also emphasized that in light of Covid-19, the High Court
had waived the unit value requirement for the year 2020. As a
corollary, the petitioner would submit that no weight should be
given to any adverse remarks stemming from low unit value in
the year 2020.
8.6 Both Petitioners highlight that the Covid years - 2020 and 2021 -
were particularly cumbersome for the judicial system inasmuch
as disposing of cases and other work done was concerned.
According to the Petitioner, for the year 2021 the High Court had
given 50% relaxation in unit value. Therefore, it was contended
that if benefit of extra 1.50 is given to the petitioner-Aditi Kumar
Sharma, the unit value for 2021 will increase to 2.86.
8.7 We need not repeat the practical difficulties endured by petitioner-
Aditi Kumar Sharma in 2021. Learned senior counsel for the
petitioner argued that the low unit value and any other deficiency
for the year must be seen in light of the trials and tribulations
faced by this petitioner.
8.8 On the aspect of grade B-Very Good – awarded by the Principal
District Judge – relegated to C-Good by the Portfolio Judge citing
“pendency and her disposal” in petitioner’s ACR for 2021, the
petitioner contended that such relegation was approved by the
Chief Justice on 13.04.2023 i.e. post an excessively inordinate
delay of more than one year. The inordinate delay, according to
the petitioner, deprived her of improving in a timely manner and
therefore negatively impacted her future assessments.
8.9 Furthermore, it is submitted that despite Covid-19 limitations
on functioning of courts, the Principal District Judge remarked
her performance to be ‘good’ in the “quantity of work” section
of the Report even though she earned only 22.9 civil units as,
summarily, she earned sufficient units over 162 working days.
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8.10 Furthermore, the petitioner also contended that there was
a violation of principles of natural justice. It was argued
that the petitioner was never given an opportunity to furnish
an explanation against the “adverse remark” noted in the
ACR, which was eventually considered by the Administrative
Committee for recommending the termination of her services.
The fact that the Registrar General of the High Court, on
07.10.2023, by way of a communication gave an opportunity
to the petitioner to file a representation explaining the “adverse
remarks” from the ACR for 2021 is relied upon by the Petitioner
to contend that prior to October 2023, the petitioner was never
given an opportunity to file a representation; that such an
adverse remark did not warrant termination; and that there was
complete non-application of mind at the stage of termination.
The adverse remark noted stated that “... she has earned only
22.9 civil units.”
8.11 In respect of the ACR for 2022, the petitioner-Aditi Kumar
Sharma submitted various grounds before the High Court, inter
alia, excessively large number of interim applications prolonging
disposal of civil matters, prioritizing matters older than 3 years,
etc. It was preliminarily submitted that the Administrative
Committee in its meetings in May 2023 should have never
considered the ACR of 2022 as the same would not finalised
by the accepting authority i.e. the Chief Justice till July 2023.
8.12 Furthermore, it was contended that the ACR for 2022 was not
prepared by petitioner’s Principal District Judge or his successor
or the second senior-most judge who had supervised the
petitioner for three months but was prepared by the Principal
District Judge of Ratlam by virtue of her being the District Judge
(Inspection) of the Jabalpur Zone during the relevant period vide
D.O letter issued by the Registrar General of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh. According to the letter, Smt. Anuradha
Shukla was authorized to act as the Inspection Judge of District
Satna for the year 2023. Petitioner challenges the evaluation
by the District Judge by contending that the District Judge
was not competent to evaluate the petitioner; that the District
Judge did not have any opportunity to personally evaluate the
performance of the Petitioner; that, consequently, petitioner
was graded solely on the basis of units earned dehors any
holistic evaluation of other factors such as conduct of business,
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1493

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quality of judgment writing, etc.; that the Principal District Judge
of the Petitioner who personally evaluated the petitioner had
assessed her judicial work to be ‘excellent’ in December 2022
in the Annual Inspection Report of the Petitioner.
8.13 Therefore, according to the petitioner, it is apparent that on
the date the Committee met, this ACR was neither final nor
communicated to the Petitioner, and yet the “adverse remarks”
and grading of ‘D – Average’ appearing therein were taken into
consideration by the Committee while terminating her services.
8.14 Although it was contended by the learned counsel appearing
for the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the Administrative
Committee of the High Court had arrived at the decision to
terminate the services of petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma on a
holistic appreciation of her ACRs and service, the petitioner has
vociferously contended that the termination is not simpliciter in
nature but is founded upon the complaints which were made
against the petitioner. It is not out of place to note here that
according to petitioner, even as far as her worst ACR of the year
2022 is concerned, the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Satna vide Annual Inspection Report dated 23.12.2022 assessed
that the judicial work of the petitioner appears to be excellent.
8.15 In order to display her efficiency and commitment to the
service, petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma also highlighted that the
petitioner earned 4.80 units from January to April 2023 i.e. until
her transfer to District Tikamgarh, which was ‘Very Good’. The
petitioner earned a total of 321.35 units and, specifically, 126.4
civil units – both categorized as ‘Very Good’. The Petitioner
contends that this shows significant improvement in units
earned. This was during post-Covid period.
8.16 Furthermore, emphasis was laid on the fact that the petitioner
had been found not guilty in three complaints out of the five
placed before the Administrative Committee. Although she was
found guilty in the discreet inquiries conducted in the remainder
two complaints, it was contended that these inquiries violated
the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not given
an opportunity to defend herself or to make a representation.
8.17 Learned senior counsel would contend that such deprivation
of opportunity to defend herself signifies that the termination
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is stigmatic and violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution,
vide Khem Chand vs. Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080.
8.18 According to her, the termination of the petitioner is punitive
and not termination simpliciter as it was founded on complaints
of misconduct and the finding of guilt in reports of full-scale
inquiries. - vide Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay
Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520
8.19 Therefore, it was contended that prior to her termination, the
Petitioner should have been given an opportunity to be heard,
vide Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P, (2000) 5 SCC
152.
8.20 Arguing from the factual record, it was contended that, in any
event, the findings of these discreet enquiries are perverse
as the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct in complaint
no. 775/2022 despite the complaint being withdrawn by the
complainant. Therefore, where there could have been no finding
of guilt, according to the Petitioner, only an advisory should
have been given which, in fact, never was. As for Complaint no.
776/2022, it was advanced that the same was perverse as the
statements of the witnesses recorded were not supported by
affidavits, instead a piece of paper with the signatures of some
advocates was annexed with the report. As per the petitioner,
such a practice is unsustainable in law, vide Amar Singh vs.
Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69.
8.21 To support the submission that the termination is punitive, it
was submitted that this Court can discern the reasons for the
termination from the material on record and need not restrict
itself to the reasons appearing on the order of termination. Our
attention was drawn to the letter addressed by the High Court
to the Law and Legislative Works Department dated 13.05.2023
recommending the termination of the petitioner which mentions
that the Assessment Chart which contains the complaints
and the finding of guilt formed part of the material taken into
consideration by the Administrative Committee. Specifically,
it was emphasized that the Assessment Chart was the only
material annexed to the letter.
8.22 Learned senior counsel submitted that it is trite law that for an
order of termination to be stigmatic the words casting stigma
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1495

