Supreme Court of India
SATYA PAL ANANDversusSTATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 988
- Decided
- 25 August 2015
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
The Court held that the Sub‑Registrar and the Inspector‑General lack jurisdiction to cancel the extinguishment deed and subsequent sale deeds, which are void ab initio, and that the High Court should have exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction to set them aside.
Summary
Satya Pal Anand, a septuagenarian, claimed that a plot of land allotted to his mother by a cooperative society was unlawfully cancelled by the society through a Deed of Extinguishment dated 9‑8‑2001, and that subsequent sale deeds to third parties were also void. The Sub‑Registrar refused to cancel the extinguishment deed, citing pending dispute before the cooperative society authority, and the Inspector‑General of Registration dismissed Anand's application under Section 69 of the Registration Act. The High Court held that the registration authority had no jurisdiction to declare the deeds void, and dismissed the writ petition. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Sub‑Registrar and his superior lack power to cancel such deeds, that the extinguishment deed and the later sale deeds are void ab initio, and that the High Court should have exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction to set them aside. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned instruments were quashed, the respondents were ordered to vacate the property and pay Rs.10 Lakhs compensation, and the matter was referred to the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench.
Issues considered
- Whether a Deed of Extinguishment and subsequent sale deeds registered under the Registration Act can be cancelled by the Sub‑Registrar or the Inspector‑General under Section 69.
- Whether the registration authority has jurisdiction to examine the substantive validity of registered documents and declare them void.
- Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in a writ petition concerning registration matters.
- Whether the unilateral cancellation of a sale deed by a cooperative society is permissible under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether the matter should be decided by a civil court or is amenable to writ jurisdiction.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art.300A
- Limitation Act, 1963s. Art.59
- M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960
- M.P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1962
- Registration Act, 1908s. 17(1)(b), s. 20, s. 21, s. 22, s. 32, s. 33, s. 34, s. 35, s. 69
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 31
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 54
Subjects
Registration ActCancellation deedExtinguishment deedCooperative societyProperty rightsArticle 300ASpecific Relief ActWrit jurisdictionLarger benchCompensation
Judgment
[2015] 14 S.C.R. 927
SATYA PAL ANAND A
v.
STATE OF M.P.AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 6673 of 2014)
B
AUGUST 25, 2015
[DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
Registration Act, 1908 - s.69 - Jurisdiction of
authorities under the Act-A plot of land has been allotted to
appellant's mother, by respondent no.4-Society-After death C
of appellant's mother, respondent no.4-society, through its
office bearer executed a Deed of Extinguishment unilaterally
cancelling the said allotment and on the strength of such
document, executed a registered sale deed in favour of
respondent no. 5, who in turn executed a sale deed in favour D
of the respondent nos. 6 and 7-Appellant moved the Sub-
Registrar (Registration) seeking cancellation of the Deed of
Extinguishment- SUb-Registrar rejected the said prayer on
two counts, namely, the dispute between the parties was
pending before the competent authority under the M.P. E
Cooperative Societies Act and secondly, his jurisdiction was
limited only to the extent of registering the documents and if
any party desired its cancellation, then to verify that the
cancellation deed is registered on appropriate stamp paper
-Appellant filed application u/s.69 of the Registration Act, F
which was rejected by the Inspector General (Registration)
stating that the powers conferred on him is limited to general
superintendence of the registration office and making rules
. - The Inspector General further intimated him that against
the order of Sub-Registrar, it was open to the appellant to G
initiate appropriate proceedings before a Court of competent
jurisdiction -Appellant filed writ petition praying for declaring
the Extinguishment Deed as well as the subsequent sale
deeds as void ab initio - High Court held that the controversy
H
927
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A raised by the appellant could not be adjudicated in the writ
proceeding; and that the authorities under the Act had
correctly stated that they have no jurisdiction to decide the
soundness of registration of Extinguishment Deed or the sale
deeds and declare them as null and void - Whether the Deed
B of Extinguishment and the subsequent sale deeds registered
by the Sub-Registrar under the Act could be cancelled by
the Sub-Registrar or by his superior authority in exercise of
powers conferred under the Act - Held (per Misra, J.): In
Thota Ganga Laxmi case, the Supreme Court, after making
c reference to a specific rule, namely, Rule 26(k)(i) framed by
the State of Andhra Pradesh u/s. 69 of the Registration Act,
opined that a cancellation deed cannot be executed or
registered - Question that emerges for consideration is
whether in the absence of any specific rule in the State of
o Madhya Pradesh, the general principle laid down in the case
ofThota Ganga Laxmi would be applicable - Jn the absence
of any rule, to opine that by no stretch of imagination can a
cancellation deed be accepted or registered by the
Registering Authority does not appear to be correct- Hence,
E the principle by way of general observations stated in Thota
Ganga Laxmi case requires consideration by a larger Bench
- Held (per Gowda, J.): High Court should have responsibly
exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction and should have
examined the documents of the sale deed with respect to
F the relevant provisions of the M.P Co-operative Societies Act
and Rules, 1962 and the Bye-Jaws of the Society - The
cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of the
appellant's mother in the year 1962 by way of the
extinguishment deed could not have been registered by the
G Sub-Registrar as he is not empowered to do so - Hence, for
want of the competent jurisdiction, in registering such
document, the High Court should have exercised its
extraordinary jurisdiction to annul the extinguishment deed
and the transactions of the subsequent sale deeds, which
H has not been done by it- Thus, the High Court has failed to
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 929
exercise its discretionary power which has resulted in a grave A
miscarriage of justice, thereby, depriving the valuable
constitutional right guaranteed wider Art.300A of the
Constitution to the appellant - Order of the High Court
accordingly set aside and the impugned instruments i.e. the
extinguishment deed and the subsequent sale deeds B
quashed with further direction to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to
vacate the said property and hand over the possession of
the same to the appellant- Respondents further directed to
pay the appellant a compensation amount of Rs.10 Lakhs
for his sufferings and the injustice caused to him by the C
society for the last 14 years as he was deprived of his right to
enjoy the property on account of the Arbitrary and unilateral
action taken by the society in canculling the sale deed in
respect of the property in question executed in favour of his
deceased mother - Held (per curiam): In view of the o
difference of opinion, matter directed to be placed before
Hon'ble the Chief Justice of/ndia, for constituting appropriate
Bench - M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 - M.P
Co-operative Societies Rules, 1962 - Constitution of India,
1950-Art. 300A. .E
· In the judgment of Dipak Misra, J.
Thota Ganga LaJ(mi and another v. Government
of Andhra Pradesh and others (2010) 15 SCC 207
- held, requires consideration by larger Bench.
F
Yanala Malleshwari v. Anantula Sayamma AIR
2007 AP 57 E.R.; Kalaivan v. Inspector General
of Registration, Chennai and Anr AIR 201 O
Madras 18; M. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Sub
Registrar, Bangalore and Another AIR 2000 G
Karnataka 46; Park View Enterprises v. State of
Tamil Nadu AIR 1990 Mad 251; Satya Pal Anand
v. Punjabi Housing Cooperative Society & Others
2013 (9) SCALE 355 - re.ferred to.
H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A In the judgment of V. Gopala Gowda, J:
Yanala Mal/esflwari v. Anantula Sayamma AIR
2007 AP 57; E.R. Kalaivan v. Inspector General
of Registration, Chennai &Anr. AIR 2010 Madras
18; M. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Sub Registrar,
B Bangalore & Anr. AIR 2000 Karnataka 46; Thota
Ganga Laxmi & Anr. v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh &Ors. (2010) 15 SCC 207; E.R. Kalaivan
v. Inspector General of Registration AIR 201 O
Madras 18; Government of U.P. v. Raja
c Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan AIR 1961 SC 787
: 1962 SCR 97 ; Government of Uttar Pradesh v.
Khan, Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964
SC 72 : 1964 SCR 733; Arunachalam v. PS.R.
Sadhanantham andAnr. (1979) 2 SCC 297: 1979
D (3) SCR 482; Ganga Kumar Shrivastav v. State
of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211; GAG v. K.S.
Jagannathan (1986) 2 sec 679 : 1986 (2)
SCR 17; Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee
Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav
E Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 :
1989 (2) SCR 697; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad
lshaque AIR 1955 SC 233 : 1955 SCR 1104 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
F
In the judgment of Dipak Misra, J.
AIR 2007 AP 57 referred to Para 15
AIR 2010 Madras 18 referred to Para 18
G
AIR 2000 Karnataka 46 referred to Para 19
(201 o) 15 sec 207 held, requires Para 20
consideration
by larger Bench
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 931
AIR 1990 Mad 251 referred to Para 23 A
2013 (9) SCALE 355 referred to Para 28
In the judgment ofV. Go1:1ala Gowda, J: •
AIR 2007 AP 57 referred to Para 2
B
AIR 2010 Madras 18 referred to Para 2
AIR 2000 Karnataka 46· referred to Para 2
(201 O) 15 sec 201 referred to Paraz
AIR 201 O Madras 18 referred to Para 11 c
1962 SCR 97 referred to Para 11
1964 SCR 733 referred to Para 19
1979 (3) SCR 482 referred to Para 22
(2005) 6 sec 211 referred to Para 22 D
1986 (2) SCR 17 referred to ·Para 25
1989 (2) SCR 697 referred to Para 26
1955 SCR 1104 referred to Para 27
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
6673 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2011 of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in WP No. 13505
of 2008. F
Satya Pal Anand (Appellant-in-Person).
