SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD, ANDHRA CIRCLE,-SECUNDERABAD REP. BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERversusMOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN AND ORS.

      SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD, ANDHRA                                A
   CIRCLE,-SECUNDERABAD REP. BY EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                         v.
            MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN AND ORS.

                        NOVEMBER 28, 2003
                                                                           B
            [BRIJESH KUMAR AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.]

     Cantonments Act, 1924-Sections 181 (3) & 181 (4)(b)-Scope of-
Held, under Section 181 (3) before sanctioning a plan the Board is
required to refer the application for sanction ofplan to the Defence Estate C
Officer for ascertaining whether there is any objection on the part of the
Government to erection or re-erection over the land in question-Under
Section 181 (4) (b), that the Competent Authority dealing with the matter
has to see whether there is or not any dispute about land between the
person applying for sanction of the plan and the Government.                D
      Sections 181(3) & 181 (4)(b)-Application submited to Cantonment
Board for sanction of a plan-Returned to the ground of non-fulfillment
ofrequirement offiling exemption certificate under the provisions ofUrban
Land Ceiling Act-Nothing to show that a reference was made to the
Defence Estate Ojicer before returning the application earlier-Held, the E
Defence Estate Officer would neither be denuded of his statutory respon-
sibility to raise objection about Government's claim to the land or dispute
about it nor the competent authority was absolved of his statutory duty to
refer the matter to the Defence Estate Officer-In such circumstances
principles of restrictive res judicata not available to the applicants- F
Constructive res judicata-Civi/ Procedure Code-Section 10.

     Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937-Rules 3 & 10-
Maintenance of General Land Register-Defence Estates Officer is re-
quired to maintain General Land Register in respect of all land, which has
been entrusted to, or vests in the Board.                                  G
     Civil Procedure Code-Sect. 79 and Order 2 7 Rule 3-Suit by or
against the Government-Whether Union of India is to be imp/eaded as
a party and not the authority or any officer-The Cantonment Board
through one ofits designated officers considers the application for sanction H
                                   395
    396                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   of plan-It shall have its right to defend its orders-Under the statut01y
    provisions, the plan is not to be sanctioned in case there is a dispute
    between the applicant and the Government-Under the statute again the
    mater is to be referred to the Defence Estate Officer to ascertain this fact
    and it is for him if any such dispute exists between the applicant and the
B   Government of India-Therefore, it cannot be said there would be no
    reason for these authorities to contest the matter-The interest of the
    Government of India is ve1y much involved and it will have all the interest
    to see that the plan is not sanctioned in case it has a claim over the land.

          The land over which the Respondents proposed to raise construc-
C   tion fell in the limits of the Appellant Cantonment Board. The
    Appellant Board had been collecting tax in respect of the land, which
    had been in possession of the Respondents. The Respondents had
    submitted plans to the Executive Officer of the Cantonment Board for
    sanction of the plan, which was returned with an objection that the
D   Respondents were required to furnish exemption certificate under the
    provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The
    Respondents challenged the return of the layout plait by filing a writ
    petition before the High Court, which was allowed and it was held that
    no exemption certificate was required under the Act. However, lay out
E   plan was again returned on the ground that the land in question was
    in Sarkari Abadi Land. So another writ petition was filed by the
    Respondents and the same was also allowed with a direction to the
    authotities to find out as to whether the Respondents had established
    a prima facie case as to their possession and also to consider the
    objection of the Union and to pass an appropriate order thereof. The
F   application for sanction of plan was dismissed as the land was found
    to have been in possession of the Government of India. Respondents
    filed appeal against order refusing permission for sanction of land.
    During the pendency of the appeal, Respondent filed another writ
    petition to restrain the authorities from interfering with the possession
G   of the Respondents till disposal of their appeal. The appeal filed by the
    Respondents was also dismissed holding that the Respondents had no
    title to the land in question. Respondent thereafter filed another writ
    petition challenging the order dismissing the aP.peaI. A Single Judge
    allowed the writ petition holding that the authorities were not required
H   to go into the question of title of the Respondents, as this question was
    SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD v. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN 397

not raised in the earlier proceedings. The Single Judge also considered A
the case of the Appellant Board that the land was covered under the
old grant and found that Nizam granted no land to the Union for
military purposes. Thus Cantonment Board was directed to sanction
the lay out plan of the Respondents. The appeal against the order of
the Single Judge was also dismissed. Hence this appeal.                 B
      It was the case of the Appellant Board that till the year 1992 the
Respondent extended no claim, whatsoever, to the land in question.
One SAK filed a petition under Section 15(2) of the Record of the
Rights Regulation for correction of entries in the Revenue Records to C
the extent of 25 acres on the basis of an unregistered sale deed, which
was rejected by the District Revenue Officer. An appeal under Section
158 of the Land Revenue Act against this order filed before the
Commissioner of Land Revenue was also dismissed. SAK, therefore
filed a suit claimiJJg ownership and possession of land measuring 65
acres. However, it was found that he was in possession of 2.71 acres D
only and near about 63 acres of land was in possession of the
Government of India.

      It was contended by the Appellant that the in old revenue records
entries with respect to the lands in question were recorded in favour E
of the Appellant; that Rule 10 of Cantonment Land Al'lministration
Rules, 1937 framed under Section 280 of the Cantonment Act, deals
with maintenance of General Land Register and Defence Estates
Officer is required to maintain the same under Rule 3 and entries made
in this Register is to be given due weight; that the title of the lands were F
in serious dispute; that the proceeding initiated by SAK for correction
of Revenue Records was rejected and entries in favour of Government
were maintained.

      It was contended by the Respondents that the area of the village
concerned belonged to the Nizam; the land given by the Nizam to the G
Government was for the purposes of exercising criminal and police
jurisdiction and that the dispute regarding the land was bona fide and
genuine.