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may also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in
such an order or in an annexure thereto. That being the case
here, it was contended that the order must be construed as ex
facie a stigmatic order of termination, as any such reference
would inevitably impact the future prospects of the judicial
officer, vide Dr. Vijayakumaran CPV vs. Central University
of Kerala & Ors, (2020) 12 SCC 426.
8.23 Furthermore, it was argued that an order may be stigmatic if
perusal of the record discloses that other material was taken
into consideration while proposing the action of termination,
vide State of Bihar vs. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra, (1970) 2
SCC 871 and Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1974)
2 SCC 831.
8.24 Our attention was also invited to the Full Court’s observation
made while reconsidering the termination inasmuch as it
stated that “considering the ACR Gradings, Disposal Statistics,
Adverse Remarks, ‘complaints made against them’ and their
overall performance”, Full Court was of the view that the
termination of the petitioner cannot be revoked. According to
the petitioner, this categorically establishes that the Committee
acted on irrelevant material i.e. complaints were taken into
consideration whilst ignoring relevant material, i.e., her good
performance. It was contended that such decision making is
bad in law as inquiries of these complaints were held behind
the back of the Petitioner without giving her the reasonable
opportunity to show cause vide Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs.
Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences,
(1999) 3 SCC 60.
8.25 It was also argued by learned senior counsel for the petitioner
that even a probationer is entitled to the protection provided
under Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the Article does
not condition protection on permanency and is available
to probationers alike, vide – Jagdish Mitter vs. Union of
India, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 75 : AIR 1964 SC 449. It was
contended that probationers require the protection of the Article
as much as permanent employees do and to limit the protective
provisions of Article 311(2) to only that class of persons who
hold permanent positions would be adding qualifying words
to the Article which do not ex facie exist, vide Parshotam Lal
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Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 (“Parshotam
Lal Dhingra”).
8.26 Learned senior counsel argued that at least soon after approval
by the Chief Justice the “adverse remarks” should have been
communicated to the petitioner along with an opportunity to
respond to the same. It was contended that deprivation of such
opportunity, as a corollary, also deprived the petitioner to make
her case for the grading to be upgraded. It was also highlighted
that a downgrade from a grading of “very good” in the previous
year to “good” in the subsequent year is considered an “adverse
remark” and must have been required to be communicated to
the petitioner. - vide Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar vs. Union of
India, (2009) 16 SCC 146.
8.27 It was contended that though the Respondent-High Court has
power to terminate the services of probationers under Rule
11(c) of M.P. Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of
Services) Rules, 1994, this discretion cannot be exercised in
an arbitrary manner, upon the subjective satisfaction of the
High Court and in violation of principles of natural justice.
Therefore, the termination order being against right and reason
must be set aside. - vide Central Inland Water Transport
Corporation Limited vs. Tarun Kanti Sengupta, (1986) 3
SCC 156.
8.28 It was also contended that the petitioner must be made a
permanent judicial officer as the impugned action suffers from
material illegalities and is liable to be set aside. The plea of the
petitioner was that to direct the petitioner to serve on probation
again would put her in a vulnerable position.
8.29 It was highlighted that as a constitutional spearhead over the
District judiciary, High Courts have a duty to guide and protect
judicial officers from concocted complaints. Furthermore, the
High Court must aid and advance the improvement of judicial
officers instead of using the mistake of a probationer as an
excuse to terminate his/her services in the first instance. Relying
on Ishwar Chand Jain vs. High Court of Punjab & Haryana,
(1988) 3 SCC 370, the petitioner argued that if even after
warning and guidance a probationer fails to improve, then the
High Court can terminate their services; however, this power
must not be exercised arbitrarily.
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8.30 Learned senior counsel finally contended that the District
Judiciary will be stifled if judicial officers are forced to live under
a constant threat of complaint and inquiry. Furthermore, as the
termination herein was, in substance, by way of punishment
and therefore bad in law, it needs to be quashed and the
petitioner should be reinstated with seniority and back wages.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent-High Court:
9. Per contra, Sri Arjun Garg, learned counsel appearing for the Madhya
Pradesh High Court, at the outset contended that as per Rule 11(d) of
the Recruitment Rules, even if the maximum period of probation has
lapsed (two years), a probationer cannot be automatically confirmed
without a specific order being passed by the High Court. Although
the probationary period lapsed, the probation would continue till the
High Court confirms the officer. In this regard, reliance was placed on
High Court of Madhya Pradesh vs. Satya Narayan Jhavar, (2001)
7 SCC 161 and Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Senior Secondary
School vs. JAJ Vasu Sena, (2019) 17 SCC 157.
9.1 It was next submitted that a probationer can be discharged without
any notice or opportunity of hearing or without conducting any
inquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Reliance
was placed on Rajasthan High Court vs. Ved Priya, (2021) 13
SCC 151 (“Ved Priya”); High Court of Judicature at Patna
vs. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha, (1997) 10 SCC 409
(“Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha”) and Satya Narayan
Athya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 560.
Further, it was contended that a discharge simpliciter or cessation
of service of an employee during probation would not cast any
stigma on the employee. The service rules do not contemplate
any prior notice or opportunity of hearing before discharge or
termination of a probationer. The following judgments were
relied upon Pavanendra Naryana Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi
PGI of Medical Science, (2002) 1 SCC 520; and Rajesh Kohli
vs. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, (2010) 12 SCC 783.
9.2 It was contended that in the case of a probationer, the overall
record must be considered. This would include the entries in
the confidential reports/character rolls/vigilance reports, both
favourable and adverse. The confirmation of probationer is purely
a matter subject to the satisfaction of the High Court. Further,
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unless there is a direct nexus between the charges levelled and
action taken, a mere preliminary inquiry or examination of the
complaints against the probationer for assessment for his overall
performance would not vitiate an order of termination so as to
make it punitive. The employer need not conduct an inquiry but
at the same time, he can terminate the employee if he does
not want him to continue in view of the complaints against him.
In such a case, the termination is not punitive. Reliance was
placed on the following judgments:
a. Registrar, High Court of Gujarat vs. CG Sharma, (2005)
1 SCC 132.
b. Rajesh Kumar Srivastava vs. State of Jharkhand, (2011)
4 SCC 447.
c. Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of
Oncology, Bangalore vs. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar,
(1992) 4 SCC 719.
d. Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose
National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 60.
9.3 It was lastly contended that the judicial service in a district falls
under the control of the High Court under Articles 233-235 of the
Constitution and therefore, if the High Court found an officer not
to be suitable, the said opinion has to be regarded and acted
upon by terminating the officer concerned from service even if the
probation has not been successfully completed. In this context,
reliance was placed on Ved Priya, and Dipti Prakash Banerjee.
9.4 On facts, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma was not entitled to the benefit of
additional 1.5 units for the year 2021 as the same is provided
for a period of two years from the date of her joining. As the
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma joined service on 15.11.2018, two
years would have completed on 15.11.2020 and therefore, the
benefit of 1.5 units cannot be extended to her for the year 2021.
9.5 Furthermore, it was contended that petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma
was indeed allocated adequate number of criminal cases and it
was not open for her to suggest that her unit value for criminal
cases was hindered due to insufficient number of criminal cases
pending in her court.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1499

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

9.6 Learned counsel also apprised us of the fact that four out of the
five complaints made against the Petitioner are kept in abeyance
and a singular complaint was disposed of with only a direction to
the complainant to take criminal action against the petitioner as
the complainant deems fit. It was therefore contended that it is
not open to the petitioner to contend that petitioner was dismissed
based on false, frivolous and malicious pending complaints.
9.7 Learned counsel appearing for the High Court placed significant
reliance on the position that the decision to terminate the services
of the petitioners-probationary judicial officers herein had been
taken based on a comprehensive view formed on a holistic
and overall performance of the judicial officers rather than any
specific misconduct.
9.8 To elaborate that there was no exclusive link between the
complaints and termination, it was contended by learned counsel
that there was no request made for termination in any of the
complaints. In the context of the complaint that from September
2022, petitioner had a poor conduct and acrimony with members
of the Bar within the courtroom, it was submitted that a discreet
enquiry was conducted by the then District Judge (Inspection)
Jabalpur. While the petitioner was found guilty as per the report
of the District Judge, the final suggestions were submitted to
the Principal Registrar (Vigilance) of the High Court. Thereafter,
on 28.03.2023, the Principal Registrar (Vigilance) thought it
sufficient to merely advice the petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma
to behave “properly with fellow advocates and maintain cordial
relations between the Bench and Bar”. At this juncture, it was
again argued that the question of terminating the petitioner was
neither raised nor suggested. Furthermore, as the services of
the Petitioner had already been terminated on 23.05.2023 i.e.
before the conclusion of enquiry, the file was kept in abeyance.
9.9 Without prejudice to the aforesaid factual position, it was also
contended that it is trite law that a probationer can assert no
indefeasible right to continue in employment until he/she is
confirmed by the competent authority. It was also summarily argued
that the subjective exercise of evaluating the performance of two
judicial officers during probation could not possibly be, in the facts
herein, held to be either violative of any fundamental right of the
petitioners or as arbitrary exercise of power by the High Court.
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9.10 Insofar as the controversy over the presiding officer for ACR of
year 2022 is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent-
High Court submitted that while ordinarily the ACR for the
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma - posted as Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Satna during the period from 22.06.2020 to 09.04.2023
- would be recorded by the then Principal District & Sessions
Judge, Satna, however, since Shri Ramesh Srivastava, the
then Principal District & Sessions Judge, Satna, was to be
superannuated on 31.12.2022, Smt. Anuradha Shukla, the then
District Judge (Inspection), Zone Jabalpur was authorized by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to record ACR of Judicial
Officers of district Satna in compliance with the order of the
Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 21.12.2022.
9.11 It was further contended on behalf of the respondent-High Court
that it is a consistent position of this Court that the conduct of
judicial officers while discharging their responsibilities must be
impeccable and judges must act as role models for the entire
judicial system. - vide Arundhati Ashok Walavalkar vs. State
of Maharashtra, (2011) 11 SCC 324; and Ram Murti Yadav
vs. State of U.P., (2020) 1 SCC 801.
9.12 It was further submitted that the objective of probation is
to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the
probationer’s performance and suitability. For the said
evaluation, the employer can assess the overall performance.
-vide Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil vs. State of Karnataka,
(2010) 8 SCC 155. According to the respondent-High Court,
this discretion is subject to subjective satisfaction and cannot
be based only on objective material. In that regard, reliance
was placed on the dicta of this Court in Ved Priya.
9.13 Relying on the aforesaid judgment, it was also contended that
unless the removal of a probationer is stigmatic and causes
prejudice to their future prospect or casts aspersions on their
character or violates their constitutional rights, they cannot
seek protection under the umbrella of principles of natural
justice. Notably, the case of the petitioners herein is that the
termination order is stigmatic.
9.14 To distinguish the present case from Anoop Jaiswal it was
submitted that, herein, there is no occasion for lifting of the veil,
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1501