S.K. Dubey, Sr. Adv., C. D. Singh, Yogesh Tiwari, Shreya
Dubey, Mishra Saurabh, Satyajit A. Desai, Ms: Anagha S.
Desai, Somnath Padhan, Swetab Kumar, Akash K., Advs. for G
the Respondents.
The Judgments and Order of the Court were deliverer' by
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The appellant, a septuagenarian,
filed an application dated 4.2.2008 ·in the office of the
H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 14 S.C.R.
A Sub-Registrar, Bhopal, the third respondent herein. for
cancellation of registered documents dated 9.8.2001,
21.4.2004 and 11. 7.2006 which pertain to registration of
immoveable property situated on Plot No. 7-B, Punjabi Bagh,
Raisen Road, Bhopal. As put forth by the appellant in his
B application, the said plot was allotted to his mother, Smt.
VeeravaliAnand, by the Punjabi Housing Cooperative Society
Ltd. (for short, "the Society"), the fourth respondent herein, by
entering into a sale deed dated 22.3.1962, registered on
30.03.1962. Sm!. Veeravali Anand expired on 12.6.1988.
c After her death, the fourth respondent, through its office bearer
executed a Deed of Extinguishment on 9.8.2001 unilaterally
cancelling the said allotment and on the strength of such
document, executed a registered sale deed dated 21.4.2004
in favour of Mrs. Manjit Kaur, the respondent no. 5 herein. Mrs.
D Manjit Kaur in her turn executed another sale deed dated
11. 7.2006 in favour of the respondent nos. 6 and 7, Mrs.
Meenakhsi and Mr. S.C. Sharma.
2.As is evident, under these circumstances, the appellant
moved the Sub-Registrar (Registration) seeking cancellation
E of the Deed of Extinguishment dated 9.8.2001. The Sub-
Registrar rejected the said prayer on two counts, namely, the
dispute between the parties was pending before the
competent authority under the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act,
1960 (for short 'the 1960 Act') and secondly, his jurisdiction
F was limited only to the extent of registering the documents and
if any party desired. its cancellation, then to verify that the
cancellation deed is registered on appropriate stamp paper.
Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Section 69
of the Registration Act, 1908 (for brevity, "the Act"), which was
G rejected by the Inspector General (Registration) stating that
the powers conferred on Inspector General (Registration) under
Section 69 of the Act is limited to general superintendence of
the registration office and making rules and not to provide
hearing by any Sub-Registrar. The Inspector General further
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 933
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
intimated him that against the order of Sub-Registrar, it was A
open to the appellant to initiate appropriate proceedings
before a Court of competent jurisdiction.
3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellant
preferred W.P. No. 13505 of 2008 before the High Court. The
prayer in the writ petition was for declaring the Extinguishment B
Deed as well as the subsequent sale deeds as void ab initio
with a further direction to the respondents to record the
cancellation of such documents. It was contended before the
High Court that the Extinguishment Deed was registered
contrary to the provisions contained in Section 17(1 )(b) of the C
Act by the Sub-Registrar and, therefore, it was obligatory on
the part of the higher authorities in exercise of powers under
Section 69 of the Act to declare the said action as ab initio
void and consequently the subsequent sale deeds to be void.
D
4. The said stand and stance of the. appellant was
resisted by the contesting respondents contending, inter alia,
that as the initial allottee, Smt. Veeravali Anand, did not take
any steps for 35 years to raise any construction on the plot in
question, the respondent no. 4 registered the Extinguishment E
Deed on 9.8.2001. On the strength of said deed, the
respondent society executed and registered the sale deed
dated 21.4.2004 in favour of Manjit Kaur. At that juncture, the
appellant and the respondents, to avoid any controversy,
entered into a deed of compromise dated 6. 7 .2004
whereunder the appellant received consideration of F
Rs.6,50,000/- (rupees six lakhs fifty thousand only); Rs.
4,50,000/- by demand draft and Rs.2,00,000/- lakhs by post
dated cheques. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application
under Section 64, of the 1960 Act before the Dy. Registrar,
Cooperative Societies, forming the subject matter of Dispute G
No. 81 of 2005. Along with said application, an application
under Section 57( 1) of the 1960 Act was filed for ad interim
injunction which was granted by the said authority on 1.2.2006
restraining the respondents to make any construction over the
H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A said property. The said order of injunction stood vacated by
order dated 12.4.2006. The said order vacating the order of
injunction was affirmed by the Joint Registrar and the Deputy
Registrar was directed to finally adjudicate the dispute.
5. As the factual matrix would unveil as the appellant
B instituted many a legal proceeding against the respondents,
they issued a notice on 12.7.2007 asking him to refund the
consideration amount of Rs.6 lakhs. Against various orders,
the appellant preferred three special leave petitions, i.e. SLP(C)
No. 34857 of 2010, SLP(C) No. 13255 of 2012 and the present
C appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 9502 of 2012. The SLP(C)
No. 34857 of 2010 was preferred assailing the maintainability
of the revision petition and the said SLP is pending. SLP(C)
No. 13255 of 2012 relates to appointment of receiver to protect
his interest, which stood dismissed by order dated 17.7.2013.
D I shall refer to the said order in detail at the appropriate time.
6. The High Court took note of the factual assertions,
scanned the relevant provisions of the Act, took note of the
authorities cited by the appellant and eventually came to hold
E that the controversy raised by the appellant could be
adjudicated before the appropriate forum and not in the writ
proceeding. The High Court further held that the authorities
under the Act had correctly stated that they have no jurisdiction
to decide the soundness of registration of Extinguishment
Deed or the sale deeds and declare them as null and void.
F
7. I have heard Mr. Satya Pal Anand, appellant-in-person
and Mr. S.K. Dubey, learned senior counsel for respondent
nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. Satyajit A. Desai, learned counsel for
respondent nos. 5 to 7.
G 8. Though there are manifold assertions by the appellant
and counter asseverations covering various arenas, the core
issue that arises for consideration in the obtaining factual
matrix is whether the Deed of Extinguishment and the
subsequent sale deeds registered by the Sub-Registrar under
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 935
(DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the Act could be cancelled by the Sub-Registrar or by his A
superior authority in exercise of powers conferred under the
Act. There is no cavil over the fact that Extinguishment Deed
was registered on 9.8.2001 and subsequent sale deeds were
registered thereafter. The stand of the respondents is that they
had paid the amount to the appellant and there is a finding to B
that effect in the Special Leave Petition that has been
dismissed by this Court.
9. Presently, I shall deal with the scheme of the Act.
Section 17 occurring in Part Ill of the Act deals with the
documents of which registrati9n is compulsory. The C
controversy pertains to Section 17(1 )(b) of the Act, as urged
. by th~ appellant. The said provision reads as follows:-
"17(1 )(b) other non-testamentary instruments which .
purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or D.
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title
or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of
one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable
property;"
10. Sectiqn 18 of the Act deals with the documents of E
which registration is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with
the documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or
alterations. The said provision is reproduced below:-
"20. Documents containing interlineations, blanks,
erasures or alterations. - (1) The registering officer F
may in his discretion refuses to accept for registration
any document in which any interlineation, blank, erasure
or alteration appears, unless the persons executing the
document attest with their signatures or initials such
interlineation, blank, erasure or alteration. G
(2) If the registering officer registers any such document,
tie shall, at the time of registering the same, make a note
in the register of such interlineation, blank, erasure or
alteration.
H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A 11. Section 21 of the Act provides for description of
property and maps or plans. The said provision is as under:-
"21. Description of property and maps or plans. (1)
No non-testamentary document relating to immovable
property shall be accepted for registration unless it
B contains a description of such property sufficient to
identify the same.
(2) Houses in towns shall be described as situate on the
north or other side of the street or road (which should be
specified) to which they front, and by their existing and
c former occupancies, and by their numbers if the houses
in such street or road are numbered.
(3) Other houses and land shall be described by their
name, if any, and as being the territorial division in which
D they are situate, and by their superficial contents, the
roads and other properties on which they abut, and their
existing occupancies, and also, whenever it is
practicable, by reference to a government map or survey.
(4) No non-testamentary document containing a map or
E plan of any property comprised therein shall be accepted
for registration unless it is accompanied by a true copy
of the map or plan, or, in case such property is situate in
several districts, by such number of true copies of the
map or plans as are equal to the number of such districts."
F 12. Section 22 deals with the description of houses and
land by reference to Government maps or surveys. The said
provision is as follows:-
"22. Description of houses and land by reference
to government maps of surveys. - (1) Where it is, in
G the opinion of the State Government, practicable to
describe houses, not being houses in towns, and lands
by reference to a government map or survey, the State
Government may, by rule made under this Act, require
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 937
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
· that such houses and lands as aforesaid shall, for the A
purposes of section 21, be so described.
