NOORJAHA W/O KHALID TEKA THRO UMER FARUQ AHMEDHUSEN HAYATversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Disposal
- 38-RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @ FH
Holding
The preventive detention order is invalid and is hereby quashed.
Summary
Noorjaha, detained under a preventive detention order dated 22‑12‑2025 pursuant to Section 2(bbb) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 as a ‘cruel person’, challenged the order through a petition filed by her brother. The petitioner argued that no material was placed before the detaining authority to show that her alleged offences under the Animal Preservation Act and other statutes disturbed public order, and that the order was passed mechanically. The State contended that she was a habitual offender whose activities threatened society, justifying detention. The High Court examined the record, noted that the cited offences did not have any bearing on public order, and relied on Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the extraordinary nature of preventive detention and the need for concrete material. Consequently, the Court held that the subjective satisfaction of the authority was unsupported, quashed the detention order, and directed her immediate release.
Issues considered
- Whether the preventive detention order under Section 2(bbb) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 is valid in the absence of material linking the alleged offences to a disturbance of public order.
- Whether the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction satisfies the statutory requirement for preventive detention.
- Whether ordinary criminal proceedings, including bail cancellation, are a more appropriate remedy than preventive detention.
Legislation cited
- Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954s. 10, s. 5(1), s. 6B, s. 8(2), s. 8(4)
- Gujarat Police Acts. 119
- Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985s. 2(bbb), s. 3
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 429
Subjects
Judgment
R/SCR.A/17555/2025 ORDER DATED: 20/01/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 17555 of 2025
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NOORJAHA W/O KHALID TEKA THRO UMER FARUQ AHMEDHUSEN
HAYAT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. ALTAF Y CHARKHA(7271) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR VINAY B VISHEN, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 20/01/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)
1. The detenue herein namely Noorjaha W/O Khalid
Teka came to be preventively detained vide the detention
detention order dated 22.12.2025 passed by the District
Magistrate, Panchmahal-Godhra, as a “cruel person” as
de ned under Section 2(bbb) of the Gujarat Prevention of
Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the
Act of 1985).
2. By way of this petition, the detenue has challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid order through her
brother.
3. This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner
and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.
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R/SCR.A/17555/2025 ORDER DATED: 20/01/2026
4. Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention
authority to indicate as to how the public health or public
order or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner.
Thus, in absence of any such material on record, the order of
detention ought not have been passed. It is further submitted
by learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned
order is passed without application of mind and prima facie
the order is passed mechanically.
4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted
that the impugned order was executed upon the detenue and
presently she is detained in the Central Jail, Junagadh.
5. On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual o2ender and
her activities a2ected at the society at large. Hence, the
Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past
activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area and
lastly prayed to dismiss the present petition.
6. Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of his
powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable
in law or not?
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R/SCR.A/17555/2025 ORDER DATED: 20/01/2026
7. We have carefully gone through the order passed by the
concerned authority. It appears that the order impugned was
executed upon the detenue and presently she is in Central
Jail, Junagadh. In the grounds of detention, reference of ,ve
cases for the o.ences punishable under Sections 5(1),
6B, 8(2), 8(4), 10 of Animal Preservation Act, Section
429 of IPC, Section 325 of Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023.
and Section 119 of G.P. Act registered with Godhra B-
Division police station against the detenue from
26.07.2023 to 31.07.2025 is made out.
7.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of
the detenue as a “cruel person” a2ects adversely or are
likely to a2ect adversely the maintenance of public order as
explained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985.
8. Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(bbb) of the Act of 1985 is referred by
the concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to be
reproduced. The same reads as under:
“2(bbb) "cruel person" means a person, who either
by himself or as a member or leader of a gang,
habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets
the commission of an o2ence punishable under
section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act,
1954;"
9. After consideration of the available material, we are of
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R/SCR.A/17555/2025 ORDER DATED: 20/01/2026
the considered view that on the basis of ,ve case, the
authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction
that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be acting
in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’.
In our considered opinion, the said o2ences do not have any
bearing on the maintenance of public order. In this regard,
we would like to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others reported
in AIR 2025 Sc 2868. In para-9 and para-21 of the said
decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive
detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State
that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an
individual in anticipation of the commission of further
o2ence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the ordinary
course of nature. The power of preventive detention nds
recognition in the Constitution itself, under Article 22(3)(b).
However, this Court has emphasized in Rekha v. State of
Tamil Nadu3 that the power of preventive detention is an
exception to Article 21 and, therefore, must be applied as
such, as an exception to the main rule and only in rare
cases.”
…..
“21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that
the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu,
instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention,
which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena
Begum v. State of Telengana9 , this Court observed :
“59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal
proceedings where the detenu had been released on
bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been
moved by the State. In the light of the same, the
provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute,
should not have been resorted to when ordinary
criminal law provided su2icient means to address the
apprehensions leading to the impugned detention
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R/SCR.A/17555/2025 ORDER DATED: 20/01/2026
order. There may have existed su2icient grounds to
appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances
did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal
procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the
law of preventive detention.”
60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain
Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC
(Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief
Justice then was) observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)
32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive
detention is a hard law and therefore it should be
strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty
of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls
squarely within the four corners of the relevant law.
The law of preventive detention should not be used
merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved
in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the
purpose of keeping a man under detention when under
ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist
the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available
is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal
provisions authorising such detention. When a person is
enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great
caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity
of an order of preventive detention which is based on
the very same charge which is to be tried by the
criminal court.” (Emphasis supplied)”
10. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material available on record are not
su2icient for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue
have either a2ected adversely or likely to a2ect adversely the
maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.
11. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned dated 22.12.2025 passed by the respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
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R/SCR.A/17555/2025 ORDER DATED: 20/01/2026
at liberty forthwith, if she is not required in any other case.
Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(ILESH J. VORA,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
OMKAR
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: OMKAR CHHAGANLAL MAHAWAR(HC00201), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 20/01/2026 14:22:57
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