PARMIT @ PARMITBHAI S/O. SURESHBHAI PRASAD (SHAH) THRO. AMIT SURESH SHAHversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/SCR.A/2200/2026                            JUDGMENT DATED: 05/03/2026




              IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
             R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2200 of 2026
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     PARMIT @ PARMITBHAI S/O. SURESHBHAI PRASAD (SHAH) THRO.
                       AMIT SURESH SHAH
                               Versus
                    STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR MATAFER R PANDE(3952) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS. DIVYANGNA JHALA, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS

                              Date : 05/03/2026

                                JUDGMENT
                  (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS)


1.       The detenue herein namely Parmit @ Parmitbhai S/O
Sureshbhai Prasad (Shah) came to be preventively detained
vide the detention order dated 01.02.2026 passed by the
Commissioner of Police, Surat, as a dangerous person as
de ned under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of
1985).


2.       By way of this petition through his brother namely Amit
Suresh Shah, the detenue has challenged the legality and
validity of the aforesaid order.


3.       This Court has heard learned advocate for the petitioner
and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.



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4.       Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention
authority to indicate as to how the public health or public order
or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner.           Thus, in
absence of any such material on record, the order of detention
ought not have been passed. It is further submitted by learned
advocate for the petitioner that the impugned order is passed
without application of mind and prima facie the order is passed
mechanically.


4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted
that the impugned order was executed upon the petitioner and
presently he is detained in the Central Jail, Ahmedabad.


5.       On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual o5ender and
his activities a5ected at the society at large. Hence, the
Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past
activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order in the area of Surat and
lastly prayed to dismiss the present petition.


6.       Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of his
powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable


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     R/SCR.A/2200/2026                          JUDGMENT DATED: 05/03/2026




in law or not?


7.       We have carefully gone through the order passed by the
concerned authority. It appears that the order impugned was
executed upon the detenue and presently he is detained in
Central Jail, Ahmedabad. In the grounds of detention,
reference of two criminal cases for the o2ences punishable
under Sections 115(2), 125(A), 351(3), 352, 54 and
296(B) of the BNS and 135 of the G.P. Act registered
with Chowkbazar Police Station against the detenue on
14.01.2026 is made out.


7.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of
the detenue as a “dangerous person” a5ects adversely or are
likely to a5ect adversely the maintenance of public order as
explained under the provisions of the the Act of 1985.
Undisputedly, in the aforesaid alleged o5ences, the detenue
was granted bail by the concerned court.


8.       Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1985 is referred by the
concerned authorities.        Hence, the same is required to be
reproduced. The same reads as under:


         “(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by
         himself or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of
         three successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to
         commit or abets the commission of any of the o ences
         punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter VIII or Chapter XVI
         (except section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376, 376A,
         376B, 3376C, 376D, or 377) or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of
         the Indian Penal Code or any of the o ences punishable under


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     R/SCR.A/2200/2026                             JUDGMENT DATED: 05/03/2026




         chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959;”


9.       After consideration of the available material, we are of
the considered view that on the basis of two cases, the
authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that
the activities of the detenue could be termed to be acting in a
manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In our
considered opinion, the said o5ences do not have any bearing
on the maintenance of public order. In this regard, we would
like to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others reported in AIR
2025 SC 2868. In para-9 and para-21 of the said decision, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:


         “9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive detention
         is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State that must
         be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an individual in
         anticipation of the commission of further o ence(s), and
         therefore, must not be used in the ordinary course of nature.
         The power of preventive detention 2nds recognition in the
         Constitution itself, under Article 22(3)(b). However, this Court
         has emphasized in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu3 that the
         power of preventive detention is an exception to Article 21
         and, therefore, must be applied as such, as an exception to
         the main rule and only in rare cases.”

         …..

         “21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that
         the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu,
         instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention,
         which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena
         Begum v. State of Telengana9 , this Court observed :

                 “59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal
                 proceedings where the detenu had been released on
                 bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been
                 moved by the State. In the light of the same, the



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              provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute,
              should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal
              law provided su<cient means to address the
              apprehensions leading to the impugned detention order.
              There may have existed su<cient grounds to appeal
              against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not
              warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal
              procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the
              law of preventive detention.”

              60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain
              Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri)
              361] , Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief
              Justice then was) observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)

              32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive
              detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly
              construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a
              person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely
              within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of
              preventive detention should not be used merely to clip
              the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal
              prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping
              a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law
              it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of
              bail, unless the material available is such as would
              satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions
              authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged
              on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution
              should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an
              order of preventive detention which is based on the very
              same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”
              (Emphasis supplied)”

10.   For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material on record are not suCcient for
holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either
a5ected       adversely    or   likely     to   a5ect    adversely        the
maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.




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     R/SCR.A/2200/2026                                                   JUDGMENT DATED: 05/03/2026




 11.      Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
 impugned dated 01.02.2026 passed by the respondent
 authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
 at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule
 is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.




                                                                       (N.S.SANJAY GOWDA,J)



                                                                                     (D. M. VYAS, J)
 YASH ARORA



Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: YASH ARORA(HC02369), ENGLISH STENO GRADE-II\, at High Court of Gujarat on 05/03/2026 18:14:09




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