SHIVASHARANAPPA AND OTHERSversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                         [2013] 5 S.C.R. 1104


A               SHIVASHARANAPPA AND OTHERS
                                    v.
                      STATE OF KARNATAKA
              (Criminal Appeal No. 1366 of 2007 etc.)
                              MAY 7, 2013
B
       [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860- ss. 143, 147,448,302 and 201 rlw. s.
  149 - Prosecution under - Acquittal by trial court on the
C ground that in view of unnatural behaviour of witnesses, it was
  not safe to convict the accused on the basis of their evidence
  - High Court convicted all the accused - Held: Trial court
  rightly disbelieved the evidence of the witnesses treating their
  conduct as unnatural - There were no compelling
o circumstances requiring a reversal of judgment of acquittal -
  Conviction order passed by High Court set aside.

       Appeal - Criminal appeal - Against acquittal - Scope
  of - Held: Powers of the appellate court in appeal against
E acquittal are extensive and plenary to review and reconsider
  the evidence and interfere with acquittal -But such
  interference should be on the basis of absolute assurance of
  the guilt, and not on the basis that another possible view or
  different view could be taken.

F        Witness:

       Child witness - reliance on - Held: Testimony of child
  witness, if credible, truthful and corroborated, can form basis
  for conviction - However, corroboration is not mandatory, but
G should be followed as a rule of prudence.

         Behaviour of witness - Relevance of - For reliance on
    the testimony of the witness - Held : Behaviour of witnesses
    or their reactions differ from situation to situation and individual

H                                  1104
   SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                   1105


to individual - But if the behaviour is absolutely unnatural, the   A
testimony of witness may not deserve credence and
acceptance.

    The appellant accused were prosecuted ulss. 143,
147, 448, 302 and 201 rlw. s. 149 IPC. The prosecution              8
case was that there was dispute, regarding some land,
between the deceased and her mother-in-law (accused
since deceased).
      During night, when the deceased was sleeping with
her eleven years old daughter (PW-9) in her father's                C
house, her mother-in-law along with appellants-accused
came and forcibly took the deceased along with them
and threatened PW-9. After the accused persons had
gone away, PW-9 went to her maternal grandmother (PW-
7), who was living along with her another daughter at that          D
point of time, and informed her about the incident. PWs
7 and 9 did not tell about the incident to anyone. Dead
body of the deceased was discovered in a well after two
days of the incident. The trial against mother-in-law of the
deceased abated due to her death. Trial court acquitted             E
all the accused inter a/ia holding that in view of unnatural
behaviour of PW-7, in not informing about the incident to
anyone, the sole testimony of the child witness (PW-9)
could not be relied upon. High Court convicted them to
life imprisonment. Hence, the present appeal.                       F

     Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal, the High Court has a duty to scrutinize the
evidence and sometimes it is an obligation on the part of           G
the High Court to do so. The power is not curtailed by
any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
While reappreciating and reconsidering the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is based, certain other
principles pertaining to other facets are to be borne in            H
    1106   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2013) 5 S.G.R.


A mind. The High Court is also required to see that unless
  there are substantial and compelling circumstances, the
  order of acquittal is not required to be reversed in appeal.
  [Para 12] [1114-D-E; 1115-B-C]

8     Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and Anr. vs. State of
  Maharashtra AIR1973 SC 2622: 1974 (1) SCR 489; Girija
  Prasad (dead) by LRs. vs.State of M. P. (2007) 7 SCC 625:
  2007 (9) SCR 483; State of Goa vs.Sanjay Thakran ( 2007)
  3 SCC 755: 2007 (3) SCR 507; Chandrappa vs. State of
  Kamataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: 2007 (2) SCR 630; State of
C Rajasthan vs. Shera Ram@ Vishnu Dutta (2012) 1SCC602:
  2011 (15) SCR 485 - relied on.

       1.2. True it is, the powers of the appellate court in an
  appeal against acquittal are extensive and plenary in
D nature to review and reconsider the evidence and
  interfere with the acquittal, but then the court should find
  an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the
  evidence on record and not that it can take one more
  possible or a different view. [Para 20] [1119-E-F]
E
       2. In the present case, the High Court has not accepted
  the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court
  pertaining to the testimonies of PWs-7 and 9 and has further
  based its reasoning on the bedrock that there was a
  property dispute between the deceased and her mother-
F in-law which provided motive for commission of the crime.
  The High Court has also expressed the view that conviction
  can be recorded on the basis of the sole testimony of a
  child witness. PW-9 was eleven years old at the time of the
  occurrence. The High Court has accepted the version of
G PW-9 (daughter of deceased) and PW-7 (mother of
  deceased) on two counts, namely, that the daughter was
  threatened and both of them were in state of fear. The trial
  court on the contrary, had found the conduct of both the
  witnesses (in not informing the incident to anyone) to be
H highly unnatural. The High Court has ascribed the reason
  SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA               1107


that PW-7 possibly wanted to save the reputation of the       A
deceased-daughter and that is why she did not inform the
other daughter and son-in-law. [Paras 13, 17 and 20) [1115·
C-E; 1117-D-E; 1119-B-C]
     3. The court can rely upon the testimony of a child
                                                              B
witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same
is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence
brought on record. The corroboration is not a must to
record a conviction, but as a rule of prudence, the court
thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other
reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that       C
apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of
witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct
and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the
ground of lack of corroboration, applies to a child
witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.       D
[Para 16) [1116-D-F]
     Dattu Ramrao Sakhare and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
(1997) 5SCC 341; Panchhi and Ors. vs. State of U.P. (1998)
7 SCC 177: 1998(1) Suppl. SCR40; State ofU.P. vs. Ashok       E
Dixit and Anr. (2000) 3 sec      70: 2000 (1) SCR 855 -
relied on.

     4.1. The behaviour of witnesses or their reactions
would differ from situation to situation and individual to
individual. Expectation of uniformity in the reaction of      F
witnesses would be unrealistic but the court cannot be
oblivious of the fact that even taking into account the
unpredictability of human conduct and lack of uniformity
in human reaction, whether in the circumstances of the
case, the behaviour is acceptably natural allowing the        G
variations. If the behaviour is absolutely unnatural, the
testimony of the witness may not deserve credence and
acceptance. [Para 20] [1118-F-G]

    Gopa/ Singh and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh          H
    1108    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A (2010) 6 SCC407: 2010 (6) SCR 1062; Rana Partap and
  Ors. vs. State of Hal)lana(1983) 3 SCC 327; State of H.P. vs.
  Mast Ram (2004) 8 SCC 660: 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 269;
  Lahu> Kamlakar Patil and Anr. vs. State ofMaharashtra 2012
  (12) SCALE 710 - relied on.
B
       4.2. In the present case, there would have been fear
  because, as alleged, the mother-in-law had forcibly taken
  away the deceased, but it is totally contrary to normal
  behaviour that PW-7 (mother of the deceased) would
  have maintained a sphinx-like silence and not inform
C others. She did not tell it to anyone for almost two days
  and it has not been explained why she had thought it apt
  to search for her daughter without even informing
  anyone else in the family or in the village or without going
  to the police station. In view of the fact situation, the trial
D court was absolutely justified in treating the conduct of
  the said witnesses unnatural and, therefore, felt that it was
  unsafe to convict the accused persons on the basis of
  their testimony. It was a plausible view and there were no
  compelling circumstances requiring a reversal of the
E judgment of acquittal. [Para 20] [1119-B-E]
                        Case Law Reference:
        1974 (1) SCR 489           relied on           Para 10

F       2007 (9) SCR 483            relied on           Para 11
        2007 (3) SCR 507            relied on           Para 11
        2007 (2) SCR 630            relied on          Para 12
        2011 (15) SCR 485           relied on           Para 12
G
        (1997) 5 sec 341            relied on           Para 13
        1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40 relied on                Para 14
        (1992) 4 sec 225            relied on           Para 14
H
  SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                 1109

    1993 Supp (3) SCC 667 relied on                 Para 14      A

    1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 174 relied on               Para 14

    2000 (1) SCR 855            relied on           Para 15

    2010 (6) SCR 1062           relied on           Para 17      B
    (1983) 3 sec 327            relied on           Para 18

    2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 269 relied on               Para 19

    2012 (12) SCALE 710         relied on           Para 19
                                                                 c
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1366 of 2007.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2005 of the
High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 937 of 1999.      D
                              WITH
Criminal.Appeal No. 508 of 2007.

    P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellants.

    Anitha Shenoy, Vishruti Vijay for the Respondent.            E

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The two appeals have been preferred
by the accused- appellants against the common judgment           F
dated 28.10.2005 in Criminal Appeal No. 937/1999 by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the Division Bench
has overturned the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned
1st Addi. Sessions Judge, Gulbarga, in S.C. No. 100/1995
acquitting all the accused persons of the offences under
Sections 143, 147, 448, 302, 201 read with Section 149 of the    G
Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and convicted the accused-
appellants for the said offences. For the pffence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 149 of IPC, each of them
was sentenced to· undergo imprisonment for life, and to pay a
                                                                 H
    1110     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A   fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo
    rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. In respect of
    other offences, no separate sentence was imposed by the High
    Court.

          2. Sans unnecessary details, the prosecution case is that
8
    the deceased, Karemma, was the wife of Mallinath, son of
    Ningawwa. After the unfortunate demise of Mallinath, dispute
    arose between Ningawwa, the mother-in-law of the deceased,
    and deceased Karemma, relating to certain landed property,
C   which initially stood in the name of Mallinath, and subsequently,
    the entries were made in name of deceased Karemma as she
    was in possession. The dispute relating to property which is
    dear to the human race as it stands in contradistinction to
    poverty, which is sometimes perceived as a cause of great
    calamity, eventually led, as alleged by the prosecution, to morbid
D   bitterness. In the intervening night of 12th and 13th June, 1994,
    accused- Ningawwa, along with her relatives formed an unlawful
    assembly in front of the house of Shankarappa, father of the
    deceased, with the common object to commit the murder and
    in execution of the said common object, they trespassed into
E   the house of Shankarappa during his absence where deceased
    Karemma was sleeping with her daughter, Jagadevi. After
    entering into the house, the accused persons assaulted the
    deceased, threatened the eleven year old girl, Jagadevi, and
    forcefully took the deceased away. After the mother was forcibly
F   removed from the house, Jagadevi proceeded to inform her
    grandmother, Chandamma, who, at that juncture, was residing
    in the house of another daughter. Being informed by the
    granddaughter, Chandamma came to the house of the
    deceased, searched for her daughter, but, eventually, it turned
G    to be an exercise in futility.

        3. As the prosecutiofi story would further uncurtain, the
    accused persons committed murder of the deceased Karemma
    and threw her dead body in a well situate at Benur village. The
    dead body was found on 15.6.1994 and thereafter, one
H
   SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                   1111
              [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Dasharath, PW-10, informed the fact at the concerned police         A
station. On 16.6.1994, the Investigating Officer went near the
well, removed the dead body of the deceased from inside the
well, held the inquest of the dead body as per Ext. P-7,
conducted the spot panchnama vide Ext Nos. 8 and 10, seized
certain articles, recorded statements of certain other witnesses    B
and, ultimately, about 8.00 P.M., re'gistered suo motu case
forming the subject matter of Crime No. 29/94 at Nelogi Police
Station. After completing the investigation, the prosecution
submitted the charge-sheet before the competent Court which,
in turn, transmitted the same to the Court of Session for trial.    c
     4. The accused persons abjured their guilt on ground of
false implication and claimed to be tried.

     5. In course of trial, the prosecution examined 17
witnesses, brought on record Exts. P-1 to P-17 and M.Os. 1 to       D
9. The defence chose not to adduce any evidence, but got
certain portion of the statements of PW-7 and PW-10 marked
during the cross-examination. During the pendency of the trial,
the accused Ningawwa, the mother-in-law of the deceased
expired, as a consequence of which, the trial abated against        E
her.

      6. The learned trial Judge framed four principal points for
consideration, namely, (i) whether the accused persons formed
an unlawful assembly with the common object to commit the
murder of Karemma; {ii) whether the accused persons had             F
trespassed into the house of Shankarappa; (iii) whether the
accused persons had thrown the dead·body into the well situate
at Benur village for causing disappearance of the evidence;· and
(iv} whether the accused persons had any motive to commit the
murder. After analyzing the evidence on record, the learned trial   G
Judge came to hold that the death was homicidal in nature; that
from the complaint Ext. P-6 lodged by PW"10, Dasharath,
nothing was relatable how the deceased had fallen into the well;
that it was not safe to record a conviction on the sole testimony
of Jagadevi, PW-9, since there were number of circumstances         H
    1112     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A due to which her version could not be given credence to; that
  the conduct of Chandamma, PW-7, could not be accepted to
  be in conformity with the expected normal human behaviour
  and, in fact, was quite unnatural since she did not intimate
  anyone about the incident after coming to know about it from
B her granddaughter; and that it was not safe to convict the
  accused persons for the offences alleged, regard being had
  to the totality of circumstances and, accordingly, acquitted them
  of all the charges.

         7. The High Court, after entertaining the appeal, opined
C   that there was a property dispute in existence between the
    deceased and her mother-in-law; that motive for commission
    of the crime had been brought home by the prosecution; that
    at the time of occurrence, Jagadevi, daughter of the deceased,
    was staying with the deceased; that the father of the deceased,
D   Shankarappa, had left the village along with his son and was
    residing at Sholapur during the relevant time of the incident; that
    Chandamma, the wife of PW-6, who had been staying in the
    house of another daughter at the relevant time was informed
    about the occurrence by PW-9; that the learned trial Judge had
E   erred by discarding the testimony of PW-7 on the ground that
    she had not informed about the incident to anyone in the village;
    that at the time when the deceased was removed forcibly from
    the house, PW-7 could not have anticipated that the deceased
    would be done to death and, therefore, they kept on searching
F   for the deceased; that PW-9 had the occasion to see the
    accused persons as there was source of light which had been
    inappositely disbelieved by the learned trial Judge; that
    Jagadevi, an eleven year old girl, could not have raised hue and
    cry because of the threat given by the accused persons; that
G   the evidence of PW-9 deserved to be given total credence and,
    hence, could safely be relied upon; that there was no reason
    on the part of PW-9 to falsely implicate the accused persons
    including her paternal grandmother Ningawwa; that the
    reactions of PW-7 and PW-9 should not have been regarded
H   as unnatural by the trial Court because every person reacts to
     SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                  1113
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

a situation in a different manner, for human behaviour differs       A
and varies from person to person depending upon the situation;
that as PW-7 and PW-9 were terrified of the accused persons,
they could not lodge the complaint against them and it got
support from the fact that only after the recovery of the dead
body, the Investigating Officer registered a suo motu case; that     B
though there had been some delay in recording the statements
of certain witnesses by the Investigating Officer, yet that should
not have been regarded to have created a dent in the
prosecution case; and that the appreciation and analysis of the
evidence by the learned trial Judge was not correct and the view     c
expressed by him not being a plausible one deserved to be
reversed. Being of this view, the High Court unsettled the
judgment, convicted the accused-appellants and imposed the
sentence as has been stated hereinbefore.

      8. We have heard Mr. P.R. Ramasesh, learned counsel for        D
the appellants, and Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned counsel for the
respondent-State.

      9. The first submission of Mr. Ramasesh, learned counsel
for the appellants, is that the High Court has erroneously           E
unsettled the decision of the trial court by holding that the view
expressed by the learned trial Judge is unreasonable. It is his
further submission that the High Court has reviewed the entire
evidence in an unusual manr:ier which is impermissible. Ms.
Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the State, would contend that      F
the appellate power of the High Court against a judgment of
acquittal cannot be curtailed if the finding based on
appreciation of evidence is totally perverse. It is urged by her
that the evidence of the sole eye witness, Jagadevi, PW-9, has
been rightly relied upon by the High Court.
                                                                     G
    10. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to the dictum
in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and Another v. State of
Maharashtra 1, wherein a three-Judge Bench has opined thus:-

1.   AIR 1973 SC 2622.                                               H
    1114      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A        " ..... there are no fetters on the plenary power of the
         Appellate Court to revie~ the whole evidence on which the
         order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to
         scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed,
         however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable
B        innocence attributed to the accused having been
         converted into an acquittal the homage of our
         jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the
         higher court not to upset the finding without very convincing
         reasons and comprehensive consideration.•
c       11. Similar view has been expressed in Girija Prasad
    (dead) by LRs. v. State of M. P. 2 and State of Goa v. Sanjay
    Thakran 3.

       12. From the aforesaid authorities, it is clear as day that
D while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the High Court
  has a duty to scrutinize the evidence and sometimes it is an
  obligation on the part of the High Court to do so. The power is
  not curtailed by any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure. It is also worthy to note that while reappreciating
E and reconsidering the evidence upon which the order of
  acquittal is based, certain other principles pertaining to other
  facets are to be borne in mind. The said aspects have been
  encapsuled in Chandrappa v. State of Kamataka 4 as under: -

          "(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
F         in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour
          of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
          available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
          jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
          innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court
G         of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,
          the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,

    2.   (2007) 7 sec 625.
    3.   (2001) 3 sec 755.
H 4. (2007) 4 sec 415.
     SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                    1115
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.                  A

      (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
      of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
      disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

     Quite apart from the above, the High Court is required to         B
see that unless there are substantial and compelling
circumstances, the order of acquittal is not required to be
reversed in appeal. It has been so stated in State of Rajasthan
v. Shera Ram @ Vishnu Dutta 5•
                                                                       c
      13. From the analysis of the High Court, it is discernible
that it has not accepted the appreciation of evidence made by
the learned trial Judge pertaining to the testimonies of PWs-7
and 9 and has further based its reasoning on the bedrock that
there was a property dispute between the deceased and her              o
mother-in-law which provided motive for commission of the
crime. The High Court has also expressed the view that
conviction can be recorded on the basis of the sole testimony
of a child witness. It is not in dispute that PW-9, Jagadevi, was
eleven years old at the time of the occurrence. In Dattu Ramrao        E
 Sakhare and others v. State of Maharashtra 6 , while dealing
with the reliability of witness who was ten years old, this Court
 opined that a child witness, if found competent to depose to
 the facts and reliable, such evidence could form the basis of
 conviction. The evidence of a child witness and the credibility
                                                                       F
 thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case.
 The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while
 assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness
must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any
other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being
tutored. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to lay down that there        G
is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such a
witness should be corroborated before a conviction can be

5. (2012) 1 sec eo2.
s.    (1997) 5 sec 341.                                                H
    1116      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A   allowed to stand but, as a rule of prudence, the court always
    finds it desirable to seek the corroboration to such evidence
    from other dependable evidence on record.

         14. In Panchhi and Others v. State of U.P. 7, it has been
    held thus: -
8
          "Courts have laid down that evidence of a child witness
          must find adequate corroboration.before it is relied on. It
          is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law (vide
          Prakash v. State of M.P. 8, Baby Kandayanathil v. State
C         of Kerafa 9, Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar10 and Dattu
          Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (supra)."

        15. Similar view has been expressed in State of U.P. v.
    Ashok Dixit and another11 •
D      16. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon
  the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of
  conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated
  by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say, the
  corroboration is not a must to record a conviction, but as a rule
E of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the
  corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record.
  The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary
  statement of witness, namely, that the statement is true and
  correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the
F ground of lack of corroboration, applies to a child witness who
  is competent and whose version is reliable.
       17. The trustworthiness of the version of PWs-7 and 9 are
  to be tested on the aforesaid touchstone and it is to be seen
G whether the other circumstances do support the prosecution
    1.   (1998) 1 sec 111.
    8.   (1992) 4 sec 225.
    9.   1993 Supp (3) sec 667.
    10. (1996) 9 sec 287.
H 11. (2000) 3 sec 10.
  SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     1117
             [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

case or to put it differently, whether the evidence brought on       A
reccrd proves the guilt of the accused persons beyond
reasonable doubt. PW-9, the daughter of the deceased, has
testified to have witnessed the accused appellants being
exhorted by her paternal grandmother, Ningawwa, who had
trespassed into the house and forcibly took out her mother. She      B
had, as is reflected, immediately rushed to the house of her
maternal grandmother and disclosed it to her. It has been
elicited in the cross-examination that her maternal grandmother
was staying with her another married daughter and both the
daughter and son-in-law were at home. She did not choose it          c
appropriate to inform them about the incident. It is manifest, the
grandmother, PW-7, came with her granddaughter, PW-9, to
the house of the deceased and tried to search for her. Despite
the search becoming a Sisyphean endeavour and non effective,
she chose to remain silent and did not inform any one. The High      0
Court has accepted the version of these two witnesses on two
counts, namely, that the daughter was threatened and both of
them were in state of fear. The learned trial Judge, on the
contrary, had found the aforestated conduct of both the
witnesses to be highly unnatural. In Gopa/ Singh and others v.       E
 State of Madhya Pradesh 12, this Court did not agree with the
 High Court which had accepted the statement of an alleged eye
 witness as his conduct was unnatural and while so holding, it
 observed as follows: -
     "We also find that the High Court has accepted the              F
     statement of Feran Singh, PW 5 as the eye witness of the
     incident ignoring the fact that his behaviour was unnatural
     as he claimed to have rushed to the village but had still
     not conveyed the information about the incident to his
     parents and others present there and had chosen to
     disappear for a couple of hours on the specious and             G
     unacceptable plea that he feared for his own safety."
     18. In Rana Partap and others v. State of Haryana 13, while
12. c2010) e sec 407.
13. (1983) 3 sec 327.                                                H
    1118     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 5 S.C.R.


A   dealing with the behaviour of the witnesses, this Court has
    opined thus: -
        "Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own
        way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand
        rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start
B       wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to
        keep themselves as far removed from the spot as
        possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even
        going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants.
        Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set
c       rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a
        witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular
        manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic
        and unimaginative way."
        19. In State of H.P. v. Mast Ram 14, it has been stated that
D there is no set rule that one must react in a particular way, for
  the natural reaction of man is unpredictable. Everyone reacts
  in his own way and, hence, natural human behaviour is difficult
  to prove by credible evidence. It has to be appreciated in the
  context of given facts and circumstances of the case. Similar
E view has been reiterated in Lahu Kamlakar Patil and anr. v.
  State of Maharashtra 15•
       20. Thus, the behaviour of witnesses or their reactions
  would differ from situation to situation and individual to
F individual. Expectation of uniformity in the reaction of witnesses
  would be unrealistic but the court cannot be oblivious of the fact
  that even taking into account the unpredictability of human
  conduct and lack of uniformity in human reaction, whether in the
  circumstances of the case, the behaviour is acceptably natural
  allowing the variations. If the behaviour is absolutely unnatural,
G the testimony of the witness may not deserve credence and
  acceptance. In the case at hand, PW-9 was given a threat when
  her mother was forcibly taken away but she had the courage
    14. (2004) a sec 660.
H   15. 2012 (12) SCALE 710.
   SHIVASHARANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                      1119
              [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

to walk in the night to her grandmother who was in her mid-            A
fifties. After coming to know about the incident, it defies
commonsense that the mother would not tell her other daughter
and the son-in-law about the kidnapping of the deceased by
her mother-in-law. It is interesting to note that the High Court
has ascribed the reason that PW-7 possibly wanted to save the          B
reputation of the deceased-daughter and that is why she did
 not inform the other daughter and son-in-law. That apart, the fear
factor has also been taken into consideration. Definitely, there
would have been fear because, as alleged, the mother-in-law
 had forcibly taken away the deceased, but it is totally contrary      c
 to normal behaviour that she would have maintained a sphinx-
 like sile.nce and not inform others. It is also worthy to note that
 she did not tell it to anyone for almost two days and it has not
 been explained why she had thought it apt to search for her
 daughter without even informing anyone else in the family or in
                                                                       0
 the village or without going to the police station. In view of the
 obtaining fact situation, in our considered opinion, the learned
trial Judge was absolutely justified in treating the conduct of the
said witnesses unnatural and, therefore, felt that it was unsafe
 to convict the accused persons on the basis of their testimony.       E
 It was a plausible view and there were no compelling
 circumstances requiring a reversal of the judgment of acquittal.
 True it is, the powers of the appellate court in an appeal against
 acquittal are extensive and plenary in nature to review and
 reconsider the evidence and interfere with the acquittal, but then
 the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the       F
 basis of the evidence on record and not that it can take one
 more possible or a different view.
     21. In view of the aforesaid premises, the appeals are
allowed and the judgment of conviction passed by the High              G
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 937 of 1999 is set aside and the
accused-appellants are acquitted of the charges. As the
appellants are already on bail, they be discharged of their bail
bonds.

K.K.T.                                          Appeals allowed.       H