VINUBHAI KURJIBHAI JADVANI THRO KISHORBHAI KURJIBHAI JADVANIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/SCR.A/3470/2026                              ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




            IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

          R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3470 of 2026
                                With
     CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (TEMPORARY BAIL) NO. 1 of 2026
         In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3470 of 2026
==========================================================
VINUBHAI KURJIBHAI JADVANI THRO KISHORBHAI KURJIBHAI JADVANI
                            Versus
                   STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR BM MANGUKIYA(437) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS BELA A PRAJAPATI(1946) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR JAY MEHTA, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE NOT RECD BACK for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3,4
==========================================================

 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI

                               Date : 10/03/2026

                        ORAL ORDER
 (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)


1.     The petitioner herein namely Vinubhai Kurjibhai Jadvani
came to be preventively detained vide the detention order
dated 07.03.2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Surat
City, as a “Cyber O*ender” as de,ned under Section 2(ba) of
the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985
(herein after referred as ‘the Act of 1985).

2.     By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid order.

3.     This      Court   has   heard     learned   counsel     Mr.     B.     M.
Mangukiya and Mr. Jay Mehta, learned AGP for the respective
parties.

                                   Page 1 of 6
     R/SCR.A/3470/2026                                    ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




4.     Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the
grounds of detention has no nexus to the “public order”, but is
a purely a matter of law and order, as registration of the
o*ence cannot be said to have either a*ected adversely or
likely to a*ect adverse the maintenance of public order as
contemplated under the explanation sub-section (4) of Section
3 of the Act, 1985 and therefore, where the o*ences alleged to
have been committed by the detunue have no bearing on the
question of maintenance of public order and his activities could
be said to be a prejudicial only to the maintenance of law and
order and not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

5.     On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing the
application contended that, the detenue is habitual o*ender
and his activities a*ected at the society at large. In such set of
circumstances,            the    Detaining      Authority,   considering            the
antecedents and past activities of the detenue, has passed the
impugned order with a view to preventing him from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in
the area of Surat City.

6.     Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the respective parties, the issue arises as to whether
the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in
exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985
is sustainable in law?

7.     The order impugned was executed upon the applicant
and presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention, a
reference        of      two    criminal   cases     registered     against         the



                                       Page 2 of 6
     R/SCR.A/3470/2026                            ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




applicant for the o*ence punishable under Sections 319(2),
318(4), 316(5), 336(2), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 61(2), 3(5) of BNS
and 66(D) of Information Technology Act dated 19.08.2025
registered with Udhana Police Station, Surat, was made and
further it is alleged that, the activities of the detenue as a
“cyber o*ender” a*ects adversely or are likely to a*ect
adversely the maintenance of public order as explained under
Section 3 of the Act of 1985. Admittedly, in all the said
o*ences, the applicant was granted bail.

8.     The term ‘Cyber O*ender’ de,ned under Section 2(ba)
reads as under:
                "cyber o*ender” means a person who commits or
                attempts to commit or abets the commission of
                o*ence   punishable     under   Chapter      XI    of       the
                Information Technology Act, 2000;

9.     After careful consideration of the material, we are of the
considered view that, there is no material placed before the
authority to establish that the applicant was convicted of
o*ences under Sections 66(C) and 66(D) of The Information
Technology Act who commits or attempts to commit or abets
the commission of o*ence punishable under Chapter XI of the
Information Technology Act, 2000. After careful consideration
of the material, we are of the considered view that on the basis
of said criminal cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the
subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue could
be termed to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order’. In our opinion, the said o*ences
do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. In



                                Page 3 of 6
   R/SCR.A/3470/2026                               ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of
Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, wherein, the
detention order was made on the basis of the registration of
the two prohibition o*ences. The Apex Court after referring the
case of Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1)
SCC 10 held and observed that mere disturbance of law and
order leading to detention order is thus not necessarily
suHcient for action under preventive detention Act. Paras-17
& 18 are relevant to refer, which read thus:
      “17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this
      Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, where
      the distinction between `law and order' and `public order' has
      been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court
      observed as follows:

              10.      "Does the expression `public order' take in every
              kind of infraction of order or only some categories
              thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury
              to speci/c persons does not lead to public disorder.
              When two people quarrel and /ght and assault each
              other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that
              there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are
              dealt with under the powers vested in the executive
              authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law
              but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that
              they were disturbing public order. The contravention of
              any law always a2ects order but before it can be said to
              a2ect public order, it must a2ect the community or the
              public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of
              demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of



                                   Page 4 of 6
R/SCR.A/3470/2026                                    ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




           disorder which directly a2ect the community or injure
           the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of
           peace of a purely local signi/cance which primarily
           injure speci/c individuals and only in a secondary sense
           public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order
           leading to disorder is thus not necessarily su4cient for
           action under the Preventive Detention Act but a
           disturbance which will a2ect public order comes within
           the scope of the Act."

   18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion,
   has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti- social
   activities of the petitioner adversely a2ect or are likely to
   a2ect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true
   some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place,
   as alleged by the witnesses. But, such incidents, in our view,
   do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order.
   The petitioner may be punished for the alleged o2ences
   committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the
   o2ences cannot be said to have a2ected the even tempo of
   the life of the community. It may be that the petitioner is a
   bootlegger within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but
   merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively
   detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down
   in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his activities as a
   bootlegger a2ect adversely or are likely to a2ect adversely
   the     maintenance    of    public       order   We     have     carefully
   considered the o2ences alleged against the petitioner in the
   order of detention and also the allegations made by the
   witnesses and, in our opinion, these o2ences or the
   allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of
   insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public


                               Page 5 of 6
        R/SCR.A/3470/2026                                                              ORDER DATED: 10/03/2026




            of the area in question giving rise to the question of
            maintenance of public order. The order of detention cannot,
            therefore, be upheld.”

10.        For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material on record are not suHcient for
holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either
a*ected              adversely               or       likely        to       a*ect           adversely               the
maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.

11.        Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned                dated          07.03.2026                passed           by       the       respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule
is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.

12.        In      view         of     the        order         passed            in     Special           Criminal
Application No.3470 of 2026, no order in Criminal Misc.
Application (Temporary Bail) No.1 of 2026. Hence, the same is
disposed of.


Direct service today is permitted.




                                                                                            (ILESH J. VORA,J)




                                                                                          (R. T. VACHHANI, J)
AMIT ITALIAN
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: AMIT DAHYABHAI ITALIAN(HCW0112), ENGLISH STENOGRAPHER GRADE I, at High Court of Gujarat on 10/03/2026 16:38:09




                                                       Page 6 of 6