     Disposing of the Appeals, the Court                                    H
    398               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         HELD : 1.L So far the question of investigating into the title of
   the parties is concerned, the view of the High Court to the extent that
   title is not required to be established by any of the parties ·before the
   competent authority, is correct. So far as possession is concerned, it
   may be indicated that there seems to be no such specific provision
B requiring to establish possession but it may depend upon facts of a
   given case and it may be considered as one of the relevant aspects to
   be kept in mind while considering the application for sanctionofa plan.
   It is evident from perusal of sub-section 4(b) of Section 181 of the
   Cantonment Act that the competent authority dealing with the matter,
C ·has to see whether there is or not any dispute about the land betw~en
   the person applying for sanction of the plan and the Government. In
   case the concerned authority, is satisfie~"about the existence o_f such a
   dispute in terms of Sectior:. 181 of the Act, t~e request for sanction of
   the layout plan is liable to be refused. Sub-section (3) of Section 181.,
   provides that before sanctioning a plan the Board is required to refer
D the application to the Defence Estates Officer for ·as~ertaining whether
   there was any objection on the part of the Government to such erection
   or re-erection over the land. The said provision casts a duty upon the
   sanctioning authority to refer the matter as pointed out above.
   Accordingly, it referred the matter to-the DEO, who raised objections
E regarding sanction of the plan. The objection relates to the question
   of ownership of the land. The Government claims ownership of the
   land and in that regard reliance was pla. ~~d upon entries in the revenue
   Records and the General Land Register, which are maintained in due
   course of official business. The respondents claimed their title t~rough
F the sale deed executed in favour of the son of SAK in 'the year i899,
   who on attaining majority had relinquished his. rights in favour of his
   father SAK on 11.8.1911 and then the alleged transfer' of diffe_rent
   parts of the land to eleven different persons. The respondents had got
   themselves inipleaded. A civil suit for injunction was' filed by SAK in
   1992 but the prayer for injunction was refused except in respect o( a
G part of the land measuring 2.71 acres since primafacie, their possession
   was not found over the rest of the land. It may be worthwhile to notice
   that the proceedings for correction of the ~ecords an~ the Civil Suit
   for injunction were initiated in 1992 and the application for sanction
   of the plan was moved in 1994, that is to say, after the respondents
H remained unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain orders in their
    SEC~DERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD v. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN               399

favour twice before. In such circumstances; it would be difficult to say A
that there would be no bonajide dispute about the land between the
parties. (411-E-H; 412-A-F)

    Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil and Ors., (1999]
3 sec 555, referred to.
                                                                           B
      1.2. Enquiry would be necessary only if question of title could be
decided in the proceedings and not otherwise. There is enough mate-
rial, on the basis of which an authority could reasonably come to the
conclusion that there was a dispute, relating to the land, between the
applicant and the Government in respect of which an authority could C
reasonably come to the conclusion that there was a dispute, relating
to the land, between the applicant and the Government in respect of
which sanction of the plan to construct, was applied for. Such a dispute
was brought to the notice of the competent authority by means of
objection placed before it by the DEO under the statutory provision. D
It would not be possible to say that the authority concerned took a view
about existence of dispute which was not sustainable. [412-F-HJ

       1.3. Stage for raising an objection regarding a dispute between the
Government and the applicant arises after the application is referred
to the DEO by the sanctioning authority in terms of sub-section (3) of E
Section 181 of tht> Act. So far as the return of the first application is
concerned, it may be noted that it was returned since the sanctioning
authority thought it not to be entertainable, having not been accom-
panied by an exemption certificate under the provisions of the Urban
Land Ceiling Act. Apparently, it appears that the stage had yet arrived F
for referring the application to the DEO for his objections. The
competent authority is required to refer the application before sanc-
tioning the plan. Nothing to the contrary has been indicated by the
respondents to show that despite reference of the application to the
DEO under Sub-section (3) of Section 181, the DEO had chosen aot
to file any objection in respect of the dispute of the claim over the land. G
On the basis of the above factual aspect, the question of failing to raise
a plea in the earlier proceedings does not arise due to return of the first
application. There is no reason to infer that the DEO had foregone his
right to raise objection regarding the ownership of the land before
sanction of the layout plan. (414-D-HJ                                      H.
    400                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A          1.4. The earlier order returning the layout plan was on the ground
    of non-fulfillment of requirement of filing exemption certificate. The
    High Court in the writ petition held that there was no such requirement
    to submit exemption certificate under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. There
    was a direction to re-consider the matter; hence it was being scrutinized
B   on the ground other than requirements of filing of an exemption
    certificate. There is nothing to show that a reference was made to the
    DEO before returning the application earlier. As a matter of fact, no.
    such occasion would have arisen then. In this background, the DEQ,
    would neither be denuded of his statutor-y responsibility to raise objection.
    about Government's claim to the land or dispute about it nor the·
C   competent authority was absolved ofhisstatutoryduty to refer the matter
    to the DEO before considering the question of passing of the order of
    sanction. The return oflayout plan earlier, was in a way atthe preliminary
    stage when it was found that the application did not accompany the·
    necessary documents e.g. Exemption Certificate under Ceiling laws,.
D   which was then considered to be necessary. Stage to.file objection comes-
     late1· when the application is refer-red· to the IlEO. (416-A-E]

         2.1. The Division: Bench of the High Court has recorded a finding
   that the Appellants were estopped, on the principles of constructive res
  judicata, from raisin~ an objection relating to existence of dispute over
E the land, on the basis that no SU('.h plea was put forward atthe stage whe.n
   the map was returned first in the year 1994 saying, that the exemption
  certificate under Urban Land Ceiling Act was not filed by the applicants
   and thus the plea ofdispute over the land between the applicants and the
   Governments, which. could have been raised earlier, but not raised cannot
F be allowed to be ta.ken up now. So far as the proposition of law is
   concerned, there would be no dispute that constructive res judicata will
   bind the parties in 'subsequent proceedings, but there has been decision
   between the parties on the question of dispute in terms of Sub-section (3)
   of Section 181 oltheAct. (413-A-C; 414-A-B]
G        Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v • Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy,
    (1970) SCR 830 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain, (1977] 3
    SCR 428, referried to.

