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High Court of Gujarat

PRAKHAR @ VARUN @ BOXER S/O SANJAYBHAI MISHRA THRO RAGHWENDRAKUMAR S/O BRIJESH TIWARIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

Disposal
38-RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @ FH

Holding

The Court held that the petitioner’s activities did not affect public order, rendering the detention order invalid and quashed.

Summary

The petitioner, Prahar @ Varun @ Boxer, was preventively detained on 2 May 2026 as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985. He challenged the legality of the detention, arguing that the alleged offences pertained only to law and order and not to public order as required by Section 3 of the Act. The State contended that the petitioner was a habitual offender whose activities threatened public order in Surat. The Court examined the distinction between "public order" and "law and order" through several Supreme Court precedents and held that the offences cited (IPC, BNS 2023, Gujarat Police Act) did not affect the community at large. Consequently, the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction was deemed invalid, and the detention order was quashed, ordering the petitioner’s immediate release.

Issues considered

  • Whether the detention order under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 is valid when the alleged offences relate only to law and order and not to public order.
  • Whether the material on record satisfies the requirement of Section 3 that the activities be prejudicial to public order.
  • Whether the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction can be upheld in the absence of a clear nexus to public order.

Legislation cited

Subjects

preventive detentionpublic orderlaw and orderGujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Actdangerous personSupreme Court jurisprudencedetention order quashed

Judgment

     R/SCR.A/9293/2026                       ORDER DATED: 17/07/2026




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

 R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9293 of 2026
=================================================
 PRAKHAR @ VARUN @ BOXER S/O SANJAYBHAI MISHRA
   THRO RAGHWENDRAKUMAR S/O BRIJESH TIWARI
                      Versus
             STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
=================================================
Appearance:
MR. RAAJEN D JADHAV(10026) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. YUVRAJ BRAHMBHATT APP for the Respondent(s) No.
1
RULE NOT RECD BACK for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
=================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
       and
       HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA

                         Date : 17/07/2026

                              ORDER

       (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI)

1.     The petitioner herein came to be preventively detained

       vide the detention order dated 02.05.2026 passed by

       the respondent authority as a “dangerous person” as

       defined under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of

       Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred as

       ‘the Act of 1985’).

2.     By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged



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       the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.

3.     This Court has heard learned the advocates appearing

       for the respective parties.

4.     Learned advocate for the detenu submits that the

       grounds of detention has no nexus to the “public

       order”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, as

       registration of the offence cannot be said to have either

       affected adversely or likely to affect adverse the

       maintenance of public order as contemplated under

       the explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act,

       1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged to have

       been committed by the detenu have no bearing on the

       question of maintenance of public order and his

       activities could be said to be a prejudicial only to the

       maintenance of law and order and not prejudicial to

       the maintenance of public order.

5.     On      the       other   hand,    learned   APP    opposing            the

       application contended that the detenu is habitual

       offender and his activities affected the society at large.

       In such set of circumstances, the detaining authority,



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       considering the antecedents and past activities of the

       detenu, has passed the impugned order with a view to

       preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial

       to the maintenance of public order in the area of

       Surat.

6.     Having considered the facts as well as the submissions

       made by the respective parties, the issue arises as to

       whether the order of detention passed by the detaining

       authority         in   exercise    of      the   powers      under          the

       provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law?

7.     The order impugned was executed upon the detenu. In

       the grounds of detention, a reference of criminal cases

       i.e. (i) for the offence under Sections 323, 504, 506(2)

       and 114 of IPC with Dindoli Police Station and (ii) for

       the offence under Sections 109(1), 117(4), 118(2),

       189(2), 189(4), 190 and 191(3) of BNS, 2023 and under

       Section 135 of G.P. Act with Udhana Police Station

       were made and further it is alleged that the activities of

       the detenu as a “dangerous person” affects adversely

       or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of



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     R/SCR.A/9293/2026                                    ORDER DATED: 17/07/2026




       public order as explained under Section 3 of the Act of

       1985.

8.     After careful consideration of the material, we are of

       the considered view that on the basis of the criminal

       cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the

       subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenu

       could be termed to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial

       to the maintenance of public order’. In our opinion, the

       said offences do not have any bearing on the

       maintenance of public order.