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that is to say, go behind the termination order as the material
on record amply shows that the order of termination is not
punitive. It was submitted that the reference to complaints in
the assessment chart is only as part of the overall record of
the petitioner and neither the sole nor principal force behind
termination. Therefore, the present cases are of termination
simpliciter and not punitive termination. Reliance in this regard
is again placed on the para 24 of Ved Priya.
9.15 A related submission was that the present order of termination
was borne out of routine confirmation exercise and not out of
any specific action against the petitioners and merely because
some complaints were pending cannot lead to the conclusion
that those complaints only were the foundation of termination.
On the relevance of closed complaints, it was submitted that
complaints even though closed can be taken into consideration
except when no truth is found in such complaints. Furthermore,
a complaint being closed merely with advisory issued would
be crucial for an eventual determination of confirmation as
they speak to overall performance.
9.16 Insofar as petitioner-Sarita Choudhary is concerned, it was
submitted that she was given warnings repeatedly, year after
year, on complaints ranging from misbehaviour, indiscipline,
administrative and work related issues.
9.17 It was vehemently contended that a probationer neither has a
right to continue in the post nor is a probationer a substantive
appointee, therefore, would not strictly be protected by Article
311(2). In that regard, it was submitted that the termination
orders being neither punitive nor based on any specific act of
misconduct there was no need to serve any notice or grant
any opportunity of hearing.
9.18 Learned counsel also contended that this Court in its writ
jurisdiction does not sit in appeal over the decision of the
Full Court. Relying on Ved Priya, it was submitted that “the
collective wisdom of the Full Court deserves due respect,
weightage and consideration in the process of judicial review”.
9.19 It was next submitted that non-communication of ACRs and
no notice being served before discharge/termination is not
fatal to the validity of the orders of termination. The delay in
1502 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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communication of ACRs was due to evaluation of representations
called from the judicial officers for upgradation of ACRs for
the period between 2016 and 2020. As the said exercise
was completed only in 2023, adverse/advisory remarks were
scrutinized and thereafter were communicated to the judicial
officers resulting in delay. Furthermore, it was contended that
there exists no obligation in law to communicate adverse material
to a petitioner before the decision is taken since the petitioners
herein did not hold any right to a post; therefore, principles of
natural justice do not apply to such situations. Reliance in this
regard was placed on Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha
wherein this Court had to answer whether non-communication
of remarks for some of the years served by a probationer would
amount to a violation of principles of natural justice. Therein,
adverse remarks in respect of some years were communicated
only after the decision to terminate had been taken. Observing
that a probationer does not have a right to hold the post during
the period of probation, this Court held that a sine qua non for
questioning an order terminating the services of a probationer
is arbitrariness or showing that it has been passed by way of
punishment without complying with the requirements of Article
311(2) of the Constitution. It was held that lacking the right to hold
the post on which a person has been appointed on probation,
a probationer cannot claim a right to be heard before an order
terminating his services was passed.

Points for Consideration:
10. Having heard learned Amicus and learned senior counsel for the
petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents at length, the
following points would arise for our consideration:
i) Whether the respondent-High Court was right in terminating
the services of the petitioners? In other words, whether the
cessation of services of the petitioners in the instant cases is
punitive, arbitrary and therefore contrary to law?
ii) If the answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative,
then what order?
11. Before proceeding to consider the individual cases, it would be useful
to discuss the applicable Rule.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1503

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Rule 11 of the Recruitment Rules reads as under:
“11. Probation-
(a) A person appointed to category (i) of rule 3(1) shall,
from the date on which he joins duty, be on probation
for a period of two years.
(b) The High Court may, at any time, extend the
probation, but the total period of probation shall not
exceed three years.
(c) It shall be competent for High Court at any time
during or at the end of the period of probation in
the case of Civil Judge (Entry Level) to recommend
termination of his service and in the case of Senior
Civil Judge, to revert him on account of unsuitability
for the post.
(d) On successful completion of probation, the
probationer shall, of there is permanent post
available be confirmed on the service or post to
which he has been appointed and if no permanent
post is available, a certificate shall be issued by
the High court to the effect that he would have
been confirmed, but for the non-availability of the
permanent post and as soon as permanent post
become available, he will be confirmed, if the High
court decides that he has successfully completed
the period of probation and he is suitable to hold
the post.”
11.1 The extract of the Minutes of the Meeting of the Administrative
Committee (Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services) held on
08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023 by which services of six women
judicial officers were terminated as per Rule 11(c) of the
Recruitment Rules reads as under:
“EXTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING
OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE (M.P. JUDICIAL
SERVICE) HELD ON 08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023.

xxx xxx xxx
1504 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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PART-3 & 4
ITEM No.02. Consideration regarding confirmation
of 393 temporary Civil Judges (Junior
Division), completed probation period upto
31.12.2021 (01.01.2020 to 31.12.2021)
under Rule 11 of the M.P. Judicial Service
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
(amended) Rules, 1994 along with 25
officers of previous consideration.
D. Further resolved that following officers did not utilise
their probation period successfully and satisfactorily,
therefore having considered the ACRs, assessment
chart, consistently poor performance/work done and
other material, the Committee resolved to recommend
that services of the following officers are no more
required to be continued. Accordingly, it is resolved
to recommend termination of services of the following
officers as per Rule 11(c) of M.P. Judicial Service
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994:-

Sr. Name of the Officers
No. Sarvashri

Sushri Sarita Choudhary, II Civil Judge Jr.
1
Division, Umaria

Smt. Jyoti Varkade, CJ, Jr. Division, Timarni
2
[Harda]

Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma, V CJ, Jr.
3
Division, Tikamgarh

Sushri Sonakshi Joshi, VAJ To I CJ, Jr.
4
Division, Morena

Sushri Priya Sharma, I CJ, Jr. Division, Dr
5
Ambedkar Nagar [Indore]

Smt. Rachna Atulkar Joshi, II CJ, Jr.
6
Division, Teonthar [Rewa]
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1505

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Further resolved that the representation dated 07.10.2021
of Sushri Sarita Choudhary, II Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Goharganj (Raisen) regarding confirmation in M.P. Judicial
Service is disposed off in terms of above resolution of
the Committee.
Let the matter be placed before Full Court for approval
by circulation.

xxx xxx xxx
Sd/-
(RAMKUMAR CHOUBEY)
REGISTRAR GENERAL
Later on Full Court approved the above recommendation
by circulation on 13.05.2023.”
11.2 The order of the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Law and
Legislative Works Department dated 23.05.2023 is in respect
of Ms. Sarita Choudhary, II-Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Umariya
is extracted below. A similar order in respect of Ms. Aditi Kumar
Sharma, V-Civil Judge (Junior Division), Tikamgarh was also
passed bearing the same date.
“GOVERNMENT OF MADHYA PRADESH, LAW &
LEGISLATIVE WORKS DEPARTMENT
ORDER
Bhopal, dated 23rd May, 2023
F. No. 2404/2023/21-B(One). As a result of not completing
the probation period satisfactorily and successfully by the
member of Judicial Service namely Ms. Sarita Chaudhary,
Second Civil Judge (Junior Division), Umariya, in
pursuance of the decision taken in the meetings dated
08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023 of the Administrative
Committee of High Court, Madhya Pradesh and meeting
dated 13.05.2023 (by circulation) of Full Court, it has
been recommended to Termination of Service of aforesaid
Judicial Officer.
Being agreed with the enclosures enclosed with the
Recommendation of High Court, Madhya Pradesh
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regarding aforesaid Judicial Officer, the State Government
has decided that Ms. Sarita Chaudhary, Second Civil
Judge (Junior Division), Umariya, be terminated from
service with effect from the date of order.
Therefore, under Rule 11(c) of the M.P. Judicial Service
(Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994, the
State Government do hereby Terminates Ms. Sarita
Chaudhary, Second Civil Judge (Junior Division), Umariya
from Service.
In the name of Governor of Madhya Pradesh
& by the Orders
Sd/-
(B.K. Dwivedi)
Principal Secretary
Law & Legislative Works Department
Page No. F. No. 2404/2023/21-B(One) Bhopal, Dt. 23rd
May, 2023
Copy to:-
1. Registrar General, M.P. High Court, Jabalpur, in
reference to his Demi-Official letter No. 479/Gopniya/2023
Two-3-70/60 dated 13.05.2023.
2. Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior (M.P.)
for information and necessary action.
3. Deputy Controller, Government Central Printing Press,
Arera Hills, Bhopal for publication in the next issue of
Gazette.
Sd/-23.05.2023
(Rajghvendra Bhardwaj)
Additional Secretary
Government of Madhya Pradesh
Law & Legislative Works Department”

Discussion:
12. The services of a probationer could result either in a confirmation
in the post or ended by way of termination simpliciter. However, if
a probationer is terminated from service owing to a misconduct as
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1507

