SMT. SNEH PRABHAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANR.

A                            SMT. SNEH PRABHA
                                     v.
                           STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.

                               NOVEMBER 15, 1995

B             [K. RAMASWAMY AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.]

          Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Section 4(1)

          Land Acquisition-Issue of Land Policy by State-Benefits under given
c   only to person whose land was acquired-Person musr be owner on the date
    of publication of notification for acquisition of land-Appellant purchasing
    land after publication of notificatiort-Not entitled to benefits of Land Policy.

          Constitution of India, 1950: Article 14.

           Land Acquisition Proceedings-Issue of Land Policy by State-Benefit
D
    of Policy-Denial of-To persons who purchased land after publication of
    notification for acquisition-Said benefit given to three co-owners as a special
    case-Denial thereof to appellant-Held : does not amount to invidious
    discrimination-Equality clause does not extend to perpetuate wrong.

E         The respondent got published in the State Gazette a notification
    issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - acquiring
    land for planned improvement by the Improvement Trust. The appellant
    had purchased a piece of land after the issue of the said notification from
    the erstwhile owner of the land.
F         The respondent issued what is known as "Land Policy" in which it
    was stated that the lands falling within the limits of the Municipality may
    be acquired in the first instance, under the Act; that the Trust should make
    external development of the entire area and ?ko internal development in
    certain categories of cases the details whereof were mentioned in the
G   Schedule appended thereto and directed to lease out the plotted area to
    the persons from whom the land was acquired by charging premium which
    shall be equal to the compensation payable for the acquisition plus the
    cost of both external and internal development. The lessee was given the
    right to sub-lease the plot and thereby earn profits on their lands. They
H    divided the land owners into three categories, viz., (1) those who held an
                                          264
                        SNEH PRABHA v. STATE                           265

area of less than 2 acres of land, (2) those who held an area of more than A
2 acres but less than 20 acres of land, and (3) those who held an area of
20 or more acres of land, at one place. It was stated that "those in category
No. (2) may be given an option either to accept cash compen!>ation for their
land under the Land Acquisition Act or to get back 40% of their land as
developed plotted area after paying the cost of external and internal B
development. In the latter case, the premium will be compensation payable
for the land".

      Arter the policy was issued, the respondent issued two Government
Orders providing guidelines for implementation of the Land Policy. The
first Government Order indicated in paragraph 2 that the persons who          c
had purchased the land which would fall under the notification, after the
publication of the notification for the acquisition of land under the Act,
may not be given any benefit under the Land Policy. Paragraph 3 provided
that the benefit of the Land Policy may also not be given to the persons
who although had submitted their applications for the benefits under the D
Land Policy well before the prescribed date but had filed their suits in the
court for stay orders against the acquisition of land and had obtained the
orders of the Courts to stop the activities of the acquisition of land.

      In paragraph 2 of the second Government Order it was stated that
those persons may be given the benefit of the land policy who had applied     E
within time for taking benefit of land policy aad in whose cases orders had
been passed to give benefit of the land policy and with whom agreements
had been entered into, although they had purchased the land after the
issue of Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.
                                                                              F
      The appellant had applied for allotment of the plot and also got
herself registered with the Trust seeking allotment of the land under the
Land Policy. The appellant also, after being informed of the need to
redeposit the compensation amount she received from the Land Acquisi-
tion Officer, deposited the same with the Trust. The appellant claimed that
she was allotted 7957 square yards of land but when she sought registra-      G
tion of the lease deed in her favour she was informed to supply a copy of
the sale deed of the land purchased by her. The Trust informed her that
since she had purchased the land after notification under section 4(1) had
already been published, she was not eligible for allotment and accordingly
the Trust had returned the amount deposited by her by a cheque.               H
    266                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was
    dismissed. Aggrieved by the High Court's Judgment the appellant
    preferred the present appeal.

           On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the owner of the
B   land was entitled under the policy for the allotment of the land in terms
    of three categories enumerated in the Land Policy; that the appellant falls
    in category (2); that had the owner claimed under the Land Policy, the
    Trust would be enjoined to allot the land in terms of the Policy with a right
    to the owner to sub- lease the same; that in consequence it made little
    difference if the subsequent purchaser stepped into the shoes of the owner
c   and laid claim for allotment; that the only condition which disabled her as     \
                                                                                    '
    owner or successor in interest was as provided in paragraph 3 of the first
    G<lvernment Order; that since she did not fall in that category, she was
    entitled to the allotment under paragraph 2 of the Second Government
    Order; that she was entitled to the allotment of the land covered under
D   category (2) as a matter of right since she had land to an extent of below
    20 acres and above 2 acres; that on the approved lands, she was entitled
    to allotment of the 40 per cent of the developed land; that though on the
    date of the notification she was not the owner, subsequently she became
    the owner; that she had duly registered her application with the Trust; that
E   in terms of paragraph 2 of the Second Government Order she was entitled
    to the allotment of the land as she had already applied within the time and
    orders had been passed to give effect to the Land Policy; that agreements,
    though unregistered, had already been entered into and she had purchased
    the land after the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the
    Act; and.that having given the benefit to the persons mentioned in the two
F
    Government Orders, denial thereof to the appellant was an invidious
    discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

          Dismissing the appeal, this Court

G         HELD : 1.1. It is settled law that any person who purchased land
    after publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisi-
    tion Act, 1894, does so at his/her own peril. The object of publication of
    the notification under section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is
    needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition
H   proceedings points out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land
                             SNEHPRABHAv. STATE                                  267

    acquired thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to enter upon the         A
    land to do preliminaries etc. Therefore, any alienation of land after the
    publication of the notification under section 4(1) does not bind the Govern-
    ment or the beneficiary under the acquisition. On taking possession of the
    land, all rights, titles and interests in land stand vested in the State, under
    section 16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute title
    in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser acquires
                                                                                        B
    land, his/her only right would be subject to the provisions of the Act and/or
    to receive compensation for the land. [271-E-H]

          1.2. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly conferred the right to
    allotment of alternate site only on that person whose land was acquired.            C
    In other words, the person must be the owner of the land on the date on
    which notification under section 4(1) of the Act was published. By neces-
    sary implication, the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the
    policy and became disentitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. [272-A-B]

          Union of India v. Shri Shivkumar Bhargava and Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC D
    274, referred to.

          2.1. A special case had arises in respect of three co- owners whose
    strip of land remained outside allotment. To relieve hardship to them the
    Second Government Order came to the issued. It clearly envisages three              E
    conditions, viz., (1) benefits of the Land Policy may be given to those who
    have applied within time to avail of the benefit of the Land Policy; (2) orders
    have been passed to give benefit of the Land Policy; and (3) the agreements
    have already been entered into; in other words, lease deeds were executed
    in favour of the allottees. Although they purchased the land after the issue
    of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act, the benefits would be given      F
    to them. It is seen that it is not a general policy not is it in supersession of



-
    the earlier policy but is a clarificatory one. In other words, it intends to deal
    with only limited collateral contingent circumstance. [272-C-E]

          2.2. In this case, though the appellant had applied within time to
    avail of the benefits of the Land Policy and she was asked to deposit the           G
    compensation received for the land acquired, the Trust was not in know
    of the fact that the appellant had purchased the land after the publication
    of section 4(1) notification. When the appellant sought for execution of the
    lease dead she was called upon to produce her title dead which, when
    produced, disclosed that she had purchased the land after section 4 (1)             H
    268                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
                                                                                    r>
A   notification was published. In other words, she fell into the main part of
    the general land policy and First Government Order. Thereby, there is no
    order passed in her favour to extend the benefits of the Land Policy nor
    was any agreement to lease the said land in her favour was entered into
    and registered although she purchased the land after the notification
    under section 4(1) of the Act was published. It would thus be clear that
B   the appellant had not fulfilled all the conditions mentioned in paragraph
    2 of the Second Government Order. [272-F-H; 273-A]

          2.3. It is seen that having given the benefit to the persons mentioned
    in the two Government Orders the benefit was given only to three co-
c   owners whose land formed part of a particular strip of land and the excess
    thereof obviously was not capable of use or inconvenient to proper use by
    the owner of the leased land. As a special case, benefit was given to them.
    The consistent policy has been that a person who purchased the land, after
    section 4(1) notification was published, becomes disentitled as she was not
    the owner as on the date on which the notification under Section 4(1) of
D   the Act was published, as indicated in the Land Policy itself. [273-B-C]

          2.4. It would thus be seen that no discrimination, much less invidious
    discrimination, was meted out to the appellant. Even if a benefit is wrongly
    given in favour of one or .two, it does not clothe with a right to perpetuate
E   the wrong and the court cannot give countenance to such actions though
    they are blameworthy and condemnable. Equality clause does not extend
    to perpetuate wrong nor can anyone equate a right to have the wrong
    repeated and benefit reaped thereunder. [273-D-E]

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal no. 1869 of
F   1981 Etc.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.77 of the Allahabad High
    Court in C. Misc. W. No. 4517 of 1974.

G        G. L. Sanghi, 0. P. Rana, P. H. Parekh, Ms. Shefali Fazl, Dileep
    Tandon, J.M". Khanna, K.S. Chauhan, A.K. Srivastava, R.B. Misra, M.K.
    Roy and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H         K. RAMASWAMY, J. C.A. No. 1869 of 1981.
            SNEH PRABHA v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY, J.)                   269

      The State of Uttar Pradesh got published in the State Gazette the A
notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, '1894
(for short, "the Act") on July 16, 1960, acquiring 287 acres of land in
Ghaziabad for planned development by the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad
(for short, "the Trust"). The appellant had purchased 1.9 and 2.9 bighas of
land under Sale deed dated March 15,1961 and 1.9., 2.4. and 1.16 bighas B
of land on March 27, 1961 constituting a total extent of 4 acres 3025 square
yards from the erstwhile owner of the land. The State Government issued
on August 13, 1962 what is known as "Land Policy" in which it was stated
that the lands falling within the limits of Ghaziabad Municipality may be
acquired in the first instance, under the Act; that the Trust should make
external development of the entire area and also internal development in C
certain categories of cases the details whereof are mentioned in the
Schedule appended thereto and directed that "lease out the plotted area
to the persons from whom the land was acquired by charging premium which
shall be equal to the compensation payable for the acquisition plus the cost
of both external and internal development. The lessee may be given the D
right to sub-lease the plot and thereby earn profits on their lands. They
divided the land owners into three categories, viz., (1) those who held an
area of less than 2 acres of land, (2) those who held an area of more than
2 acres but less that 20 acres of land and (3) those who held an area of 20
or more acres of land, at one place. In paragraph 6 it was stated that "those
in category No. (2) may be given an option either to accept cash compen- E
sation for their land under the Land Acquisition Act or to get back 40%
of their land as developed plotted area after paying the cost of external
and internal development. In the latter case, the premium will be compen-
sation payable for the land."
                                                                           F
       In furtherance thereof, the appellant had applied on May 10, 1963
for allotment of the plot and also got herself registered with the Trust on
November 25, 1968 seeking allotment of the land under the Land Policy.
The appellant also, after being informed of her need to redeposit the
compensation amount she received from the Land Acquisition Officer on G
September 12, 1969, and deposited the same with the Trust on July 31,
1970. The appellant claimed that she was allotted 7957 square yards of land
in Sector 12, viz., Chander Nagar but when she sought registration of the
lease deed in her favour on June 27, 1972 she was informed to supply a
copy of t~1e sale deed of the land purchased by her vide communication
dated April 18, 1974. By letter dated May 6, 1974, the Trust informed her H
    270                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
                                                                                     ,?

A   that since she had purchased the land after notification tinder Section 4 (1)
    had already been published, she was not eligible for allotment and accord-
    ingly the Trust had returned the amount deposited by her by a cheque
    dated June 3, 1974. Thereafter, the appellant filed Miscellaneous Writ
    Petition No. 4517of1974 in the Allahabad High Court which was dismissed
    on November 29, 1977.
B
           When the matter was heard on August 29, 1995 by this Court, it
    transpired that after the policy was issued, the Stat_e Government issued
    two G.Os. dated December 8, 1971 and June 2, 1972 providing guidelines
    for implementation of the Land Policy. We, therefore, directed the counsel
c   for the State as well as the Trust to produce the copies of the orders.
    Accordingly, they came to be filed. G.O. No. 342 dated December 8, 1971
    addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Trust indicates in paragraph 2
    that the persons who had purchased the land which would fall under the
    notification, after the publication of the notification for the acquisition of
    land under the Act, may not be given any benefit under the Land Policy.
D   Paragraph 3 provides that the benefit of the Land Policy may also not be
    given to the persons who although had submitted their applications for the
    benefits under the Land Policy well before the prescribed date but had
    filed their suits in the court for stay others against the acquisition of land
    and had obtained the orders of the courts to stop the activities of the
E   acquisition of the land. Other dauses of the said G.O. dated December 8,
    1971 are not relevance and hence omitted. In G.O. No. 1802 dated June 2,
    1972, it was further clarified that the orders mentioned in para 3 of earlier
    G.O. No. 342 dated December 8, 1971 will apply only to those persons who
    had filed suits in the courts in the acquisition of the land after December
    8 1971. Para 2 further states as under :
F
                "I am also to state that those persons may be given benefit of
            the land policy who have applied within time for taking benefit of
            land policy and in whose cases orders have been passed to give
            benefit of the land policy and with whom agreements have been
G           entered into, although they have purchased the land after the issue
            of Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act."

                                                                                      ,..,;;
          Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
    contended that the owner of the land is entitled under the policy for the
H   allotment of the land in terms of three categories enumerated in the Land
             SNEH PRABHAv. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY,J.]                      271

Policy. Admittedly, the appellant falls in category (2). Had the owner A
claimed under the Land Policy, the Trust would be enjoined to allot the
land in terms of the Policy with a right to the owner to sub-lease the same.
In consequence, it makes little difference if the subsequent purchaser steps
into the shoes of the owner and lays claim for allotment. The only condition
which disables the appellant as owner or successor in interest is as provided B
in paragraph 3 of G.O. No. 342 dated December 8, 1971. Since she does
not fall in that category, the appellant is entitled to the allotment under
paragraph 2 of G.O. No. 1802 dated June 2, 1972. Therefore, the appellant
is entitled to the allotment of the land covered under category (2) as· a
matter of right since she had land to an extent of below 20 acres and above
2 acres. On the approved lands, she was entitled to allotment of the 40 per C
cent of the developed land. She alternatively contended that though on
the date of the notification she was not the owner, subsequently she became
the owner. She had duly registered her application with the Trust. 1 here-
fore, in terms of paragraph 2 of the G.O. dated June 2, 1972, she is entitled
to the allotment of the land as she already applied within the time and D
orders had been passed to give effect to the Land Policy. Agreements,
though unregistered, had already been entered into and she had purchased
the land after the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the
Act.

      Though at first blush, we were inclined to agree with the appellant E
but on deeper probe, we find that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit
of the Land Policy. It is settled law that any person who purchases land
after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her
own peril. The object of publication of the notification under Section 4 (1)
is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for F
public purpose and the acquisition proceedings points out an impediment
to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. It authorises the
designated officer to enter upon the land to do preliminaries etc. There-
fore, any alienation of land after the publication of the notification under
Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the
acquisition: On taking possession of the land, all rights, titles and interests G
in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free from
all encumbrances and thereby absolute title in the land is acquired there-
under. If any subsequent purchaser acquires land, his/her only right would
be subject to the provisions of the Act and/or to receive compensation for
the land. In a recent judgment, this Court in Union of India ~· Slui H
    272                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Shivkumar Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274 considered the controversy
    and held that a person who purchases land subsequent to the notification
    is not entitled to alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly
    conferred that right only on that person whose land was acquired. In other
    words, the person must be the owner of the land on the date on which
    notification under Section 4(1) was published. By necessary implication,
B   the subsequent purchaser was elbowed out from the policy and became
    disentitled to the benefit of the Land Policy.

           Para 2 of the G.O. No. 1802 dated June 2, 1972 also does not come
    to the aid of the appellant. This order is not in supersession of earlier Land
C   Policy or G.O. No. 342 dated December 8, 1971. It would appear, as
    pointed out in the impugned judgment of the High Court, that a special
    case had arisen in respect of three co-o\Vners whose "strip of land remained
    outside allotment". To relieve hardship to them, a clarification was sought
    for by the letter dated February 14, 1972 by the Trust. In response thereto,
D   this G.O. dated June 2, 1972 came to be issued. It clearly envisages three
    conditions, viz, (i) benefits of the Land Policy may be given to those who
    have applied within time to avail of the benefit of the Land Policy; (ii)
    orders have been passed to give benefit of the Land Policy; and (iii) the
    agreements have already been entered into; in other words, lease deeds
    were executed in favour of the allottees. Although they purchased the Land
E   after the issue of the notification under section 4(1), the benefits would be
    given to them. It is seen that it is not a general policy nor is it in
    supersession of the earlier policy but is a clarificatory one. In other words,
    it intends to deal with only limited collateral contingent circumstance.

F         In this case, though the appellant had applied within time to avail of
    the benefits of the Land Policy and she was asked to deposit the compen-
    sation received for the land acquired, the Trust was not in know of the fact
    that the appellant had purchased that land after the publication of Section
    4 (1) notification. When the appellant sought for execution of the lease
    deed she was called upon to produce her title deed which, when produced,
G   disclosed that she had purchased the land after section 4(1) notification
    was published. In other words, she fell into the main part of the general
    land policy and G.O. No. 342 dated December 8, 1971. Thereby, there is
    no order passed in her favour to extend the benefits of the Land Policy nor
    was any agreement to lease the said land in her favour was entered into
H   and registered although she purchased the land after the notification under
            SNEH PRABHA v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.]                    273

section 4(1) was published. It would thus be clear that the appellant had A
not fulfilled all the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2 of the G.O. No.
1802 dated June 2, 1972.

     It is next contended that having given the benefit to the persons
mentioned in the impugned G.Os. denial thereof to the appellant is an
invidious discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It is seen B
that the benefit was given only to three co-owners whose land formed part
of a particular strip of land and the excess thereof obviously was not
capable of use or inconvenient to proper use by the owner of the leased
land. As a special case, benefit was given to them. The consistent policy
has been that a person who purchased the land, after Section 4(1) notifica-   c
tion was published, becomes disentitled as she was not the owner as on the
date on which the notification under section 4(1) was published, as indi-
cated in the Land Policy itself. It was reiterated in paragraph 2 of G.O.
No. 342 December 8, 1971. It would thus be seen that no discrimination,
much less invidious discrimination, was meted out to the appellant. Even D
if a benefit is wrongly given in favour of one or two, it does not cloth with
a right to perpetuate the wrong and the court cannot give countenance to
such actions though they are blame worthy and condemnable. Equality
clause does not extend to perpetuate wrong nor can anyone equate a right
to have the wrong repeated and benefit reaped thereunder.
                                                                              E
       Considered from this perspective, we are of the opinion that the
appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. The High Court
rightly did not extend the benefit of the appellant. Hence our interference
under Article 136 of the Constitution is not warranted.

     The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances,           F
without costs.

CA. No. 4549 of 1984

      For the reasons given in the above appeal, this appeal also stands      G
dismissed.

v.s.s.                                                  Appeal dismissed.