(2) Save as otherwise provided by any rule made under
sub-section (1 ), failure to comply with the provisions of
section 21, sub-section (2) or sub-section (3 ), shall not
disentitle a document to be registered if the description B
of the property to which it relates is sufficient to identify
that property."
13. Section 32 of the Act, which occurs in Part VI provides
for persons to present documents for registration. The said C
provision is reproduced below:-
"32. Persons to present documents for registration
- Except in the cases mentioned in sections 31,'88 and
89, every document to be registered under this Act,
whether such registration be compulsory or optional, shall 0
be presented at the proper registration office-
(a) by some person executing or claiming under the same,
or, in the case of a copy of a decree or order, claiming
underthe decree or order, or·
(b) by the representative or assignee of such a person, E
or
(c) by the agent of such a person, representative or
assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed
and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned."
F
14. Section 32Aof the Act which has been inserted w.e.f.
24.9.2001, lays down compulsory affixing of photographs, etc.
Section 33 of the Act stipulates the power of attorney
recognizable for purposes of Section 32. Section 34 of the
Act provides for enquiry before registration by the Registering G
Officer.
15. I have referred to the aforesaid provisions to
understand the scheme of registration and the role of the
Registration Officer. It is urged. by the appellant that the
H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A Extinguishment Deed was registered contrary to the provisions
contained in Section 17(1) (b) of the Act and in a fraudulent
manner. Section 17(1 )(b) stipulates certain categories of
documents which are required fo be registered. It stipulates
registration of non-testamentary documents which purport or
B operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether
in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested
or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards,
to or in immovable property. It is contended by the appellant
that authority, on the ground offraud, can declare the deeds to
c be null and void. To bolster the said stand, he has drawn
inspiration from the authority in Yana/a Malleshwari v.
Anantula Sayamma1 (Full Bench). Before the Full Bench,
the question arose whether a person can nullify the sale by
executing and registering a cancellation deed and whetherthe
D Registering Officer like District Registrar and/or Sub-Registrar
appointed by the State Government, is bound to refuse
registration when a cancellation deed is presented. Rao, J.,
adverting to the provisions of the Act and the Rules and
dwelling upon the concept offraud held thus:-
E "The person, who has ex facie right whether such right is
registered or not can always approach the registering
authority, with a request to cancel a sale deed, which
was registered earlier by such registering authority by
showing that subsequent registration was obtained by
F fraud by a person who is not entitled to transfer the
property or that such transfer was registered by·playing
fraud on the owner or on the stranger. In the present
statutory dispensation, namely, Transfer of Property Act,
Contract Act, Specific Relief Act and Registration Act,
G the Court does not see any prohibition operating on the
exercise of inherent power by the registering authority to
cancel the sale deed earlier registered, which is likely to
cause prejudice to the true owner as well as to the entire
public at large."
.H 1 AIR 2007 AP 57
. :......
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 939
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Chandraiah, J., while concurring with Rao, J. opined A
that:-
"I would like to reiterate that there is no specific prohibition
under the Registration Act, 1908 (for short 'the Act') to
register a deed of cancellation. The Registering Officer .
can refuse registration in the situations arising under 8
.Sections 19 - 22, 32 and 35 and the relevant rules are
Rules 26, 58 and 117. But in all other cases where the
conditions under the Act i.e., Sections 17 and 18 of the
Act are fulfilled, the Registering Officer is bound to
register the document and it is not in dispute that the C
cancellation deed fulfills the conditions for the purpose
of registration. However, the Act does not permit the
Registering Officer to enquire. into the title of the party
presenting the document for registration and the
situations mentioned ill the above said provisions under D
which the registration can be refused are for different
purpose and only under those contingencies he can
refuse. This Court cannot enlarge the scope of these
provisions under the guise of interpretation of statute.
Further when there is no prohibition under the Act the E
Registering Officer has to register the documents
presented for registration in accordance with law and
this Court by judicial interpretation cannot impose the
same into the statute. It is well settled that what has not
been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by F
Courts and to do so will amount to legislating which is
not the function of the Courts."
·1e. In the said case, the minority view is to the following
effect:-
G
"The purpose of noting down these provisions of TP Act
and the Registration Act is to come to a conclusion as to
whether a vendor retains any interest in the.property which
he sold and of which a sale deed was executed and
registered. The answer is emphatic 'no'. Therefore, in H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A my view, when a person transfers all his rights, his rights
in the properly get extinguished and if he tries to get back
the property, it has to be done by challenging the sale
deed which he has executed and which is registered by
the Sub-Registrar."
B 17. It is apt to note here that in the said case, the majority
took the view that if a person is aggrieved by the cancellation
deed, his remedy is to seek an appropriate relief in the civil
court and the writ petition is not the proper remedy.
c 18. The High Court in the impugned order has also
referred to a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court
in E.R. Kalaivan v. Inspector General of Registration,
Chennai and Anfl. In the said case, the Division Bench took
note of the decision in Yanala Mal/eshwari (supra) and the
D Rule 26(k) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules that was
introduced after the verdict of the Full Bench. The Division
Bench dealt with decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
and the constitutional validity of the newly amended Rule, which
provides for adherence to the principles of natural justice when
E there is presentation of unilateral cancellation deed. The
Madras High Court observed that the situation is prevalent in
Andhra because of rule position and thereafter proceeded to
state thus:-
"In this context, we may also usefully refer to the judgment
F of a learned single Judge of this Court in G.D.
Subramaniam v. The Sub-Registrar, Konur3. The
learned Judge has extensively considered the scope of
registration of cancellation of sale deed and had
ultimately held that such unilateral cancellation of deed
G cannot be made in the absence of any specific provision
for the Registrar to do so. We are entirely in agreement
with the said view taken by the learned single Judge."
2
AIR 2010 Madras 18
3 2009 CIJ 243 Madras
H
..
SATYAPAL ANANDv. STATE OF M.P. 941
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Be it noted, after so stating, the Division Bench opined A
thus:-
"That apart, on the facts of this case, our attention is not
drawn to any of the specific provision under the
Registration Act empowering the Registrar to entertain
a document of cancellation for registration on the ground B
that the sale .consideration was not paid and
consequently, received by the vendor. Further, in our , ·
opinion, when the Registrar satisfies himself on the
perusal of the document, wherein it is stated that the full·
sale consideration is received and on such satisfaction, C
entertain the document for registration, cannot thereafter
be conferred with a power for cancellation of the deed
on the ground that the full sale consideration was not paid
and received by the vendor. Conferring such power on
the Registrar would tantamount to conferring a power to D
decide the disputed questions. That apart, as already
stated, in the absence of any provision specifically
empowering the Registrar to entertain a document of
cancellation for registration, without the signature of both
the vendor and the purchaser, the deed cannot be E
entertained. For the said reason, we find no infirmity in
the impugned circular issued by the Inspector General
of Registration."
19. In this regard, I may usefully refer to the judgment F
referred· in M. Ramakrishna Reddy v. Sub Registrar,
Bangalore and Anothe~. by a learned Single Judge of
Karnataka High Court. In the said case, the petitiener therein
claimed that he was the lawful owner of the property and the
concerned cooperative society had no right over the said site G
nor could it be sold by the said society in favour of the private
respondents. It was contended that the Sub-Registrar could
not have registered the sale deed relating to the said site in
favour of the second respondent. Anotice was sent to the
4
AIR 2000 Karnataka 46
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A Sub-Registrar by the petitioner calling upon to remove the name
of the second respondent as purchaser of the site, but the said
request was not complied with by the concerned Sub-
Registrar. Being dissatisfied with the said inaction, a writ
petition was filed seeking appropriate direction to consider
B the demand contained in the notice. The learned Single Judge
while dealing with the concept of registration of instruments
under the Act, observed that:-
"The object and intent of providing for registration of
instruments under the Act is to create and maintain a
c public record of transactions relating to immovable
properties, on which every person dealing with an
immovable property can rely with confidence, for a full
and complete account of the transactions by which his
title to 'the immovable property, may be affected.
D Section 17 of the Act enumerates the documents of which
the registration is compulsory. All instruments (except
Wills) which purport or operate to create, declare, assign,
limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any
right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, in
E regard to an immovable property, the value of which is
Rs. 100/- or more, and all Gift Deeds as also leases
relating to immovable properties for any term exceeding
one year, are compulsory registrable."
F Thereafter, the learned Judge referred to various
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1885 and also of
the Act and concluded as follows:-
" .......when .a. person who claims to be the owner or a
person interested in an immovable property, finds that·
G someone else has executed and registered a sale deed
or other deed in regard to his property, claiming to be
the owner or a person interested in the property, the
appropriate course for him is to file a suit for declaration
and consequential reliefs. If he is satisfied such sale deed
H is executed by a person without any title and that the deed
SATYAPAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 943
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
is void ab initio, he may even choose to ignore the same A
and leave it to the person claiming title under such deed
to establish his title in appropriate proceedings. A Court
of Law has the jurisdiction to declare a document to be
void or even cancel a document. But under no
circumstances, a person claiming to be the owner of a B
property or a holder of a property, can require the
Registering Authority to cancel the registration of a
document."
20. In this context, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Tho ta Ganga Laxmi and another v. C
Government of Andhra Pradesh and others 5 . In the said
case, the High Court of Andh.ra Pradesh had dismissed the
writ petition relying on the Full Bench decision in Yana/a
Mal/eshwari (supra). The father of the appellants therein had
purchased the plot in question from the 4'h respondent by a D
registered sale deed dated 21.6.1983 and since then they
were in possession and enjoyment of the said property.
Subsequently, the fourth respondent unilaterally registered the
cancellation deed without any notice to the appellants. A writ
petition was filed seeking declaration that the cancellation deed E
was illegal but the said writ petition was dismissed holding
that the appellants should approach the civil court. This Court,
in the said factual matrix opined:-
"ln our opinion, there was no need for the appellants to F
approach the civil court as the said cancellation deed
dated 4-8-2005 as well as registration of the same was
wholly void and non est and can be ignored altogether.
For illustration, if A transfers a piece of land to B by a
registered sale deed, then, if it is not disputed thatA had
the title to the land, that title passes to Bon the registration G
of the sale deed (retrospectively from the date of the
execution of the same) and B then becomes the owner-
5 (2010)15SCC207
H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14S.C.R.
A of the land. If A wants to .subsequently get that sale deed
cancelled, he has to file a civil suit for cancellation or
else he can request B to sell the land back to A but by no
stretch of imagination, can a cancellation deed be
executed or registered. This is unheard of in law."
B Thereafter, the Court referred to Rule 26(k)(i) of Andhra
Pradesh Registration Rules framed under Section 69 of the
Act which reads as follows:-
"(1) The registering officer shall ensure at the time of
c preparation for registration of cancellation deeds of
previously registered deed of conveyances on sale
before him that such cancellation deeds are executed
by all the executant and claimant parties to the previously
registered conveyance on sale and that such cancellation
deed is accompanied by a declaration showing natural
D
consent or orders of a competent Civil or High Court or
State or Central Government annulling the transaction
contained in the previously registered deed of
conveyance on sale:
E Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with
the execution of cancellation deeds by executant and
claimant parties to the previously registered deeds of
conveyances on sale before him if the cancellation deed
is executed by a Civil Judge or a government officer
F competent to execute government orders declaring the
properties contained in the previously registered
conveyance on sale to be government or assigned or
endowment lands or properties not registerable by any
provision of law."
G After reproducing the Rule, the Court proceeded to
state:-
" A reading of the above Rule also supports the
observations we have made above. It is only when a sale
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 945
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
deed is cancelled by a competent court that the A
cancellation deed can be registered and that too after
notice to the parties concerned. In this case, neither is
there any declaration by a competent court nor was there
any notice to the parties. Hence, this Rule also makes it
clear that both the cancellation deed as well as B
registration thereof were wholly void and non est and
meaningless transactions."
21. On a reading of the aforesaid judgment, two aspects
are noticed. It is evident from paragraph 4 of the judgment
that the Court has opined that the cancellation deed cannot be C
executed or registered; and in paragraph 5 of the said
judgment, reference has been made to Rule 26(k)(i) which has
been framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh under Section
69 of the Act and on that basis, it has been ruled that the said
Rule supports the observations made by the Court. It is apt to D
note here that the case had arisen from the State of Andhra
Pradesh, where specific rule had come into force after the
pronouncement by the Full Bench in the case of Yanala
Mal/eshwari (supra). That apart the observations made in
paragraph 4 of the decision is of general import. E
22. At this juncture, I think it apt to refer to Section 69 of
the Act, which reads as follows:-
"69. Power of Inspector-General to superintend
registration offices and make rules - (1) The F
Inspector-General shall · exercise a general
superintendence over all the registration offices in the
territories under the 59 [State Government], and shall have
power from time to time to make rules consistent with
this Act- G
(a) providing for the safe custody of books, papers and
documents;
(aa) providing the manner in which and the safeguards
subject to which the books may be kept in computer H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A floppies or diskettes or in any other electronic form under
sub-section ( 1) of section 16A;]
(b) declaring what language shall be deemed to be
commonly used in each district;
B (c) declaring what territorial divisions shall be recognized
under section 21;
(d) regulating the amount offines imposed under sections
25 and 34, respectively;
(e) regulating the exercise of the discretion reposed in
c the registering officer by section 63;
(f) regulating the form in which registering officers are to
make memoranda of documents;
(g) regulating the authentication by Registrars and Sub-
D Registrars of the books kept in their respective offices
under section 51;
(gg) regulating the manner in which the instruments
referred to in sub-section (2) of section 88 may be
presented for registration;
E
(h) declaring the particulars to be contained in Indexes
Nos. I, II, Ill and IV, respectively;
(i) declaring the holidays that shall be observed in the
registration offices; and
F
0) generally, regulating the proceedings of the Registrars
and Sub-Registrars.
(2) The rules so made shall be submitted to the State
Government for approval, and, after they have been
G approved, they shall be published in the Official Gazette,
and on publication shall have effect as if enacted in this
Act."
23. The Rule which I have reproduced has been framed
under the aforesaid provision and has been incorporated as
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 947
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Rule 26(k)(i). The qu·estion that emerges for consideration is A
whether in the absence of any specific rule in the State of
Madhya Pradesh, the general principle laid down in the case
of Tho ta Ganga Laxmi (supra) would be applicable.
24. On a careful reading of the provisions of the Act, I do
not find there is any prohibition to register a document of B
cancellation or deed of extinguishment. Section 35 of the Act
which deals with procedure cannot be construed to confer a
quasi-judicial power on the registering authority. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in M.
Ramakrishna Reddy (supra) has observed that:- C
" ... If a duly stamped document is presented for
registration with required registration fee (with supporting
enclosures required to satisfy the provisions relating to
valuation and payment of stamp duty under the Kamataka 0
Stamp Act, 1957 and the requirements of Section 230-A
or269-ULof Income TaxAct, 1.961 and Section 22-Aof
the Registration Act and Section 26 of Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation)Act, 1976 and any other relevant
statutory provisions), the Sub-Registrar will proceed to E
register the document. Before registration, the
Registering Officer will peruse the document to be
registered and supporting documents (like tax paid
receipts, revenue register extracts and even copies of
earlier title deeds). But such incidental examination is F
not with the purpose of ascertaining or verifying the title
of the executant, but only to ensure that there is no
violation of Section 22-A of the Act and that there is
compliance with the statutory requirements under Stamp
Laws, Taxation Laws, Land Ceiling and Land Reforms G
Laws etc."
It is apt to note there that the learned Single Judge has
referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in Park View
Enterprises v. State of Tamil Nadu6 , wherein it has been
6 AIR 1990 Mad 251 H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A observed that function of the Sub-Registrar, for purposes of
registration, are purely administrative and not quasi-judicial
and, therefore, he cannot decide whether a document which
is registered is executed by a person having title as recited in
the instrument.
B 25. Thus, in the absence of any power conferred on the
Registering Authority to adjudicate any aspect, it is difficult to
agree with the view in Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) that the
Registering Authority cannot unilaterally register a deed of
cancellation. In my considered opinion, in the absence of any
C rule like the one that is prevalent in the State of Andhra Pradesh,
which commands the Registering Officer to ensure atthe time
of preparation for registration of cancellation deeds of
previously registered deed of conveyances on sale before him
that such cancellation deeds are executed by all the executant
D and claimant parties to the previously registered conveyance
on sale and that such cancellation deed is accompanied by
declaration showing natural consent, the Registering Authority
or the superior authority cannot refuse to register a deed of
cancellation solely on the ground that the claimant parties to
E the previously registered conveyance are riot present or they
have not given consent.
26. Section 69 empowers the Inspector General to make
rules consistent with the Act. He has been allocated certain
F areas to frame rules. Rule 26(k)(i) relating toAndhra Pradesh
under Section 69 of the Act may come under any such
regulatory measure. I do not intend to express any opinion
with regard to the validity of the Rule. The Rule actually provides
the manner of verification of execution. It is a condition
G precedent forthe purpose of execution and registration. In the
absence of any rule-to opine that by no stretch of imagination
can a cancellation deed be accepte~ or registered by the
Registering Authority does not appear to be correct. It seems
to me that it has been broadly stated. Hence, I am of the view
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 949
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
that general observations in Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra)·· A
· requires to be considered by a larger Bench.
27. Having said that, I would have directed the Registry
to place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for
constitution of the larger Bench, but I am constrained to refer
to certain other facts which are imperative to be stated. In the B
case at harid the factual score that is evincible is that the
Society had exe.cuted a sale deed in favour of the mother of
the appellant on 22.2.1962. As the construction was not raised
and there was violation, as claimed by the society, it executed
the Extinguishment Deed dated 9.8.2001 and cancelled the C
sale deed dated 22.2.1962. On the strength of the
Extinguishment Deed, the Society executed and registered a
sale deed in favour of other private respondents and further
transactions took place. As the factual matrix would reveal,
the dispute raised by the appellant under Section 64 of the D
1960 Act is still pending before the competent authority for
adjudication. The said authority has the jurisdiction to hold
whether cancellation of the allotment made in favour of the
mother of the appellant was justified in law. The said order is
further subject to appeal and other proceedings and, therefore, E
I refrain from adverting to the same .