9.     The distinction between "public order" and "law and

       order" has been carefully defined in a Constitution

       Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of

       Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and

       Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709. In this judgment, His

       Lordship          Hidayatullah,          J.   by      giving        various

       illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law

       and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads

       thus:

                "....Does the expression "public order" take in
                every kind of disorder or only some? The answer


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R/SCR.A/9293/2026                                 ORDER DATED: 17/07/2026




           to this serves to distinguish "public order" from
           "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly
           takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed,
           must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the
           peace does not lead to public disorder. When two
           drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but
           not public disorder. They can be dealt with under
           the powers to maintain law and order but cannot
           be detained on the ground that they were
           disturbing public order. Suppose that the two
           fighters were of rival communities and one of
           them tried to raise communal passions. The
           problem is still one of law and order but it raises
           the apprehension of public disorder. Other
           examples can be imagined. The contravention of
           law always affects order but before it can be said
           to affect public order, it must affect the
           community or the public at large. A mere
           disturbance of law and order leading to disorder
           is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under
           the Defence of India Act but disturbances which
           subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate
           is entitled to take action under Rule 30(l)(b) to
           prevent subversion of public order but not in aid
           of maintenance of law and order under ordinary
           circumstances.

           It will thus appear that just as "public order" in
           the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to
           comprehend disorders of less gravity than those
           affecting "security of State", "law and order" also
           comprehends disorders of less gravity than those
           affecting "public order". One has to imagine three
           concentric circles. Law and order represents the
           largest circle within which is the next circle
           representing public order and the smallest circle
           represents security of State. It is then easy to see
           that an act may affect law and order but not
           public order just as an act may affect public order
           but not security of the State...."



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9.1     The concept of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ has

        been dealt with in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee &

        Others v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC

        852. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had

        relied on the important work of Dr. Allen on `Legal

        Duties' and spelled out the distinction between `public'

        and `private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In

        considering the material elements of crime, the historic

        tests which each community applies are intrinsic

        wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two

        most        important   factors     which   have     led     to       the

        designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen

        has distinguished `public' and `private' crimes in the

        sense that some offences primarily injure specific

        persons and only secondarily the public interest, while

        others directly injure the public interest and affect

        individuals only remotely. There is a broad distinction

        along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the

        application of any such test.

9.2     The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babul



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      R/SCR.A/9293/2026                                  ORDER DATED: 17/07/2026




        Mitra alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal &

        Others, (1973) 1 SCC 393 had an occasion to deal

        with the question of "public order" and "law and order".

        The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the true

        distinction between the areas of "law and order" and

        "public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach

        of the act in question upon society. The Court pointed

        out that the act by itself is not determinant of its own

        gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its

        potentiality it may be very different.

9.3     In Commissioner of Police & Others, v. C. Anita

        (Smt.), (2004) 7 SCC 467, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

        again examined the issue of "public order" and "law

        and order" and observed thus:

                 "7. ....The crucial issue is whether the activities of
                 the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While
                 the expression "law and order" is wider in scope
                 inasmuch as contravention of law always affects
                 order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and
                 public order could be affected by only such
                 contravention which affects the community or the
                 public at large. Public order is the even tempo of
                 life of the community taking the country as a
                 whole or even a specified locality. The distinction
                 between the areas of "law and order" and "public
                 order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach


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                 of the act in question on society. It is the
                 potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of
                 life of the community which makes it prejudicial
                 to the maintenance of the public order. If a
                 contravention in its effect is confined only to a few
                 individuals directly involved as distinct from a
                 wide spectrum of the public, it could raise
                 problem of law and order only. It is the length,
                 magnitude and intensity of the terror wave
                 unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder
                 that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting
                 "public order" from that concerning "law and
                 order". The question to ask is:

                 "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of
                 the community so as to amount to a disturbance
                 of the public order or does it affect merely an
                 individual leaving the tranquility of the society
                 undisturbed?"

                 This question has to be faced in every case on its
                 facts."

10.     For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered

        opinion that the material on record are not sufficient

        for holding that the alleged activities of the detenu

        have either affected adversely or likely to affect

        adversely         the   maintenance        of   public      order      and

        therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the

        detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid

        and in accordance with law.

11.     Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order


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     R/SCR.A/9293/2026                                                         ORDER DATED: 17/07/2026




        impugned dated 02.05.2026 passed by the respondent

        authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenu to

        be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any

        other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct

        service permitted.




                                                                                      (GITA GOPI,J)



                                                                              (L. S. PIRZADA, J)
DIKSHA

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: DIKSHA HARISH GUSAIN(HC02363), ENGLISH STENO GRADE-II\, at High Court of Gujarat on 17/07/2026 16:35:49




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