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a punishment, the termination would cause a stigma on him. If a
probationer is unsuitable for a job and has been terminated then
such a case is non-stigmatic as it is a termination simpliciter. Thus,
the performance of a probationer has to be considered in order to
ascertain whether it has been satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If the
performance of a probationer has been unsatisfactory, he is liable
to be terminated by the employer without conducting any inquiry. No
right of hearing is also reserved with the probationer and hence, there
would be no violation of principles of natural justice in such a case.
12.1 In Parshotam Lal Dhingra, this Court held that the protection
of Article 311 also covers a probationer if the termination was
by way of a punishment and “it puts delible stigma on the
officer affecting his future career”. To a similar effect is the
ruling of this Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Gopi
Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 689. In the said case, it was
observed that if the employer simply terminates the services
of a probationer without holding an inquiry and without giving
him a reasonable chance of showing cause against his removal
from service, the probationary civil servant has no cause of
action even though the real motive behind the removal from
service may have been that the employer thought him to
be unsuitable for the post he was temporarily holding, on
account of his misconduct, or efficiency or some such cause.
Thus, the test is, whether, in a given case the termination is
simpliciter or by way of punishment. When termination is by
way of punishment, the concept of stigma would arise. If a
punishment casts a stigma on the competence of an employee,
it can affect his future career. However, the dilemma is, even
when the probationer, who has no right to hold the post in the
first instance, could argue that a cessation of service owing
to non-suitability, inefficiency or any other similar reason was
stigmatic.
12.2 As noted, if a termination from service is not visited with any
stigma and neither are there any civil consequences and nor is
founded on misconduct, then, it would be a case of termination
simpliciter. On the other hand, an assessment of remarks
pertaining to the discharge of duties during the probationary
period even without a finding of misconduct and termination
on the basis of such remarks or assessment will be by way
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of punishment because such remarks or assessment would
be stigmatic. According to the dictionary meaning, stigma is
indicative of a blemish, disgrace indicating a deviation from
a norm. Stigma might be inferred from the references quoted
in the termination order although the order itself might not
contain anything offensive. Where there is a discharge from
service after prescribed probation period was completed and
the discharge order contain allegations against a probationer
and surrounding circumstances also showed that discharge
was not based solely on the assessment of the employee’s
work and conduct during probation, the termination was held
to be stigmatic and punitive vide Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh
Jadeja vs. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, (2007) 10 SCC 71.
12.3 Even though a probationer has no right to hold a post, it
would not imply that the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution could be violated inasmuch as there cannot be
any arbitrary or discriminatory discharge or an absence of
application of mind in the matter of assessment of performance
and consideration of relevant materials. Thus, in deciding
whether, in a given case, a termination was by way of
punishment or not, the courts have to look into the substance
of the matter and not the form.
12.4 In Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192,
a seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that if a probationer
was discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency
or for similar reasons without a proper inquiry it might, in a
given case, amount to inflicting the punishment of removal
from services within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution. In the very same case, it was also observed as
a test for determining whether, the termination was by way
of punishment, namely, whether, the termination was sought
to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other disqualification. Thus, if a termination is founded on
misconduct, it would be a punishment but de hors this, if the
right to terminate existed, the motive operating in the mind
of the employer would be wholly irrelevant. However, all that
is stated above would ultimately boil down to the question,
whether, the termination would prejudicially affect the future
employment of the employee. It is this delicate line which has to
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1509

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

be discerned in every case where a challenge to a termination
is made by a probationer. In other words, if the termination
is simply owing to unsuitability having regard to the nature of
the job and such other factors, it is not stigmatic. Before any
probationer is considered for confirmation, the satisfactory
nature of the work and suitability of the probationer have to
be considered for which some inquiry would have to be made
and if it is found that he is unsuitable for the job then, he could
be discharged and the same would be non-stigmatic and this
would also not call for opportunity for hearing being given to
a probationer.
13. The relevant case law could be discussed at this stage:
(i) In Anoop Jaiswal, the facts were that the impugned order of
discharge was passed in the middle of the probation period
after seeking an explanation regarding the alleged act of
indiscipline. Similar explanations were called from persons
other than the appellant therein, but in the end only the case
of the appellant was dealt with severely. This Court observed
that even though the order of discharge was non-committal, it
could not stand alone. It was observed that though the noting in
the file of the Government may have been irrelevant, the cause
of the order of discharge could not have been ignored. That
the recommendation, which was the basis or the foundation for
the order of discharge should have been read with the order
for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading
the two together the court reached the conclusion that the
alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and but
for that allegation it could not have been passed, then it was
inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground.
This was because the appellant therein had not been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article
311(2) of the Constitution. While holding so, this Court held in
paragraph 12 as under:
“12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the
form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order
of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the
court before which the order is challenged to go
behind the form and ascertain the true character of
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the order. If the court holds that the order though in
the form is merely a determination of employment is
in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the court
would not be debarred, merely because of the form
of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred
by law upon the employee.”
Consequently, in the aforesaid case, after discussing the facts
of the case in detail, this Court set aside the order of discharge/
termination of service on the ground that an inquiry ought to
have been held against the appellant therein prior to termination
of service. As a result, the appellant therein was reinstated in
service at the same rank and seniority in which he was entitled
to before the order the discharge was passed, as if it had not
been passed at all, with all consequential benefits.
(ii) In Dipti Prakash Banerjee, this Court inter alia, considered
the following points:
“(1) In what circumstances, termination of a
probationer’s services can be said to be founded
on misconduct and in what circumstances could
it be said that allegations were only a motive?
(2) When can an order of termination of a probationer
be said to contain an express stigma?
(3) Can stigma be gathered by referring back to
proceedings referred to in termination order?
Each of the aforesaid points were answered which
can summarised as under:
Point 1: If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to
misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without
a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order
of termination is to be treated as “founded” on the
allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not
held, no findings were arrived at and the employer
was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the
same time, he did not want to continue the employee
against whom there were complaints, it would only
be a case of motive and the order would not be bad.
Similar is the position if the employer did not want
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1511

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

to enquire into the truth of the allegations because
of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he
was doubtful about securing adequate evidence.
In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a
motive and not the foundation and the simple order
of termination would be valid.
xxx
Point 2: There is considerable difficulty in finding out
whether in a given case where the order of termination
is not a simple order of termination, the words used
in the order can be said to contain a ‘stigma’. It
depends on facts and circumstances of each case
and language or words used to ascertain whether
termination order contains stigma.
xxx
Point 3: Material which amounts to stigma need not
be contained in termination order of a probationer
but might be contained in documents referred to
in the termination order or in its annexures. Such
documents can be asked for, or called for, by any
future employer of the probationer. In such a case,
employee’s interests would be harmed and therefore
termination order would stand vitiated on the ground
that no regular enquiry was conducted.
xxx
It is true that the Supreme Court in some of the
cases has held that termination order is not punitive
where employee has been given suitable warnings
or has been advised to improve himself or where he
has been given a long rope by way of extension of
probation. However, in all such cases, there were
simple orders of termination which did not contain
any words amounting to stigma. On the other hand,
there is a stigma in the impugned order which
cannot be ignored because it will have effect on the
appellant’s future. Stigma need not be contained in
termination order but may also be contained in an
1512 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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order or proceeding referred to in termination order
or in an annexure thereto and would vitiate the
termination order.”
Referring to Indra Pal Gupta vs. Managing Committee, Model
Inter College, Thora, (1984) 3 SCC 384, it was observed in
paragraph 35 that the said decision is a clear authority for the
proposition that the material which amounts to stigma need not
be contained in the order of termination of the probationer but
might be contained in any document referred to in the termination
order or in its annexures. Obviously, such a document could be
asked for or called for by any future employer of the probationer.
In such a case, the order of termination would stand vitiated on
the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted.
In that case, the employer had given ample opportunity to the
employee by giving him warnings, asking him to improve and
even extended his probation twice. It was observed that in
such circumstances where he was given a long rope by way of
extension of probation, this Court had said that the termination
order could not be held to be punitive as held in Hindustan
Paper Corpn. vs. Purnendu Chakrobarty & Ors., (1996)
11 SCC 404, Oil & Natural Gas Commission vs. Dr Md. S.
Iskender Ali, (1980) 3 SCC 428, Principal, Institute of Post
Graduate Medical Education & Research, Pondicherry vs.
S. Andel & Ors., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 609 and a labour case
being Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad
vs. Presiding Officer, (1998) 3 SCC 225. This Court further
observed that in the above noted cases, the order were simple
orders of termination which did not contain any word amounting
to stigma. That in case it was concluded that there was stigma
in the impugned order of termination or discharge it would have
an effect on the future irrespective of whatever had been the
earlier opportunities granted by the employer to the employee
to improve.
Thus, the approach of the Court must be firstly, to ascertain
whether the impugned order is founded on any conclusions
arrived at by the employer as to his misconduct or whether
the termination was passed because the employer did not
want to continue an employee against whom there were some
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1513

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complaints. The second aspect is whether there is any stigma
in the order of termination or in the documents referred to in
the termination order. In the aforesaid case, the impugned order
of termination was quashed and the appeal was allowed. The
appellant therein was directed to be reinstated with back wages
till the date of reinstatement and continuity of service reserving
liberty to the respondents therein to take such action as they
deem fit in accordance with law against the appellant therein.
(iii) Recently in Swati Priyadarshini, this Court, placing reliance on
the earlier judgment in Parshotam Lal Dhingra granted relief
to the appellant therein. The relevant portion of Parshotam Lal
Dhingra could be recapitulated as under:
“28. …. Any and every termination of service is not a
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination
of service brought about by the exercise of a
contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal.
… In short, if the termination of service is founded
on the right flowing from contract or the service rules
then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment
and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article
311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has,
by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate
the employment without going through the procedure
prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal
or removal or reduction in rank, the Government
may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant
and if the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other disqualification, then it is a punishment and
the requirements of Article 311 must be complied
with. As already stated if the servant has got a right
to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of
employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his
services cannot be terminated otherwise than for
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and
sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such
a servant on such grounds must be a punishment
and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article
1514 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he
is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay
and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the
officer affecting his future career. …”
(iv) Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti is a case pertaining to a
Civil Judge, Junior Division who was placed on probation for
the period of two years. The respondent in the aforesaid case
initially received certain adverse remarks to which she sent her
replies and the same were followed by her termination from
service on the premise that her performance was not good and
satisfactory and that she was not suitable for the post she held.
Therefore, it was recommended for termination of her probation
immediately and that she should not be allowed to continue to
officiate in service for a long term. Being unsuccessful in her
representation, she assailed the same before the High Court
which held that it was not a case of termination simpliciter of a
probationary officer and therefore set aside the termination of her
service and directed reinstatement with back wages. The High
Court of Gujarat had preferred an appeal before this Court. Going
through the original records, this Court summarised as under:
“The question is whether this is a case of termination
simpliciter of the services of a probationer on account
of her unsuitability for the post that she was holding, or
whether it is a termination of her services after holding
an inquiry behind her back, and without giving her an
opportunity to defend herself. Having gone through
the salient judgments on the issue in hand, one thing
which emerges very clearly is that, if it is a case of
deciding the suitability of a probationer, and for that
limited purpose any inquiry is conducted, the same
cannot be faulted as such. However, if during the
course of such an inquiry any allegations are made
against the person concerned, which result into a
stigma, he must be afforded the minimum protection
which is contemplated under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution even though he may be a probationer.
The protection is very limited viz. to inform the person
concerned about the charges against him, and to
give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1515

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Consequently, this Court affirmed relief granted to the respondent
therein by granting reinstatement of her service with continuity and
all consequential benefits. However, the back wages payable to her
were restricted to the period subsequent to the decision of the High
Court as the respondent therein confined her prayer to that extent
as she was interested in mitigating her position.

Analysis:

Re: Sarita Choudhary:
14. As already noted, Ms. Sarita Choudhary was appointed as a Civil
Judge, Class-II (Entry level) vide order dated 28.12.2016 in Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service. For the year 2017 she served as a trainee
Judge for which the District Judge graded her as ‘B-Very Good’;
however, the Portfolio Judge reduced her general assessment grade
to ‘C-Good’. It was noted by the District Judge that her judicial work
was satisfactory and she had good reputation and good character.
However, the Portfolio Judge noted that on an overall review he
disagreed with the remark made by the District & Sessions Judge
and thereby changed her grade.
14.1 The ACR of the successive year i.e. 2018 is appreciative for the
petitioner. The District Judge granted the petitioner a general
assessment grade of ‘B-Very Good’ and it was also noted
that she has good conduct of business in court and office, is
a sincere and punctual judicial officer and that the quality of
her judgments is good. Notably, her management and inter-
personal skills were also appreciated. It is equally important
to note that her judicial work, quantity and quality-wise, was
termed to be ‘good’. Despite not meeting the civil units due to
being posted in a vacant court, this assessment was approved
as it is by the Portfolio Judge.
14.2 In the following year, while her unit value increased, her
general assessment grade was yet downgraded in the ACR
for 2019 to ‘C-Good’. Consistent with previous years, it was
noted that she has good conduct in in court and office. She
was an average judicial officer insofar as sincerity, punctuality
and overall performance were concerned. Again, despite not
earning requisite civil units it was observed that her quantity
of work was good. Our attention was drawn to two letters:
the first dated 26.11.2020 which communicated the adverse
1516 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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remarks to the petitioner and provided her with an opportunity
to submit representation. This is particularly useful to know in
light of the fact that Complaint No.26/2019 dated 04.01.2019
was filed by an advocate against the petitioner complaining that
the petitioner had failed to take action in accordance with law
in a grave criminal case. However, the respondent-High Court
submitted before us that in a discreet enquiry the said complaint
was found to be baseless and therefore no action was taken.
14.3 Furthermore, in another complaint filed by an advocate it
was alleged that the petitioner had failed to conduct her court
in accordance with law. As her explanation was not found
satisfactory, she was issued a warning to conduct proceedings
as per law. Finally in another complaint bearing no. 408/2019,
the High Court upon discreet enquiry issued a non-recordable
warning (oral) to her stating that the petitioner must not repeat
procedural mistakes in the future.
14.4 This context is particularly useful in the context of reliance
placed on a second letter dated 27.11.2020 which clarified to
the petitioner that certain adverse remarks in the ACR for 2019
were only advisory in nature and meant for future guidance
and improvement. Therefore, despite these observations the
ACR was categorical that she deserves ‘C-Good’ grade and
that her quality of judgments is good. We must also note that
although all these complaints related to conduct in court, the
ACR categorically recorded that petitioner had good conduct of
business in court and office, a fact, as already noted, consistent
with previous years.
14.5 The Administrative Committee of the High Court was convened
on July 24, 2020, to consider the confirmation of 92 temporary
Civil Judges (Entry Level) under Rule 11. While considering
these cases, the Committee deferred its decision regarding the
petitioner due to a complaint filed against her, for which they
requested a special report from the District & Sessions Judge.
The Administrative Committee’s decision was subsequently
approved on August 18, 2020. As we have noted above, the
first complaint filed in 2019 was found to be baseless and in
the other two, the petitioner was only asked to be careful and
conduct proceedings as per law. Albeit, these two complaints
were only closed in September 2021, much after petitioner’s
case had been deferred.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1517

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

14.6 Thereafter, petitioner’s ACR for 2020 witnessed a downward
shift in her grade to ‘D-Average’.
14.7 In 2020, two complaints were filed against the petitioner by
the District and Session Judge, Raisen wherein he complained
regarding petitioner’s lack of punctuality and improper conduct
of office, and an instance of erroneous grant of bail in a criminal
case triable by Sessions Court. Notably, in both complaints
she was only given advice to adhere with the rules of court
and propriety. In the complaint related to erroneous grant of
bail, she was warned to remain vigilant and not commit the
same mistake again.
14.8 We note that it is not the case advanced before us that petitioner
was not adept at handling criminal cases. In fact her ACRs
reflect that the petitioner regularly handled criminal cases. The
High Court’s decision to only issue a warning seems to be an
acknowledgement of the fact that this instance was an error
made by a junior judicial officer who is, indeed, expected to
be vigilant but also expected to learn with experience.
14.9 Part II of her ACR for 2020, prepared by the District Judge,
noted that her conduct of business in court and office was
satisfactory. This observation is despite the first complaint
suggesting that she poorly managed her court. While the
ACR was overtly critical of her conduct, her lack of sincerity to
dispose of old cases and highlighted the lack of transparency
in her judicial work which had room for improvement, we must
also note that the ACR observed that her unit value earned
was in ‘Very Good’ category. Furthermore, it was also noted
in the ACR that she earned a total 253.5 units by disposal
of cases pending for more than three years. The ACR form,
as placed before us, noted 15% of total units earned as the
benchmark for disposal of old cases and the same had clearly
been achieved by the petitioner. Thus, we are not clear as to
how the aforesaid adverse remark regarding lack of sincerity
to dispose of old cases was warranted. Although the District
Judge had noted that she earned only 3 units in civil cases,
we are of the view that this must be seen in light of the fact
that the petitioner was already in charge of a vacant court and
Covid-19 prolonged civil cases during the year 2020.
1518 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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14.10 Although it was noted that her judicial and administrative
work was not up to the mark and she was habitual to make
unnecessary and false statement in official letters, it was
also noted that she had satisfactory capability to manage the
cases, lead, initiate, plan and make decisions.
14.11 The adverse remarks in the ACR were communicated to the
petitioner only on 09.12.2021 and her representation was
rejected by the High Court vide letter dated 13.12.2023. We
find ourselves in agreement with the general submission of
the petitioners that such delay in communicating adverse
remarks deprives judicial officers of the ability to rectify their
approach and conduct towards their work. In that regard,
we would hope that hereafter the High Court will take all
reasonable and necessary steps to ensure that such delay
is minimized and curtailed.
14.12 It is pertinent to note that as the format of the Assessment Chart
placed before the Administrative Committee only includes
comments that were exclusively adverse comments, it was
never highlighted that her unit value for old cases fell in the
‘Very Good’ classification or that her conduct of business in
court and office was considered to be ‘satisfactory’.
14.13 Petitioner’s ACR for 2021 was further downgraded to ‘E-Poor’,
despite earning units in excess than required units. It is noted
that though the required units per day to be classified as very
good were only 3.5, the petitioner had achieved 6.47 units
per day. Notably, she was recorded to dispose of 124 cases
pending for more than three years. However, she achieved
only 149.8 units on the civil side.
14.14 For a comprehensive evaluation of the material on record,
we must be cognizant of the fact that the ACR notes her to
be not interested in judicial work and adversely remarks her
aversion to work. However, simultaneously, it has also been
noted that her unit value and disposal of old cases is very
good. The ACR also notes that out of 25 targeted old cases
she disposed of all cases. Therefore, although the petitioner
may have not been able to dispose of any contested civil case
in the year 2021, it seems unclear to suggest that a judicial
officer may lack initiative to work when the quantitative record
suggests that she has been highly productive.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1519