          2.2. It would be worthwhile to notice that- stage· for raising an
H   objection regarding a dispute between the Government and the appli-
    SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD v. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN 401

cants arise after the application is referred .to the DEO by the A
sanctioning author under Section 181 (3) of the Act. So far as the
return of the first application is concerned, it "!ay be noted that it was
returned since the sanctioning authority thought that it was not to be
entertainable, having not been accompanied by an exemption certifi-
cate under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Apparently B
it appears that the stage had not . yet arrived for referring the
application to the DEO for his objections. The competent authority is
required to refer the application before sanctioning the plan. Nothing
to the contrary has been indicated by the Respondents to show that
despite reference of application to the DEO under Section 181 (3) of C
the Act, the DEO had chosen not to file any objection in respect of
the dispute of the claim over the land. qn the basis of the above
factual aspects the question of failing to raise a pie~ in the earlier
proceedings does not arise due to return of the first application. There
is no reason to infer that the DEO had foregone his right to raise
objection regarding the ownership of the land before sanction of the D
lay out plan. (414-D-H)

    Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors., [1996]
6 SCC 424 and Bansilal Farms v. Umarani Bose and Ors., [1997) 9 SCC
191, referred to.                                                         E
     Administrative Law by Sir William Wade; Eighth Edition, page 249,
referred to.

      2.3. The Respondents just wanted to hold on by raising a flimsy
 and feeble plea of constructive res judicata, which is not sustainable F
 either on fact or on law. The High Court fell into error in holding that
 the objectior. under Sub-section (3) of Section 181 of the Act could not
 be raised by the DEO by applying the doct.rine of constructive res
judicata. [416-E-G]
                                                                          G
     3. The Cantonment Board throa.gh one of its designated officer,
considers and passes appropriate orders on the application for sanction
of plan. At least it shall have right to defend its orders. Under the
statutory provisions, the plan is not to be sanctioned in case there is
a dispute between the applicant and the Government. Under the statute H
    402                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A again the matter is to be referred to the DEO to ascertain this fact and
    it is for him to raise objection, if any such dispute exists between the
    applkant and the Government of India. Therefore, it cannot be said
    there would be no reason for these authorities to contest the matter.

B
      .                                 .
    The interest of the Government ofindia is very much involved and it
    will have all the interest to see that the plan is not sanctioned in case
    it has a claim over the land. (418-C-E]

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                Civil Appeal Nos. 6877-
    6881 of 2000.

C        From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.2000 of the Andhra Pradesh
    High Court in W.A. Nos. 92/98, 1499/97, 538, 2004, 1996 of 1998.

                                      WITH

D        C.A. No. 753, 1107-1111, 6604/2001, 9453-9456/2003 and 6376 of
    2001.

         Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, R.F. Nariman, Anoop G.
    Chaudhary, P.S. Narasimha, Ananga Bhattacharya, Sudhir Nandrajog, G.
    Seshagiri, T.K. Kodandaram-in-person, Guntur Prabhakar, K. Ram Kumar,
E   B. Sridhar, Ms. Rekha Pandey, B.V. Balaram Das, Nikhil Nayyar, Anil
    Kumar Tandale and Mrs. Lalita Kaushik for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F         BRIJESH KUMAR, J. All the above noted appeals though filed by
    different parties, involve the same question relating to the legality of the
    order dated 11.8.2000 passed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
    High Court as well as the judgments later passed following the above said
    decision. The controversy revolves around the refusal to sanction the plan
    submitted by different parties to the Cantonment Board for construction
G   of building over the land in question. The central government raised its
    claim over the land and filed objections to that effect through the Defence
    Estate Officer as provided under Section 181 of the Cantonment Act, 1924.
    (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

H         All the appeals have been heard together along with Special Leave
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD v. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR, !.]   403
Petition(C) Nos.406-409/02 in which we grant leave. All these matters are A
being disposed of by this common judgment.

      The facts in brief, relevant for purposes of disposing of these matters
are that: the land over which the respondents proposed to raise construction
and had submitted plans therefor, falls in the limits of Secunderabad B
Cantonment Board. There is a bungalow No. 215 tn Thokatta Village,
which is said to have been purchased in the name of Sy~d Sirajuddin Ali
Khan, the minor, represented through his father Syed Sadiq Ali Khan,
by means ofa registered sale deed dated 21.9.1899. It is also the case of
respondents that Syed Sirujdin Ali Khan on attaining majority relinquished
his rights in favour of his father Syed Sadiq Ali Khan by means of a deed C
dated l l.8 .1911. The case of the respondents further is that Sadiq Ali
Khan had allotted land to 11 persons sometime in 1920 and made an
application for making entries in the village records accordingly. The land
S No. 37 was changed to S No. 170 on revision of settlement. According
to the respondents, the cantonment authorities have been collecting tax D
in respect of the land which has been in their possession. The respondents
moved application to the Executive Officer, Cantonment Board for sanc-
tion of lay out in respect of part of the land of S. No. 170, measuring
8 acres. The application for sanction of the plan was returned to the
respondents with an objection that they were required to furnish exemption E
certificate under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976.

      The respondents challenged the return of the layout plan and filed
a writ petition 4250 of 1994, before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The
Writ petition was allowed on 30.9.94, and it was held that no such F
exemption certificate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 was required t? be furnished. The authorities were directed to
consider the sanction of the plan without insisting for exemption certificate.
The lay out plan, however, was again returned on the ground that S No.
170 is in Sarkari Abadi Land. Another writ petition No.6012/95 was filed, G
challenging the above order. The said writ petition was also allowed by
order dated 6.12.95 with a direction to the authorities to find out as to
whether the respondents had established a prima facie case as to their
possession and also to consider the objection of the Union of India and to
pass an appropriate order thereof. The application for sanction of plan was H
    404                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A   ultimately dismissed on 18.1.1996, refi.Ising permission, as the land was
    found to have been in possession of Government of India. An appeal was
    preferred against that order. Since the appeal kept on pending, yet another
    writ petition No. 3606/96 was filed to restrain the authorities from
    interfering with the possession of the petitioners (in the writ petition) over
B   the land, till disposal of their appeal. This prayer was granted on
    27 .2.1996. By means of yet another order passed in writ petition No. 6009/
    96 police protection was also provided to the writ petitioners (respondents
    here). Ultimately,· the appeal was dismissed on 10.5.1996 holding that the
    respondents had no title to the land in question.

C         It gave·rise to filing of yet another writ petition No. 10804/96 against
    the order dismissing the appeal. The learned Single Judge while allowing
    the writ petition held that the authorities were not required to go into the
    question of title of the applicants in the land. The writ petitioners,
    namely, the present respondents were held to be in possession over the
D   property. The learned Single Judge also considered the case of the
    appellants that the land was covered under the old grant and found that
    no land was granted to the Government of India by Nizam for military
    purposes. The learned Single Judge found that in the earlier proceedings,
    the authorities did not raise objection'claiming title, therefore, they could
E   not take that stand in subsequent proceedings as it would be hit by
    principles of constructive res judicata. Possession of appellant was also not
    found. With such observation, the learned Single Judge while allowing t:he
    writ petition, directed the Cantonment Board to sanction the lay out plan.
    The appeal, preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge,
F   has been dismissed, which is the subject matter of appeals in hand.

        Some other developments also took place during all this period.
  According to the appellants, till the year 1992 the respondents extended
  no claim, whatsoever, to the land in question. However, the respondent
  Sadiq Ali Khan filed a petition under Section 15(2) of the Record. of the
G Rights Regulation Act for correction of entries in the Revenue Records
  to the extent of 25 acres, on the basis of an unregistered sale deed. The
  said application was rejected by order dated 9.4.92 by the District Revenue
  officer, holding that land measuring only 2.71 acres out of the land of
  Bungalow No.215 was in the private hands and the rest of the land was
H Government land which has been correctly shown to be so in the revenue
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD v. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR, l.]   405
records. An appeal was preferred against the said order before the A
Commissioner of Land Revenue under Section 158 of the Land Revenue
Act which was dismissed on 15.3.97. It may also be mentioned that
according to the appellants, the respondents Nos. l to 62 had also got
themselves impleaded as parties in the appeal which has been decided
~~~.                                                                                 B
     Sadiq Ali Khan filed a Civil Suit No.288/92 also in the Court of Civil
Judge, Secunderabad claiming ownership and possession of land measuring
65 acres in S. No. 170 in Tokketa Village. A prayer made for interim
injunction was rejected by order dated 12.10.92. It was, however, found
that the plaintiff in suit was in possession of land measuring 2.71 acres C
only and in respect thereof,. he was entitled for injunction against
dispossession, but so far the rest of the land is concerned measuring near
about 63 acres it was in the ownership and possession of the Government
of India.
                                                                                     D
      The Division Bench took note of the finding of the learned Single
Judge that the competent authority, while considering the question of
sanction of the building plan, is only required to see the prima facie
possession of the applicant, it has not to adjudicate upon the title of the
applicants.    The Division Bench also observed that the government E
authorities had not claimed title over the land in the previous proceedings,
therefore, they were estopped from raising such a plea later which is hit
by the principles of constructive res judicata. Referring to a decision
reported in AIR (1977) SC 392 Y.B. Patil v. Y.L. Patil, it observed that
the principles of constructive res judicata could apply in subsequent F
stages of the same proceedings as well. Ultimately, it was held that
principle of constructive res judicata in this case would apply to a limited
extent as to the availability of the grounds on which layout plan could
be refused. The Division Bench, however itself recorded finding that there
is a serious dispute of title amongst various persons. The relevant part
of the judgment may be quoted, which reads as follows:-                      G

               "With regard to question of title, it is well settled that highly
         disputed question of title cannot be entertained and adjt:dicated
         in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia. From
         the various contentions raised and arguments urged on behalf of H
    406                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A            the respective parties, it is apparent that there is a serious dispute
             of title among the various persons and authorities in respect of title
             to the property in question."

  In so far the objections of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has
H virtually given a finding on the title in favour of the petitioners, the
  Division Bench observed as follows: -

                   "Such an impression does emerge from the observations of
             the learned Single Judge at page 22 of the judgment, like as
             authenticity of these documents cannot be doubted by the re-
C            spondents, the same have to be given their weight, and when
             reliance is placed on those documents, the title of the petitioners
             cannot be disputed. We do not agree. with the conclusions of
             the learned Single Judge that the petitioners' .title has been
             established."
D
    The Division Bench has reiterated its view that question of title could not
    be decided before the competent authority nor such disputed question could
    be decided in writ proceedings. It, however, in the later part of disou!!sion
    in the judgment, has clarified the extent to whic~ it upholds the applica-
E   bility of principl~s of constructive res judicata, not being totally in
    agreement with the finding of the learned Single Judge on the said point.
    The relevant observation in that regard may be perused, which are quoted
    below:-

                  "It is made clear that this judgment under appeal shall not
F            be construed as having decided the question of title in respect of
             the land involved in the said writ petition. We also hold the view
             that even the failure of respondents to raise or set up the question
             of the title in earlier writ petitions, namely, WP No. 6012of1995,
             3600 of 1996 and 6012 of 1996 as mentioned at page 21 of the
G            judgment of the learned Single Judge, cannot be basis for
             invoking the principle of res judicata in respect of the question
             oftitle. The principle of res judicata as stated above would in
             this case be applicable only to -the limited question as to the
             entitlement of the petitioner for sanction of lay out and as to the
             grounds on which such sanction can be refused.'"
H
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENl BOARD 1·.• MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.]   407

     In so far the finding of the learned Single Judge in relation to the A
possession of the land by all the writ petitioners, it has been held by the
Division Bench that the said finding is limited only for the purpose of
sanction of lay out and not for any other purpose.

      Before proceeding to discuss the submissions made before us by the
respective parties, it may be beneficial to peruse the provisions regarding B
the sanction of the lay out plan. Section 181 of the Cantonment Act reads
as under:-

         "Section 181. Power of Board to sanction or refuse - (1) The
         Board may either refuse to sanction the erection or re-erection, C
         as the case may be, of the building, or may sanction it either
         absolutely or subject to such directions as it thinks fit to make
         in writing in respect    of all or any of the following matters
         namely:-

         (a)     to    G) x x x x x x                                                  D
         (2)    xx xx xx ....... .

         (3) The Board before sanctioning the erection or re erection of
         a building on land which is under the management of the E
         (Defence Estates Officer), shall refer the application to the
         (Defence Estates Officer) for ascertaining whether there is any
         objection on the part of the "Government to such erection or re-
         erection and the (Defence Estates Officer) shall return the
         application together with his report thereon to the Board within
         thirty days after it has been received by him.                   F
         (4) The Board may refuse to sanction the erection or re-erection
         of any building ·

         (a)   when the land on which it is proposed to erect or re-erect
               the building is held on a leasl! from the Government, if the G
               erection or re-erection constitutes a breach of the terms of
               the lease, or

         (aa) when the land on which it is proposed to erect or re-erect
              the building is entrusted to the management of the Board by H
    408                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A                  the Government if the erection or re-erection constitutes a
                   breach of the terms of the entrustment of management or
                   contravenes any of the instructions issued by the Govern-
                                                                        .
                   ment regarding the management crf 'the land by the Board,
                   or
B
             (b)   when the fand on wh;ch it is proposed to erect or re-erect
                   the building is not held on a lease from t!ie Government,
                   ifthe right to build on such, land is in dispute between the
                   person applying for sanction and the Government.

c            (5) x x x x x x x

             (:6) x x x x x x x"

    Bye law 15 reads as under:-
D
             "15. Power of Cantt. Board to sanction, modify or reject:- The
             Cantonment Board may sanction the lay out plan submitted by the
             applicant if the same is in accordance with the bye-laws or
             sanction the same with such modifications as the Cantt. Board
E            may consider fit, o.r may refuse to sanction any layout if
             proprietary rights on the land proposed to be laid out is claimed
             by the Government oflndia in the Ministry of Defence to be their
             l~nd as shown in the General Land Register maintained for the
             purpose".         ·

F          In our view, the main question which falls for consideration is about
    the ambit and scope of Section 181 of the Act, more particularly Clause
    (b) of sub-section 4 of Section 181. The above provision empowers the
    Board to refuse sanction of a building plan where the land on which a
    construction is proposed to be raised is not on lease from the Government
G   and there exists any dispute between the applicant for sanction of the plan
    and the Government.

         The respective parties have drawn our attention to certain facts and
    documents to.show as to which of them is the rightful owner of the land.
H   The other question which has been raised by the respondents is that ground
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD v. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRJJESH KUMAR. J.)   409
for rejection of plan as contained in Clause (b) of Sub-section 4 of Section A
181 is not open to be resorted to by the appellants since such a ground was
not raised earlier while returning the plan, since in such a situation
principle of constructive res judicata would be attracted. There are a few
other peripheral questions which we shall be discussing later.
                                                                                     B
      The application for sanction of plan was moved by the respondents
on 4.12.93 addressed to the Cantonment Executive Officer. On 415
January, 1994 the Cantonment Executive Officer wrote that the ULSC
exemption certificate in Form l 9(V) from DEAPU Circle Secunderabad
was not furnished. It was also indicated that Board was also examining
the matter relating to entertaining new lay out plans. Hence the plan C
submitted by Nawab Mohd. Usuf Khan, the General Power of Attorney,
was returned. We have already noted that a writ petition preferred namely,
writ petition No. 4250of1994, against the return of the plan was allowed
by the High Court by Judgment dated 30.9.94, holding that no exemption
certificate under the provisions of the Urban (Land and Ceiling) Act was D
necessary. Hence the matter was required to be considered again without
insisting upon a Urban Ceiling exemption certificate. The respondents
then again seems to have approached for consideration of sanction of the
plan on 10.1.1995. The cantonment Executive Officer by means of his
notification dated 15/3/99 informed to the General Power of Attorney Sh. E
Nawab Mohd Usuf Khan that the DEO (Defence Estates Officer) had
raised definite objection on behalf of the Government against the lay out
plan submitted by the respondents. It was also indicated that in the
 Revenue Records Sy. No. 170 of Thokatta Village is shown as Sarkari
 Abadi which is defence owned land. The plan was thus again returned
to the respondents. At this juncture, it may be relevant to take note of F
sub-section 3 of Section 181 of the Act, as quoted earlier.

      We have already noted the findings recorded in the writ petition and
the appeal in the earlier part of the judgment. The learned counsel for the
appellant has laid great emphasis upon the old revenue record entries in G
favour of the appellant and the entries made in the General Land Register.
It is submitted that Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937 have
been framed by virtue of power vested under Section 280 of the Canton-
ments Act, 1924. Rule l 0 in Chapter III of the Cantonment Land
Administration Rules deals with maintenance of General Land Register. H
     410                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2003] SUPP. 6 S.CR.
A The Military Estates Officer (now Defence Estates Officer) is required _to_
     maintain General Land Register prepared under Rule 3 in respect of all
     land which has been entrusted to or vests in the Board. In this
     connection, a reference has also been made to a decision repo1ted in
     Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil and Ors., [1999] (3) SCC
B    page 555. Regarding General Land Registers, it has been observed thflt
     they are maintained under the Rules, in normal course of business and
     entries made in such registers were to be given due weight. It is therefore,
     submitted that it cannot be said that no value is to be attached to the entries
     made in the General Land Registers. It has also been submitted that there
     being a serious dispute about the title of the property as also found by
C    the Division Bench, existence of the dispute in respect of the property
     in question cannot be disputed.

           The learned counsel appearing for the Union of India has referred
     to the proceedings which were initiated by Sadiq Ali Khan for correction
·D   of revenue records but that application was rejected on 9.4.92. The appeal,
     preferred against the said order passed by the District Revenue Officer in
     which 62 respondents also got themselves impleaded, was also dismissed.
     That is to say the entries in revenue records in favour of the Government -
     were maintained and the attempt of the        respondents for change of the
E    entries claiming right over the land in question failed. The authorities of
     the Defence Department were also heard. It was held that the claim
     advanced by the respondents was not substantiated by documents and)t
     was without any basis. It was found that the land was Government land/
     military estate. The Special Commissioner, Land Revenue observed in
     his order that no proper documents were produced by the respondents. It
F    is also indicated that in a suit filed by Sadiq Ali Khan (O.S. No. 288/92)
     with a prayer for injunction on the basis of the possession, the prayer was
     rejected except in part relating to 2.7 acres.

           Learned counsel appearing for the respondents tracing the history
G    submitted that area of the village concerned belongs to the Nizam. It is
     also submitted that respondents have been paying tax in respect of the
     Bungalow No.215 which was purchased by Syed Sirajuddin Ali, a minor
     son of Sadiq Ali Khan in the year 1899 who, on attaining majority, had
     relinquished his rights in favour of his father, Sadiq Ali Khan on
H    11.8.1911. He wrote to the authorities in 1920 that he had allotted the )anp
     SECUNDERABAD C..\NTON1'fENT BOARD ». MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR. J]   41 l

to the extent of 19.05 gts. to different persons and the same was requested A
to be recorded in the village records. The fact was acknowledged by the
Directorate and the Secretary of the Estate of Nawab Salarjung Bahadur
saying that it was not agricultural land, therefore no assessment was made
but. later tax at the rate of Rs. 5 per acre was levied. Therefore, a sum
of Rs. 325 in respect of the land in Survey No. 37 was held liable to be B
collected from Sadiq Ali Khan and his allottees. It was also indicated by
the authorities of the Estate that on revision of the Bandobast (settlement)
 Sy. No. 37 was given a new Sy. No. 170. He. has also drawn our attention
 to the fact that the land which was handed over by the Nizam to
Government was only for the purposes of exercising criminal and police
jurisdiction by the Government of India and Thokatta is one of such C
villages mentioned in the notification dated 28.9.1906. A copy of the
aforesaid document has been provided to us by the learned Counsel for
the respondents which does not seem to be a part of th~ record. He has
 also drawn our attention to the documents, namely, the sale deed dated
 21.9.1899 regarding 64 acres and deeds pertaining to non-agricultural D
 land. It has further been submitted that the dispute regarding the land, by
 reason of which permission to sanction the map can be refused, should
 be bonajide and a genuine dispute. ·

      So far the question of investigating into the title of the parties is E
concerned; we feel that the view of the High Court to the extent that title
is not required to be established by any of the parties before the competent
authority, is correct. So far possession is concerned, it may be indicated
that the.re seems to be no such specific provision requiring to establish
possession but it may depend upon facts of a given case and it may be
considered as one of the relevant aspects to be kept in mind while F
considering the application for sanction of a plan. But so far the statutory
requirement is concerned, it is evident from perusal of sub-section 4 (b)
o~ Section 181 that the competent authority dealirig with the matter, has
to see whether there is or not any dispute about the land between the
person applying for sanction of the plan and the Government. In case the G
concerned authority is satisfied about the existence of such a dispute in
terms of Section 181 of the Act, the request for sanction of the lay out
plan is liable to be refused. In this connection, it will also be relevant
to refer to sub-section 3 of Section 181 which provides that before
sanctioning a plan the Board is required to refer the application to the H
    412                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Defence Estates Officer for ascertaining whether there was any objection
  on the part of the Government to such erection or re-erection over the land.
  The said provision casts a duty upon the sanctioning authority to refer the
  matter as pointed out above. Accordingly, it referred the matter to the
  DEO, who raised objections regarding sanction of<he plan. The objection
B relates to the question of ownership of the land. The government claims
  ownership of the land and in that regard reliance was placed upon entries
  in the Revenue Records and the General Land Register which are
  maintained in due course of official business. The respondents claimed
  their title through the sale deed executed in favour of son of Sadiq Ali Khan
C in the year 1899, who on attaining majority had relinquished his rights in
  favour of his father Sadiq Ali Khan on 11.8.1911 and then the alleged
  transfer of different pa11s of the land to eleven different persons. It has
  been pointed out earlier also tnat the respondents had moved for correction
  of the records before the Revenue Officer but they failed. The appeal also
  remained unsuccessful, in which all the 62 respondents had got impleaded
D themselves. A civil suit for injunction was filed by Sadiq Ali Khan in 1992
  but the prayer for injunction was refused except in respect ofa part of the
  land measuring 2.71 acres since prima facie, their possession was not
  found over the rest of the land. It may be worthwhile to notice that the
  proceedings for correction of the records and the Civil Suit for injunction
E were initiated in 1992 and the application for sanction of the plan was
  moved- in 1994, that is to say, after the respondents remained unsuccessful
  in their attempts to obtain qrders in their favour twice before. In such
  circumstances, it would be difficult to say that there would be no bonafide
  dispute about the land between the parties. In this background, we do not
F feel it necessary to enter into the contents and merits of various documents
  relating to title relied upon by either side. That enquiry would be necessary
  only if question of title could be decided in these proceedings and· not
  otherwise. But we find there enough material, on the basis of which an
  authority could reasonably come to the conclusion that there was a dispute,
  relating to the land, between the applicant and the Government in respect
G of which sanction of the plan to construct, was applied for. Such a dispute
  was brought to the notice of the competent authority by means of objection
  placed before it by the Defence Estates Officer under the statutory
  provision. We don't think that i! would' be possible to say that the
  authority concerned took a view about existence of dispute which was not
H sustainable.
     SECUNDERABAD CA:<TONMENT BOARD "· MOHAMMED MOlllUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR. J]   413

      We may then consider the question as raised regarding application A
of principles of constructive resjudicata. The Division Bench has recorded
a finding that the appellants were estopped, on the principle of constructive
resjudicata, from raising an objection relating to existence of dispute over
the land, on the basis that  no such plea was put forward at the.stage when
the map was returned first in the year I 994 saying that the exe1i1ption B
certificate under Urban Land and Ceiling Act was not filed by the
applicants. Therefore, this plea of dispute over the land between applicants
and the Government, which could have been raised earlier, but not raised,
cannot be allowed to be taken up now. Learned counsel for the respondent
has in this connection placed reliance upon a decision reported in 1970
SCR page 830, Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai NB. C
Jeejeebhoy. Our attention has been pa1ticularly drawn to page 836 which
is quoted below:-

               "It is true that in determining the application of the rule of
         res judicata the Couit is not concerned with the correctness or D
         otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one
         purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent
         court must in a subsequent litigation between the same patties be
         regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed
         question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding E
         between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be
         questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties.
         But, where the decision is on a question law, i.e. the interpretation
         of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding
         between the same parties where the cause of action is the same,              F
         for the expression "the matter in issue" in s. I I Code of Civil
         Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e. the
         facts on which the right is claimed or. denied and the law
         applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the
         question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of G
         the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which
         is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected
         by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity
         of that order under the rule ofresjudicata, for a rule of procedure
         cannot supersede the law of the land."
                                                                                      H
      414                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
  A On the basis of above observation, it is submitted that decision between
      the parties, on the question of law, will bind the parties in subsequent
      proceedings. So far proposition of law is concerned, there would be
      no ~ispute to the same butwe don't find that there has been any decision
---   between the parties on the question of dispute in terms of sub-section 3
  B   of Section 181 of the Act. No question for interpretation of any provision
      of law is involved. We, therefore, find that the above decision would be
                                                                 .
      of no help to the respondents. A reference has also been made to 1977
      (3) SCR 428 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain particularly to the
      observation made at pages 431 and 434. On the basis of the above decision,
      it is submitted that doctrine of res judicata would be applicable even to
  C   the proceedings other than suits, as has been held in the above case that
      principle of constructive res judicata would be applicable in proceedings
      under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that
      a plea which could be raised in the earlier proceedings; if not raised by
      a party, it would not be permissible to raise the same subsequently between
  D   the same parties.

          In connection with the above arguments, it would be worthwhile to
    notice that stage for raising an objection regarding a dispute between the
    Government and the applicant arises after the application is referred to the
  E DEO by the sanctioning authority in terms of sub-section 3 of Section 181.
    So far the return of the first application is concerned, it may be noted that
    it was returned since the sanctioning authority thought it not to be
    entertainable, ·having not been accompanied by an exemption certificate
    under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Apparently, it appears
  F that the stage had not yet arrived for referring the application to the DEO
    for his objections: The competent ·authority is required to refer the
    application before sanctioning the plan. Nothing to the .contrary has been
    indicated by the res~ondents to show that despite reference of the
    application to the DEO under Sub-section JofSection 181, the DEO had
    chosen not to file any objection in respect of the dispute or the claim over
  G the land. On the basis of the above factual aspect, in our view, the question
    of failing to raise a plea in the earlier proceedings does not arise due to
    return of the first application. There is no reason to infer that the DEO had
    foregone his right to raise objection regarding the ownership of the land
    before sanction of the lay out plan. The argument therefore, raised is not
  H applicable in the set of facts of this case; Learned counsel for the appellants
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD 1•. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.]   4 J5

has, however, placed reliance upon a decision repo!J:ed in t 996 (6) sec A
424 Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors. particu-
larly to paragraph 6, which reads as under:-

               "[n view of the above ratio, it is seen that when the legislature
         has directed to act-in a pa11icular manner and the failure to act B
         results in a consequence, the question is whether the previous
         order operates as res judicata or estoppel as against the persons
         in dispute. When the previous decision was found to be erroneous
         on its fact, this Court held in the above judgment that it does not
         operate as res judicata. We respectfully follow the ratio therein.
         The principle of estoppel or res judicata does not apply where to C
         give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction
         or prohibitio~. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be
         ovderridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the
         parties ......... ".
                                                                                       D
Yet another case referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant is
reported in [1997] 9 SCC 191 Bansilal Farms v. Umarani Bose and Ors.
On the basis of the above decision, it was submitted that the State's right
would not be affected by any order or compromise by applying the
principle of constructive res judicata.
                                                                                       E
     We, however, find that facts of the case in which the above
observations have been made by the Court were slightly different. Shri
Altaf Ahmad, learned Addi. Solicitor General, has then referre;d to
"Administrative Law" by Sir William Wade, eighth edition, page 249,
relevant part of which reads as under:-                                                F
         "Like other forms ofestoppel already discussed, resjudicata plays
         a restricted role in administrative law, since it must yield to two
         fundamental principles of public law: that jurisdiction cannot be
         exceeded: and that statutory powers and duties cannot be fettered.
         Within those limits, however, it can extend to a wide variety of G
         statutory tribunals and authorities which have power to give
         binding decisions, such as ~mployment tribunals and commons
         commissioners ....... ".

        lt is, therefore, submitted that generally, role of the principle H
    416                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A of resjudicata in administrative matters is restricted, and statutory powers
    and duties administratively performed cannot be thwarted by application
    of principles of res judicata. It may be remembered that the earlier order
    returning the lay out plan was on the ground of non-fulfillment of
    requirement of filing exemption ce1tificate which the High Court in the
B   writ petition held that there was no such requirement to submit exemption
    ce1tificate under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. There was a direction to re-
    consider the matter, hence it was being scrutinized on the grounds other
    than requirements of filing of an exemption certificate. As indicated
    earlier, there is nothing to show that a reference was made to the DEO
C   before returning the application earlier. As a matter of fact, no such
    occasion would have arisen then. In this background, the DEO would
    neither be denuded of his statutory responsibility to raise objection about
    Government's claim to the land or dispute about it nor the competent
    authority was absolved of his statutory duty to refer the matter to the DEO
    before considering the question of passing of the order of sanction of the
D   plan. The return of lay out plan earlier, was in a way at the preliminary
    stage when it was found that the applicatirn did not accompany the
    necessary. documents e.g., exemption certificate. under ceiling laws, which
    was then considered to be necessary. Stage to file objection came
    later when the application may have been referred to the D.E.O. The
E   observations referred to earlier made in the Administrative Law by Wade
    are ce1tainly attracted to the facts of the case. In our view, the respondents
    just wanted to hold on by raising a flimsy and feeble plea of constructive
    res judicata which is not sustainable either on fact or in law.In the facts
    and circumstances indicated above, we, therefore, have no hesitation in
F   holding that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench fell
    into error in holding that.the objection under Sub-section 3 of Section 181
    of the Act could not be raised by the DEO by applying the doctrine of
    constructive res judicata.

          We have already found that in the facts and circumstances discussed
G above, it cannot be said that a reasonable person would not come to a
    conclusion that there is a dispute in regard to the land in question so mach
    so the respondents themselves had to move the authorities and the Court
    twice in connection thereof. Before the revenue authorities they failed
    and in the civil court some partial relief of injunction restricting to an area
H   of 2.71 acres was granted. Therefore, it cannot be said that the land was
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD "· MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.]   4\ 7

free from dispute. As a matter of fact, we have already indicated that                A
the Division Bench of the High Court itself has arrived at such a conclusion
but found erroneously that it would not be entertainable being barred by
principles of constructive res judicata.

     There also seems to be some inter se dispute with one of the parties             B
appearing in person who alleged that the writ petition was filed by third
parties claiming themselves as allottees to the extent of 19.30 gt. In fact,
it is submitted that land was given to his fore-fathers and the case of the
petitioner-respondents is false and bogus. He fmther alleges forgery on
the part of the holder of the Power of Attorney. Initially there were only            C
11 transferees which number swelled to 62. He made various allegations
of forgery etc. committed in the matter. We however, find that such
disputes are beyond the scope of the present controversy which is confined
to the question as to whether the lay out plan could have been sanctioned
or "not.
                                                                                      D
      An effort has also been made on behalf of the petitioner-respondents
about the array of the parties in the proceedings. In this connection Section
79 and Order 27 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure have a.Isa been
referred to contend that in a suit by or against the Government, Union
of India is to be impleaded as a party and not the authority or any officer.          E
The learned com.sel for the Union of India submits that the appeal has
been filed on behalf of the Union of India and the Defence Estates Officer
is appellant No. 2. It is submitted that proceedings in court were initiated
by the respondents by filing writ petitions. Proper parties should have been
impleaded by them. In the writ petition, the respondents did not implead              F
Union of India as a party, hence, it does not lie to them to raise any such
objection. Again such an objection, in any case, should have been raised
in the writ appellate court. We, however, also find that in the array of
parties in the appeal proceedings before the High Court, Union of India
is the appellant with Cantonment Board. So is the position here also, in              G
as much as the Union oflndia is also impleaded as one of the respondents
in the present proceedings. It is indit.ated that DEO has throughout been
representing the Government of India. It is submitted that no such issue
was raised earlier and the matter has been contested through out by the
DEO and the Cantonment Board, it cannot be said that Union of India H
    418                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A is not on the record as· a party; it is   also represented through counsel
    and submissions have been advanced on behalf of Union of India as well
    by Shri Anoop Choudhary, senior advocate and Shri Altaf Ahmad, Addi.
    Solicitor General of India has argued the case on behalf of the appellant.
    The Union of India supports the applicants in challenging the order of the
B   High Court. Union oflndia has also filed appeals, Civil Appeal Nos. I I 07~
    1111 of 200 I impugning the judgment of the Division Bench. We are not
    favourably inclined to entertain this technical plea for.the above reasons.

          We also find no substance in the submission made on behalf of the
    respondents that the lis is between the Cantonment Board and the
C   respondents and there is no /is between the Union. of India and the
    respondents. The Cantonment Board through one of its designated officer,
    considers and passes appropriate order on the application for sanction of
    plan. At least it shall have right to defend its orders. Under the statu~ory
    provision, the plan is not to be sanctioned in case there is a dispute between
D   the applicant and the government. Undet the statute again the matter is to
    be referred to the Defence Estates Officer to ~.>certain this fact and it is
    for him to raise objection, if any such dispute exists between the applicant
    and the Government oflndia. Therefore, it cannot be said that there would
    be no reason for these authorities to contest the matter. The interest of
E   Government of India is very much involved and it will have all the .intere~t
    to see that the plan is not sanctioned in ca$e it. has a claim. over the iand.

         While parting with the matter, we would like to clarify that the dispute
  and the orders thereon, in these proceedings, are confined only to the
  question of sanction of the plan for construction of building. We have,
F therefore, refrained from taking note of vein efforts made by learned
  counsel for the respondents to assure the Court abouHheirtitle, which, as
  observed earlier, could !lot be subject matter of such proceeding .. Any
  dispute regarding the title between the appellants and the. respondents or
  the respondents inter se or with any other party may be a subject matter.
G of any appropriate separate proceeding, which any. of the parties may ·
  initiate if advised in that regard, as that right would not be affected by
  this order.

           For the discussion held above, we find that the judgment and order
H   passed by the High Court is not sustainable.
     SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD 1·. MOHAMMED MOHIUDDIN (BRIJESH KUMAR. J.]   419
C.A.Nos. 9453-9456 of 2003 @ SLP(C) Nos.406-0912002                                   A
      After having heard the appellants and perusing the judgment im-
pugned in these appeals, we find no infirmity so as to call for any
interference with the order passed. The High Court rightly held if the
petitioner society wants to set up title, it may institute a separate suit for B
such a relief. The High Court rightly found that the1e wa~ no occasion
to reject the plaint or to claim any declaration to the effect that the
Cantonment Board is not the owner ofthe1 ~uit propertie;;. The appeals have
no merit.

     In the result, the appeals filed by the s.ecunderabad Cantonment C
Board (i.e. Civil Appeals No.6877-6~81/2000 and C.A.No.6604/2001) and
the Union oflndia (i.e. Civil Appeals No.1107-1111/2001) are allowed and
the impugned judgments/orders passed by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh are set aside.
                                                                                      D
C.A.No. 75312001 and C.A.No.637612001

     Since the appeals filed by the Secunderabad Cantonment Board and
the Union of India have been allowed setting aside the impugned judg-
ments/orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh,, no further order is
required to be passed in these appeals and they stand finally disposed of E
in view of the aforesaid judgment.

C.A. Nos. 9453-9456/2003 @ SLP (C) Nos.406-09102

    In view of the position aforesaid and discussion held earlier, we find            F
no merit in the appeals and the same are dismissed.

     Costs easy.

R.K.S.                                                     Appeals disposed of