Holding

The High Court erred in interfering with the arbitral tribunal's order; the tribunal had already given full opportunity for cross‑examination, and the High Court's direction is set aside.

Summary

Serosoft Solutions and Dexter Capital Advisors were in arbitration over unpaid fees. During the arbitration, the respondent sought additional time to cross‑examine the appellant's witness RW‑1, which the arbitral tribunal rejected, holding that sufficient opportunity had already been given. The respondent appealed to the High Court under Article 227, and the High Court granted the additional cross‑examination despite the tribunal's order. The appellant challenged this interference before the Supreme Court, arguing that the tribunal had complied with Section 18 and the time‑limit provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and that judicial restraint precludes such interference unless the tribunal's order is perverse. The Supreme Court examined the statutory duty of equal treatment, the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction, and the jurisprudential guidelines for interference. It found no perversity in the tribunal's decision and held that the High Court had no justification to intervene. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeals, directing the tribunal to resume and conclude the proceedings promptly.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court correctly exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in granting further cross‑examination despite the arbitral tribunal's rejection.
Whether the arbitral tribunal had already provided full and sufficient opportunity for cross‑examination in compliance with Section 18 and Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Whether judicial interference is permissible only when the arbitral tribunal's order is perverse or in cases of bad faith, as per established jurisprudence.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 18, s. 29A
Constitution of Indias. Article 227

Subjects

Article 227 of ConstitutionSection 18 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Section 29A of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Supervisory jurisdictionCross‑examinationJudicial restraintArbitral tribunal discretion

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 151 : 2025 INSC 26

Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
v.
Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 51-52 of 2025)
03 January 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court has correctly exercised its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 in granting the respondent/claimant
one more opportunity to cross-examine appellant/respondent’s
witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting such a prayer.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.227 – Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 – ss.18, 29A – The respondent/claimant
cross-examined RW-1 – The unrestrained cross-examination of
RW-1 by the respondent/claimant already exceeded 12 hours,
however, the respondent/claimant was unsatisfied and sought
more opportunity to cross-examine – Arbitral Tribunal rejected
such prayer – However, the High Court granted further
opportunity to the respondent/claimant to cross-examine
RW-1 – Correctness:
Held: It is evident that the cross-examination of the appellant/
respondent’s witness RW-1 commenced on 09.12.2023 when the
respondent/claimant’s counsel asked 9 questions on that very day
and the cross was adjourned for 10.02.2024 – On 10.02.2024,
the record shows that the cross-examination commenced at 11
am and concluded by 7 pm during which time the respondent/
claimant’s counsel asked as many as 104 questions to the said
witness – After a long lapse of almost 8 months, during which
period the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was exhausted, the
cross-examination commenced on 01.10.2024 – Even on that
day the cross-examination was commenced at 5.35 pm and
concluded at 7.40 pm, which is more than two hours – The Arbitral
Tribunal seems to have given full opportunity to all parties, which
is amply evident from the record – There is statutory obligation,
* Author
152 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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which is imposed on the judicial authorities – That is the statutory
incorporation of judicial restraint in interfering with matters governed
under Part I of the Act relating to arbitration agreement, composition
and jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal, coupled with the conduct of
the proceedings and making, challenge and enforcement of the
award – In the instant case, the High Court should have restrained
itself from interfering – The High Court has not indicated under what
circumstances the order passed by the Tribunal was perverse –
There is no justification in the order passed by the High Court in
interfering with the directions of the Arbitral Tribunal holding that
full and sufficient opportunity to cross-examine RW-1 has already
been given and no further extension of time is warranted – For the
reasons stated, the order passed by the High Court is set aside.
[Paras 10, 12, 13, 14, 17]

Case Law Cited
Kelvin Air Conditioning and Ventilation System Pvt. Ltd. v. Triumph
Reality Pvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC Online Del 7137 – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

List of Keywords
Article 227 of Constitution; Section 29A of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996; Supervisory jurisdiction; Cross-examination;
More opportunity to cross-examine; Statutory obligation; Judicial
restraint.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 51-52 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.10.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CMM No. 3711 of 2024 and CMA No.
63047 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Jayant Mehta, Sr. Adv., M/s. Plr Chambers And Co., Suhaan
Mukerji, Harsh Gursahani, Adarsh Kumar, Sayandeep Pahari,
Tanmay Sinha, Ms. Jasleen Virk, Advs. for the Appellant.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 153

Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v.
Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd.