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

14.15 In stark contrast to the previous year, it was noted that the
petitioner has good personal relationship and good team
work. In our view, this signifies a crucial improvement in her
outlook and interpersonal behaviour and a marked departure
which should be appreciated.
14.16 A complaint bearing No.127/2021 was filed against the
petitioner for improper behaviour towards her seniors,
but upon noting her explanation and apology, the Chief
Justice advised her to improve her behaviour and exercise
care. Similarly, in another complaint No.130/2021 filed by
an advocate, the Chief Justice advised her to be careful.
Pertinently, upon perusal of the submissions of the
respondent-High Court, it is revealed that as the complaint
had been withdrawn, no further enquiry was called for. In
light of the fact that this complaint was not mentioned in the
Assessment Chart and the complaints had been withdrawn,
we are of the view that no adverse inference must be drawn
against this petitioner.
14.17 Learned Amicus Curiae and learned senior counsel for the
petitioner have drawn our attention to the fact that there
was a significant improvement, as noted in her ACR for the
following year i.e. 2022, which was also the year before
termination. It was noted that the petitioner’s work is ‘good
and up to mark’. Comprehensively, her understanding of law,
marshalling and appreciation of evidence was appreciated.
Her interpersonal relationship with office staff was also
appreciated. In consonance with last few years, it was noted
that her unit value was in the ‘very good’ category. Although
she was unable to achieve the benchmark for disposal of civil
cases and disposal through ADR, the District Judge noted
that petitioner successfully disposed of all 25 old cases, as
targeted in pursuance of High Court Memo No.A/3397 Jabalpur
dated 01.09.2022
14.18 We must note that despite complaints filed by members of
the Bar in 2022 and one even alleging mismanagement of
files in her courtroom, the District Judge in the ACR for 2022
noted that her managerial skill and leadership quality was
good and so was her decisive nature.
1520 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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14.19 In the assessment chart placed before the Administrative
Committee and the Full Court, two complaints against the
petitioner were shown as pending. Of these, the first related
to 321 suspicious cases/order sheets found in the court of the
petitioner. There is merit in the submission of the petitioner
that the Inquiry Report dated 13.12.2022 found that while
the petitioner should have continuously monitored those
suspicious cases/order sheets but the actual negligence and
lack of sense of duty was on part of the then posted execution
clerks, who were then subjected to departmental inquiry. In
our view, this fact also lends credence to her submission that
her court staff generally failed to execute and follow directions
or instructions.
14.20 Another complaint bearing No.174/2023 is reflected as
pending in the Assessment Chart. However, as neither any
explanation was actually called for nor any action was taken
in respect of this complaint regarding a post on Face Book
messenger, the same would not merit further consideration
by us. Although two more complaints were filed against the
petitioner in 2023, we must be circumspect in considering
the same as they were not placed before the Administrative
Committee and the Full Court when the decision to terminate
was taken. It is alleged in Complaint No.271/2023 dated
29.04.2023 that during her posting in Umaria District, the
petitioner resided in Room No.4 of Judicial Officer’s Circuit
House without submitting any application for allotment in
the Circuit House. It was complained that petitioner’s act of
leaving with the keys of the VIP Room had caused grave
inconvenience to visiting guests.
14.21 In Complaint No.286/2023, it was complained that petitioner
took unauthorized absence from office.
14.22 In our view, these complaints should not stand as a hurdle
in any holistic consideration in favour of this petitioner as
neither do they speak about her capabilities as a judicial
officer nor do they militate the fact that the latest ACR
for 2022 was generally positive and noted her to have
undoubtful integrity, good personal relationships and high
disposal.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1521

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

Re: Aditi Kumar Sharma:
15. On a perusal of the material on record, it is inferred that petitioner-
Aditi Kumar Sharma’s performance for the years 2019 and 2020
was sufficiently good and does not call for minute scrutiny except
for the low unit value. Although the respondent-High Court has
contended that in 2020, her final disposal rate was poor, it is
pertinent to give weight to the submission that in 2020 only urgent
cases were heard due to the pandemic and that in the same year
she got married. On a broader level, we note that after considering
her overall performance the petitioner was finally awarded the
grades ‘B-Very Good’ in her ACR for 2019 and ‘C-Good’ in the
ACR for 2020.
15.1 Note must also be made of ‘Column 8 – General Assessment’
wherein the Principal District Judge has noted as follows:
“She is hard working judge, having good reputation
and character and takes her responsibilities seriously.
Her conduct, behaviour and working is very good.
She is submissive, serious officer.”
15.2 If there indeed was a significant deficiency towards her work,
there clearly would have been no occasion for the Principal
District Judge to observe as above. The aforesaid ACR was
also approved by the Chief Justice as it is.
15.3 Therefore what falls for consideration, on facts, are the
ACRs for the following two years and the complaints filed
against her. As noted, the petitioner’s initial grade of ‘B-Very
Good’ in the ACR of 2021 was lowered by the Portfolio
Judge to ‘C – Good’ considering the pendency and disposal.
Foundationally, it is pertinent to examine the remarks of the
Principal District and Sessions Judge made in her ACR for
the year 2021. Part II of the ACR for 2021 noted that the
Principal District Judge was of the view that the petitioner
has ‘very good conduct of business in court and office staff’.
Additionally, she was also noted to be ‘sincere and punctual’
and someone who ensures the regular entry of data on
NJDG portal. Although she earned only 22.9 civil units in
2021, the general assessment was that her ‘judicial work,
quantity and quality wise is very good. Her administrative
work is very good’.
1522 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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15.4 Upon perusal of the record, it is apparent that the Portfolio
Judge deemed it fit to downgrade her from ‘B-Very Good’
to ‘C-Good’ only due to ‘pendency and disposal’. We are
of the view that an appropriate analysis of ‘pendency and
disposal’ must not be distanced from the practical realities of
the courtroom and the petitioner’s life. In fact, the petitioner
in the section titled ‘If required the following note stating
reasons/endeavours may be added’ has supplemented the
quantitative record of the ACR with reasons explaining the
deficit. In Column 1(e) it was added that she was unable to
reach the benchmark set for disposing of sufficient number
of cases pending in her court as she presided over a vacant
court with very old and complicated files transferred to her.
Furthermore, in Column 1(f) wherein a judicial officer is
provided opportunity to give any other sufficient reason beyond
control, she submitted as follows:
“After my regular posting to a vacant court, most of
the time the proper and regular functioning of the
court ha(d) been adversely affected by the global
pandemic COVID-19. In the same course of time,
i got married on a very short notice shortly after
which i had contracted COVID-19 infection. i was
hospitalised in ICU for the treatment of the same at
dedicated covid 19 centre Chirayu Hospital, Bhopal
for 11 days with further prescription of bed rest for
more than 10 days after getting discharged ever
since then my health not been in good state. In the
month of January my elder brother was diagnosed
with blood cancer and in the month of march I had
a miscarriage due to w(h)ich i had to avail special
leave of 45 days on the advice of my doctor. (I)
would attribute only the above stated unfortunate
yet unavoidable reason for having not achieve the
bench mark set by hon. High Court.”
15.5 Some of the prevailing factors cited in her ACR for 2021 by the
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma had occurred in 2020 but we
would be remiss to ignore their cascading effects, especially
as the petitioner submitted that her health had not been in a
good state ever since Covid-19. Clearly her elder brother’s
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1523

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

diagnosis is of January 2021 and later in March of the same
year she suffered a miscarriage herself. It is apparent from
the aforesaid that the additional reasons provided by the
petitioner in conjunction with her posting in a vacant court
would sufficiently explain the low units earned in 2021. It is
also worth noting that so far neither the quality of her work nor
the reasons of her health were ever noted to act as hindrances
to her service. This is particular evident from absence of
negative comments on her ‘State of health’ in any ACR In
fact, the respondent-High Court submitted before us that the
sole reason for grade ‘C-Good’ was her low disposal rate. At
this point, it would be beneficial to appreciate the argument
of the learned amicus to the effect that low disposal in the
above factual backdrop should not be the sole reason for
termination of this petitioner.
15.6 Further, a total of five complaints filed against the petitioner
were also taken into consideration by the Administrative
Committee. Insofar as 2021 is concerned, the complaint
bearing no.75/2021 in which the allegation was of wrongfully
adjourning a case was found to be not proved in the report of
the enquiry officer. The petitioner has contended that despite
a positive preliminary report, the status of the complaint
was erroneously marked as pending and placed before the
Administrative Committee. We are of the view that it would
not be appropriate to draw any negative inference against the
petitioner from this complaint as the allegation was found to be
not proved. Even the respondent-High Court in its submissions
before this Court has noted that it is due to termination of
the petitioner that the complaint is kept in abeyance by order
of the Chief Justice dt. 27.06.2023. More importantly, as the
ACR of 2021 does note that her management, planning, and
decision making were good, we glean that the true general
assessment of the petitioner on court management would
be positive.
15.7 At this juncture, it is pertinent to examine the argument of
learned senior counsel for the petitioner who contended that
the Administrative Committee gravely erred in considering
petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma’s ACR for 2022 as the same
was yet to be approved and finalised. The relevant extract
1524 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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of the minutes of the meeting Administrative Committee on
08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023 reads as follows:
“Further resolved that following officers did not utilise
their probation period successfully and satisfactorily,
therefore having considered the ACRs, assessment
chart, consistently poor performance/work done
and other material, the Committee resolved to
recommend that services of the following officers
are no more required to be continued. Accordingly,
it is resolved to recommend termination of services
of the following officers as per Rule 11(c) of M.P.
Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of
Service) Rules,1994.
(emphasis supplied)”

15.8 It is the submission of the petitioner’s learned senior counsel
that in reply to an RTI application, it was revealed that the
‘other material’ relied upon were excerpts of ‘unapproved
and under process’ ACR of 2022 and the statement showing
her actual disposal from January 2023. As noted, after an
assessment the ACR is graded by the reporting authority
i.e. the Principal District Judge. Thereafter, the same is
reviewed by the Portfolio Judge and is finally placed before
the Chief Justice for acceptance. It was therefore argued that
an unapproved and unprocessed ACR is akin to irrelevant
material and could not have been placed for consideration
before the Administrative Committee and the Full Court. It is
trite law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. The imprimatur of the Chief Justice to an ACR is
an approval of the highest judicial office in the State which
is a mandatory requirement. In the absence of the said
procedure being completed, the Administrative Committee
could not have considered by classifying an unapproved
ACR as ‘other material’.
15.9 Given that the Administrative Committee did indeed take
into consideration the ACR for 2022 we consider it useful to
examine the same to draw a complete overview of petitioner’s
service.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1525

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

15.10 It is true that the general assessment of the petitioner was
further downgraded in her ACR for 2022 to ‘D-Average’. In
her self-assessment in the ACR for 2022, the petitioner duly
acknowledged that the quantity of work done by her was not
satisfactory but that she was leaving no stone unturned to
improve. The reasons appended by the petitioner explaining
the shortfall, inter alia, were being posted to a vacant court,
excessive interim applications, priority given to matters
pending for over three years, non-appearance of witnesses
and insufficient number of criminal cases, were rejected as
unsatisfactory by the Principal District Judge, Ratlam. That
being the case, it also merits consideration that the petitioner
highlighted in her self-assessment that out of 25 cases
specially listed by the High Court in September 2022, the
petitioner disposed of 10 cases by the end of the year including
the oldest pending case of Satna District. Pertinently, even
this ACR found no qualms with the quality of her judicial work.
15.11 Part II of the ACR for 2022 assessed by the Principal District
Judge, Ratlam (M.P.) is equal parts appreciative of the quality
of petitioner’s judgments, her marshalling and appreciation
of evidence, her interpretation and application of law and the
style of language in writing judgments, but was critical of the
low quantity of work done by her. Column 1 of Part II is a
field marked for assessment of judicial officer’s ‘Quality of
work’. Further filtered down, Column 1(a) is for evaluation of
‘Conduct of business in Court and Office’. However, instead
of assessing the quality of work done in Column 1(a), the
Principal District Judge, Ratlam has noted that this petitioner,
despite being in the same posting since 26.05.2020, only
resolved 28 regular cases in 2022. It is further noted by the
Principal District Judge, Ratlam that although the petitioner
served as junior-in-charge of the filing section, no notable
work carried out by her had been highlighted. In our view any
such adverse remark must not be read dehors petitioner’s
general approach towards court management. In her self-
assessment for the year 2022, the petitioner indeed noted
that she inspected the filing section with her senior-in-charge
various times and that she found no major shortcoming in
2022. However, it is also pertinent to note that in the preceding
1526 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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years (2021 and 2020) the petitioner was junior-in-charge
of civil record room wherein, according to her ACR for the
relevant years, she did observe shortcomings in arrangement
of old records and took active steps to ensure that old files
were bundled and maintained appropriately in accordance
with relevant rules and orders. Therefore, it is apparent that
the petitioner has been neither aloof nor uninvested in the
improvement of court operations and it would therefore be
incongruous with her record to infer the same solely from
the observation in ACR of 2022.
15.12 In Part III, the Portfolio Judge agreed with the assessment
of the Principal District Judge, Ratlam and concluded that
the petitioner deserved the grade of ‘D-Average’ as drastic
improvement in working was necessitated to achieve desired
targets. In contrast to these observations, we must not lose
sight of the fact that the then Principal District & Sessions
Judge, who had personally supervised the petitioner, on
23.12.2022 prepared an Annual Inspection Report and
observed that petitioner’s judicial work appeared to be
‘excellent’.
15.13 Out of the four remaining complaints, two each were presented
before the Administrative Committee as pending and closed.
Complaint No.251/2022 dated 24.02.2022, which was shown
as pending, alleged an indirect misuse of her position to
exert pressure on police officials by way of mentioning the
said judicial officer’s name in FIR filed by her sister. While
the petitioner contends violation of principles of natural
justice and incomplete disclosure by the High Court officials
before the Administrative Committee and the Full Court, it
is observed that the respondent-High Court has itself in its
written submissions filed before this Court notes that by a
discreet enquiry report dt. 13.06.2022 the allegations were
not found to be correct; however, the file has been kept in
abeyance because of the termination of the petitioner. This
complaint is inconsequential.
15.14 Another pending complaint in the assessment chart was
Complaint No.775/2022 alleging that petitioner did not record
the statement of the complainant. While the petitioner contends
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1527

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

that the enquiry was conducted in violation of fundamental
principles of natural justice, we find it more appropriate to
appreciate the submission of the petitioner that the complaint
was voluntarily withdrawn. In view of the same, at this stage,
it is inconsequential whether the complaint was supported
by affidavit(s) or was the fact of voluntary withdrawal placed
before the Administrative Committee or not. In any event,
the respondent-High Court has submitted before this Court
that Registrar (Vigilance) by his report dated 31.03.2023 only
recommended issuance of advice to the petitioner-Aditi Kumar
Sharma. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid facts, especially
that the complaint is said to have been voluntarily withdrawn,
it would be irrelevant to consider the same.
15.15 Two further complaints were reflected as concluded in the
assessment chart. Complaint No.664/2022 dated 28.07.2022
alleged that petitioner released her dogs and used abusive
words at the complainant. The Assessment Chart noted that,
“Status: Hon’ble the Chief Justice order dated 17.12.2022,
the permission/direction regarding to take criminal action
against the judicial officer namely Sushri Aditi Kumar Sharma
may not be given and the complaint be filed.” The petitioner
has contended that it was concealed from the Administrative
Committee that the Chief Justice had ordered the filing of the
complaint after a preliminary enquiry conducted by Registrar
(Vigilance) found that the allegations, prima facie, appeared
to be an afterthought and counterblast to the police complaint
filed by the petitioner against the complainant. Presently,
since terminated, the file is kept in abeyance by order of the
Chief Justice.
15.16 Complaint No.776/2022 concerning notation of unnecessary
comments against an advocate in the order sheet was
also shown as concluded in the Assessment Chart. The
petitioner has contended that despite being found guilty in a
discreet enquiry, no explanation was ever sought from her.
Moreover, we note that the only semblance of any action
taken therein has been the proposal by PR(Vigilance) to
advise the petitioner to maintain cordial relations between
the Bar and the Bench. Furthermore, we also note that from
2019 till 2021, her respective ACRs have noted that her
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inter-personal relationship with advocates, staff, colleagues,
and litigants, was good. Even the ACR for 2021 notes her
inter-personal relationship to be satisfactory. Considering the
general assessment in the ACR to be the compendious annual
review of a judicial officer, rather than relying exclusively on
complaints, we find that it would be appropriate to take a
holistic view of the material on record. That being the case,
especially when action taken was an advisory to maintain
cordial relations between the Bar and Bench, no inference
negativing her generally cordial approach – as evidenced
by successive ACRs - could be drawn from this complaint.
15.17 Therefore, it appears that it is only Complaint No. 664/2022
dated 28.07.2022 concerned with use of abusive words by
the petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma which would hold weight
and suggest that she displayed conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer. However, it is also noteworthy that the Chief
Justice had directed that permission for a criminal complaint
against the petitioner may not be given.
16. On a perusal of the Minutes of the Meetings of the Administrative
Committee of the High Court dated 08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023, it
is apparent that the Committee considered the ACRs, Assessment
Charts which included the complaints pending/concluded against
these two judicial officers. Their consistent “poor performance”/work
done and “other material” were also considered by the Committee.
As a result of the said consideration, it was resolved that, inter
alia, these two officers were no longer required to be continued in
their posts. The Minutes extracted above when juxtaposed with our
aforesaid analysis would bring to fore the following aspects:
(i) That the ACRs which were adverse in nature were either not
communicated in time and even after an explanation was
received, there were no effort to expunge the adverse remarks
made in the said ACRs on the basis of a consideration of the
explanation. Possibly they were simply rejected.
(ii) The reference to the consistent “poor performance” is also not
in accordance with the record which has been submitted by
the learned counsel for the respondent-High Court insofar as
these two officers are concerned. The record does not reflect
any consistent poor performance; the record speaks otherwise.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1529

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

We have also pointed out the inherent contradictions in the
ACRs in our analysis.
(iii) As far as “other material” considered is concerned, it could
have been the complaints which were either concluded or
pending against them. If the complaints formed the foundation
for these officers to be terminated, we find that the voluminous
cases which we have referred to above in our discussion would
clearly point out that an opportunity had to be given before
termination. This is particularly having regard to Article 311 of
the Constitution read with relevant Conduct Rules.
(iv) Therefore, in our view, the termination of these two judicial
officers is punitive, arbitrary and therefore illegal. They are
not in accordance with the judgments of this Court discussed
above, as we have applied the tests laid down in those
judgments to the facts of the present cases while detailing
the ACRs, the Assessment Charts and other material in light
of the submissions made by the learned amicus as well as
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respective petitioners.
(v) Even on perusal of the records of the petitioners submitted
by the learned counsel for the High Court in a sealed cover,
they do not persuade us to take a different view in the matter.
(vi) Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned terminations
herein were by way of punishment as the surrounding
circumstances also show that the terminations were, inter alia,
founded on the allegations of the complaints of misconduct
and “inefficiency” and were stigmatic in nature. Even though
many of the complaints against these officers may have been
closed or resulted in advisories/warnings, they could not have
been the basis for the impugned terminations.
16.1 In the circumstances, we find that the Resolutions of the
Administrative Committee dated 08.05.2023 and 10.05.2023
followed by the Resolution of the Full Court dated 13.05.2023
by circulation; orders of the High Court dated 13.05.2023 and
the Government Orders dated 23.05.2023 insofar as these
two officers are concerned, are illegal and contrary to the
established principles of law and, therefore, are liable to be
set-aside and are set-aside.
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Women Workforce: Women in the Indian Judiciary:
17. To holistically understand women’s effective participation in the
Judiciary, it is important to look at three main phenomena: (I) the entry
of women into the legal profession; (II) the retention of women and
growth of their numbers in the profession; and (III) the advancement
of women, in numbers, to senior echelons of the profession.
17.1 Many have stressed that increased diversity within a judiciary,
and ensuring judges are representative of society, enables the
judiciary as a whole to better respond to diverse social and
individual contexts and experiences. It is a recognition of this
fact that a greater representation of women in the judiciary,
would greatly improve the overall quality of judicial decision
making and this impacts generally and also specifically in
cases affecting women.
17.2 Advancing women’s greater participation in the judiciary also
plays a role in promoting gender equality in broader ways:
a. Female judicial appointments, particularly at senior
levels, can shift gender stereotypes, thereby changing
attitudes and perceptions as to appropriate roles of men
and women.
b. Women’s visibility as judicial officers can pave the way
for women’s greater representation in other decision-
making positions, such as in legislative and executive
branches of government.
c. Higher numbers, and greater visibility, of women judges
can increase the willingness of women to seek justice
and enforce their rights through the courts.
17.3 Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights states that special protection should be
accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and
after child birth. Article 11 of CEDAW states that in order
to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of
marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to
work, State Parties shall take appropriate measures, which
can be extracted as under:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1531

Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including
the application of the same criteria for selection in matters
of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment,
the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and
conditions of service and the right to receive vocational
training and retraining, including apprenticeships,
advanced vocational training and recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to
equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as
equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work.
17.4 The freedom from discrimination or equal protection of the
laws during pregnancy and maternity of a woman are precious
rights for women workforce. If pregnancy results in the birth
of a child, it brings not only joy to the parents of the child but
also a sense of fulfilment to the young mother. On the other
hand, a pregnancy miscarriage has deep physical, mental and
psychological aftereffects on a woman. Miscarriage is generally
defined as a loss of pregnancy before viability. Psychological
consequences include increase in the risk of anxiety, depression,
post-traumatic stress disorder, sometimes leading to suicides.
Recurrent miscarriage leads to obstetrics complications and
long-term health problems. Although there is varying amount
of physical aftereffects including backache and abdominal pain
involved in miscarriages, the psychological and social effects
may be more severe and long lasting. A miscarriage affects a
person’s identity, leading to disappointments and challenges
to motherhood identity and role, stigma and isolation, amongst
other aspects. A number of risk factors predisposing women
to experience significant psychological distress following
miscarriage have also been identified. There could be psychiatric
illness and a previous pregnancy loss could lead to increase
in chances of severe psychological distress.1

1 See: V Klier, P Geller and J Ritsher, ‘Affective Disorders in the Aftermath of Miscarriage: A
Comprehensive Review’ (2002) 5 Archives of Women’s Mental Health 129-149; Siobhan Quenby and
others, ‘Miscarriage Matters: The Epidemiological, Physical, Psychological, and Economic Costs of
Early Pregnancy Loss’ (2021) The Lancet, May; P Gerber-Epstein, RD Leichtentritt and Y Benyamini,
‘The Experience of Miscarriage in First Pregnancy: The Women’s Voices’ (2008) 33(1) Death
Studies 1-29; OB Van den Akker, ‘The Psychological and Social Consequences of Miscarriage’ (2011)
6(3) Expert Review of Obstetrics & Gynecology 295
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17.5 In Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469,
this Court castigated the State’s perpetuation of anachronistic
gender roles based on sex stereotypes which have long
discriminated against women. Reliance was placed by the
State on the “inherent physiological differences between men
and women” to effectively suggest that the “weaker” sex may
not undertake tasks that are “too arduous” for them. This Court
rejected the State’s arguments finding them to not constitute
a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to
women officers.
17.6 In Nitisha v. Indian Army, (2021) 15 SCC 125, this Court
significantly advanced Indian jurisprudence on indirect
discrimination. In this case, this Court explained how the
facade of certain structures as harmless and as a “norm” may
in reality reflect the ‘insidious patriarchal system’. Cognizant
of the transformative intent of our constitutional project, this
Court noted the need to rebuild societal and legal structures
to realise equal opportunity in public employment and gender
equality.
17.7 Much like ‘it is not enough to proudly state that women officers
are allowed to serve the nation in the Armed Forces’, it is not
enough to find comfort solely in the growing number of female
judicial officers if we are unable to secure for them a sensitive
work environment and guidance. The High Court has erred
in acting agnostic to, inter alia, claims of insubordination of
petitioner-Sarita Chaudhary and acute medical and emotional
conditions battled by petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma. Despite
still reeling from the effects of a severe case of Covid-19 and a
miscarriage, the ACR for 2021 of petitioner-Aditi Kumar Sharma
was downgraded by the Portfolio Judge from ‘B-Very Good’
to ‘C-Good’ only considering ‘pendency and disposal’. While
gender is not a rescue for poor performance, it is a critical
consideration which must weigh for holistic decision-making
at certain times and stages of a woman judicial officer.

Conclusion:
18. In the result, we set aside the termination orders vis-à-vis the
petitioners herein including Resolution dated 13.05.2023 and the
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Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another

order/letter dated 13.05.2023 of the High Court, order of the State
Government dated 23.05.2023 and all consequential adverse orders,
if any. The petitioners herein are reinstated in their service with all
consequential benefits, subject to the following conditions:
(i) the respondents are directed to declare their probation as on
the date their juniors were confirmed;
(ii) However, the petitioners herein shall not be entitled to any
salary from the date of termination till their reinstatement but
the monetary benefits for the said period shall be calculated
notionally for the purpose of pensionary benefits etc.;
(iii) It is directed that these petitioners shall be reinstated into service
within a period of fifteen days from today in accordance with their
seniority that they possessed as on the date of termination; and
(iv) the complaints if any, which were kept in abeyance by orders
of the Chief Justice owing to the termination of these officers
may be dealt with in accordance with law.
Before parting with these matters, we wish to record our appreciation
for the valuable assistance rendered by Sri Gaurav Agrawal, learned
senior advocate and Amicus Curiae appointed by the Chief Justice
of India in effectively assisting the Court in the adjudication of these
cases.
The writ petitions as well as Suo Moto Writ Petition are allowed and
disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Result of the case: Writ Petitions and Suo Moto Writ Petition allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain