SHAIL KUMARIversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH

                 [2025] 8 S.C.R. 599 : 2025 INSC 936

                               Shail Kumari
                                     v.
                           State of Chhattisgarh
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 2189 of 2017)
                                06 August 2025
           [B.R. Gavai,* CJI and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the conviction, as recorded by the trial Court and affirmed
       by the High Court was totally based on conjectures and surmises;
       whether the conviction of the appellant u/s.302 IPC is sustainable
       in law.

                                   Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – Allegation against the
       appellant-accused that she took her children to a pond/lake
       and drowned them – Trial Court convicted accused u/s.302 of
       IPC solely on the basis of evidence of PW-2 – The High Court
       upheld the conviction – Correctness:
       Held: The conviction in the present case could be sustainable only if
       the prosecution is in a position to prove the case beyond reasonable
       doubt and also establish a chain of events which is so connected
       to each other that it leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of
       the accused – The conviction is based solely on the evidence of
       PW-2 – The perusal of the cross-examination of PW-2 would reveal
       that he has fully improved his case in his examination-in-chief – He
       has narrated what does not find place in his statement u/s.161,
       CrPC – As such his evidence is totally contradictory and therefore
       totally unworthy – Apart from the testimony of PW-2, there is nothing
       to connect the present appellant with the crime in question – The
       prosecution has not even examined the Rickshaw Puller who was
       stated to have seen the appellant going towards the Pujari Talab
       and the children floating in the lake – The testimony of PW-2 being
       unreliable, at the most, can be treated as hearsay evidence – This
       Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction, as recorded
       by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is totally based
       on conjectures and surmises – The conviction of the appellant is
       not sustainable in law. [Paras 7, 8, 12, 13, 14]

* Author
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       Evidence – Law on conviction in the case of circumstantial
       evidence – Discussed. [Paras 6 and 7]

                                  Case Law Cited
       Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR
       88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [1957]
       1 SCR 981 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13 – relied on.

                                   List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                              List of Keywords
       Circumstantial evidence; Chain of events; Improving
       examination-in-chief; Conviction on the basis of circumstantial
       evidence; Conjectures and surmises; Murder.

                             Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       2189 of 2017
       From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2010 of the High Court
       of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 713 of 2004

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Mrs. Nanita Sharma.
       Advs. for the Respondent:
       Prashant Singh, Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Ambuj Swaroop, Shivam
       Ganeshiya, Kapil Katare, Ms. Rajnandani Kumari.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Judgment

       B.R. Gavai, CJI.

       FACTUAL ASPECT
1.     The present appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
       8th September 2010, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         601

                    Shail Kumari v. State of Chhattisgarh


     of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (hereinafter referred to as “the High
     Court”) in Criminal Appeal No. 713 of 2004, wherein the Division
     Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein - Shail
     Kumari. By the said judgment and order, the High Court upheld
     the judgment and order dated 18 th June 2004 rendered by the
     2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (hereinafter referred to as “the
     Trial Court”) in Sessions Trial No. 286 of 2003 convicting the appellant
     for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
     Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and sentencing her to
     undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.
2.   Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are as under:
     2.1 The case of the prosecution is that on 11th October 2003, one
         Santosh Kumar Pandey (PW-2), who was an owner of Beetel
         Kiosk shop, saw the appellant with her two children (son aged – 2
         years and daughter aged – 4 months) going towards Pujari
         Talab (a water body situated near the Beetel Kiosk shop of
         PW-2). He observed that the appellant was taking the kids
         in a disordered condition and grew suspicious. He asked a
         nearby Rickshaw Puller to go and see where the appellant
         was going. After five to seven minutes, the Rickshaw Puller
         came back and stated that two children were floating in the
         water body. Thereafter, PW-2 saw the appellant going towards
         the railway tracks. PW-2 then sat on a motorbike driven
         by someone else coming from the other side of the water
         body and he asked the rider to turn around and go towards
         the train tracks. PW-2 then saw a train coming towards the
         appellant but somehow, he managed to drag her away from
         the train tracks.
     2.2 On being asked by PW-2 the reason for killing her children, the
         appellant replied that she had been fighting with her husband.
         PW-2 informed the Police about the incident and the Dehati
         merg intimation was lodged which was signed by PW-2. Then
         the First Information Report was lodged.
     2.3 The dead bodies of the victims were sent for post-mortem. The
         post-mortem was conducted by Dr. P. Akhtar (PW-6) and the
         cause of death for both of the victims was found to be asphyxia
         due to drowning.
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       2.4 The statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section
           161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
           referred to as “Cr.P.C”). After completion of the investigation,
           Charge Sheet was filed against the appellant before the Court
           of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, who then, committed
           the case to the trial court.
       2.5 Nine witnesses were examined during the trial and the
           appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
           The appellant, in her statement, denied the circumstances
           appearing against her. She further stated that she had been
           in a state of tension, because her husband - Kanhaiya Lal
           Kharre had performed a second marriage. She lastly stated
           that she was innocent and that she had been falsely implicated
           in the case.
       2.6 At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court vide its judgment
           and order dated 18th June 2004 convicted the present appellant
           for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. On
           the same day, in a separate hearing, the Trial Court sentenced
           the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.
       2.7 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appellant preferred a
           criminal appeal before the High Court challenging the judgment
           and order of conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial
           Court. The High Court vide the impugned judgment and order
           dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence
           awarded by the Trial Court.
       2.8 Being aggrieved thereby, a Special Leave Petition was filed
           before this Court on 21st July 2017. This Court, vide Order dated
           15th December 2017 condoned the delay and granted leave in
           the matter. The appellant was also directed to be released on
           interim bail on the conditions which may be imposed by the
           Trial Court.

       SUBMISSIONS
3.     We have heard Smt. Nanita Sharma, learned counsel appearing on
       behalf of the appellant and Shri Prashant Singh, learned counsel
       appearing on behalf of the respondent - State.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                             603

                        Shail Kumari v. State of Chhattisgarh


4.    Smt. Nanita Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
      submitted that the present case is a case of no evidence. The High
      Court, only on the basis of conjectures and surmises, has convicted
      the appellant. It is, therefore, submitted that the present appeal
      deserves to be allowed and the appellant be acquitted of the charges.
5.    Per contra, Shri Prashant Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf
      of the respondent would submit that no perversity could be noticed
      in the concurrent findings of facts, so as to warrant interference of
      this Court. It is submitted that both the Courts below, upon correct
      appreciation of evidence, have found that it is the appellant alone who
      is responsible for committing the crime in question. It is, therefore,
      submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

      DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
6.    Indisputably, the present case rests on circumstantial evidence. The
      law on conviction in the case of circumstantial evidence has been
      very well crystallized by this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand
      Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1. It will be relevant to refer to the
      observations made by this Court in the aforesaid case:
             “151. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand
             or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength
             from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law and
             no decision has taken a contrary view. What some cases
             have held is only this: where various links in a chain are in
             themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence
             may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.
             In other words, before using the additional link it must be
             proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do
             not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where
             there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case,
             the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence
             or a plea which is not accepted by a court.
             152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the
             High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the


1    (1984) 4 SCC 116
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       nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal
       case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The
       most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is
       Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 :
       AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129].
       This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this
       Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for
       instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar
       Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and
       Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR
       1972 SC 656] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan,
       J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 :
       AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
            “It is well to remember that in cases where
            the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
            circumstances from which the conclusion of
            guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
            be fully established, and all the facts so
            established should be consistent only with the
            hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
            the circumstances should be of a conclusive
            nature and tendency and they should be such
            as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
            proposed to be proved. In other words, there
            must be a chain of evidence so far complete
            as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
            conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
            accused and it must be such as to show that
            within all human probability the act must have
            been done by the accused.”
       153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
       following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
       an accused can be said to be fully established:
            (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
            of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
       It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
       circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                       605

                    Shail Kumari v. State of Chhattisgarh


           be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
           legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
           or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
           Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
           793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
           the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
           (Cri) p. 1047]
                “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
                accused must be and not merely may be guilty
                before a court can convict and the mental
                distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
                long and divides vague conjectures from sure
                conclusions.”
                (2) the facts so established should be consistent
                only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
                accused, that is to say, they should not be
                explainable on any other hypothesis except that
                the accused is guilty,
                (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
                nature and tendency,
                (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
                except the one to be proved, and
                (5) there must be a chain of evidence so
                complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
                for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
                of the accused and must show that in all human
                probability the act must have been done by the
                accused.
           154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
           constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
           on circumstantial evidence.”
7.   The law laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has been
     consistently followed by this Court in a catena of judgments. In
     that view of the matter, the conviction in the present case could be
     sustainable only if the prosecution is in a position to prove the case
     beyond reasonable doubt and also establish a chain of events which
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       is so connected to each other that it leads to no other conclusion
       than the guilt of the accused.
8.     The perusal of both the impugned judgments and orders passed by
       the High Court as well as the Trial Court would reveal that though the
       prosecution has examined nine witnesses, the conviction is based
       solely on the evidence of PW-2.
9.     The perusal of the testimony of PW-2 would reveal that on the
       day of the incident, after opening his shop, he went to urinate, and
       while returning from there, he saw that accused was abnormally
       going towards the Pujari Talab, she was keeping one child in her
       hands and another child was walking with her. He stated that Pujari
       Talab is situated at a distance of 10 feet away from his shop. He
       stated that in the meantime, he directed a nearby Rickshaw Puller
       to watch where she was going. He further stated that after one and
       half hour, the appellant was going alone behind an STD nearby.
       Rickshaw Puller told him that woman was going empty handed. He
       asked the Rickshaw Puller where the child was. He said that he
       didn’t know, she took them to pond. He then asked the Rickshaw
       Puller to go to the pond. After 5-7 minutes, he returned and told
       him that both the children were floating in the water. Later on, he
       stated that he saw that the accused was going to lie on the railway
       track. One Hero Honda motorbike was coming from the other side
       of the pond. He asked the rider to turn around and he went to the
       railway track. By the time train had come near, he dragged the
       accused away from railway track by holding her waist. He stated
       that he then brought her to his STD and asked her as to why she
       killed her children to which she replied that she had a fight with
       her husband.
10. From the cross-examination of this witness, it would reveal that his
    statement in the examination-in-chief is a complete improvement
    than what was stated by him in his police statement. Whatever he
    narrated before the Court does not find place in his police statement.
11. This Court in the case of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras2
    held thus:



2    AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                              607

                    Shail Kumari v. State of Chhattisgarh


           “11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation
           in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the
           court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too
           broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act,
           has categorically laid it down that “no particular number
           of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof
           of any fact”. The legislature determined, as long ago as
           1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and
           cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof
           of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In
           England, both before and after the passing of the Indian
           Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes
           as set out in Sarkar’s Law of Evidence — 9th Edn., at pp.
           1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of
           a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted
           on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule
           recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The section
           enshrines the well recognized maxim that “Evidence has
           to be weighed and not counted”. Our Legislature has given
           statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice
           may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses
           were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime
           has been committed in the presence of only one witness,
           leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon
           occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely
           on circumstantial evidence. If the legislature were to insist
           upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of
           a single witness only could be available in proof of the
           crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion
           of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus
           must depend upon the circumstances of each case and
           the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose
           testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a
           testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there
           is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused
           person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused
           person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness,
           the innocence of an accused person may be established
           on the testimony of a single witness, even though a
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                     Supreme Court Reports


       considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to
       testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence,
       in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule
       of law that the court is concerned with the quality and
       not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for
       proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral
       testimony in this context may be classified into three
       categories, namely:
            (1) Wholly reliable.
            (2) Wholly unreliable.
            (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
       12. In the first category of proof, the court should
       have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either
       way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony
       of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach
       or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or
       subornation. In the second category, the court equally
       has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is
       in the third category of cases, that the court has to
       be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in
       material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or
       circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on
       plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the
       oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist
       on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be
       indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations
       may arise and do arise where only a single person is
       available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact.
       The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony
       and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free
       from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to
       suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony.
       The law reports contain many precedents where the court
       had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single
       witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions
       to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or
       of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                           609

                    Shail Kumari v. State of Chhattisgarh


           which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect,
           being that of a participator in crime. But, where there
           are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes
           the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the
           testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have
           therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony
           of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in
           support of the prosecution.”
                                                (emphasis supplied)

12. This Court in Vadivelu Thevar (supra) has classified the witnesses
    into three types: (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii)
    neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. It has been held that in
    the first category of cases, there is no difficulty inasmuch as if the
    testimony of such witness is found to be fully reliable, it may convict
    or may acquit on the basis of his statement. Even in the second
    category cases, there is no difficulty that if evidence of such a witness
    is found to be wholly unreliable, the testimony must be discarded.
    The difficulty arises only in the case of third type of witnesses, where
    the Court is required to separate the chaff from grain to arrive at
    a conclusion. The perusal of the cross-examination of PW-2 would
    reveal that he has fully improved his case in his examination-in-chief.
    He has narrated what does not find place in his statement under
    Section 161, Cr.P.C. As such, his evidence is totally contradictory
    and therefore totally unworthy.
13. Apart from the testimony of PW-2, there is nothing to connect the
    present appellant with the crime in question. The prosecution has
    not even examined the Rickshaw Puller who was stated to have
    seen the appellant going towards the Pujari Talab and the children
    floating in the lake. The testimony of PW-2 being unreliable, at the
    most, can be treated as hearsay evidence.
14. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the
    conviction, as recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High
    Court is totally based on conjectures and surmises. We are of the
    considered view that the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable
    in law at all.
15. In the result, we pass the following order:
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       i.      The present appeal is allowed;
       ii.     The impugned judgment and order dated 8th September 2010,
               passed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 713 of 2004
               and the judgment and order dated 18th June 2004 passed by
               the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 286 of 2003 are hereby
               quashed and set aside; and
       iii.    The appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against
               her and is directed to be released forthwith, if her detention is
               not required in any other case.
16. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan