Supreme Court of India
SHANKARLAL NADANIversusSOHANLAL JAIN
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 420
- Decided
- 12 April 2022
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- HEMANT GUPTA
Holding
A decree passed by a civil court in a suit filed before the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 became applicable remains valid and executable; the Act does not retrospectively oust civil‑court jurisdiction for such suits.
Summary
The appellant, a tenant, sought possession of a shop owned by the respondent. A civil suit for possession was filed in 2013, before the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (the Act) applied to the area. During the suit, the State Government notified that the Act would become effective on 11 May 2015, and the civil court passed a decree for possession on 28 May 2015, after the Act’s applicability. The Supreme Court examined whether the Act barred the civil court from passing or executing a decree after it became applicable, and whether the Act had retrospective effect. It held that the law applicable at the time of filing governs the suit, the Act is not retrospective, and a decree passed by a civil court in a suit instituted before the Act’s applicability remains valid and executable. Consequently, the decree was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 bars civil courts from hearing landlord‑tenant disputes after its applicability to the premises.
- Whether a decree for possession passed by a civil court after the Act became applicable is valid and enforceable when the suit was filed before the Act’s applicability.
- Whether the Act has retrospective effect on pending suits and decrees.
Legislation cited
- Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001s. 1(2), s. 18, s. 32
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106
Subjects
rent controlcivil suitjurisdictionrent tribunalretrospective legislationpossession decreeTransfer of Property ActRajasthan Rent Control Act
Judgment
[2022] 13 S.C.R. 841 841
SHANKARLAL NADANI A
v.
SOHANLAL JAIN
(Civil Appeal No. 2816 of 2022)
APRIL 12, 2022 B
[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 – Suit for Possession –
Rent Tribunal’s Jurisdiction after the applicability of Act – Validity
of decree passed by the Civil Court – The appellant’s father was the
C
tenant of the shop since 1982, whose owner was the father of the
respondent – After the death of the appellant’s father, the shop was
continuing for monthly tenancy of the appellant – The premises in
question was not in the urban area when the suit for possession
was filed on 18.04.2013 – During the pendency of the suit, the
State Government issued a notification extending the provisions of D
the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 w.e.f. 11.5.2015 – The Civil
Court passed the decree for possession on 28.05.2015 against the
appellants even though the Act became applicable to the area in
question w.e.f. 11.5.2015 – The High Court on appeal being filed,
held that the decree in civil suit could be passed after the applicability
E
of the Act to the area in question and dismissed the appeal – On
appeal, held: The Act has come into force in respect of the premises
in question on 11.5.2015 i.e., after the civil suit was filed, therefore,
the decree could validly be passed and executed – After the
applicability of the Act to the area in question, the landlord and
tenant dispute can be raised only before the Rent Tribunal but not F
before the civil court – However, a suit filed before the civil court
prior to the applicability of the Act has to be decided by the civil
court – A decree passed by the civil court is valid and executable
which is not interdicted by the applicability of the Act to the area in
question – The Act is applicable to the area in question from the
G
date the notification came into force and it does not bar the decree
of the civil court or the pendency of such civil suit – One of the
principles is that the rights of the parties have to be determined on
the date when lis commences i.e., on the date of filing of the suit –
The plaintiff is entitled to decree on that day when he initiated the
proceedings, therefore, rights of the parties have to be examined as H
841
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A on the said day – No error in the order passed by the High Court –
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sec. 106.
Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge & Ors.
(1992) 1 SCC 751 : [1992] 1 SCR 349; Shri Kishan
& Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 710 :
B [1998] 1 SCR 830 ; Mansoor Khan v. Motiram
Harebhan Kharat & Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 462 : [2002] 2
SCR 594 - relied on.
K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal v. Shri Pukhraj Banthiya
2017 SCC OnLine Raj 4178; Om Prakash Gupta v.
C DIG Vijendrapal Gupta (1982) 2 SCC 61 : [1982] 3
SCR 491; Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera
(1984) 3 SCC 352:[1984] 2 SCR 333; Nand Kishore
Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi (1987) 4 SCC 382 :
[1988] 1 SCR 158; Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra
(1980) 1 SCC 1 : [1980] 2 SCR 141; Atma Ram Mittal
D v. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 : [1988] 2
Suppl. SCR 528; Rajender Bansal & Ors. v. Bhuru
(Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. (2017) 4
SCC 202 : [2016] 9 SCR 800; Shree Chamundi Mopeds
Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association CSI
E Cinod Secretariat, Madras (1992) 3 SCC 1 : [1992]
2 SCR 999 ; Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik & Anr.
v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge & Ors. 1989 Supp
(2) SCC 627: [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 ; Dilip v. Mohd.
Azizul Haq & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 607 : [2000] 2 SCR
280; Subhash Chander & Ors. v. Bharat Petroleum
F Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) & Anr. 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 98; ECGC Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV21 2022
SCC OnLine SC 184; Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Choudhry & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 540 : [1957] 0 SCR
488; Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of
G Sales Tax, M.P., Nagpur AIR 967 SC 344; Hardeodas
Jagannath v. The State of Assam AIR 1970 SC 724 :
[1969] 2 SCR 261 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1982] 3 SCR 491 referred to Para 11
H
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 843
[1984] 2 SCR 333 referred to Para 11 A
[1988] 1 SCR 158 referred to Para 12
[1992] 1 SCR 349 relied on Para 13
[1980] 2 SCR 141 referred to Para 14
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 528 referred to Para 16 B
[1998] 1 SCR 830 relied on Para 17
[2002] 2 SCR 594 relied on Para 19
[2016] 9 SCR 800 referred to Para 20
C
[1992] 2 SCR 999 referred to Para 22
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 23
[2000] 2 SCR 280 referred to Para 24
[1957] 0 SCR 488 referred to Para 29
D
[1967] SCR 344 referred to Para 29
[1969] 2 SCR 261 referred to Para 29
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2816
of 2022.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.119
of 2021.
With
Civil Appeal No.2817 of 2022 F
Gopal Shankarnarayan, Sr. Adv., Deepak Prakash, Ms. Divyangna
Malik, Vishal Somany, Ms. Vishnu Priya, Subhash Choudhary, Ms. Tanya
Srivastava, Nachiketa Vajpayee, Advs. for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. This judgment shall dispose of two appeals arising out of
judgment dated 16.12.2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature of
Rajasthan, Jodhpur whereby the tenant’s revision petition against the
decree for possession was dismissed.
H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A 2. For the sake of convenience, the facts in Civil Appeal No. 2816
of 2022 (Shankarlal Nadani v. Sohanlal Jain) are mentioned
hereinafter.
3. The appellant’s father was the tenant of Shop No. 4 situated at
Jain Katla, Bikaner Road, Suratgarh since 1982, whose owner was the
B father of the respondent herein at that time. The premises were let out
on lease for monthly rent of Rs.583.33. After the death of the appellant’s
father, the shop was continuing for monthly tenancy of the appellant.
The premises in question was not in the urban area when the suit for
possession was filed on 18.4.2013 after serving a notice of termination
of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 1.
C During the pendency of the suit, the State Government issued a
notification on 11.7.2014 extending the provisions of the Rajasthan Rent
Control Act, 20012 w.e.f. 11.5.2015.
4. The Civil Court passed the decree for possession against the
appellants on 28.5.2015 even though the Act became applicable to the
D area in question w.e.f. 11.5.2015. Aggrieved against the said judgment
and decree, the appellants filed first appeal before the Additional District
Judge, Suratgarh which was dismissed on 5.10.2021. In the second appeal
before the High Court, the appellants relied on the Division Bench
judgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported as K. Ramnarayan
E Khandelwal v. ShriPukhraj Banthiya3 wherein it has been held that
the decree in civil suit could not be passed after the applicability of the
Act to the area in question. The High Court in the impugned judgment
found that such judgment has been stayed by this Court in Special Leave
Petition, therefore, the judgment is not binding. In view of the said fact,
the High Court held that the decree in civil suit could be passed as the
F same view was adopted by another co-ordinate Bench of the High Court
in another case4 and consequently, dismissed the appeals filed by the
appellants.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the Special Leave
Petition arising out of the Division Bench judgment of the Rajasthan
G High Court in K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal and other similar cases
are pending final disposal before this Court and that, therefore, the present
1
For short, the ‘TP Act’
2
For short, the ‘Act’
3
2017 SCC OnLine Raj 4178
4
H Mohd. Rafiq v. Hanuman Sahai & Ors. (SBCWP No. 16681 of 2019)
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 845
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
appeals should also be heard along with the said matters. But we do not A
think so. Though, ideally all cases in which the same or similar questions
are pending, are taken up together, but there is no bar for us to deal with
the matters that come up before us. Once the question of law is answered
in one matter, all other matters, pending at various stages, will follow
suit. In any case, we find that the interest of the appellants is materially
B
different from the interest of the petitioners in the Special Leave
Petition(s) which are pending. In the present case, the appellants are
tenants whose interest is in continuing to be in possession whereas the
petition(s) pending before this Court are preferred on behalf of the
landlord. We have heard Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellants assisted by Mr. Deepak Prakash, C
learned Advocate on Record on the legal question as to whether the
decree passed by the civil court after the Act is made applicable to the
area in question can be executed.
6. The Act was applicable in the first instance to such of the
municipal areas which were comprising of the District Headquarters in D
the State and later on to such of the other municipal areas having a
population exceeding fifty thousand as per 1991 census as the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify from
time to time as per Section 1(2) of the Act. Section 18 of the Act deals
with jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal whereas Section 32 repeals the
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The E
relevant provisions from the Act read thus:
“1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act
may be called the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001.
(2) It shall extend in first instance to such of the municipal areas F
which are comprising the District Headquarters in the State and
later on to such of the other municipal areas having a population
exceeding fifty thousand as per 1991 Census as the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify
from time to time.
G
xx xx xx
18. Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal.—(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in
the areas to which this Act extends, only the Rent Tribunal and no
civil court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions
H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A relating to disputes between landlord and tenant and matters
connected therewith and ancillary thereto, filed under the provisions
of this Act:
Provided that Rent Tribunal shall, in deciding such
petitions to which provisions contained in Chapters II and III of
B this Act do not apply, have due regard to the provisions of Transfer
of Properties Act, 1882 (Act 4 of 1882), the Contract Act, 1872
(Act 9 of 1872), or any other substantive law applicable to such
matter in the same manner in which such law would have been
applied had the dispute been brought before a civil court by way
of suit…
C
xx xx xx
32. Repeal and Savings.—The Rajasthan Premises (Control of
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act, 1950 (Act 17 of 1950) shall
stand repealed with effect from the date notified under sub-section
(3) of Section 11 of this Act.
D
(2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect—
(a) anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so
repealed; or
(b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or
E incurred under the enactment so repealed; or
(c) any fine, penalty or punishment incurred or suffered uder the
provision of the enactment so repealed.
(3) Notwithstanding the repeal under sub-section (1)—
F (a) xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx
G 7. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that after
the notification of the State Government issued on 11.7.2014, became
operative from 11.5.2015, it was the Rent Tribunal alone which would
have jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions related to disputes
between landlord and tenant and not the civil courts. Therefore, the
decree of possession could not be passed by the civil court as it can be
H
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 847
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
passed only by the Rent Tribunal. Reliance was placed upon non-obstante A
clause with which sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act starts so as to
give overriding effect to the Act in question.
8. The civil court ceases to have jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petitions as only the Rent Tribunal would have jurisdiction to decide
such dispute but it does not deal with the suits and proceedings initiated B
and pending on the date of applicability of the Act to the municipal area.
There is no express or implied provision in the Act in respect of the
decrees passed prior to the applicability of the Act to the area in question.
The notification issued cannot have any retrospective application or the
Act contemplates the applicability of the Act with retrospective effect.
C
9. We are of the opinion that whether or not the decree of eviction
can be passed after the Act became applicable would depend upon the
language of the statute.
10. A short resume of the various judgments of this Court on the
maintainability of decree by the civil court may be noticed. Under the D
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 19725, the Act is not applicable for a period of ten years from the
date of construction of the building. Section 20 of the U.P. Rent Act
restricts the right of a landlord to evict a tenant which reads thus:
“2. Exemptions from operation of Act.—(1) Nothing in this Act E
shall apply to [the following, namely]:—
(1) xxx xxx
(2) [Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-
section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections
24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this F
Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the
date on which its construction is completed]:
20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified
grounds. —(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall
be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, G
notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time
or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit
for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by
5
For short, the “U.P. Rent Act” H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered
into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at
with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding,
which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing
and signed by the tenant.”
B 11. In Om Prakash Gupta v. DIG Vijendrapal Gupta6, a question
arose whether the Rent Act would be applicable to a building which was
constructed prior to the applicability of the Rent Act and whether the
exemption granted to newly constructed buildings would be available to
such building. It was held that the Rent Act is not applicable to a building
which does not have a standing for ten years, even if the building was
C constructed prior to the applicability of the State Urban Rent Act to the
area in question. However, in a later judgment reported as Vineet Kumar
v. Mangal Sain Wadhera7, it was held that under the U.P. Rent Act,
even if the suit was filed within the exemption period and if the decree is
not passed, the decree would be not executable after the Rent Act will
became applicable. This Court held as under:
D
“17. The appellant in the present case only seeks the protection
of the new Rent Act which became applicable to the premises in
question during the pendency of the litigation. We see no reason
why the benefit of the new Rent Act be not given to the appellant.
Section 20 of the new Rent Act provides a bar to a suit for eviction
E of a tenant except on the specified grounds as provided in the
section. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 stipulates that in any suit
for eviction on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) to sub-section
(2) viz. the arrears of rent, if at the first hearing of the suit the
tenant in default pays all arrears of rent to the landlord or deposits
in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and
F
occupation of the building due from him, such damages for use
and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent together
with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and
the landlord’s cost of the suit in respect thereof after deducting
therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-
G section (1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree
for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant
against his liability for eviction on that ground. Sections 39 and 40
of the new Rent Act also indicate that the benefit of the new Act
6
(1982) 2 SCC 61
7
(1984) 3 SCC 352
H
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 849
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
will be given to the tenant if the conditions contemplated in those A
sections are satisfied. Section 39 also indicates that the parties
are entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and
to adduce additional evidence where necessary.”
12. However, the said judgment was explained in a later judgment
reported as Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi8 wherein B
it was held as under:
“14. …. This is put in Chapter IV with the heading “Regulation
and Eviction” and the section starts with title which is printed in
bold “Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except, on specified grounds”
and again in the wording of the section itself it provides: “No suit
shall be instituted for eviction”. This clearly indicates that the C
restriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit itself
and therefore it is clear that if the provisions of this Act applies
then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the grounds
specified in the sub-sections of this section. Keeping in view the
language of this section if we examine the provisions contained in D
sub-section (2) of Section 2 it will be clear that for a newly
constructed building the provisions of this Act will not apply for 10
years and therefore so far as the restriction under Section 20 is
concerned they will not apply and therefore it is clear that within
10 years as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 2 restriction
on the institution of suit as provided for in Section 20 sub-section E
(1) quoted above will not be applicable and it is thus clear that
during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired the
restriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted within
10 years and therefore restriction as provided for in Section 20
cannot be attracted.”
F
13. Later in Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge
& Ors.9, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under:
“12. Yet another contention urged by the learned counsel for the
tenant on the strength of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain
Wadhera [(1984) 3 SCC 352] is that inasmuch as the statutory
period of ten years expired during the pendency of the suit, the G
Act became applicable and the suit must be disposed of only in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and in particular sub-
section (2) of Section 20. This decision has, however, been
8
(1987) 4 SCC 382
9
(1992) 1 SCC 751
H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A explained in a subsequent decision in Nand Kishore
Marwah v. Samundri Devi [(1987) 4 SCC 382] wherein it has
been held that the law applicable on the date of the institution of
the suit alone governs the suit and the mere fact that the statutory
period of 10 years expires during the pendency of the suit/appeal/
revision, the Act does not become applicable. It was held that the
B suit has to be tried and decided without reference to the Act. We
are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Nand
Kishore Marwah [(1987) 4 SCC 382].”
14. In Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra10, the provisions of
East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 194911 were being examined. It was
C a case where a consent decree was passed by the civil court but before
the decree could be executed, the Punjab Rent Act was extended to the
urban area of Chandigarh. Section 13 of the said Act is to the effect that
a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted
therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the
commencement of the Act or otherwise, before or after the termination
D of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Considering the said provision, this Court held that a person who has
suffered a decree of the civil court continues to be tenant and since he
was in possession on the date when the Punjab Rent Act was extended
to Chandigarh, therefore, the tenant is not liable to be evicted after the
E commencement of the Punjab Rent Act. Such judgment was in view of
Section 13 of the Punjab Rent Act which bars the execution of a decree
passed before or after the commencement of the Punjab Rent Act which
reads thus:
“13. Eviction of tenants. - (1) A tenant in possession of a building
or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a
F decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or
otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the
tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Section,
[or in pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, as subsequently amended].”
G 15. The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 197312
provides that a tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall
not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of
this section. The relevant provisions of the said Act read thus:
10
(1980) 1 SCC 1
11
For short, the “Punjab Rent Act”
12
H For short, the “Haryana Rent Act”
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 851
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
“1. xx xx xx A
(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction
of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act
for a period of ten years from the date of its completion.
xx xx xx
13 (1) A tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall B
not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions
of this section.”
16. A perusal of the said provisions goes to show that the tenant
cannot be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the said
Act. Considering the said provisions, this Court in a judgment reported C
as Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia13 held that if the suit has
been filed within the exemption period of ten years, the decree could be
executed. This Court held as under:
“8. It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the
fault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the
maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” — an act of court shall D
prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally
consumed for adjudication, the ten years’ exemption or holiday
from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the
suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is
common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the E
date of letting it would never be disposed of within ten years and
even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will
make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide
no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem
of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be
defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration F
legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else.
9. xxx xxx If the immunity from the operation
of the Rent Act is made and depended upon that ultimate disposal
of the case within the period of exemption of ten years which is in
reality an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our G
opinion, bearing in mind the well-settled principle that the rights of
the parties crystallise to (sic on) the date of the institution of the
suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash
Gupta v. Digvijendrapal Gupta [(1982) 2 SCC 61 : (1982) 3
13
(1988) 4 SCC 284
H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A SCR 491] , the meaningful construction must be that the exemption
would apply for a period of ten years and will continue to be
available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or
proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of ten
years. Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be in
accordance with law.”
B
17. In a three-judge Bench judgment reported as Shri Kishan &
Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors.14, the judgment of this Court in Vineet
Kumar was specifically overruled. This Court held as under:
“20. Thus it is seen that this Court has been consistently taking
the view that a suit instituted during the period of exemption could
C be continued and a decree passed therein could be executed even
though the period of exemption came to an end during the pendency
of the suit. The only discordant note was struck in Vineet
Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera [(1984) 3 SCC 352] . We have
noticed that several decisions subsequent thereto have held
that Vineet Kumar [(1984) 3 SCC 352] is not good law. We have
D already construed the relevant provisions of the Act and pointed
out that there is nothing in the Act which prevents the civil court
from continuing the suit and passing a decree which could be
executed.”
18. Thus, under the Punjab Rent Act, the provision is explicit that
E no decree for eviction passed before or after the commencement of the
Act can be executed whereas under the Haryana Rent Act, a tenant
cannot be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Haryana
Rent Act. It has also been held in the judgments referred to above that in
a suit filed within the exemption period, the decree could be passed by
the civil court even if the premises are located within the urban area to
F which the Act is applicable. The consistent view of this Court is that the
decree can be validly executed if the suit was filed within the exemption
period, except Vineet Kumar, which was specifically held to be not
laying good law.
19. It would be relevant to refer to one judgment of this Court
G reported as Mansoor Khan v. Motiram Harebhan Kharat & Anr.15
which dealt with an identical question wherein after filing of the suit, by
virtue of a notification, a municipality was established. The landlord filed
a suit for possession on 2.5.1985 whereas Risod, District Yavatmal was
notified to be a municipality on 9.10.1989. This Court held as under:
14
(1998) 2 SCC 710
H 15
(2002) 5 SCC 462
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 853
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
“5. So long as the provisions of the Order are not applicable to A
any premises, the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant are
governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Once
the Order becomes applicable, a landlord cannot give notice to a
tenant determining the lease nor can initiate proceedings for
recovery of possession from the tenant except with the previous
written permission of the Controller in accordance with clause 13 B
of the Order. What is prohibited by the Order is initiation of the
proceedings by the landlord. In the present case, the proceedings
were initiated by filing suit before a civil court, much before the
provisions of the Order became applicable to the suit premises.
There is nothing in the Order which makes it applicable to the C
pending suit for eviction of the tenant.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant tenant has placed reliance
on a decision of this Court in Nandlal v. Moti Lal [(1977) 3 SCC
500 : AIR 1977 SC 2143] . The said decision is an authority for
the proposition that the Order becomes applicable to any area
which is notified to be a municipality from the date of such D
notification because the Order was already applicable in the
Province of C.P. and Berar. However, this Court has very
specifically held that the provisions of the Order would become
applicable from that date i.e. the date on which a particular area
within which the suit premises are situated, is notified to be a E
municipality. The Order is not retrospective in operation. It does
not affect the validity of the proceedings initiated before the date
on which the Order became applicable. Clause 13 of the Order
does not restrain the court from exercising its power to pass a
decree of eviction. All that clause 13 provides is to impose a
restriction on the right of the landlord to initiate the proceedings F
for eviction. Inasmuch as the proceedings for eviction were already
initiated and the Order is not retrospective in operation, it does not
affect the validity of the previously instituted proceedings nor does
it take away the power of the court to pass a decree of eviction in
the pending suit.” G
20. Out of the various judgments referred to by the learned counsel
for the appellants, the judgment relied upon in Rajender Bansal & Ors.
v. Bhuru (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. 16 was dealing
with Haryana Rent Act. The landlords were the appellants who had
16
(2017) 4 SCC 202 H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A filed suit for eviction of the respondents, their tenants. The suit was filed
in the civil court. The premises in question were outside the ambit of
rent legislation on the day the suit was filed. However, during the
pendency of the suit and before it could be finally decided, the area in
question was brought within the sweep of rent legislations by requisite
notifications. This Court concluded the issue against the tenants wherein
B it was held as under:
“18. From the aforesaid discussion in Atma Ram Mittal [Atma
Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284] , Vineet
Kumar [Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC
352] , Ram Saroop Rai [Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati, (1980) 3
C SCC 452] , Ramesh Chandra [Ramesh Chandra v. III Addl.
District Judge, (1992) 1 SCC 751] and Shri Kishan [Shri
Kishan v. Manoj Kumar, (1998) 2 SCC 710] cases, the apparent
principles which can be culled out, forming the ratio decidendi of
those cases, are as under:
D 18.1. Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the
institution of the suit and, therefore, the law applicable on the date
of filing of the suit will continue to apply until the suit is disposed
of or adjudicated.
18.2. If during the pendency of the suit, the Rent Act becomes
applicable to the premises in question, that would be of no
E consequence and it would not take away the jurisdiction of the
civil court to dispose of a suit validly instituted.
18.3. In order to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, there must
be a specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of
the civil court in respect of those cases also which were validly
F instituted before the date when protection of the Rent Act became
available in respect of the said area/premises/tenancy.
18.4. In case the aforesaid position is not accepted and the
protection of the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit
validly instituted prior in point of time when there was no such
protection under the Act, it will have the consequence of making
G
the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming
applicable to the said area/premises, unexecutable after the
application of these Rent Acts in respect of such premises. This
would not be in consonance with the legislative intent.
xx xx xx
H
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 855
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
23. When we apply the principles laid down above to the instant A
case, we find that this case would fall in the category of Atma
Ram Mittal [Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4
SCC 284] and Mansoor Khan [Mansoor Khan v. Motiram
Harebhan Kharat, (2002) 5 SCC 462] , etc. as under the scheme
of the Rent Act, no protection to the ex-tenants is provided and no
provision is made excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts in B
respect of pending cases, expressly or impliedly. On the other
hand, in the facts of the present case, it needs to be highlighted
again that the respondents had not only sublet the premises but
had not paid rent for a period of 14 years. His defence was struck
off by the civil court and ultimately the suit was even decreed. It C
is only during the pendency of the appeal that the notification was
issued covering the area where the suit premises are situate under
the Rent Act. It will be travesty of justice if the appellant landlords
are deprived of the fruits of the said decree.
24. We are, thus, unable to accept the view taken by the High
Court. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the D
first appellate court as well as the High Court is set aside. As the
only contention which was taken by the respondents before the
first appellate court, challenging the decree of the trial court, was
that the civil court ceased to have jurisdiction, the said first appeal
preferred by the respondents stands dismissed thereby restoring E
the decree passed by the trial court. There shall, however, be no
order as to costs.”
21. In the aforesaid case, the Haryana Rent Act provided that no
decree could be executed after the commencement of the Haryana Rent
Act whereas, the Act herein has no such or similar provision. Therefore,
F
this Court in the said judgment held that decree for eviction can be
executed if suit has been filed when the Act was not applicable to the
premises in question. We have our reservations in respect of such finding
in the context of Haryana Rent Act but such question may be examined
in an appropriate case. The Haryana Rent Act was enacted after repeal
of Punjab Rent Act, which provides that a tenant in possession of a G
building shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of
Section 13 of the said Act.
22. Mr. Sankaranarayanan has referred to Shree Chamundi
Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod
H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A Secretariat, Madras17 to contend that the stay granted by this Court
would not wipe off the order passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court holding that the decree could not be passed by the civil court. The
said question need not be answered in the present case as the fact remains
that the High Court has taken a view that the decree of the civil court
could be validly passed to which we agree.
B
23. Another judgment referred to is Pandurang Ramchandra
Mandlik & Anr. v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge & Ors.18 wherein
the issue was maintainability of the suit filed by the appellants under the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The finding returned
was that the said Act is not applicable to the land in question as only
C natural grass grew thereon. The issue was whether the civil court has
the jurisdiction to entertain the suit or the competent authority under the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 would have the
jurisdiction to decide the suit. The question was regarding the jurisdiction
of the civil court and the revenue court not that whether the decree
passed by the civil court could be executed.
D 24. Reference has been made to Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq &
Anr.19 wherein Section 13-A of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses
and Rent Control Order, 1949 as amended on 26.10.1989 barred the
passing of a decree of eviction in a suit for proceedings filed and pending.
The relevant clause reads as under:
“13-A- no decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceeding
E
filed and pending against the tenant in any court or before any
authority unless the landlord produces a written permission of the
Controller as required by sub-clause (1) of clause 13”
25. The dispute in the said case was in respect of an open plot. As
per the landlord, the tenancy was deemed to have expired on 10.4.1986
F in view of Section 106 of the TP Act before Section 13-A of the C.P.
and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 came into
force. The High Court held that no appeal was pending against the tenant
when Section 13-A was introduced. This Court remanded the matter
back to the High Court as the High Court has not examined the question
as to whether the amendment was retrospective or prospective. This
G Court held as under:
“8. The High Court further concluded that the amendments have
no retrospective effect. The provision came into force when the
17
(1992) 3 SCC 1
18
1989 Supp (2) SCC 627
19
H (2000) 3 SCC 607
SHANKARLAL NADANI v. SOHANLAL JAIN 857
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
appeal was pending. Therefore, though the provision is prospective A
in force, has “retroactive effect”. This provision merely provides
for a limitation to be imposed for the future which in no way
affects anything done by a party in the past and statutes providing
for new remedies for enforcement of an existing right will apply
to future as well as past causes of action. The reason being that
the said statutes do not affect existing rights and in the present B
case, the insistence is upon obtaining of permission of the Controller
to enforce a decree for eviction and it is, therefore, not
retrospective in effect at all, since it has only retroactive force.
xx xx xx
10. The High Court further took the view that the expression C
“premises” in the Act (sic Order) does not state as to when the
amendment was to be effective as it does not state whether the
amendment was retrospective or prospective. The same is on the
statute-book on the date on which the suit or proceeding is pending
for purpose of eviction and cannot ignore the provision on the
statute-book. Therefore, the view of the High Court on this aspect D
of the matter also, is incorrect. The arguments advanced on behalf
of the respondents that these amendments are retrospective in
character and could not have been made in the absence of an
authority under the main enactment by virtue of which such order
is made are untenable.”
E
26. The facts of the said case do not go to the extent to say that
the decree of the civil court cannot be executed if the Act has been
extended to an urban area.
27. Mr. Sankaranarayanan has also referred to the judgment of
this Court reported as Subhash Chander & Ors. v. Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) & Anr.20 wherein the landlord had filed a F
civil suit for possession though the premises was situated in the urban
area governed by the Haryana Rent Act. It has been held that such civil
suit is not maintainable as the remedy lies under the Haryana Rent Act.
This Court held as under:
“25. In the given circumstances, we are of the considered view
G
that no error was committed by the High Court in arriving to a
conclusion that even after the expiry of the lease term of the
lease deed, the respondents became a statutory tenant and
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred and could be
evicted only under the provisions of the Act 1973.”
20
2022 SCC OnLine SC 98 H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A 28. Under the Act in question, Section 18 does not talk about the
validity of any decree of the civil court but only restricts the jurisdiction
of the civil court from the date the Act became applicable. The Act has
come into force in respect of the premises in question on 11.5.2015 i.e.,
after the civil suit was filed, therefore, the decree could validly be passed
and executed. After the applicability of the Act to the area in question,
B the landlord and tenant dispute can be raised only before the Rent Tribunal
but not before the civil court. However, a suit filed before the civil court
prior to the applicability of the Act has to be decided by the civil court. A
decree passed by the civil court is valid and executable which is not
interdicted by the applicability of the Act to the area in question. The Act
is applicable to the area in question from the date the notification came
C into force and it does not bar the decree of the civil court or the pendency
of such civil suit.
29. Still further, one of the principles is that the rights of the parties
have to be determined on the date when lis commences i.e., on the date
of filing of the suit. The plaintiff is entitled to decree on that day when he
D initiated the proceedings, therefore, rights of the parties have to be
examined as on the said day. Recently, this Bench in a judgment reported
as ECGC Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV21 was examining the
question as to whether the condition of deposit while filing appeal under
the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would be applicable or the provisions
as it existed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 when the complaint
E was filed would be applicable. This Bench considering the Constitution
Bench judgments in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry &
Ors.22, Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax,
M.P., Nagpur23and Hardeodas Jagannath v. The State of Assam24
held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would not
be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the
F 2019 Act. Therefore, the Judgement and Decree passed in the suit for
possession does not suffer from any illegality.
30. In view of the above, we do not find any error in the order
passed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.
G Ankit Gyan Appeals dismissed.
(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)
21
2022 SCC OnLine SC 184
22
AIR 1957 SC 540
23
AIR 1967 SC 344
24
H AIR 1970 SC 724
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "rent control"Sign in to search