Supreme Court of India
SMT. ANGOORI DEVI FOR RAM RATANversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 362
- Decided
- 6 December 1988
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Bench
- G L OZA
Holding
Detention under the National Security Act, 1980, was invalid because the grounds cited did not have a requisite nexus with public order.
Summary
Two Delhi Police personnel, Ram Ratan (Head Constable) and Hawa Singh (Constable), were arrested for assaulting a rickshaw puller and seizing TV parts, offences under IPC sections 392 and 34. While the criminal case was pending, the Commissioner of Police detained them under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, alleging that their conduct created a sense of insecurity and threatened public order. The petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 32 seeking habeas corpus relief, contending that the ground of detention had no nexus with public order but was merely a matter of law and order. The Supreme Court examined the distinction between "public order" and "law and order" and held that preventive detention must be based on a genuine connection to public order; an isolated criminal act by police officers without broader impact does not satisfy this requirement. Consequently, the Court quashed the detention orders, set the detainees at liberty, and affirmed that the same preventive‑detention standards apply to police as to the public.
Issues considered
- Whether the ground of detention under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, must have a nexus with "public order" or can be based on "law and order".
- Whether preventive detention law applies differently to police personnel compared to ordinary citizens.
- Whether the subsequent dismissal of the detainees from service affects the validity of the detention.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 32
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 392
- National Security Act, 1980s. 3(2)
Subjects
National Security Actpreventive detentionpublic orderlaw and orderpolice misconducthabeas corpusArticle 32preventive detention standards
Judgment
SMT. ANGOORI DEVI FOR RAM RATAN
A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. '
DECEMBER 6, 1988
[G.L. OZA AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETIY, JJ.] B
National Security Act, 1980,· s. 3_.:_Detenus-Two police person·
nel in Seeurity Unit-Offence committed u/s 392/34 I.P.C.-An
isolated criminal act-Does not disturb 'public order'-'Public Order'
and 'law and order'-Distinction between.
The detenu, in the writ petitions filed· by the petitioners under C
Article 32 of the Constitution, belonged to the Security Unit of Delhi
Police. While on duty, they were alleged to have stopped a ·rickshaw
puller who was carrying some goods to a transport company. They
0
caught bold of him and started beating him and asked for a receipt for
the goods. Thereafter they removed the goods from the rickshaw and D
went away in a T .S.R. The aforesaid goods was recovered from their
possession and a case under Section 392/34 I.P.C. was registered
against them. Thereafter they were arrested and placed under suspen·
sion. The court, however, released them on bail. While the case was
under investigation, the Commissioner of Police, Delhi detained them
u 1s 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 on the ground that the above E
criminal activity of the detenu has created a sense of insecurity in the .,
minds of public at large and is pre·judicial to the maintenance of public
order.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the said orders
are bad in law, since the ground of detention has no nexus to the 'public F
order', but purely a matter for 'law and order'. Counsel for the respon·
dents, on the other hand, argued that though the incident in question
was a simple case of robbery, since It was committed by persons belong·
Ing to the disciplined police force, it would certainly disturb the public
safety in the life of the community with a sense of insecurity In their
minds and therefore the detention orders were justified. · G
Allowing the writ petitions,
HELD: (1) The orders of detention are quashed. The detenu
Ram Ratan and Hawa Singh are set at liberty forthwith. [1030F]
H
'
1023
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
A (2) The law of pre,·entive detention is not different to police
personnel. It is the same law that is applied to police as well as to public.
Therefore, this Court cannot apply a 'different standard in respect of
acts Individually committed by any police officer. [1027DJ
3(1) The subjective satisfaction of tbe detaining authority with
B respect to the persons sought to be detained should be based only on the
nature of the activities disclosed by the grounds of detention. The
grounds of detention must have nexus with the purpose for which the
detention.is made. [1027E] · ·
3(ii) The impact on 'public order' and 'law and order' dep~nds
upon the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive
c force behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without directly or
indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community' it may be a
matter of law and order only. But where tbe gravity of the act is
otherwise and likely to endanger the public tranquility, it may fall
within the orbit of the 'public order?. What might be an ~therwise
0 simple 'law and order' situation might assume the gravity and mischief
of a 'public-order' problem by reason alone of the manner of circums-
tances in which or the place at which it is carried-out. Necessarily,
much depends upon tbe nature of the act, the, place where it is commit-
ted and ~he sinister significance attached to it. Ho2sc-:ET .
E In the instant case, the offence was committed by two misguided
police men under the cover of darkness with the assistance of a ·member
of the public. It is an isolated criminal c..Se with no sinister significance
attached to it. It was certainly suicidal to those two police personnel.
But it seems to have no connection whatsoever to disturb the 'public
order' having regard to the circumstances of the case. (103-0D-E]
F
·Superintendent, Central 'Prison,· Fatehga;h v. Ram Manohar
Lohia, (1960] 2 SCR 821; Ayya Alias Ayub v. The State of U.P. &
Anr., Judgment Today 1988 Vol. 4 p. 489 (at 496); Abdul Aziz v. The
Distt. Magistrate Burdwtin & Ors., [1973] 2 SCR 646 and Mohd. Dhtina
Ali Khan v. State of West Bengal, (1975] Suppl. SCR 124followed. -. ,:
G J
ORIGINAL JURISOICilON:· W1it Petitioq {Cr!) Nos. 353 and
491of 1988.
(Under Article 32 of the_Constitution ~f India).
H A.S. Pundir for the Petitioners.
SMT. ANGOORI DEVI v. U.0.1. [SHE'ITY, J.I 1025
V.C. Mahajan, Mrs. A. Katiyar, Dalveer Bhandari and Ms. A
A
Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATIIA SHETTY, J. These two petitions under Art.
32 of the Constitutfon are for issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus for the B
release of Ram Ratan and Hawa Singh, who have been detained under
sec. 3(2) of the National Security Act of 1980.
Ram Ratan was a Head Constable and Hawa Singh was a Const·
able in the Security Unit of Delhi Police. While on duty, they were
together said to have committed a cognizable offence under Sec. 392/ C
34 of IPC alongwith a member of the public. Immediately thereafter
they were arreste·a and placed on suspension. The Court, however,
released them on bail". While the case was under investigation, the
Commissioner of Police. Delhi (Mr. Vijay Karan) thought fit to detain
them under the National Security Act. Accordingly, he made the
orders which are impugned herein. Subsequently, they have been sum- D
marily dismissed from service under Article 3 ll(ii)(b) of the
Constitution.
The principal contention urged for the petitioners relates to the
oft-repeated question-that the ground of detention has no nexus to
the "public order", but purely a matter for "law and order". ·E
In order to appreciate the contention urged in this regard, it will
be necessary to have regard to the orders of detention. The orders
passed against the two detenu are on different dates, but are similar in
terms and it may be sufficient if we reter to one of the orders. The
ground of detention in each case relates to one incident which has been F
stated as follows:
"That on 22. 7 .88, one Shri Ja:;bir Singh S/o Shri
' lnder Singh R/o 5869/3 Ambala City (Haryana) reported
that on 21.7.88 he purchased some T.V. parts from Lajpat
Rai Market. After purchase, he loaded the TV parts on a G
rickshaw and asked the rickshaw puller Shanker S/o Shri
Vasudev R/o Old Lajpat Ra; Market, Near Hanuman
Mandir, who was known to him to take the TV parts to
Patiala Transport near Libra Service Station G.T.K. Road.
He h:mself went alone to Patiala Transport and waited for
the rickshaw puller. ·At about 11.00 pm, the rickshaw H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
~·
puller informed him that two police personnel namely H.C.
A
Ram Ratan and Constable Hawa Singh who were pre-
!·
viously posted in P .S. Kotwali along with a member of the
public '!rabhu Dayal wno he knew has stopped his rickshaw
near l:l l:llock, Industrial Area, G.T.K. Roact. Head Const-
able Ram Ratan caught him and started beating him and
B asked for a receipt for the goods. Constable Hawa Singh
ancic';abhu Dayal removed the parts and loaded in a TSR
and went away."
It was also stated that those T. V. parts were recovered from the
detenu and the case was registered under sec. 392/34 IPC in which the
investigation was progressing.
c
There then, it was said:
"From the above criminal activity of Shri Ram Ratan
it is clear that he, being a Police Officer and bound to
D provide security and safety to the public, has himself com-
milted a heinous offence which has created a sense of inse-
curity in the minds of public at large and is pre-judicial to
tne mamtcnance of public order. •
'
1'..eeping in view the above criminal activity of the i:"
E said Head Constable Ram Ratan, it has been felt necessary
to detain him U/S 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 so
that his such activity which is prejudicial to the main-
tenance ol public order could be stopped
xxx xxx xxx xxx
F
Sd1- (Vi jay Karan)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: Delhi"
j!
, As is obvious from the order, the Commissioner was satisfied ....
with the need to detain the person, firstly because, the person being a ,.
G police officer was boutid to provide security and safety to the public
and secondly, the offence committed was "heinous" which has createct
a >ense of msecunty in the minds of the public at large.
,
i he same was highlighted before us by Shri Mahajan, learned
counsel for the respondents justifying the detention orders. The
H counsel argued that though the incident in question was a simple case {
t-• •: ~- c:tj_~,'!'!-!!
- _, /.'":;:::
-·<::
SMT. ANGOORI DEVI v. U.0.1. ISHETTY, J.J 1027
of robbery, since it was committed by persons belonging to the disci- A
plined police force, it would certainly disturb the public safety in the
life ·of the community with a sense of msecurity in their minds.
. '!• It is true that the detenu belonged to the police force in the
I
national capital. Public look for the police for safety. Society regards
them as their guardian for its protection. Society needs a properly B
trained and well disciplined police force whom it can trust in all
respects. They are the real frontline of our defence against violence.
They have to maintain law and order. They have to safeguard our
freedoms and liberty. They have to prevent crime and when crime is
committed, they have to detect it and bring the accused to justice.
They must be available at all hours. They are always expected to act
and indeed must act properly. it is reprehensible if they themselves C
indulge in criminal activities.
We are not, as we cannot, be unmindful of the danger to liberties
of people when guardians of law and order themselves indulge in un-
desirable acts. But the law of preventive detention is not different to D
police personnel. It is the same law that we apply to police as well as to
public. We cannot, therefore, apply a different standard in respect of
acts individually conunitted by any police officer. The subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority with respect to the persons
sought to be detained should be based only on the nature of the
activities disclosed by the grounds of detention. The grounds of deten- E
tion must have nexus with the purpose for which the detention is
made. ·
The question in this case is whether the crime in question has any
impact on ·'public order" as such. Courts have strived to give to this
concept a narrower construction than what the literal words suggest. F
In the Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar
Lohia, [ 1960] .:. SCR 32 i Subba Rao, J., as he then was, observed (at
833):
"But in India under Art. 19(2) this wide concept of
"public order'' is split up under different heads. It enables G
the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the right to freedom of speech and expression i.n the
interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or· in
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to
an offence. All the grounds mentioned therein can .he H
"'
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
A brought under the general head "pubik ~rder" in its most
comprehensive sense. But the juxtaposition of the different
grounds indicates that, though sometimes they tend to
overlap, they must be ordinarily intended to exclude each
other. "Public order•· is therefore something which is
demarcated from the others. In that limited sense, particu-
B larly in view of the history of the amendment, it can be
postulated that "public order'' is synonymous with public
peace, safety and tranquility."
'The impact on "public order'' and "law and order" depends
updn the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive
c force behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without directly
or indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may
be a matter of law and order only. But where the gravity of the act is
otherwise and likely to endanger the public tranquility, it may fall
within the orbit of the public order. This is precisely the distinguishing
D feature between the two concepts. Sometimes, as observed by Ven-
katachaliah, J. in Ayya Alias Ayub v. The State of U.P. & Anr., Judl(-
mcnt Today 1988 Vol. 4 p. 489 (at 496): "what might be an otherwise
simple "law and order'' situation might assume the gravity and mis-
chief of a "public-order" problem by reason alone of the manner or
circumstances in which or the place at which it is carried-out." Neces-
E sarily, much depends upon the nature of the act the place where it is
committed and the sinister significance attached to it.
As for example dare devil repeated criminal acts, open shoot
out, throwing bomb at public places, committing serious offences in
public transport, armed persons going on plundering public properties
F or terrorising people may create a sense of insecurity in the public
mind and may have an impact on "public order". Even certain murder
committed by persons in lonely places with the definite object of
promoting the cause of the party to which they belong may also affect
the maintenance of 'public order'.
G In Abdul Aziz v. The Distt. Magistrate Burdwan & Ors., [1973] 2
SCR 646 this Court has stated so. There two grounds were furnished to
the detenu in justification of the order of detention. It was stated:
"firstly, that the petitioner and his associates were mem-
bers of an extremist party (CPI-ML), that on 16th August
H 197 J, they armed themselves with lethal weapons like ; :
SMT. ANGOORI DEVI v. U.0.1. [SHETfY, J:I 1029
firearms, choppers and daggers with a view to promoting A
the cause of their party, that they raided the house of one
Durgapada Rudra and murdered him and that the afore-
said incidents created a general sense of insecurity, as a
result of which the residents of the locality could not follow
their normal avocations for a consider~!Jle period.
The second ground of detention is that on 22nd .May, 1971 the B
petitioner and his associates raided the house of Smt.
Kshetromoni Choudhury and· murdered one Umapada
Mallick who was staring in that house. This incident is also
stated to have created a general sense of insecurity amongst
the residents of the locality."
Repelling the connection in that case that the two incidents refer-
c
red to above are but simple cases .:if murder germane to law and order
but could have no impact on public order Chandrachud, J. as he then
vas, said (at p. 648):
"A short answer to this contention is that the murders are D
stated to have been committed. by the petitioner and his .
associates with the definite object of promoting the cause
of the party to which they belonged. These, therefore, are
not stray or simple- cases of murder as contended by the
learned counsel. Such incidents have serious repercussions
not merely on law and order but on public order." E
. In Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan v. State of West Bengal, [ 1975] Suppl.
SCR U4 this Court had an occasion to consider the detention of a
person under the maintenance of Internal Security Act, 197 1 regarding
a single instance of theft in a running train at night. The acts attributed
to the detenu in that case were that on 3.8.1973 between 2110 and 2120 F
hrs., the detenu and his associate being armed with daggers boarded a
3rd class compartment of SL 257 UP train of E. Railway Sealdah
Division at Gocharan Railway Station. They put the passengers of the
compartment to fear of death and snatched away a wrist watch and a
gold necklace from one Nirmal Chatterjee and his wife in between
Gocharan and Surajpur Railway Stations. Then they decamped with · G
booty from the running train at Suryapur Railway Station. It was con-
tended in that case that the said single incident referred to have not
even casual connection with the disturbance of public order. Fazal Ali,
J. while rejecting that contention said (at 126): ·
"From a perusal of this we are unable to accept the H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
I
A content10n of the petitioner that this ground has no nexus
with the disturbance of public order. It is true that the
ground contains a single incident of theft of valuable pro-
perty from some passengers travelling in a running train
and may amount to robbery. But that does not by itself
B take the case out of the purview of the provisions of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act. There are two per-
tinent facts which emerge from the grounds which must be
noted. In the first place the allegation is that the petitioner
had snatched away a wrist watch and a gold necklace after
putting the passengers of the compartment to fear of death.
Secondly, the theft had taken place at night in a running
c train in a third class compartment and the effect of it would
be to deter peaceful citizens from travelling in trains at
night and this would undoubtedly disturb the even tempo
of the life of the community."
We have carefully examined the act complained of in the present
D
case in the light of the principles stated above. It is an isolated criminal
case with no sinister significance attached to it. The offence was com-
mitted by two misguided police men under the cover of darkness with
the assistance of a member of the public. It was certainly suicidal to
those two police personnel. But it seems to have no connection what-
soever to disturb the 'public order' having regard to the circumstances
o: the case.
The last contention urged for the petitione" that the detention
would be illegal in view of dismissal of detenu from service is really
without merit. The subsequent order of dismissal is not germane to
examine the validity of the detention.
F'
In the result the rule is made absolute. The orders of detention )
impugned in these cases are q°uashed. The detenu Ram Ratan and
Hawa Singh be set at liberty forthwith.
M.L.A. Petitions allowed.
G
)
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