M.A. Niyazi, Advait Ghosh, Dawneesh Shaktivats, Tamjeed Ahmad,
Ms. Mrinal, F.A. Khan, Ms. Anamika Ghai Niyazi, Ms. Kirti Bhardwaj,
Ms. Nehmat Sethi, Arqam Ali, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant and the respondent are parties in a pending arbitration.
The question for consideration is whether the High Court has correctly
exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in granting
the respondent/claimant one more opportunity to cross- examine
appellant/respondent’s witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting
such a prayer.
3. The brief facts leading to the present appeals are as follows. The
appellant/respondent, a startup company providing educational
software and related services, and the respondent/claimant, a provider
of capital advisory services to various companies, entered into a
Client Service Agreement. Under this agreement, the respondent/
claimant was to provide advisory services to the appellant/respondent.
Disputes arose between the parties with respect to non-payment of
fee for the services rendered by respondent/claimant to appellant/
respondent company,prompting respondent/claimant to invoke dispute
resolution mechanism through arbitration.
4. Following the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, proceedings
commenced, and parties submitted their respective statements of
claim and defence. The Tribunal, by its order dated 06.09.2023
formulated the specific issues for consideration that needed to be
addressed,by the parties to proceedings. Following the said order,
respondent/claimant side produced two witnesses CW-1 and CW-2.
The counsel for the appellant/respondent cross-examined CW-1 on
17.11.2023 and asked about 22 questions on that day. However,
due to time constraints, the cross-examination was deferred and
rescheduled for 21.11.2023. On that date, the cross-examination of
CW-1 was completed. On that very day cross of CW-2 was taken
up and completed over the course of two sessions.
154 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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5. After the cross-examination of respondent/claimant’s witnesses got
concluded, cross-examination of appellant/respondent’s witness
RW-1 commenced. This is where the trouble began.
6. On 09.12.2023 a total of 9 questions were put to RW-1, as is evident
from the record of proceedings of the Tribunal. The cross-examination
of RW-1 was then deferred to 10.02.2024.
6.1 On 10.02.2024, though the cross commenced at 11 am and
continued till 07:00 p.m.,respondent/claimant’s counsel sought
permission of the Tribunal to defer the cross-examination of
RW-1 to some other day and sought an additional hour for
completing the cross-examination of RW-1. By its order dated
10.02.2024 the Tribunal acceded to respondent/claimant’s
request for additional one hour of cross-examination. The
Tribunal’s order notes that the case was reluctantly adjourned
to 06.04.2024 for conclusion of the cross.
7. It is alleged that, due to various applications for discoveries and
interrogatories filed by the respondent/claimant, the cross-examination
of RW-1 was cancelled on 06.04.2024. The proceedings kept on
being delayed and the parties consensually extended the mandate
of the Tribunal by 6 months which was due to expire on 16.05.2024
as per Section 29A of the Act. Ultimately, the proceedings resumed
with cross-examination of RW-1 on 01.10.2024, where a total 28
questions were put to him. The Tribunal in the record of proceedings
noted that the cross-examination of RW-1 stands concluded and
accordingly, the witness was discharged.
8. After two days, i.e. on 03.10.2024, respondent/claimant moved an
Interlocutory Application before the Tribunal seeking extension of
time for cross-examination of RW-1. Tribunal heard the parties on
the said application and by its order dated 09.10.2024 noted that
arbitral proceedings were time bound and in fact the extended
mandate was also to expire soon. The Tribunal also noted that despite
exhausting twice the allotted time for cross-examination of RW-1, the
respondent/claimant’s approach reflected lack of preparedness and a
non-serious attitude. With this view of the matter the Tribunal rejected
the application and directed that final arguments should conclude
by November 2024, so that there is sufficient time for preparation
and making of the award. Respondent/claimant challenged the
above referred order of the Arbitral Tribunal by filing a petition
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 155

Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v.
Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd.

under Article 227 of the Constitution and sought a direction to the
Tribunal for providing further opportunity to cross-examine RW-1.
By the order impugned before us the High Court noted that judicial
interference in such type of matter was least warranted, but came
to the conclusion that in view of the exceptional circumstances
there can be a direction to the Tribunal to grant further opportunity
to the respondent/claimant to cross-examine RW-1 on the date and
time fixed by the Tribunal. Questioning the above referred order the
appellant/respondent is before us.
9. Heard learned counsel for both the parties.
10. We may recapitulate that the Section 11 application was allowed
by the High Court on 08.05.2023 leading to the constitution of the
Tribunal which held the first hearing on 19.05.2023. It is evident
that the cross-examination of the appellant/respondent’s witness
RW-1 commenced on 09.12.2023 when the respondent/claimant’s
counsel asked 9 questions on that very day and the cross was
adjourned for 10.02.2024. On 10.02.2024, the record shows that the
cross-examination commenced at 11 am and concluded by 7 pm
during which time the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked as many
as 104 questions to the said witness. After a long lapse of almost
8 months, during which period the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
was exhausted,the cross-examination commenced on 01.10.2024.
Even on that day the cross-examination was commenced at 5.35
pm and concluded at 7.40 pm, which is more than two hours.
11. It is in the above referred background that the legality and the
propriety of the respondent/claimant’s application for further time to
cross-examine RW-1 was to be considered by the Arbitral Tribunal.
12. The first principle that governs ‘conduct of arbitral proceedings’
under Chapter V of the Act is the obligation of equal treatment of
parties. Under Section 18 of the Act, it is the statutory duty of the
Arbitral Tribunal to ensure that the parties are treated with equality
and each party is given full opportunity to present its case. At
the same time, there is yet another statutory obligation, which is
imposed on the judicial authorities. That is the statutory incorporation
of judicial restraint in interfering with matters governed under
Part I of the Act relating to arbitration agreement, composition and
jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal, coupled with the conduct of the
proceedings and making, challenge and enforcement of the award.
156 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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This objection of restraint on the judicial authority is overriding and
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force.
13. Having looked into the matter, we are of the opinion that the Arbitral
Tribunal seems to have given full opportunity to all parties, which is
amply evident from the record. On the other hand, the unrestrained
cross-examination of RW-1 by the respondent/claimant has already
exceeded 12 hours, but the respondent/claimant does not seem to
be satisfied with it.
14. In any event of the matter when the Arbitral Tribunal by its order
dated 09.10.2024 held -‘that far and no further’, to the respondent/
claimant’s endeavour to cross-examine RW-1, the High Court
should have restrained itself from interfering. In order to justify its
interference and extension of time, the High Court has referred to
and relied on a judgment of the same Court1. Certain conditions for
exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 are mentioned in the
judgment. Conditions (v) and (vi) of the said judgment could have
provided sufficient guidance for the High Court to consider whether
interference is warranted or not. The relevant portion of the said
order is as under:-
“(v) Interference is permissible only if the order is completely
perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.
(vi) High Courts ought to discourage litigation which
necessarily interfere with the arbitral process.
(vii) Excessive judicial interference in the arbitral process
is not encouraged.
(viii) It is prudent not to exercise jurisdiction under Articles
226/227.
(ix) The power should be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity’
or if there is ‘bad faith’ which is shown.
(x) Efficiency of the arbitral process ought not to be allowed
to diminish and hence interdicting the arbitral process
should be completely avoided.”

1 Kelvin Air Conditioning and Ventilation System Pvt. Ltd. v. Triumph Reality Pvt. Ltd.; 2024 SCC Online
Del 7137.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 157

Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v.
Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd.

15. It is evident from the above that even as per the quote hereinabove
interference under Article 226/227 is ‘permissible only if the order is
completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.’
Condition (vi) to (x) underscores the reason why High Courts ought
not to interfere with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunals for more
than one reason.
16. We looked into the other parts to see if the High Court has in fact
found any perversity in the decision of the Tribunal. We found none.
The High Court has not bothered to indicate under what circumstances
the order passed by the Tribunal is perverse. All that the High
Court has said is that cross-examination is one of the most valuable
and effective means of discovering the truth. This is a normative
statement, and nobody disputes the said principle. The only enquiry
required was whether there is denial of opportunity for an effective
cross-examination of the witness. There is absolutely no discretion
about this aspect of the matter, except to say that in the facts and
circumstances of the case and as an exceptional circumstance as
well, the request of the respondent/claimant is excessive.
17. Having considered the matter in detail, we find no justification in the
order passed by the High Court in interfering with the directions of the
Arbitral Tribunal holding that full and sufficient opportunity to cross-
examine RW-1 has already been given and no further extension of
time is warranted. For the reasons stated, we allow the appeals and
set aside the orders passed by the High Court in CM(M) 3711/2004
and CM Appl. 63047/2024 dated 25.10.2024.
18. In the facts and circumstances, we further direct that the Arbitral
Tribunal shall resume the proceedings and conclude the same as
expeditiously as possible.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan