Supreme Court of India
SHANMUGAM @ LAKSHMINARAYANANversusHIGH COURT OF MADRAS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 619
- Decided
- 1 May 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SUDHANSHU DHULIA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the appellants were guilty of criminal contempt, the conviction is upheld, and the sentence is reduced to one month’s simple imprisonment.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a criminal contempt case where three appellants were accused of forging and using bogus interim orders of the Madras High Court to obstruct the execution of a decree. The High Court had convicted them of contempt and sentenced each to six months’ imprisonment, based on investigations by the Crime Branch and CBCID that showed the appellants prepared, supplied, and utilized the fake orders. The appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, alleged procedural irregularities, and argued that the strict criminal standard of proof was not applied. The Court held that the contempt proceedings were properly initiated suo motu on 5 September 2018, within the one‑year limitation period, and that the evidence proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It also affirmed that the High Court had complied with procedural requirements and that the standard of strict proof applies to criminal contempt. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to one month’s simple imprisonment, finding the original six‑month term excessive.
Issues considered
- Whether the charge of criminal contempt against the appellants is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the High Court's conviction and six‑month imprisonment sentence for criminal contempt should be upheld.
- Whether the contempt proceedings are barred by the one‑year limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the standard of proof required for criminal contempt is the same as that for a criminal offence.
- Whether the High Court complied with procedural requirements, including framing of charges and opportunity to be heard, in the contempt proceedings.
Legislation cited
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 15(1), s. 18(1), s. 20
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 466, s. 468, s. 471
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 17, s. 3, s. 4-24
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the charge of criminal contempt is proved against the appellants-contemnors beyond all reasonable doubt; whether the conviction of the appellants by the High Court for criminal contempt of Court and the sentence imposed ought to be upheld. Headnotes† – ss.15(1) r/w 18(1) – In Execution Petition filed by the decree holder, contemnors produced interim orders passed by the High Court staying the decree – On verification it was found that the said orders were fraudulently created by committing forgery and impersonation in the
Subjects
Contempt of courtCriminal contemptContempt proceedingsSuo motu contempt actionCreating fake orders of the CourtFraudulent creation of bogus ordersCreation of forged High Court orderForgery of recordForgery and impersonation in the name of the Judge of the High CourtFake interim orders of the High CourtCharge of contempt provedBeyond all reasonable doubtReport of the CBCIDTamil Nadu Forensic Science LaboratoryProbability of commission of offenceContempt proceeding not barred by limitationUtilisation of the fabricated orderStandard of strict proof
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 100 : 2025 INSC 619
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan
v.
High Court of Madras
(Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024)
02 May 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the charge of criminal contempt is proved against the
appellants-contemnors beyond all reasonable doubt; whether the
conviction of the appellants by the High Court for criminal contempt
of Court and the sentence imposed ought to be upheld.
Headnotes†
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – ss.15(1) r/w 18(1) – In
Execution Petition filed by the decree holder, contemnors
produced interim orders passed by the High Court staying
the decree – On verification it was found that the said
orders were fraudulently created by committing forgery and
impersonation in the name of the Judge of the High Court –
High Court held the appellants responsible in preparation of
the bogus High Court interim orders and held them guilty of
contempt – Correctness:
Held: When a person is found to have utilised an order of a court
which he or she knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on
persons who are not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of
the fabricated order by the person concerned would be sufficient
to hold him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether
he or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication – High
Court initiated suo motu contempt on proved and admitted
facts that Contemnor No.3 produced fake interim orders of the
High Court and the same were prepared by Contemnor No.4
and 7 – On facts, it is established beyond all reasonable doubt
that the appellants-contemnors have either used or created fake
High Court interim orders – It is not a case of mere probability of
commission of offence rather it is a proved case of commission
* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 101
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
of offence – Creating fake orders of the Court is one of the
most dreaded acts of contempt of court – It not only thwarts the
administration of justice, but it has inbuilt intention by committing
forgery of record – Charge of contempt proved against the
appellants beyond all reasonable doubt – Conviction confirmed,
however, the sentence is modified from simple imprisonment for
six months to simple imprisonment for one month – Penal Code,
1860 – ss.466, 468, 471. [Paras 8, 16, 17]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – s.20 – Limitation for actions
for contempt – Originating point for calculating the period of
limitation, as interpreted in Pallav Sheth’s case – Appellant
pleaded that the entire contempt proceeding was barred by
limitation since it should have been initiated within one year
from date of production of fake interim orders i.e. 18.04.2018
however, the notice was issued after four years in 2022:
Held: Contempt action must be initiated either by filing of an
application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu within a period
of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have
been committed – The writ petition for initiation of action against
the appellants was filed by the Decree Holder on 20.08.2018 i.e.
immediately after four months from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders
were produced before the Court – On facts, it was on 05.09.2018
when the contempt proceedings were drawn by the High Court
though actual notice was issued later on by the Division Bench in
the year 2022 as the case bundle of writ petition was missing in
the Registry of the High Court – However, it does not mean that
the contempt was initiated in the year 2022 – As held in Pallav
Sheth case, s.20 has to be construed in a manner which would
avoid such an anomaly and concluded that the date of initiation
of suo motu contempt action is regarded as the initiation by the
Court for the purpose of s.20 – Therefore, initiation of contempt
action shall be treated to have been taken on 05.09.2018 when
Single Judge dealing with the writ petition so directed and this date
being within one year from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders were
presented before the Court, the present contempt action was not
barred by limitation. [Paras 14, 15]
Contempt of Court – Exercise of power – Object:
Held: The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish
for contempt is always for maintaining the purity of administration
102 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of justice – Nothing is more incumbent upon the courts of justice
than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor
is there anything more pernicious when the order of the court is
forged and produced to gain undue advantage. [Para 8]
Case Law Cited
Pallav Sheth v. Custodian & Ors. [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 387 : (2001)
7 SCC 549 – relied on.
In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh [2001] 3 SCR 424 : (2001) 5 SCC
501; In Re : Vinay Chandra Mishra [1995] 2 SCR 638 : (1995) 2
SCC 584; Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur,
through Registrar [1992] 1 SCR 864 : (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 529;
Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati & Anr. (1953) 1 SCC 726 – referred to.
List of Acts
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Contempt of court; Criminal contempt; Contempt proceedings;
Suo motu contempt action; Creating fake orders of the Court;
Fraudulent creation of bogus orders; Creation of forged High Court
order; Forgery of record; Forgery and impersonation in the name
of the Judge of the High Court; Fake interim orders of the High
Court; Charge of contempt proved; Beyond all reasonable doubt;
Report of the CBCID; Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory;
Probability of commission of offence; Contempt proceeding not
barred by limitation; Utilisation of the fabricated order; Standard
of strict proof.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
5245 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in SMCRLCP No. 2493 of 2022
With
Criminal Appeal No. 4219 of 2024 and Criminal Appeal No. 2403
of 2025
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 103
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Sonia Mathur, Nachiketa Joshi, S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Advs.,
Tadimalla Bhaskar Gowtham, Ms. Shubhi Bhardwaj, Subhodh
Patil, Aditya Sharma, Ajay Awasthi, Alabhya Dhamija, Ms. Richa
Vishwakarma, Ms. Shriya Gilhotra, Ms. Stuti Wason, Purushottam
Tiwari, M.P. Parthiban, Bilal Mansoor, Shreyas Kaushal, S. Geyolin
Selvam, Alagiri K, P. V. K. Deivendran, Vairawan A.S.
Advs. for the Respondent:
S Guru Krishnakumar, Sr. Adv., Siddharth Naidu, Ashwin K,
V. Balachandran, S. Hariharan, K. M. Kalidharun, Vikash Singh.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
Appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of 2024 is
admitted.
2. The three appellants before us namely, Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan in Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024 (Contemnor
No. 4 before the High Court), M. Muruganandam in Criminal Appeal
No. 4219 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 3 before the High Court) and S.
Amal Raj in Criminal Appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal Diary
No. 45480 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 7 before the High Court) stand
convicted by the High Court for committing contempt of Court and
have been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period
of six months. The appellants have called in question the legality and
validity of the judgment and order of the High Court in the present
appeals.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The District Munsiff Court, Tiruchengode passed a decree dated
17.11.2004 in O.S. No. 212 of 2000 in favour of J.K.K. Rangammal
Charitable Trust1 ordering recovery of possession and arrears of
1 “Decree Holder”
104 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
rent from the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3. The Contemnors preferred
appeal suits which were dismissed. The Decree Holder preferred
Execution Petition and when the Court Amin went to execute
the decree to effect delivery of possession on 17.04.2018 the
Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 produced interim orders passed by the
High Court of Madras in C.R.P. Nos. 1467 – 1469 of 2018 staying
the decree.
3.1. The Decree Holder applied and obtained the copies of the
said orders produced by the Contemnors in Execution Petition
Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of 2014 and also entered caveat before
the High Court. On verification, it was found, the said orders
produced before the Execution Court were fraudulently created
by committing forgery and impersonation in the name of the
Judge of the High Court of Madras.
3.2. The Decree Holder submitted a complaint to the High Court
and Superintendent of Police, Namakkal District on 03.05.2018
and 15.05.2018 respectively. The Registrar General, High
Court, forwarded the complaint to the Superintendent of Police,
Namakkal on 18.07.2018.
The Decree Holder then preferred W.P. No. 22410 of 2018
before the High Court to direct the Superintendent of Police,
Namakkal to take action on the complaint dated 15.05.2018.
In the meanwhile, First Information Report in Crime No. 8 of
2018 was registered by the District Crime Branch, Namakkal
for offences under Sections 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian
Penal Code, 18602 against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3/Judgment
Debtors. The writ petition was disposed of on 05.09.2018
directing the registry to place the matter before the Division
Bench, dealing with the criminal contempt matters, after
obtaining necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice,
for the Division Bench to proceed with the matter in terms of
Section 15 (1) read with Section 18 (1) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The Superintendent of Police, Namakkal
District, was also directed to monitor the investigation in DCB
Crime No. 8 of 2018.
2 ‘IPC’
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 105
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
3.3. On 10.09.2018, the Contemnor No. 4/Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan3 was arrested by the District Crime Branch,
Namakkal and he made a statement about the manner in which
the fake order copies were prepared with the help of Contemnor
No. 6/P. Meiyappan4 in a Digital Net Centre at Bhavani.
3.4. On 11.09.2018, Contemnor No. 3/M. Muruganandam 5 was
arrested. He disclosed the manner in which the fraudulent order
copies were obtained by the Contemnor No. 4 and Contemnor
No. 7. The District Crime Branch, Namkkal completed the
investigation and submitted a report on 14.08.2019 in C.C. No.
537 of 2020 before the Judicial Magistrate, Komarapalayam
against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5.
3.5. On account of the case bundle relating to W.P. No. 22410 of
2018 missing in the Registry, the criminal contempt was not
numbered from 2018 to 2022. On the Division Bench being
informed regularly, the bundle was traced, and the contempt
petition was numbered as 2493 of 2022. Initially, statutory
notice was issued to the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5 and thereafter
to the Contemnor No. 6 and Contemnor No. 7 when they
were also found to be involved in the process of preparation
of the fake order of the High Court. Since the Contemnor
nos. 1 and 2 died during proceedings, the same stood abated
against them.
3.6. The Division Bench framed charges against Contemnor Nos.
1, 3, 4 & 5 on 19.12.2022 to the following effect:
“Since S. Sundaram (2nd contemnor) has died, no
charge could be framed against him.
2 . T h a t , y o u , A n g a m u t h u ( 1 st c o n t e m n o r ) ,
Muruganandam (3 rd contemnor), Shanmugam @
Lakshminarayanan (4th contemnor) and Thangamani
(5th contemnor) along with the deceased Sundaram
submitted the photocopies of the following three
fake orders of this Court, all dated 12.03.2018 to
3 ‘C4’
4 ‘C6’
5 ‘C3’
106 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the bailiff, when he came for executing the decree
as set out above.
i. C.R.P.No.1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018
ii. C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of
2018 and
iii. C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of 2018
The above three orders appear to have been passed
by Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa Sathyanarayana on
12.03.2018, whereas, the records of the Registry
show that no such Civil Revision Petitions were even
filed, and the said Hon’ble Judge was not holding
the C.R.P. roster on 12.03.2018 and therefore, it is
evident that these three orders have been fabricated.”
3.7. Basing the affidavits filed by the Contemnor Nos. 1 and 3 to 5,
during pendency of the contempt proceedings, the High Court
suo motu impleaded Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 on the ground
that the material available on record including the police report
revealed that these two contemnors are also involved in the
preparation and handing over of the fake High Court’s orders
to the litigants, Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5. Accordingly, charges
were framed by the High Court on 16.04.2024 against the
Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 as under:
“That, you, P. Meiyappan (6th contemnor) and S.
Amal Raj (7th contemnor) along with Contemnor
Nos.3 to 5, including the deceased, P. Angamuthu
and S. Sundaram, created fake orders of this Court,
all dated 12.03.2018 and aided in producing it to the
bailiff, when he came for executing the decree as set
out in the order dated 19.12.2022:
i. C.R.P.No. 1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018
ii. C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of
2018 and
iii. C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of 2018
The above three orders appear to have been passed
by Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa Sathyanarayana on
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 107
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
12.03.2018, whereas, the records of the Registry
show that no such Civil Revision Petitions were even
filed and the said Hon’ble Judge was not holding
the C.R.P. roster on 12.03.2018 and therefore, it is
evident that these three orders have been fabricated.
The above act of yours prima facie attracts Section
2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which
is punishable under Section 12, ibid., in that, by
submitting the aforesaid three photocopies of
the orders of this Court, you have interfered with
the administration of justice, in the execution of
proceedings before the District Munsif, Tiruchengode”
3.8. The Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5 preferred Crl. O.P. No. 17492
of 2023 for reinvestigation/fresh investigation of the crime
registered against them. The Division Bench passed an order on
21.09.2023 directing the DGP to form a Special Team whereupon
the DGP transferred the investigation to CBCID (OCU) and
renumbered as Crime No. 2 of 2023. A detailed investigation was
carried out by CBCID, and voluminous incriminating materials
were collected against the Contemnor Nos. 4 to 6.
3.9. P. Meiyappan/Contemnor No. 6 6 and S. Amal Raj/Contemnor
No. 7 7 were also arrested by the CBCID. The statement of two
witnesses namely, Thangaraj and Shanthi was recorded under
Section 164(5) of Cr. P. C. before the Judicial Magistrate No. II,
Namakkal. Sample voices of C3 and C4 were also recorded
by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for comparison with
the cell phone conversation held between them. CBCID filed
first status report in the contempt petition on 18.10.2023 and
also verified the record relating to C.R.P. Nos. 1467 – 1469
of 2018. The material objects were recovered from the Digital
Net Centre, Bhavani and sent to the Tamil Nadu Forensic
Science Laboratory.8 The CBCID filed second status report in
the contempt petition on 19.12.2023 and thereafter third status
report was filed on 12.02.2024. Basing above status reports,
C6 & C7 were impleaded.
6 ‘C6’
7 ‘C7’
8 ‘FSL’
108 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.10. In his affidavit in response to the contempt notice, the C3
admitted that in the Execution case he and other tenants
were guided by C4 to prefer revision before the High Court.
According to him, the Judgment Debtor, in three suits, paid
a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for preferring revision. On the relevant
date his wife handed over the copy of bogus interim order to
the Court Amin which was given to him by C4 through one
Mr. P. Meiyappan. He categorically states that since C4 was
handling his case for the last two decades, there was no
occasion to doubt the genuineness of the High Court order.
When he contacted C4, he stated that one Mr. Thangapandian,
advocate had given the said order to him. This conversation
was recorded in the automated Samsung android phone. He
had given transcript of the conversation between him and C4
to the police along with the certificate under Section 65-B (4)
of the Evidence Act, 1872.
3.11. The High Court after considering the materials and the
submissions made by the appellants found that the three
appellants are responsible in preparation of the bogus High
Court interim orders and have accordingly sentenced them to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The High Court
found that the Contemnor Nos. 1 and 2 are also involved but
since they have died, the case stood abated against them.
Insofar as C6 is concerned, the High Court has given him the
benefit of doubt.
SUBMISSIONS
4. Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel and Mr. S. Nagamuthu,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants/contemnors
would submit that the initiation of contempt against the appellant/
contemnors is barred by limitation in view of the provisions contained
in Section 20 of Contempt of Court Acts, 1971. It is also argued that
formal charges are not framed against the appellants/contemnors
without which contempt cannot proceed. It is vehemently argued that
standard of proof in a criminal contempt is the same as required in
a criminal case, therefore, the High Court has erred in holding that
standard of strict proof is not required for conviction in a contempt
matter. It is lastly submitted that the High Court having given benefit
of doubt to C6 and has acquitted Contemnor No. 5, wife of the C3,
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 109
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
the same yardstick should have been applied against the appellant/
C3 and thus, he deserves to be acquitted.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/High Court and
Intervenor/Decree Holder have supported the impugned order.
According to them, the present appellants have been found involved
in creation of forged High Court order which have rightly been dealt
with by the High Court by punishing them for committing contempt of
Court. It is submitted that when the contempt proceedings are drawn
suo motu by the High Court the law of limitation is not attracted.
There being sufficient material against the appellants/contemnors, it
is not a case where they have been found guilty and sentenced on
the basis of probabilities, but it is a case of cogent material available
against them.
ANALYSIS
6. The High Court has recorded the finding of guilt against the appellants/
contemnors on the basis of the report filed by CBCID and the affidavits
filed by the appellants in response to the statutory notice issued
against them. The report of the CBCID was in turn founded on the
statement of witnesses as well as telephonic conversations held
between C3 and C4 as also between C6 and C4. It has also come
on record that C4 has forwarded the format for the preparation of
fake stay order copies received from the advocate Thangapandian
through P. Meiyappan’s email. Thereafter, C4 prepared the fake stay
order copies and handed over the same to the accused, Thangamani,
Sundaram and Angamuthu through P. Meiyappan. C4 further stated
in his confession statement to the CBCID that Contemnor No. 7/S.
Amal Raj9 is the person who floated the idea of preparing the forged
High Court stay orders. The properties were seized from the Digital
Net Centre, Bhavani where the fake stay orders were prepared
and the same were sent to the FSL. The High Court has extracted
the report of the FSL in para 30 of the impugned order. Moreover,
C3 in his affidavit has alleged that C4 was the person who guided
them throughout in the litigation and it was he (C4) who handed
over fake orders through P. Meiyappan. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 15
& 16 of his affidavit have been reproduced by the High Court which
9 ‘C7’
110 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
clearly supports the finding recorded by the High Court. Thus, the
case against the appellants/C3, C4 & C7 for committing contempt
has been found proved by the High Court on the basis of cogent
and reliable material available on record and the same is recorded
after considering their stand taken in the affidavit.
7. Having deeply scrutinised the material, we are satisfied that the finding
recorded by the High Court does not suffer from any illegality or
perversity. The present is not a case where it is not known as to who
produced the fake interim orders of the High Court or who prepared
the same. The chain of events emerging from 18.04.2018 onwards,
when the fake orders were presented at the time when the bailiff tried
to effect delivery of possession, have been found established. As a
matter of fact, C3 admits that he submitted the fake orders before
the Court Amin. From the conversation recorded between C3 and C4
as produced before the CBCID and as mentioned in the affidavits,
clearly accuses that it was C4 who was responsible for handing over
the orders through P Meiyappan. It was C7 who floated the idea of
preparing the forged orders. Thus, all three appellants/contemnors
have rightly been convicted.
8. The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish for contempt
is always for maintaining the purity of administration of justice. Nothing
is more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to preserve their
proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything more
pernicious when the order of the court is forged and produced to gain
undue advantage. A misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and
wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable
order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference with the due
course of judicial proceedings. When a person is found to have
utilised an order of a court which he or she knows to be incorrect
for conferring benefit on persons who are not entitled to the same,
the very utilisation of the fabricated order by the person concerned
would be sufficient to hold him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective
of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of
fabrication. [See: In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh10). Thus, C3, who
is the beneficiary of the fake interim orders is rightly held guilty of
contempt.
10 (2001) 5 SCC 501
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 111
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
9. In re: “Vinay Chandra Mishra”11, this Court has held that the Judiciary
is the guardian of the rule of law and the duty to protect the same
is apart from the function of adjudicating the disputes between the
parties and it is for this purpose that the courts are entrusted with the
extraordinary power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether
inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority
and bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them and
obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear or favour.
10. It has been argued by learned senior counsel for the appellants
that they were not given proper opportunity to defend, inasmuch
as, the charges were not framed against them in a formal manner
nor explained to them. This argument deserves to be rejected at
the outset in view of the settled proposition in “Vinay Chandra
Mishra”(supra) in the following words:
“26.……….The criminal contempt of court undoubtedly
amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and
hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under
the common law and the statute law even in this country has
always been summary. However, the fact that the process
is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement,
viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied
to the contemner. The degree of precision with which the
charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So
long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or
otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation,
it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in a
specific allegation. The consensus of opinion among the
judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection
that the Judge deals with the contempt himself and the
contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is
a residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish
on the spot, but it is the only realistic way of dealing with
certain offenders. This procedure does not offend against
the principle of natural justice, viz., nemo judex in sua
causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting
the Judge personally but protecting the administration of
11 (1995) 2 SCC 584
112 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most
effective deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to
remain in full control of the hearing of the case and he
must be able to take steps to restore order as early and
quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging
out the contempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption
to the main proceedings which paralyses the court for a
time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with
which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be
completely satisfactory, yet it does provide the simplest,
most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing
with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the contemner’s
interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an
opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary
procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the court
is commended and not faulted.”
11. Much emphasis was laid by the appellants taking shelter under
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197112 to raise the plea
of limitation. It was submitted that the contempt proceedings should
have been initiated within one year from the date of production of the
fake interim orders i.e. 18.04.2018. However, the notice was issued
after four years in the year 2022 and as such entire proceeding
is barred by limitation. Reliance is placed on “Pallav Sheth vs.
Custodian & Ors.”13
12. In “Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur,
through Registrar”14 the following is held:
“15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was
held that the High Court has inherent power to deal
with a contempt of itself summarily and to adopt its own
procedure, provided that it gives a fair and reasonable
opportunity to the contemnor to defend himself. But the
procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the
Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 14, List
III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though
12 “1971 Act”
13 (2001) 7 SCC 549
14 (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 529
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 113
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
High Court can be regulated by legislation by appropriate
legislature under Entry 77 of List I and Entry 14 of List III
in exercise of which the Parliament has enacted the Act
of 1971, the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and the High Court is given a constitutional foundation by
declaring to be ‘Courts of Record’ under Articles 129 and
215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the inherent power
of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot be taken
away by any legislation short of constitutional amendment.
In fact, Section 22 of the Act lays down that the provisions
of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts.
It necessarily follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129
and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971.
The above position of law has been well settled by this
Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges
of the PEPSU High Court [(1953) 2 SCC 571]holding thus:
“In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court itself
is concerned, as distinct from one of a subordinate
court, the Constitution vests these rights in every
High Court, so no Act of a legislature could take
away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue
of its own authority.”
24. From the above judicial pronouncements of this
Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme
Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as
embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot
be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation
including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and
their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected
to any limit. It would be appropriate, in this connection, to
refer certain English authorities dealing with the power of
the superior court as Courts of Record.
37. The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a summary
power as held in the cases of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, C.K.
Daphtary and in Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P.
114 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
38. Peacock, C.J. laid down the rule quite broadly in the
following words in Abdool, Re: [(1867) 8 WR Cr 32, 33)
“[T]here can be no doubt that every court of record
has the power of summarily punishing for contempt.”
42. If we examine the facts of the present case
in the backdrop of the proposition of law, the
contentions raised by the appellant challenging the
procedure followed by the High Court do not merit
any consideration since the appellant has been served
with a notice of contempt and thereafter permitted to
go through the records and finally has been afforded
a fair opportunity of putting forth his explanation for
the charge levelled against him. Incidentally, we may
say that the submission of the contemnor that the
impugned order is vitiated on the ground of procedural
irregularities and that Article 215 of the Constitution of
India is to be read in conjunction with the provisions
of Sections 15 and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be
countenanced and it has to be summarily rejected as
being devoid of any merit.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in “Pallav Sheth” (supra) has
held thus:
“30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High
Courts are courts of record, and the Constitution has given
them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions
of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be
abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129
and Article 215 is absolute, can thereby any legislation
indicating the manner and to the extent that the power
can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law
which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129
and/or Article 215, there can be little doubt that such law
would not be regarded as having been validly enacted.
It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum
of punishment or what may or may not be regarded
as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 115
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot
be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies
the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215
of the Constitution.
33. The question which squarely arises is as to what is the
meaning to be given to the expression “no court shall initiate
any proceedings for contempt …” occurring in Section 20
of the 1971 Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal
contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies not only
to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court
or the Supreme Court but would also be applicable in the
case of contempt of the subordinate court. The procedure
which is to be followed in each of these cases is different.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation
is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its
rights. In this background such an interpretation should
be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead
to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who
may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the
inaction on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be
made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner
canvassed by Mr Venugopal would mean that the court
would be rendered powerless to punish even though
it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the
contempt having been committed and the same having
been brought to the notice of the court soon after the
committal of the contempt and within the period of
one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to
be construed in a manner which would avoid such an
anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants
as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the
court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of
Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant,
which would render the constitutional power of the
courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even
in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden
for a period of one year by practising fraud by the
contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be
regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or
116 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore
be avoided.
(Emphasis supplied)
42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to the effect
that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be
said to have occurred when the court formed the prima
facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued
notice to the contemner to show cause why it should not be
punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which
does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to
cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision
like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to
the realities of the situation. (Emphasis supplied) For
instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate
court is committed, a report is prepared whether on an
application to court or otherwise, and reference made by
the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter
that a High Court can take further action under Section
15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one
year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in
Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that
notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High
Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been
committed the High Court would become powerless to
take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an
application before the subordinate court or the High
Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on
its own motion or the filing of an application before an
Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt
proceedings is regarded as initiation by the court for
the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation
would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High
Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in
Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation
of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the
powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is
recognised by the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 117
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories,
namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that
instituted otherwise than on the court’s own motion. The
mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be
different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it
is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice,
in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing
an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper
construction to be placed on Section 20 must be
that action must be initiated, either by filing of an
application or by the court issuing notice suo motu,
within a period of one year from the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed.
(Emphasis supplied)
46. The record discloses that the Custodian received
information of the appellant having committed contempt
by taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to
these concerns and operating their accounts clandestinely
only from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax
Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6-1998, a petition
was filed for initiating action in contempt and notice issued
by the Special Court on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where any special or
local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period prescribed by
the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if
such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule
and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special
or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to
24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or
local law. This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das
has held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section
3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a
special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted.
118 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that
where, in the case of any suit or application for which a
period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge
of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded
is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent
[Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document necessary to
establish the right of the plaintiff or the applicant has been
fraudulently concealed from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the
period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff
or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or
could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in
the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the
applicant first had the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production. These provisions
embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz.
that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt
legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary
for him to do so have been wilfully concealed from him
and also that a party who has acted fraudulently should
not gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by
virtue of such fraud.
48. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are
applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated
by the appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian
receiving information from the Income Tax Department,
vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware
of the fraud, application for initiating contempt
proceedings was filed on 18-6-1998, well within the
period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on
this application that the Special Court by its order of
9-4-1999 directed the application to be treated as a
show-cause notice to the appellant to punish him for
contempt. (Emphasis supplied) In view of the abovestated
facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct
interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to
punish the appellant for contempt was valid. The Special
Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding
the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 119
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
circumstances, to examine the finding of the Special Court
that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore,
action for contempt was not barred by Section 20.”
14. While the appellants have referred to para 44 of “Pallav Sheth”(supra),
the respondent has relied upon paragraph nos. 30, 41 & 42. Upon
reading of the entire judgment in the matter of “Pallav Sheth” (supra),
it is clearly depicted that the contempt action must be initiated either
by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu
within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is
alleged to have been committed. The originating point for calculating
the period of limitation has been interpreted in para 42 of Pallav
Sheth which is reproduced again at the cost of repetition.
“42………………..On the other hand, if the filing of an
application before the subordinate court or the High Court,
making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own
motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-
General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings
is regarded as initiation by the court for the purposes of
Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge
on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for
contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution.
Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise
that section with the powers of the courts to punish for
contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.”
Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in paras 42 and 44
of “Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is to be seen as to when the application
was preferred by the respondent/Decree Holder for initiation of action
against the appellants. The present contempt proceeding has its
root in WP No. 22410 of 2018 preferred by the Trust/Decree Holder.
This writ petition was preferred on 20.08.2018 i.e. immediately after
four months from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders were produced
before the Court Amin. In this writ petition, prayer was made to
initiate action against the respondents for committing act of forgery
and fraudulent creation of bogus orders in the name of the High
Court. When the matter was posted before the learned Single
Judge it was informed by the Registry that the matter was placed
before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the administrative side and the
120 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Hon’ble Chief Justice has directed police investigation in this case.
Accordingly, the Deputy Registrar, High Court of Madras gave a
complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Namakkal Division for
investigation and eventually Crime No. 8 of 2018 was registered in
District Crime Branch, Namakkal Division on 04.09.2018. When the
matter was placed before the learned Single Judge on 05.09.2018,
the Court was of the prima facie opinion that despite registration
of FIR further action needs to be taken for initiation of contempt
proceedings under the Act, 1971, as there is prima facie material to
show that criminal contempt has been committed. The jurisdiction
to proceed for criminal contempt being with the Division Bench,
the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed the Registry to
place the matter before the Division Bench dealing with the criminal
contempt matters, after obtaining necessary orders from Hon’ble
the Chief Justice, for the Division Bench to proceed with the matter
in terms of Section 15(1) read with Section 18(1) of the Act, 1971.
Thus, it is this date i.e. 05.09.2018 when the contempt proceedings
were drawn by the High Court though actual notice was issued later
on by the Division Bench in the year 2022. Significantly, it requires
special reference that for about 4 years the case bundle of WP No.
22410 of 2018 was missing in the Registry of the High Court. On
repeated information/request by the Decree Holder the bundle was
traced, and the contempt case was registered in 2022. However,
it does not mean that the contempt was initiated in the year 2022.
15. It is significant to notice that the case bundle of writ petition in the
High Court was misplaced in the registry of the High Court so as to
render the High Court powerless to punish for contempt even though
it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt and
the same having been brought to the notice of the Court within
one year from the date of commission of contempt. Such situation
was clearly foresighted by this Court in “Pallav Sheth”(supra), by
observing in para 41 that Section 20 of the Act, 1971, therefore, has
to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and
eventually concluded that the date of initiation of suo motu contempt
action is regarded as the initiation by the Court for the purpose of
Section 20. Therefore, in the case in hand, initiation of contempt
action shall be treated to have been taken on 05.09.2018 when the
learned Single Judge dealing with the writ petition so directed and
this date being within one year from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 121
Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras
were presented before the Court Amin, we are of the considered
view that the present contempt action was not barred by limitation.
16. Another submission of learned senior counsel for the appellants
is that the High Court has proceeded on an assumption that the
standard of strict proof required to convict a person under the penal
law need not be considered whereas in Khushi Ram vs. Sheo Vati
& Anr.,15 it is held that the charge of contempt of court partakes of
the nature of a criminal charge and it must be established beyond
all reasonable doubt. Basing above, it is argued that the charge
having not proved beyond all reasonable doubt, the appellants
cannot be punished. However, the present is a case where the
High Court has initiated suo motu contempt on proved and admitted
facts that C3 produced fake interim orders of the High Court and
the same were prepared by C4 & C7. Despite observation by the
High Court, we are of the view that present is a case where it is
established beyond all reasonable doubt that the present appellants/
contemnors have either used or created fake High Court interim
orders. It is not a case of mere probability of commission of offence
rather it is a proved case of commission of offence. Creating fake
orders of the Court is one of the most dreaded acts of contempt
of court. It not only thwarts the administration of justice, but it has
inbuilt intention by committing forgery of record. Therefore, the
charge of contempt is fully proved against the appellants beyond
all reasonable doubt.
17. For the foregoing, we have no hesitation in affirming the finding of
guilt of commission of contempt by the appellants, as recorded by
the High Court. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
However, insofar as imposition of sentence of simple imprisonment
for six months is concerned, the same appears to be harsh, therefore,
considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the view that ends of justice would be served if the appellants are
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
Accordingly, we confirm the conviction and modify the sentence from
simple imprisonment for six months to simple imprisonment for one
month. It is ordered accordingly.
15 (1953) 1 SCC 726
122 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The appellants shall surrender before the Registrar of the High
Court of Madras within 15 days from today to undergo the sentence.
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to communicate this order
to the concerned High Court for compliance.
Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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