SUMIT JIVRAJBHAI VADHEL THRO. VADHEL MANJULABEN SUMITBHAIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/SCR.A/5795/2026                          ORDER DATED: 01/05/2026




            IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

           R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5795 of 2026

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SUMIT JIVRAJBHAI VADHEL THRO. VADHEL MANJULABEN SUMITBHAI
                           Versus
                  STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS GAYATRIBA B JADEJA(5152) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR LB DABHI APP for the Respondents
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI

                           Date : 01/05/2026

                            ORAL ORDER
             (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)


1.     The petitioner came to be preventively detained vide the
detention order dated 15.04.2026 passed by the Police
Commissioner, Surat, as a “Sexual Offender” as defined under
Section 2(ha) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities
Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of 1985).

2.     By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid order.

3.     This Court has heard learned counsel Ms. G. B. Jadeja and
Mr. LB Dabhi, learned APP for the respondent State.

4.     Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the
grounds of detention has no nexus to the “public order”, but is
a purely a matter of law and order, as registration of the
offence cannot be said to have either affected adversely or
likely to affect adverse the maintenance of public order as

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contemplated under the explanation sub-section (4) of Section
3 of the Act, 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged to
have been committed by the detunue have no bearing on the
question of maintenance of public order and his activities could
be said to be a prejudicial only to the maintenance of law and
order and not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

5.     On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing the
application contended that, the detenue is habitual offender
and his activities affected at the society at large. In such set of
circumstances,           the   Detaining     Authority,   considering           the
antecedents and past activities of the detenue, has passed the
impugned order with a view to preventing him from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in
the area of Surat.

6.     Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the respective parties, the issue arises as to whether
the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in
exercise of his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985
is sustainable in law?

7.     The order impugned was executed upon the applicant
and presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention, a
reference of one criminal case registered against the applicant
for the offence punishable under Sections 74, 76, 115(2),
296(B) of BNSS, 2023 dated 07.12.2025 registered with
Lalgate Police Station was made and further it is alleged that,
the activities of the detenue as a “sexual offender” affects
adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of


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public order as explained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985.
Admittedly, in all the said offences, the applicant was granted
bail.

8.       The term ‘Sexual Offender’ defined under Section 2(ha)
reads as under:

                "sexual offender” means a person, who commits or
                attempts to commit or abets the commission of any
                offence punishable under section 354, 354A, 354B,
                354C, 354D, 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C, 376-D or
                377 of the Indian Penal Code or the Protection of
                Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012;”

9.      After careful consideration of the material, we are of the
        view that, the activities as alleged would not fall under the
        definition of ‘sexual offender’. After careful consideration
        of the material, we are of the considered view that on the
        basis of one criminal case, the authority has wrongly
        arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of
        the detenue could be termed to be acting in a manner
        ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In our
        opinion, the said offence does not have any bearing on the
        maintenance of public order. In this connection, we may
        refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
        Piyush Kantilal Mehta Vs. Commissioner of Police,
        Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, wherein,                        the
        detention order was made on the basis of the registration
        of the two prohibition offences. The Apex Court after
        referring the case of Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of


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R/SCR.A/5795/2026                            ORDER DATED: 01/05/2026




Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10 held and observed that mere
disturbance of law and order leading to detention order is
thus not necessarily sufficient for action under preventive
detention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer, which
read thus:

   “17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this
   Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal,
   where the distinction between `law and order' and
   `public order' has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J.
   speaking for the Court observed as follows:

           10.      "Does the expression `public order' take in
           every kind of infraction of order or only some
           categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of
           assault or injury to specific persons does not lead
           to public disorder. When two people quarrel and
           fight and assault each other inside a house or in a
           street, it may be said that there is disorder but not
           public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the
           powers vested in the executive authorities under
           the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the
           culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they
           were disturbing public order. The contravention of
           any law always affects order but before it can be
           said to affect public order, it must affect the
           community or the public at large. In this connection
           we must draw a line of demarcation between
           serious and aggravated forms of disorder which
           directly affect the community or injure the public


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           interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace
           of a purely local significance which primarily injure
           specific individuals and only in a secondary sense
           public interest. A mere disturbance of law and
           order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily
           sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention
           Act but a disturbance which will affect public order
           comes within the scope of the Act."

   18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our
   opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti-
   social activities of the petitioner adversely affect or are
   likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public
   order. It is true some incidents of beating by the
   petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses.
   But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing
   on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may
   be punished for the alleged offences committed by him
   but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be
   said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the
   community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger
   within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely
   because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively
   detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid
   down in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his
   activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to
   affect adversely the maintenance of public order We
   have carefully considered the offences alleged against
   the petitioner in the order of detention and also the



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             allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion,
             these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have
             created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror
             among the members of the public of the area in
             question giving rise to the question of maintenance of
             public order. The order of detention cannot, therefore,
             be upheld.”

 10.        For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered
 opinion that, the material on record are not sufficient for
 holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either
 affected             adversely               or      likely         to       affect          adversely               the
 maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
 satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
 said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.

 11.        Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
 impugned               dated           15.04.2026                passed           by       the       respondent
 authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
 at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule
 is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.



                                                                                             (ILESH J. VORA,J)




                                                                                           (R. T. VACHHANI, J)
 P.S. JOSHI


Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: PALLAV SUBHASHCHANDRA JOSHI(HC00177), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 01/05/2026 12:14:26




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