. 28. In this regard, I may refer with profit to the order dated
July 17, 2013 on which reliance has been placed by the
respondents, passed in Satya Pal Anand v. Punjabi
Housing Cooperative Society &Others7 • In the said case, F
the Court has taken note of the dispute pending before the
Registrar under Section 64 of the 1960 Act, questioning the
legality of the execution of the Extinguishment Deed and
allotment of the property in dispute in favour of other G .
respondents. While dealing with the factum of appointment of
receiver, the Court has observed thus:-
"We must also mention herein that during the pendency
of these proceedings, the second respondent sold the
7
SLP(C) No. 13255 of 2012 · H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A property in favour of respondent nos. 4 and 5 by sale
deed dated 11.7 .2006. It appears thatthe Sub-Registrar
on inspection of the disputed plot found that there were
two constructed duplex and two more near completion
as on the date of inspection i.e. on 13.03.2007 of which
B one was occupied by respondent no.4.
It must be remembered that the instant proceedings arise
out of the interlocutory proceedings seeking appointment
of the receiver at the instance of the petitioner herein.
Having regard to the fact that respondent no. 4 was in
c possession of the property in dispute at least since .
13.03.2007 admittedly and also having regard to the fact
that the petitioner received an amount of Rs.6,50,000/-
we do not see any justification for the appointment of the
receiver."
D
29. I have noted this aspect as the counsel for the
respondent has highlighted the said aspect for two purposes,
namely, a dispute before the appropriate forum is pending for
adjudication and that the appellant had entered into a
E compromise with the respondents. It is also urged that the
compromise was entered into to buy peace. Thus, the
appellant has raised a dispute, accepted the money from the
subsequent purchasers and moved the authority under the Act
to cancel the deed of extinguishment. In such a situation, in
F my view, the writ court has rightly declined to exercise the
jurisdiction.
30. In view of the foregoing analysis, while not finding
any error on the factual score of the dismissal of the writ petition
by the High Court, as stated earlier, I am of the view that the
G principle by way of general observations stated in Thota
Ganga Laxmi (supra) requires consideration by a larger Bench
and, therefore, the papers be placed before the Hon'ble the
Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench.
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 951
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. I have gone through the A
judgment of my learned brother Judge, Justice Dipak Misra,
wherein certain relevant facts have been adverted to by my .
learned brother on the contentious legal issues urged on behalf
of the parties~ My learned brother has also adverted· to the
relevant provisions un(jer Sections 20, 21, 22 and 32 of the B
Indian Registration Act, .1908,
2. My learned brother Judge has also referred to the full
bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case
of Yanala Malleshwari v. Anantula Sayamma1, the judgment
of the Madras High Court in the case of E.R. Kalaivan v. C
Inspector General of Registration, Chennai & Am:. 2· and
the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of M.
Ramakrishna Reddy v, Sub Registrar, Bangalore & Anr. 3
My learned brother judge has also referred the decision of this
Court in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi & Anr. v. D
Government ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors.4, wherein the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed the Writ Petition of the
appellant therein, relying on the Full Bench decision of Yanala
Malleshwari (supra).
E
3. I have also taken into consideration the fact that the
sale ·deed of the property in dispute was executed by the
Society in favour of the mother of the appellant on 22.03.1962
in respect of the plot involved in this proceeding. The contention
urged on behalf of the Society is that as there was no
construction raised by the appellant or his deceased mother F
on the said plot ofland and therefore, there has been a violation
of the Bye-laws of the Society, as claimed by the Society and
hence, it has executed the Extinguishment Deed dated
09.08.2001 with respect to the said plot of land and cancelled G
the already registered absolute sale deed in favour of the
appellant's mother dated 22.03.1962.
1
AIR 2007 AP 57
2
AIR2010 Madras 18
3
AIR 2000 Karnataka 46
• (201 OJ 15 sec 207 H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 14 S.C.R.
A 4. On the basis of the registration of the Extinguishment
Deed with respect to the said plot of land, the subsequent
allotment of the said plot of land took place and the sale deed
was registered by the society in favour of Mrs. Manjeet Kaur-
respondent No.5, who further alienated the said plot and
B registered another sale deed in favour of the respondent Nos.6
and7.
5. My learned brother Judge has also referred to the
order dated 17 .07 .2013 passed by this Court in SLP (C) No.
13255 of 2012 (Satya Pal Anand v. Punjabi Housing
C Cooperative Society & Ors.), arising out of the order dated
03.08.2011, passed in Writ Petition No. 14548 of 2008 by the
High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur in relation to the appointment of
rece!ver with respect to the said plot of land. This Court held
that since the respondent No.5-Mrs. Manjeet Kaur was already
D in possession of the property in dispute and the appellant had
received an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- by way of a compromise
deed, there was no justification forthe appointment of the
receiver in the light of the fact that there was a pending dispute
bet\'veen the parties under Section 69 of the M.P. Co-operative
E Societies Act, 1960, before the Registrar of Societies. Hence,
the Special Leave Petition filed by the appellant was dismissed
by this Court. My learned brother, in the present case has also
based his findings on similar reasons. -
F 6. I respectfully dissent with the said view taken by my
learned brother Judge by giving the following reasons.
7. It is an undisputed fact that the respondent No.4-
Punjabi Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. Bhopal (for short
"the Society'') had allotted the said plot of land in favour of the
G appellant's mother namely, Smt. VeeravaliAnand and it had
executed the absolute sale deed dated 22.03.1962 with regard
to the said plot of land in her favour and the same was
- registered on- 30.03.1962 before the jurisdictional Sub-
Registrar. The mother o! the appellant died on 12.06.1988,
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P.. 953
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
leaving behind the appellant and his sister as her legal heirs A
to succeed her intestate property comprising of the said plot
of land.
8. Subsequent to the death of the appellant's mother, the
Society, represented by its office bearer has executed an
extinguished deed dated 09.08.2001, unilaterally cancelling B
their already registered sale- deed with regard to the said plot
of land. Thereafter, on the strength of the extinguished deed,
the Society executed a registered sale deed dated 21.04.2004
in favour of respondent No.5- Mrs. Manjit Kaur who in turn has
executed another sale deed dated 11:07.2006 in favour of C
respondent Nos.6 and 7 (Mrs. Minakshi and Mr. S.C. Sharma).
The said documents have been fraudulently registered by them
which is against the acquired legal rights of the appellant on
the said plot of land, the same is void ab initio in law as it is
impermissible under the provisions of the Indian Registration D
Act, 19-08 read with Section 31 of the Specific Relief Ad, 1963.
9. There is also a reference with regard to the taking of
the consideration amount of Rs.6,50,000/-by ttie appellant from
the respondent no.5 vide the execution of the Deed of E
Compromise dated 06.07 .2004. The appellant has also raised
a dispute in that regard under Section 64 of the M.P. Co-
operative Societies Act, 1960 before the Sub-Registrar, Co-
operative Society, Bhopal which is pending in respect of the
said plot of land. Besides this, some of the litigations between F
the parties are pending before different forum i.e. Joint
Registrar, Co-operative Society, State Co-operative Tribunal
and in the High Court.
10. The appellant filed an application before the Sub-
Registrar (Registration), seeking the cancellation of the G
extinguishment deed dated 09.08.2001 executed by the.
Society against the appellant's plot of land. By order dated
28.06.2008, the Sub-Registrar (Registration) dismissed the
application of the appellant, holding that since the question of
sustainability of the extinguished deed dated.09.08.2001 and H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A interpretation of Clause 43( 1) of the Bye-Laws of Society are
still pending before Sub-Registrar, Co-operative Society and
various other competent forum, the jurisdiction of the Sub-
Registrar is limited only to the extent to register the document.
The Sub-Registrar further held that if any of the parties want its
B cancellation, then the relevant party may file for the registration
of the cancellation deed with regard to the said plot of land.
The appellant filed an application under Section 69 of the M.P.
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, before the Inspector
General, Registration and the same was dismissed on the
C ground that it is not maintainable and further directed the
appellant to approach the competent court in this regard.
Therefore, the aforesaid Writ Petition was filed before the High
Court by the appellant wherein he has questioned the
correctness of the order dated 15.09.2008 passed by the
o Inspector General, Registration, Bhopal wherein it has been
held that the Inspector General of Registration has the powers
of only general superintendence over the registration officers
and to make. Rules in that regard. He is however, not
empowered to hear any proceedings against the order of Sub-
E Registrar.
11. The High Court after adverting to the aforesaid facts
and noting the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the judgment of Yanala Malleshwari (supra)
and the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of E.R.
F Kalaivan v. Inspector General of Registration 5 and further,
referring to Section 17(1)(b)'read with Rule 69 of the
Registration Act, 1908 and Rules, and other judgments of this
Court in the cases of Government of U.P. v. Raja Mohammad
Amir Al1mad Khan• and Government of Uttar Pradesh v.
G Khan, has held that as soon as the registering officer has
registered the documents presented to him for registration,
his function of performance for such document produced
before him is over and therefore, he becomes a functus officio
5 AIR2010Madras18
H 6 AIR 1961SC787
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 955
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
and does not have the power even to impound the document A
under Section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908. Further, the
High Court has referred to the judgment of the Karnataka High
Court in the case of M. Ramakrishna Reddy (supra) and
dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant in favour of .
the respondent Society. The correctness of the same is B
questioned in this Civil Appeal urging various legal grounds.
12. Having regard to the facts, the rival legal contentions
and the grounds urged in the writ petition and in these
proceedings on behalf of the parties, the following question of
law would arise for my consideration: ·C
."Whether the appellant is entitled to seek for the rellef of.
cancellation of the registered documents dated
09.08.2001, 21.04.2004 and 11.07.2006, registered with
respect to the immovable property, i.e. plot No.7-B, . 0
Punjabi Bagh, Raisen Road, Bhopal?" · ·
13. The said point is required to be answered in favour
of the appellant for the following reasons:
It is an undisputed fact that the Society had executed an
absolute sale deed dated 22.03.1962 in favour of the deceased E
mother of the appellant, Smt. Veeravali which was registered
on 30.03.1962. It is also not in dispute that she died on
12.06.1988, leaving behind the appellant and his sister to
succeed her intestate property. The respondent-Society has
also not disputed the fact that the appellant is the legal heir of F
the deceased Smt. VeeravaliAnand, in whose favour the sale
deed was executed for the said plot of land.
14. The said sale deed was unilaterally cancelled by
the Society byway of executing an extinguishment deed dated G
09.08.2001, with regard to the said plot of land and thereafter,
on the strength of such extinguished deed, the Society again
executed a registered sale deed on 21.04.2004 in favour of
respondent No.5 who in tum executed another sale deed dated
11.07.2006 in favourofrespondent Nos. 6 and 7.
.. H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A 15. The contention urged by the appellant is that the
action of the Society and the Sub-Registrar, who has cancelled
the initially registered sale deed in favour of Smt. Veeravali
Anand by registering the extinguished deed unilaterally, is
.contrary to the statutory provisions of the Indian Registration
B Act, 1908. In this regard, thejudgmentofthisCourtin the case
of Thota Ganga Laxmi &Anr. (supra) has been relied upon,
wherein this Court has held thus:
"4. In our opinion, there was no need for the appellants
to approach the civil court as the said cancellation deed
c dated 04-08-2005 as well as registration of the same
was wholly void and non est and can be ignored
altogether. For illustration, if A transfers a piece of land
to B by a registered sale deed, then, if it is not disputed
that A had the title to the land, that title passes to Bon the
D registration of the sale deed (retrospectively from the
date of the execution of the same) and B then becomes
the owner of the land. If A wants to subsequently get that
sale deed cancelled, he has to file a civil suit for
cancellation or else he can request B to sell the land back
E to A but by no stretch of imagination, can a cancellation
deed be executed or registered. This is unheard of in
law.
5. In this connection, we may also refer to Rule 26(k)(t)
relating to Andhra Pradesh under Section 69 of the
F
Registration Act, 1908, which states:
"(1) The registering officer shall ensure at the time of
preparation for registration of cancellation deeds of
previously registered deed of conveyances on sale
G before him that such cancellation deeds are executed
by all the executant and claimant parties to the
previously registered conveyance on sale and that
such cancellation deed is accompanied by a
declaration showing natural 'consent or orders of a
H
SATYAPAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 957
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
competent Civil or High Court or State or Central A
Government annulling the transaction contained in the
previously registered deed of conveyance on sale:
Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with
the execution of cancellation deeds by executant and
claimant parties to the previously registered deeds of B
conveyances on sale before him if the cancellation
deed is executed by a Civil Judge or a government
officer competent to execute government orders
declaring the properties contained in the previously
registered conveyance on sale to be government or C
assigned or endowment lands or properties not
registerable by any provision of law."
A reading of th'e above Rule also supports the
observations we have made above. It is only when a D ·
sale deed is cancelled by a competent court that the
cancellation deed can be registered and that too e1fter
notice to the parties concerned. In this case, neither
is there any declaration by a competent court nor was
there any notice to the parties. Hence, this Ru'le also E
makes it clear that both the cancellation deed as well
as registration thereof were wholly void and non est
and meaningless transactions."
16. Further reliance has .been placed upon the decision
of the Madras High Court in the case of E.R. Kalaivan v. The F
.,
/nsp(!ctor General of Registration Chennai & Anr. (supra)
wherein the powers of the Registrar with regard to the
cancellation of the document have been elaborately discussed.
· The relevant paras of the case read thus:
"12. In this context, we may also refer to Section 32A of G
the Indian Registration Act providing that all such deeds
shall be signed by the vendor as well as the purchaser.
and the same shall also bear the finger prints and
photographs. Section 34 of the Act also needs a ·
H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A reference, whereby the Registering Authority is
mandated to hold an enquiry in respect of the validity of
the document presented for registration. Having regard
to the above provisions, in our opinion, a registered sale
deed, if sought to be cancelled, registration of such deed
B must be at the instance of both the parties viz., bilaterally
and not unilaterally. Section 34AoftheAct, whereby the
Registering Authority is to enquire whether or not such
document was executed by the persons by whom it
purports to have been executed. A sale is essentially an
c executed contract between two parties on niutual agreed
conditions. Question is as to whether such contract can
be unilaterally rescinded, particularly, in a case of sale
deed. In this context, we may refer to Section 62 of the
Indian ContractAct, 1872 whicfi provides that contract
o which need not be performed. By that provision, any
novation, rescission and alteration of a contract can be
made only bilaterally. Adeed of cancellation will amount
to rescission of contract and if the issue in question is
viewed from the application of Section 62 of the Indian
E ContractAct, any rescission must be only bilaterally. See ·
City Bank N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank and
Ors.(2004 (1) sec 12).
xxx xxx xxx
.• F
19. That apart, on the facts of this case, our attention is
not drawn to any of the specific provision under the
Registration Act empowering the Registrar to entertain
a document of cancellation for registration on the ground
that the sale consideration was not paid and
consequently, received by the vendor. Further, in our
G
opinion, when the Registrar satisfies himself on the
perusal of the document, wherein it is stated that the full
sale consideration is received and on such satisfaction,
entertain the document for registration, cannot thereafter
be conferred with a power for cancellation of the ?eed
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 959
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
on the ground that the full sale consideration was not paid A
and received by the vendor. Conferring such power on
the Registrar would tantamount to conferring a power to
decide the disputed questions. That apart, as already
stated, in the absence of any provision specifically
empowering the Registrar to entertain a document of B
cancellation for registration, without the signature of both
the vendor and the purchaser, the deed cannot be
entertained. For the said reason, we find no infirmity in
the impugned circular issued by the Inspector General
of Registration." C
17. · Thus, the decision of this Court and the Madras High ·
Court in the cases referred to supra, aptly apply to the fact
situation of the present case. In the present case also such an
extinguishment deed, which is unilaterallyregistered would be
rescinded, particularly, in the case of sale deed or D
extinguishment deed. In this context, Section 62 of the Indian
ContractAct, 1872 would come into play which provides that if
the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for
it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be
performed. Thus, for any novation, rescission and alteration of E
the contract, it can be made only bilaterally and with the amicable
consent of both the parties. Thus, a deed of cancellation of the
earlier registered sale deed executed in favour of the Smt.
VeeravaliAnand would amount to an illegal rescission of the
absolute sale deed because if the issue in question is viewed F
from the application of Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872, then it is clear that any rescission must be done only
bilaterally.
18. In the case on hand, undisputedly, the
extinguishmentdeed dated 09.08.2001 and the cancellation G
of the sale deed dated 22.03.19~2 in respect of the said plot·
of land involved in this case is unilaterally done by applying the
clause 43( 1) of the Bye-laws of the Society which has been
amended·in the year 1991 bearing No.Panji/Gram Nirman
' ..
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14S.C.R.
A 90/24 dated 02.01.1992, communicated to the Society by the
Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Society, Bhopal. The said
clause cannot have a retrospective effect with regard to the
cancellation of!he sale deed in the name of the mother of the
appellant and for executing extinguished deed with regard to
B the said plot of land as the cancellation deed which was
registered on 09.08.2001 is only a subterfuge. The said clause
of the Society by-laws, cannot override the statutory provisions
under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 31
of the Specific Relief Act reads thus:
c "31. When cancellation may be ordered: (1) Any
person against whom a written instrument is void or
voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that
such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious
injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and
D the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it
to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908 ), the court shall also
send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office
E
the instrument has been so registered; and such officer
shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his
books the fact of its cancellation."
19. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the sale deed
F with regard to the said plot of land against the appellant is
contrary to the provisions as provided under Section 31 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Article 59 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, wherein the cancellation of any instrument can be
done only within three years, 'when the facts entitling the plaintiff
G to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the
contract rescinded first become known to him'. Therefore, the
respondent-Society had no right to unilaterally cancel the
absolute sale deed executed in favour of the appellant's mother
in the year 1962 with regard to the said plot of land in the year
H 2001 after lapse of more than 39 years which is totally
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 961
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.)
impermissible in law, both for the Society and the Sub- A
Registrar. The respondent has neither any authority under the
provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 nor under Section 31
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 to unilaterally cancel the sale deed without
the authority of law and as such the registration of the document B
by the sub-Registrar amounts to playing fraud on the power
provided to. him under law which is ultra vires the relevant
statutory provisions and the Constitution of India. Further
reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of Pratap Singh v. State of C
Punjab 7, wherein the Constitution Bench, with reference to
the House of Lords, has clearly laid down the aforesaid
principle as under :
"6. If this were put aside, the second ground of attack on
the orders may be viewed from two related aspects-of D
ultra vires pure and simple and secondly as an infraction
of the rule that every power vested in a public body or
authority has to be used honestly, bona fide and
reasonably, though the two often slide into each other.
Thus Sir Lyman Duff, speaking (in Municipal Council of E
Sydneyv. Campbell) in the context of an allegation that
the statutory power vested in a municipal corporation to
acquire property had been used in bad faith which was
held to have been proved, stated:
F
"A body such as the Municipal Council of Sydney,
authorised to take land compulsorily for specified
purposes, will not be permitted to exercise its powers
for different purposes, and if it attempts to do so, the
Courts will interfere. As Lord Lorebum said, in Marquess G
of Clanricarde v. Congested Districts Board
'Whether it does so or not is a question of fact.' Where
the proceedings of the Council, are attacked upon this
·ground, the party impeaching those, proceectingsmust,
7 AIR 1964 SC 72 H
.
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14S.C.R.
A of course, prove that the Council, though professing
to exercise its powers for the statutory purpose, is in
fact employing them in furtherance of some ulterior
object." ·
Similarly, in Short v. Poole Corporation Pollock M.R.
6 observed:
"The appellants (represented before the Court by
Maugham K.C.-afterwards Lord Maugham) do not
contest the proposition that where an authority is
c constituted under statute to carry out-statutory powers
with which is entrusted it, ... if an attempt is made to
exercise those powers corruptly-as under the influence ·
of bribery, or mala tides -for some improper purpose,
such an attempt must fail. It is null and void: see Reg. v. ·
Governors of Darlington School".
0
In the same case Warrington, L.J. said:
"No public body can be regarded as having statutory
authority to act in. bad faith or from corrupt motives, and
any action purporting to be that of the body, but proved
E to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt motives,
would certainly be held to be inoperative.
It may be also possible to prove that an act of the public
body, though performed in good faith and without the
F taint of corruption, was so clearly founded on alien and
irrelevant grounds as to be outside the authority
conferred upon the body, and therefore inoperative. It is
difficult to suggest any act which would be held ultra vires
under this head though performed bona fide.""
G 20. For the aforesaid reasons, I have come to the
conclusion that the Society has no right to re-allot the said plot
of land in favour of the respondent No. 5 by cancelling the
already registered sale deed in favour of the appellant's mother
in the year 1962 which was an absolute sale deed. Fmthe'r,
H registering the sale deed on 21.04.2004 in favour of
SATYAPAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 963
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
respondent no.5, who in tum sold the said plot of land in favour A
of respondent Nos. 6 and 7, is void ab initio. in the light of the
fact that according to the bye-Laws of the Society, Mrs.
Manjeet-respondent no.5, could not have come in possession
of the said plot in the first place as her husband has already
got a plot allotted to him in the very same Society. Therefore, B
the transfer of the said plot of land via subsequent sale deeds
are void ab initio in law and therefore, liable to be set aside.
21. For the above stated reasons, it is clear that the
appellant has got a valid constitutional right over the said plot
of land as guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution C
of India, wherein it has been stated that the. deprivation of
property without the authority of law is totally impermissible in
law. Merely because the cancellation of the void extinguishment
deed with regard to the said plot of land and the subsequent
sale deed executed in favour of the respondent No.5 has not D
been sought for by the appellant by approaching the civil court,
it does_ not disentitle him for seeking the relief with regard to
the said plot of land for the reason that the cancellation of the
. sale deed dated 30.03.1962 after a lapse of 39 years has
been done withoutthe authority of law by the Society. The E
subsequent actions of re-registering the sale deed in favour
of the respondent No.5 and thereafter in favour of respondents
Nos.6 and 7 are void ab initio in law. Thus, this Court has the
power to closely examine the same in these proceedings
having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the . F
present case.
· 22. The scope of the powers of this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India has been discussed in a catena
of cases. In the case otArunachalam v. P.S.R.
· Sadhanantham andAnr. 8 , ChinappaReddy, J ..observed as G
under: ·
• (1979) 2 sec 297
H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A "4 .... Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the
Supreme Court with a plenitude of plenary, appellate
power over all Courts and Tribunals in India. The power
is plenary in the sense that there are no words in
Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature
B of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within
which to exercise such power. It is now the well
established practice of this Court to permit the invocation
of the power Under Article 136 only in very exceptional
circumstances, as when a question of law of general
c public importance arises or a decision shocks the
conscience of the Court. But within the restrictions
imposed by itself, this Court has the undoubted power to
interfere even with findings of fact making no distinction
between judgment of acquittal and conviction, if the High
D Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted "perversely
or otherwise improperly"., .."
More recently, in the case of Ganga Kumar Shrivastav
v. State ofBihat", this Court laid down the following principles
as regards the power of this Court under Article 136:
E
"10.
i)The powers of this Court Under Article 136 of the
Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this
F Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings
of the fact save in exceptional circumstances.
ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of
fact given by the High Court if the High Court has
G acted perversely or otherwise improperly.
iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power Under
Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as
and when a question of law of general public
• (2005) 6 sec 211
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 965
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
importance arises or a decision shocks the A
conscience of the Court.
· iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell
short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as
such it is highly unsafe to act upon it.
B.
v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is
vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found
contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of
record and misreading of the evidence, or where the
conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse c
and unsupportable from the evidence on record."
As can be seen from the above case law, the power
vested with this Court is quite wide and the Court can examine
any case to prevent miscarriage of justice.
23. Therefore, the High Court ought to have granted the D
relief to the appellant by holding that the extinguishment deed
executed with regard to the appellant's said plot of land on
09.08.2001, without following the procedure contemplated
under Section 31(1) & (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is void ab E
initio in law. The same is required to be interfered with by this
Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as there is a grave
miscarriage of justice and the septuagenarian appellant has
been suffering unnecessarily for the past 14 years at the hands
of the Society and the Sub-Registrar, who have violated the F
provisions of law and deprived the appellant of his valuable
constitutional right guaranteed under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India upon the said property. Therefore, the
appellant is entitled for the relief as prayed for in this appeal.
G
24. The contention urged on behalf of the respondents,
namely that this Court has already dismissed the SLP
No.13255 of 2012 filed by the appellant earlier, wherein, this
Court has examined the correctness of the order dated
08.11.2008 of the Joint Registrar passed in exercise of his H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A revisional jurisdiction with regard to the appointment of the
receiver under Section 64 of the M.P. State Cooperative
Societies Act 1960, at the instance of the respondents, has
no relevance to the reliefs sought for in the present appeal.
The prayer sought for in the present appeal is with regard to
B cancellation of the extinguishment deed and the subsequent
sale deed executed by Society in favour of respondent No.5,
who in tum has executed another sale deed in favour of
respondent Nos. 6 and 7 with regard to the said plot of land.
Therefore, the prayer in the present appeal is totally different
C from the one in SLP No.13255 of 2012. The order dated
17 .07 .2013 passed in SLP No. 13255 of 2012 by this Court,
at para 4, is very clear with regard to the extinguishment deed
which reads thus:
"4. It appears that after lapse of 40 years, the first
D respondent purported to have cancelled the sale made
in favour of the petitioner's decea~ed mother. On
9.8.2001, a deed styled as Extinguishment Deed came
to be executed by the first respondent before the Sub-
registrar, Bhopal-the legality of which deed is required
E to be examined separately. However, we do not propose
to say anything· at this stage."
25. In so far as the document of compromise deed dated
06.07 .2004 is concerned, the sum of Rs.6,50,000/- allegedly
F voluntarily received by the appellant from the respondent No.5
to put an end to the dispute over the said property is also a
void transaction, as the same has been done during the
pendency of the proceedings before the Sub-Registrar in
relation to the dispute. The said compromise deed is void ab
G initio in law and the same cannot be put against the appellant
so as to deny him the relief sought by him in the present appeal.
Apart from the said reason, the notice dated 12.07.2007
served upon the appellant by the lawyer of respondent No.5
has rescinded the agreement dated 06.07 .2004 and she has
claimed the refund of 6,50,000/-, to be returned with interest
H
SATYA PAL ANAND v,_STATE OF M.P. 967
(V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
to her, failing which she will file a suit for claim for payment of A
Rs.6,50,000/- with interest. The said notice is produced at
Annexure 'P-6' in the proceedings. The relevant clause 4 of
the said notice is extracted hereunder which readsthus:-
"4.That after receipt of money by you frivolous disputes
are being raised by you. By raising unnecessary disputes B
you have violated compromise dated 6.7.2004.
Therefore, my client being constrained (makes demand
of the amount paid to you). Therefore, you are liable to
return and pay to my client the amount ofRs.6,50,000/-
• (Rupees six lakh and fifty thousand). C'
Therefore, by means of the notice you are informed that
the amount of Rs.6,50,000/- (Rupees six lakh and fifty
thousand) and interest thereon at bank rate from date of
receipt till the date of payment be returned to my client D
within 30 days of receipt of this notice and obtain a receipt
in writing after the said period my client shall be entitled
to take action before you in the court of laYi in accordance
with law.. ."
In view of the aforesaid demand notice, since the E
agreement has been rescinded, it does not subsist and the
High Court by placing reliance upon the same has committed
an error in factand in law and has wrongfully denied the relief
to the appellant even though the same was brought to the notice
of the High Court by the appellant in the proceedings before it. F
For the reasons stated supra, I have to grant the reliefs in favour
of the appellant as prayed by him and quash the extinguishment
-deed dated 09.08.2001 along with the subsequent sale deeds
registered in favour of the respondent No.5 who in turn has
sold property in favour of respondent Nos.6 and 7 without the G
authority of law. The sale deed can be cancelled under Section
31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, by the competent civil court
if the same is challenged within the period of limitation
stipulated under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since
H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A the facts are undisputed in the case on hand and the respondent
Society, after the lapse of 39 years has erroneously and illegally
cancelled the absolute sale deed registered in favour of the
appellant's mother, the appellant has acquired a valid and
absolute title to the property in question and the same could
B not have been cancelled by the respondent Society and the
Sub-Registrar as it is void ab initio in law. Hence, the High
Court should have responsibly exercised its extraordinary
jurisdiction and should have examined the documents of the
sale deed with respect to the relevent provisions of the M.P
C Co-operative Societies Act and Rules, 1962 and the Bye-laws •
of the Society. The cance!lation of the sale deed executed in
fa•:0ur cf the appellant's mother in the year 1962 by way of the
ext!nguishment deed could not have been registered by the
Sub-Registrar as he is not empowered to do so. Hence, for
o w::int cf the competent jurisdiction, in registering such
document, the High Court should have exercised its
extrao~dinary jurisdict!cn l'J annul ihe extinguishment deed and
the t~ansactions of the subsequent sale deeds, which has not
been done by it. Reliance has been p!accd upcn the decision
E of this Court in the case of CAG v. K.S. Jagannathan 10,
wherein it has been held thus:
"19. Even had the Division Bench issued a writ of
mandamus giving the directions which it did, if
circumstances of the case justified such directions, the
F High Court would have been entitled in law to do so for
even the courts in England could have issued a 'A'l"it of
mandamus giving such directions. Almost a hundred and
thirty years ago, Martin, B., in Mayor of Rochester v.
Regina said:
G "But, were there no authority upon the subject, we ~houitl
be prepared upon principle lu affirm the judgment cf
the Court of Queen's per.ch. That caurt has power, by
_!he prerogative writ of niar.ida:nus, tc arr.end all errors
'' ,, (~98€)2 sec 679
n
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 969
[V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
which tend to the oppression of the subject or other ·A
misgovernment, and ought to be used when the law has
provided no specific remedy, and justice and good
government require that there ought to be one for the
execution of the common law or the provisions of a
statute: B
Comyn's Digest, Mandamus (A) .... Instead of being
astute to discover reasons for not applying this great
constitutional remedy for error and misgovernment, we
think it our duty to be vigilant to apply it in every case
to which, by any reasonable construction, it can be C
made applicable."
The principle enunciated in the above case was
approved and followed in King v. Revising Barrister for
the Borough of Hanlev. In Hochtief Gammon case this 0
Court pointed out that the powers of the courts in relation
to the orders of the government or an officer of the
government who has been conferred any power under
any statute, which apparently confer on them absolute
discretionary powers. are not confined to cases where E
such power is exercised or refused to be exercised on
irrelevant considerations or on erroneous ground or mala
fide. and in such a case a party would be entitled to move
the High Court for a writ of mandamus. In Padfield v.
Minister of Agriculture. Fisheries and Food the House F
of Lords held that where Parliament had conferred a
discretion on the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food. to appoint a committee of investigation so that it
could be used to promote the policy and objects of the
Agricultural Marketing Act, 1958, which were to be
determined by the construction of the Act which was a G
matter of law for the court and though there might be
reasons which would justify the Minister in refusing to refer
a complaint to a committee of investigation. the Minister's
discretion was not unlimited and if it appeared that the
H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A effect of his refusal to appoint a committee of
investigation was to frustrate the policy of the Act, the
court was entitled to interfere by an order of mandamus.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., vol. I, para 89,
it is stated that the purpose of an order of mandamus
B "is to remedy defects of justice; and accordingly it will
issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases
where there is a specific legal right and no specific
legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue
in cases where, although there is an alternative legal
c remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient,
beneficial and effectual."
20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India
exercising theirjurisdiction under Article 226 have the
power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature
D
of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessarv
directions where the government or a public authoritv has
failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion
conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision
of the government or has exercised such discretion mala
E
fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the
relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner
as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or
the policy for implementing which such discretion has
been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and
F
proper case a High Court can. in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226. issue a writ of mandamus
or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and
give directions to compel the performance in a proper
and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the
G
government or a public authoritv. and in a proper case.
in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned
parties. the court may itself pass an order or give
directions which the government or the public authority
H
SATYAPAL ANANDv. STATEOFM.P. 97~
(V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]
should have i;iassed or given had it i;iroi;ierl:x'. and lawfull:x'. A
exercised its discretion."
(Emphasis laid by me)
26. Further reliance has been placed upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree 8
Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav
Smarak Trustv. V.R. Rudani11, wherein it has been held thus:
"20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context,
must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article
12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of c
enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article
226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for
enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-
fundamental rights.-The words "any person or authority"
used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only D
to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.
They may cover any other person or body performing
public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very
much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of t'1e duty
imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the E
light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority
to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty ·
is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus
cannot be dE;mied.
21. In Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. /manua/this Court F
said that a mandamus can issue against a person or •,
body to carry out the duti~s·placed on them by the statutes
even though they are not public officials or statutory body.
It was observed:
G
"It is, however, not necessary that the person or the
authority ori whom the statutory duty is imposed need
be a public official or an official body. A niandamus
can issue, for instance, to an official of a·society to ·
11
( 1989) 2 sec 691
H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 14S.C.R.
A compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under
or by which the society is constituted or governed and
also to companies or corporations to carry out duties
placed on them by the statutes authorising their
undertakings. A mandamus would also lie against a
B company constituted by a statute for the purpose of
fulfilling public responsibilities."
22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot
be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is
not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the
c development of this law, Professor de Smith states: ''To
be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not
necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may
be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter,
common law, custom or fiVen contract."I We share this
D view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze
of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be
put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible
to meet the requirements of variable circumstances.
Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily
E available "to reach injustice wherever it is found".
Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that
relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the
contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability
of the writ petition."
F 27. Further, this Court has laid down the following
principles with respect to the writ of certiorari ·in the 7 judge
bench decision in the case of Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Ahmad
lshaque 12 :
G " .... (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to
exercise it.
12
H AIR 1955 SC 233 ·
SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. 973
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or A
Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted
jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an
opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates
the principles of natural justice.
(3) The 9ourt issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise B
of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the court will not review
findings of facts reached by the inferior Court or
Tribunal, even if they be erroneous.
(4) An error in the decision or determination itself may
c
also be amenable to a writ of "certiorari" if it is a
manifest error apparent on the face of the
proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear
ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In D
other words, it is a patent error which can be
corrected by "certiorari" but not a. mere wrong
decision. What is ari error apparent on the face of
the record cannot be defined precisely or
exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness E
inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be
determined jud,icially on the facts of each case.".
28. Thus, the High Court has failed to exercise its
discretionary power which has resulted in a grave miscarriage
of justice, thereby, depriving the valuable constitutional right F
guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constituti.on of India to
the appellant. I, hereby, set aside the said order of the learned
single Judge of the High Court and quash the impugned
instruments i.e. the extinguishment deed dated 09.08.2001
and the subsequent sale deeds dated 21.04.2004 and G
11.07 .2006 and further direct the respondent Nos.6 and 7 to
vacate the said prop_erty and hand over the possession of the
same to the appellant. The respondent\> are further directed to
. pay the appellant a compensation amount of Rs.1 OLakhs for
H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 14 S.C.R.
A his sufferings and the injustice caused to him by the society
for the last 14 years as he was deprived of his right to enjoy
the property on account of the arbitrary and unilateral action
taken by the society in cancelling the sale deed in respect of
the property in question executed in favour of his deceased
B mother. .
29. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
ORDER
In view of the difference of opinion between us, the
C Registry is directed to place the matter before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of India, so that an appropriate Bench could be
constituted for hearing the matter.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Matter directed to be placed before
Hon'ble CJI for constituting appropriate Bench
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