SHLOK BHARDWAJversusRUNIKABHARDWAJ & ORS.

                    .'   ,.      [2014] 14S.C.R.1372


A    "\•   .                    . SHLOK BHARDWAJ,
                                         v.
                              RUNIKABHARDWAJ & ORS.
                         · (CrimlnalAppealNo.741 of2009)
B,   ..
                                 DECEMBER 10, 2014
                   [SUDHANSU
                    .        JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
                                   . .          AND
                              ADARSHKUMAR GOEL, JJ.]
c       Jurisdiction· - Revisional jurisdiction of High Court -
  Scope of - Matrimonial dispute - Divorce Petition by
  husband as well as wife - Criminal Case by wife u/ss. 498-A,
  406, 506 /PC and ss. 314 of Dowry Prohibition Act resulting ·
  in acquittal of husband and his relatives by the trial court-
D On parties reaching settlement, divorce by mutual consent
  granted - Thereafter, wife challenging the acquittal order -
  High Court in its revisional jurisdiction set aside the acquittal
  order and remanded the matter for trial afresh - Held: Scope
  of revisional jurisdiction is limited- High Court could interfere
E with acquittal order only when it was perverse - In the present
  case order of the trial court was not perverse ..:. Hence
  interference therewith not justified specially when the parties
  had taken divorce by mutualconsent- Penal Code, 1860-.
  ss, 498-A, 406 and 506 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - ss.
F 3/4- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- s. 401 .
     .:        Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. The scope of revisional jurisdiction of the
  High Court does not extend to re~appreciation of
  evidence. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High
G Court can interfere with the acquittal only if there is
  perversity in the order of acquittal. In the present case,
  the order of acquittal could not be held to be perverse.
  The Magistrate having dealt with the matter threadbare,
  the High Court, in exercise of revision al jurisdiction was
H          ;

         \ :· ,;.,
               .
                             1372
  SH LOK BHARDWAJ v. RUN IKA BHARDWAJ & ORS.                  1373


not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal A
particularly when the parties had reached the settlement
before this Court on the basis of which divorce by mutual
consent was granted by the Family Court. [Para 12]
[1377-F-H; 1378-D-E]
     Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State ofBihar(2002)      B.
     6 SCC 650: 2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 495- relied
     on.
                                     .   '

        2. Once the matter was settled between the parties
and the said settlement was given effect to in the form of c
divorce by mutual consent, no further dispute survived
between the parties. No liberty was reserved by the wife
to continue further proceedings agaim~t the. husband.
Thus, the wife was, after settling the matter, estopped
fro'.11 continuing the proceedings. [Para 12][1377-E-F]    D
                  Case Law Reference
     2002 (1) Suppl. SCR 495      relied on    Para 9
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 741 of2009.
                                                              E
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2006 of the
Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1159 of 2002.
     Appellant-in-person.
    B. K. Satija, Kamlendra Mishra, Advs., for the
Respondents.                                                  F
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. This appeal has _been
preferred against the Judgment and Order dated 21st
November, 2006 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in G
Criminal Revision Case No.1159 of 2002.
     2. By the impugned order, the High Court has allowed
the revision petition filed by the Respondent, set aside the
order dated 30'h July, 2002 passed by Judicial Magistrate,
Ghaziabad, in Case No.356 of 2002 and remanded the matter H
, 1374     · SUPREME COURT REPORTS                I· [2014] 14 S.C.R.



 · A · back to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with
       law.                                                  · ,
            3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. ·
            4. The question raised for our consideration is whether
  B. in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court was justified
      in setting aside the acquittal of the appellant, having regard to
    · the facts and circumstances of the case.'                      ·
                                                                '.
            5. The appellant and Respondent No.1 were married on
      25th January, 1996. The appellant belongs to Allahabad where
  C his parents live and the respondent belonged to Jabalpurwhe;re
      her parents are living. The appellant is said to be employed at
      Delhi in Central Government. The appellant-husband filed a
      divorce petition on 7th July, 1997 at Allahabad Family Court.
      The wife lodged First Information Report dated 4th November,
  D 1997 at Ghaziabad making allegations of cruelty agains,t the
      husband. After investigation, the husband and four of his family
      members were tried under Sections 498-A, 406, 506 IPC and
      3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act before the Judicial Magistrate,
      Ghaziabad, in Case No.356/2002. The trial ended in acquittal
  E of all the accused including the appellant vide Order dated
      30th July, 2002.
           6. The divorce petition filed by the husband was ordered
     to be transferred to Jabalpur at the instance of the wife. The
    wife also filed a divorce petition at Jabalpur. The husband
  F filed Transfer Petition (Civil) No.150 of 2004 before this Court
    which was disposed of on 11th March, 2005. This Court noted
    that since both the parties had sought divorce, the marriage
    had broken down and the parties had agreed to a decree of
    divorce by mutual consent. Accordingly, this Court directed
  G the Family Cou'rt, Jabalpur, to take up the matter on 4th April,
     2005 without eritertairiir:ig any prayer for adjournment and pass
    ·~'decree of divorce. Accordingly, the Family Court, J~ba!pur
    passed the· decree of divorce on 4th April, 2005 after recoh:Jing
    the statement of the parties that they mutually agreed to oecree
  H
c;        SHLOK BHARDWAJ v. RUNIKA BHARDWAJ & ORS. • 1375
                  [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

of divorce. The wife did not press her counter claim for · A
maintenance. She also did not reserve liberty for any other
action againstthe husband.
  . . 7. It may be mentioned that against the Order of the
Magis.trate acquitting the appellant and his family membe,rs, ..
the Respondent-wife had preferred Criminal Revision No.~ 159 · B
of 2002 before the Allahabad High Court. The husband filed
affidavit dated 41h September, 2006 placing on record the order
of this Court and the order of the Family Court, Jabalpur and
also mentioning that after the dissolution of marriage, the wife
has re-married and in view of the order of this Court and the C
Family Couit, the revision petition ought to be dis'!lissed.
         8. The High Court, instead of dismissing the revision·
  petition, without referring to the above developments, allowed
  the revision petition by the impugned order with the observation .0
  that documents Exhibit Ka2 and Ka3 showed harassment,
  cruelty and mental torture and the Magistrate had skipped over
  the facts and wrongly acquitted the appellant. Aggrieved by
  the said order, the appellant has approached this Court as
  already noticed above.
                                                                     E
         9. The appellant appearing. in person submitted that the
  parties had taken divorce by mutual consent as per agreement
  reached before this Court and thereafter, the respondent was
  n9t justified in proceeding against the appellant. It was further
  submitted that the High Court failed to advert to the settlement F
  between the parties and also exceeded its jurisdiction in setting
  aside the order of acquittal. The Magistrate in its detailed
  order duly appreciated the entire evidence and found that no
  case for cruelty was made out against the appellant. In exercise
  of revisional jurisdiction, the said acquittal could not be.'set . G
  aside in absence of perversity. Reliance has been placed.on
  Judgment of this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs .
. State of Bihart laying down as follows :       ·
     1
         (2002) 6 sec 650
                                                                    H
1376    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  ' [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A       "12. We have carefully considered the material on record
         and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified
         in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming
         to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the
         informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
 B       Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms
         provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed
         to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal
         into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which
         places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court,
 c       prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into
         one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and
         extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401
         of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the·High Court
         could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of
 D       conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the
         method of ordering a. retrial. It is well settled by a catena
         of decisions of this Court that the High ~Court will
         ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of
         acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest
 E       of public justice requires interference for the correction
         of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross
         miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be
         justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely
                                              a
         because the trial court has taken wrong view of the
 F       Jaw or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither
         possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of
         circumstances in which exercise of revisional
        jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court
         have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional
         jurisdiction by the P-ligh Court under Section 401 of the
 G
         Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against
       . acquittal by a private party. (See D. Stephens v.
         Nosibolla [AIR (1951) SC 196], K. Chinnaswamy
         Reddy v. State of A.P [AIR (1962) SC 1788], Akalu
         Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram [(1973) 2 SCC 583], Pakalapati
 H
     SHLOK BHARDWAJ v. RUNIKABHARDWAJ & ORS.                        1377
        ..   [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

       Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda A
       Appadu[(1975) 4 SCC 477] and Mahendra Pratap
       Singh v. Sarju Singh [AIR (1968) SC 707].)
    / 10. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other
  harid, submitted that even though the parties had re-married
  after obtaining divorce by mutual consent as noticed above,       B
· the wife was not debarred from pursuing the criminal case
  against the appellant. He further submitted that the High Court
  was justified in setting aside the order of the Magistrate and
  remitting the matter back for a fresh decision.
                                                                    c
      11. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival
 submissions. We are satisfied that the view taken by the High
 Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not just
 and fair and needs to be set aside.
        12. It is clear from perusal of the impugned order of the D
 High Court that the development of settlement between the
 parties during pendency of the revision petition has not even
 been adverted to. Once the matter was settled between the
 parties and the said settlement was given effect to in the form
 of divorce by mutual consent, no further dispute survived E
 between the parties, though it was not so expressly recorded ·
 in the order of this Court. No iiberty was reserved by the wife
 to continue further proceedings against the husband. Thus,
 the wife was, after settling the matter, estopped from continuing
 the proceedings. In any case, it is well settled that the scope F
 of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court does not extend to
 re-appreciation of evidence. In exercise of revisional
 jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere with the acquittal only
 if there is perversity in the order of acquittal. In the present
 case, the order of acquittal could not be.held to be perverse. G
 The High Court ob.served that the demand of articles, papers
 of house property of Jabalpur and Naida and the contents of
 Exhibits Ka2 and Ka3 amounted to harassment, cruelty and
 mental torture. This observation amounted to substitution of
                                                                    H
1378             SUPREME COURTREPORTS                  ' [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A      its view by the High Court for the view taken by the Magistrate
       after due consideration of all the allegations. The Magistrate
       inter a/ia found the version of the respondent-wife to be not
        believable and also found that the allegations were not
       substantiated. It was obser\ted that the wife herself admitted
 B ~ that the documents Exhibit Ka2 and Ka3 were merely guidelines
       for good conduct and·behavior expected of her and did riot
       amount.to cruelty.: !twas also adinitted 1that there .was no
       demand 9f dowry at the time of marriage. The Investigating
       Officer had. never visited Jabalpur and the demand of house
 c     at Jabalpur was not substantiated. It was further observed
       that criminal case filed by the wife was a counter blast to the
       divorce case filed by the husband. Version before the Court
       was improvement over the original version in the First
        Information Report. She had given contradictory statement
 D about the place where her husband demanded the house.
       Thus, the Magistrate having dealt with the matter threadbare,
       the High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction was not
       justified in interfering with the order of acquittal particularly when
       the parties had reached the settlement before this Court on
 E . · the basis of which divorce by mutual consent was granted by
       the Family Court, Jabalpur Which fact was placed on record of
       the High Court.
             13. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside
       the impugned order passed by the High Court and.restore the
 F     order of the Magistrate.


       Kalpana K. Tripathy                                    Appeal allowed .




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