Holding

The High Court erred in refusing to cancel the bail; bail granted under suspension of sentence must be cancelled when the convict is implicated in a serious offence, and the High Court's order is set aside.

Summary

The appellant Somesh Chaurasia sought cancellation of bail granted to the second respondent, who had been convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC and whose sentence was suspended under Section 389(1) CrPC. While the suspension was in force, an FIR (No. 143 of 2019) alleged that the second respondent had murdered the appellant's father, prompting applications to revoke the bail. The Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to cancel the bail, directing a 90‑day investigation, which the Supreme Court held to have stultified the criminal justice process. The Supreme Court examined the doctrine of post‑conviction bail under Section 389(1) and the circumstances warranting its cancellation, emphasizing the need for public prosecutor’s input and the seriousness of the new allegation. It concluded that the High Court erred, set aside its order, and cancelled the bail, directing the respondent’s transfer to another jail. The judgment also underscored the importance of judicial independence and the duty of the State to uphold the rule of law.

Issues considered

The High Court's refusal to cancel bail/suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC despite the accused's alleged involvement in a murder during the suspension period.
Whether bail granted post‑conviction can be cancelled on the ground of supervening events such as the commission of a serious offence.
The procedural requirement of giving the public prosecutor an opportunity to show cause before granting or revoking bail under Section 389(1).
The effect of the High Court's direction to complete investigation within 90 days on the administration of criminal justice.
The broader implications for judicial independence and executive interference in the criminal process.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(8), s. 319, s. 389(1), s. 82
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

bail cancellationsuspension of sentenceSection 389 CrPCjudicial independencepolitical influencepolice collusioncriminal justicehigh court overreach

Judgment

692 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 692 [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A SOMESH CHAURASIA
v.
STATE OF M.P. & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 590-591 of 2021)
B
JULY 22, 2021
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.389 (1) – Prosecution
C case was that the second respondent was convicted under s.302
IPC and awarded life imprisonment – By order dated 3.2.2016, High
Court directed that the sentence shall during the pendency of appeal
remain suspended under s. 389(1) – Two applications were filed
before High Court for cancellation of bail and revocation of order
D dated 3.2.2016 suspending the sentence of second respondent inter-
alia on ground that after the sentence was suspended, an FIR was
registered against the second respondent at the behest of the
appellant alleging that the second respondent was involved in the
murder of his father during the period when his sentence was
suspended – By impugned order, High Court declined to entertain
E the application for revocation of suspension of sentence/grant of
bail and allowed him to continue on bail until his claim that he was
being falsely implicated was first investigated in ninety days – Hence
the instant appeal – On 12.2.2021, the appellant apprised this Court
that by order dated 8.1.2021, ASG issued summons to second
F respondent under s.319 in the course of session trial arising out of
charge-sheet – However, second respondent was resisting arrest –
In order dated 8.2.2021, the ASJ expressed serious apprehension
that the accused (second respondent) and the Superintendent of
Police had colluded with the subordinates of the latter “to frame
serious charges” against the judge – The Director General of Police
G of Madhya Pradesh was directed “to immediately ensure the arrest
of the second respondent and report compliance by filing a personal
affidavit in this Court” – Second respondent was ostensibly arrested
from bus stand after lot of efforts – Held: The High Court by
declining to revoke suspension of sentence had clearly transgressed
into an unusual domain – High Court in effect stultified the
H
692
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 693

administration of criminal justice – This order had the effect of A
obstructing a fair investigation into the FIR at the behest of the
accused despite the nature and gravity of the allegations against
him – High Court erred in passing its directions which were misused
to defeat the investigation – The police submitted a closure report
absolving the second respondent – Thereafter, despite the order
B
under s.319, the second respondent evaded arrested in contravention
of the warrant of arrest which was issued by the ASJ – The facts
indicated that the police was complicit in shielding the second
respondent – The criminal antecedents of the second respondent
and the prior conviction on a charge of murder were adverted to –
The second respondent, whose spouse was an MLA, was provided C
security by the State – The DGP was sanguine in informing this
court that the second respondent could not be arrested despite the
directions issued by this Court – It was only after this Court issued
a peremptory direction indicating recourse to the coercive arm of
law that the second respondent was arrested, ostensibly from a bus-
D
stand – The material on the record indicated that an effort was
made to shield the accused from the administration of criminal justice
– The apprehensions expressed by the ASJ in his order dated
8.2.2021 of the machinations of a highly influential accused evading
the process of law are amply borne out by the facts – There was no
reasonable basis to doubt the anguish and concern of a judicial E
officer – That the State did not oppose the application under s.319
CrPC is a feeble attempt to justify the inaction of the police –
Unfortunately, High Court failed in its duty to ensure that the sanctity
of the criminal justice process is preserved.
Judiciary: Independence of judiciary – Judicial independence F
of the district judiciary is cardinal to the integrity of the entire system
– If the faith of the citizen in the administration of justice has to be
preserved, it is to the district judiciary that attention must be focused
as well as the ‘higher’ judiciary – The district judiciary operates
under the administrative supervision of the High Court which must
G
secure and enhance its independence from external influence and
control – This compartmentalization of the judiciary and executive
should not be breached by interfering with the personal decision-
making of the judges and the conduct of court proceedings under
them.
H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A Disposing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court by its impugned order allowed
the second respondent, who allegedly committed murder during
the period when his sentence was suspended, to continue on bail
until his claim that he was being falsely implicated was first
B investigated in ninety days. In adopting such a procedure, the
High Court has clearly transgressed into an unusual domain. The
High Court has in effect stultified the administration of criminal
justice. [Para 29][714-C-D]
2. There are distinct doctrinal concepts in criminal law
C namely (i) the grant of bail before trial or, what is described as
the ‘pre-conviction’ stage; (ii) setting aside an order granting
bail when the principles which must weigh in the decision on
whether bail should be granted have been overlooked or wrongly
applied; (iii) the post-conviction suspension of sentence under
the provisions of Section 389(1); and (iv) the cancellation of bail
D on the ground of supervening events, such as the conduct of the
accused during the period of bail, vitiating the continuance of
bail. The present case falls in the last of the above genres where
bail was sought to be cancelled on the ground that the second
respondent was implicated in an offence under section 302
E during the period when his sentence was suspended. [Paras 34,
35][716-D-F]
3. This Court in Abdul Basit vs. Abdul Kadir Choudhary,
while discussing the powers of the High Court to cancel bail
granted to an accused under Section 439 (2) of the CrPC, has
F observed that typically the following conduct of the accused would
result in the cancellation of bail – (i) misuse of liberty by engaging
in similar criminal activity; (ii) interference with the course of
investigation; (iii) tampering of evidence or witnesses; (iv)
threatening of witnesses or engaging in similar activities which
would hinder the investigation; (v) possibility of fleeing to another
G country; (vi) attempts to become scarce by becoming unavailable
for investigation or going underground; and (vii) being out of the
reach of their surety. Similar considerations govern the
cancellation of bail at the post-conviction stage under the second
proviso to Section 389 (1) of the CrPC. [Para 36][716-F-G;
H 717-A]
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 695

Atul Tripathi v. State of U.P. (2014) 9 SCC 177 : [2014] A
14 SCR 1188; Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal
and Anr. (2002) 9 SCC 366; Masood Ali Khan v. State
of U.P. and Ors. (2009) 3 SCC 492 : [2009] 1 SCR 859;
Vijay Kumar v. Narendra (2002) 9 SCC 364 Abdul Basit
v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary (2014) 10 SCC 754:[2014]
B
10 SCR 571; Pampapathy v. State of Mysore 1966 Supp
SCR 477; Ramesh Kumar Singh v. Jhabbar Singh &
Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 195 – relied on.
4. The present case was a fit case for the cancellation of
bail by the High Court. The registration of FIR 143 of 2019
implicating the second respondent in the murder of the appellant’s C
father during the period when the sentence of the second
respondent was suspended after his conviction of a prior offence
under Section 302. The criminal antecedents of the second
respondent; The strong likelihood of the second respondent using
his political clout to prevent a fair investigation of FIR 143 of D
2019; The truth in the apprehensions of the appellant having
become evident by the abject failure of the police to properly
investigate the FIR lodged against the second respondent on
the allegation that he had committed the murder of the appellant’s
father on 15 March 2019 after his sentence was suspended by
the High Court; The submission of a closure report by the police E
against the second respondent absolving him; The order of the
ASJ dated 8 January 2021 summoning the second respondent
under Section 319 of the CrPC; The second respondent having
evaded arrest despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest and a
proclamation; The failure of the law enforcement authorities to F
effectuate the arrest of the second respondent in spite of the
order of this Court dated 12 March 2021; The peremptory
directions issued by this Court on 26 March 2021 requiring the
DGP to take necessary steps for compliance with the previous
order failing which the Court would be constrained to take coercive
steps in accordance with law; The eventual arrest of the second G
respondent on 28 March 2021 ostensibly from a bus stand; The
apprehension expressed by the ASJ in his order dated 8 February
2021 that he was being targeted at the behest of a politically
influential accused; and The provision of security to the second
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696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A respondent by the State government at the behest of his spouse
who is an MLA despite a prior conviction under Section 302 of
the IPC. [Para 37][717-F; 718-A-H; 719-A]
5. The High Court mis-applied itself to the legal principles
which must govern such a case. The serious error by the High
B Court in its impugned order can be considered from two
perspectives. First, the High Court by simply disposing of the
IAs seeking cancellation of bail ignored material considerations
which ought to have weighed in the decision. Some of the events
undoubtedly transpired after the order of the High Court.
However, taking the position as it stood when the High Court
C considered the issue, a clear case for cancellation of bail was
established. The second aspect which is also of significance is
the impact of the order of the High Court. The High Court was
apprised of the fact that FIR No 143 of 2019 had been lodged
against the second respondent. The investigation into the FIR
D had to proceed according to law. Instead, the High Court gave a
period of ninety days to the police to enquire into the complaint
of the second respondent that he was being targeted and allowed
the police to thereafter proceed in accordance with law. This order
had the effect of obstructing a fair investigation into the FIR at
the behest of the accused despite the nature and gravity of the
E allegations against him. The events which have transpired since
go to emphasize the fact that the High Court was in grievous
error in passing its directions which were misused to defeat the
investigation. The police submitted a closure report absolving
the second respondent. Thereafter, despite the order under
F section 319, the second respondent evaded arrested in
contravention of the warrant of arrest which was issued by the
ASJ. The facts indicate that the police have been complicit in
shielding the second respondent. The criminal antecedents of
the second respondent and the prior conviction on a charge of
murder have been adverted to. The second respondent, whose
G spouse is an MLA was provided security by the State. The DGP
was sanguine in informing this court that the second respondent
could not be arrested despite the directions issued by this Court.
It was only after this Court issued a peremptory direction

H
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 697

indicating recourse to the coercive arm of law that the second A
respondent was arrested, ostensibly from a bus-stand. The
material on the record indicates that an effort has been made to
shield the accused from the administration of criminal justice.
The apprehensions expressed by the ASJ in his order dated 8
February 2021 of the machinations of a highly influential accused
B
evading the process of law are amply borne out by the facts which
have been revealed before this Court. There is no reasonable
basis to doubt the anguish and concern of a judicial officer. That
the state did not oppose the application under section 319 is a
feeble attempt to justify the inaction of the police. Unfortunately,
the High Court failed in its duty to ensure that the sanctity of the C
criminal justice process is preserved. This court has had to step
in to ensure that the rule of law is preserved. [Para 38][719-B-H;
720-A-B]
6. The order of the High Court dated 23 July 2019 shall
stand set aside. The bail granted to the second respondent shall D
stand cancelled. The second respondent shall be moved under
the directions of the DGP to another jail in Madhya Pradesh to
ensure that the fair course of the criminal proceedings is not
deflected. [Para 39][720-C-D]
7. During the course of this proceeding, an enquiry was E
directed to be made into the apprehensions expressed by the
ASJ in his order dated 8 February 2021. An independent and
impartial judiciary is the cornerstone of democracy. Judicial
independence of the district judiciary is cardinal to the integrity
of the entire system. The courts comprised in the district judiciary
are the first point of interface with citizens. If the faith of the F
citizen in the administration of justice has to be preserved, it is
to the district judiciary that attention must be focused as well as
the ‘higher’ judiciary. Trial judges work amidst appalling conditions
– a lack of infrastructure, inadequate protection, examples of
judges being made targets when they stand up for what is right G
and sadly, a subservience to the administration of the High Court
for transfers and postings which renders them vulnerable. The
colonial mindset which pervades the treatment meted out to the
district judiciary must change. It is only then that civil liberties
for every stakeholder – be it the accused, the victims or civil
H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A society – will be meaningfully preserved in our trial courts which
are the first line of defense for those who have been wronged.
[Para 40][720-D-G]
8. The functioning of the judiciary as an independent
institution is rooted in the concept of separation of powers.
B Individual judges must be able to adjudicate disputes in
accordance with the law, unhindered by any other factors. Thus,
“for that reason independence of judiciary is the independence
of each and every judge”. The independence of individual judges
also encompasses that they are independent of their judicial
superiors and colleagues. [Para 41][720-G-H; 721-A]
C
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. 2021
SCC OnLine SC 463 – relied on.
9. Our Constitution specifically envisages the
independence of the district judiciary. This is implicit in Article
D 50 of the Constitution which provides that the State must take
steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public
services of the State. The district judiciary operates under the
administrative supervision of the High Court which must secure
and enhance its independence from external influence and control.
This compartmentalization of the judiciary and executive should
E not be breached by interfering with the personal decision-making
of the judges and the conduct of court proceedings under them.
[Para 42][721-E-F]
10. There is no gainsaying that the judiciary should be
immune from political pressures and considerations. A judiciary
F that is susceptible to such pressures allows politicians to operate
with impunity and incentivizes criminality to flourish in the political
apparatus of the State. [Para 43][721-G]
11. India cannot have two parallel legal systems, “one for
the rich and the resourceful and those who wield political power
G and influence and the other for the small men without resources
and capabilities to obtain justice or fight injustice.” The existence
of a dual legal system will only chip away the legitimacy of the
law. The duty also falls on the State machinery to be committed

H
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 699

to the rule of law and demonstrate its ability and willingness to A
follow the rules it itself makes, for its actions to not transgress
into the domain of “governmental lawlessness”. At the same time,
we believe that judges, while being undeterred in their
commitment to follow the law and do justice, should be wary of
launching into a diatribe against the State authorities without due
B
care and reflection. [Paras 44, 45][722-A-C]
12. The apprehensions expressed by the ASJ should be
duly enquired into by the High Court on its administrative side
so that if they are found to be true, necessary action should be
taken in order to secure the fair administration of justice. [Para
46][722-C-D] C

Case Law Reference
[2014] 14 SCR 1188 relied on Para 30
(2002) 9 SCC 366 relied on Para 31
D
[2009] 1 SCR 859 relied on Para 32
(2002) 9 SCC 364 relied on Para 32
[2014] 10 SCR 571 relied on Para 36
1966 Supp SCR 477 relied on Para 36
E
(2003) 10 SCC 195 relied on Para 36
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 590-591 of 2021
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2019 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh Principal Bench Jabalpur in I. A. No.6837 of 2019 F
and I. A. No.5781 of 2019 in Criminal Appeal No.3107 of 2015.
Varun Thakur, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Saurabh Mishra, AAG, Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Gopal Jha,
Shakeel Ahmed, Raj Kishor Choudhary, Ms. Malvika Raghavan, Nakul
G
Chaudhary, Anupam Bhati, Yaddaiah Jetti, Rajesh Kumar Shukla, Chirag
Madan, Akshay Sehgal, Ms. Pankhuri Budhidaja, Ms. Roohe Hina Dua,
Brajesh Pandey, Mrs. Suchita Dixit, Rajeev Yadav, Anilendra Pandey,
Advs. for the Respondents.

H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. This appeal arises from an order by a Division Bench of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 23 July 2019. The High Court
declined to entertain two applications – IA 6837 of 2019 filed by the
B
State of Madhya Pradesh and IA 5781 of 2019 filed by the appellant -
seeking arevocation of the suspension of sentence and bail granted to
the second respondent.
2. The second respondent has been convicted of an offence
C punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. By an order dated 3 February
2016, the High Court directed that the sentence shall, during the pendency
of the appeal, remain suspended under the provisions of Section 389(1)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (“CrPC”).

D 3. Two applications were moved before the Division Bench of
the High Court (IA 6837 of 2019 and IA 5781 of 2019) for cancellation
of bail and revocation of the order dated 3 February 2016 suspending
the sentence of the second respondent. These applications for bail were
filed by the appellant and by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant
sought cancellation of bail on the ground that after the sentence was
E suspended, FIR No 143 of 2019 was registered against the second
respondent at Police Station Hata, District, Damoh,in which he is
implicated in the murder of the appellant’s father. The State of Madhya
Pradesh sought cancellation of bail on the ground that:
(i) The second respondent has two other convictions against
F him on a charge of murder;
(ii) The second respondent has been convicted of another crime
for offences punishable under Section 399 and 402 of the
IPC and Section 25 (1) (1B)(a) of the Arms Act; and

G (iii) An FIR has been registered at the behest of the appellant
alleging that the second respondent is involved in the murder
of his father during the period when he was on bail.
4. The application for cancellation of bail which was moved by
the State of Madhya Pradesh sets out the criminal antecedents of the
H second respondent. Paragraph 8 reads as follows:
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 701
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“8. At this stage, it would be relevant to detail the three convictions A
suffered by the appellant. The same are detailed hereunder:
(a) It is submitted that in the first crime, the appellant committed
the murder of the deceased Rajendra Pathak on 13.10.1998 who
was going on his scooter and was confronted by the appellant and
co-accused Chandu Thakur who were coming on a motorcycle B
from theopposite direction. At the relevant point of time the
appellant Govind Singh fired through Katta on the deceased
Rajendra Pathak which hit the deceased on his chest. After
receiving the said shot the deceased ran to save his life and on
noticing the same co-accused Chandu Thakur fired a shot which
hit the deceased on his back. The deceased Rajendra Pathak C
succumbed to the said injuries. Based on the said incident, session
trial was instituted and appellant was convicted for the murder of
Rajendra Pathak and sentenced to life imprisonment by judgment
dated 30.09.2008. It is thereafter Cr.A No.2353/2008 was filed
by the appellant before this Hon’ble Court. It is also relevant to D
mention herein that the similarity of the present case with a case
relating to deceased Rajendra Pathak is that the deceased in the
present case Pappu @Ramakant Pathak and Kailash Pathak were
all belonging to the same family.
(b) It is submitted that in the second crime, the appellant along E
with others committed the murder of Munna Vishwakarma. Based
on the said incident, Sessions Trial No. 113/2005 was instituted
and the appellant was convicted for the murder of Munna vide
Judgment dated27.10.2015. It is thereafter, Criminal Appeal No.
3108/2015 was filed by the appellant before this Hon’ble Court.
F
(c) To put it differently, it can thus be seen that the appellant
committed two crimes punishable under Section 302 IPC on the
same date i.e. 11.5.2004 viz. the present case in which Ramakant
Pathak and Kailash Pathak were killed and Munna Vishwakarma
in respect to which Criminal Appeal No. 3108/2015 is pending.
G
(d) It would also be relevant to mention herein that the appellant
committed another crime for offences punishable under Section
399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 (1) (1B)(a)
of the Arms Act. In the said case too, the appellant was convicted
and thereafter filed a Criminal Appeal No. 1984 /2011, in which
case also his sentence was suspended. It is thus clear that the H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A appellant has been a serious threat to the society and that has
been continuously committing criminal offences.”
Paragraph 10 contains a reference to the FIR lodged on 15 March
2019 at the behest of the appellant alleging that the second respondent
has committed the murder of his father:
B “10 It is also relevant to mention herein that after grant of bail in
the said criminal appeals, the appellant has again committed murder
of one Devendra Chaurasiva on 15.03.2019 and an F.I.R. to that
respect has been registered against the appellant on 15.03.2019
itself for offences punishable U/s 294. 323, 324, 307, 147, 148,
C 149, 506 of I.P.C. Pertinently, since the deceased died after
registration of F.I.R., offence U/s 302 has been added in the present
crime. Copy of the F.I.R dated 15.03.2019 bearing crime No.
143/2019 is filed herewith as ANNEXURE-R/1.”
5. By its order dated 23 July 2019, the High Court declined to
entertain the application for revocation ofthe suspension of sentence/
D
grant of bail. The grounds which weighed with the High Court appear in
the following extract:
“…we are of the considered opinion that I.A.No.6837/2019 &
I.A.No.5781/2019 can be disposed of as per the statement made
at bar by Shri Ajay Gupta, Additional Advocate General for the
E State that the State Government is further investigating the issue
on an application filed on behalf of appellant Govind Singh interalia
stating that he has been falsely implicated. We,therefore, direct
that the investigation may be completed as far as possible within
three months but not later than 90 days. On completion of the
F investigation, if the appellant is found involved in commission of
the crime,he be immediately taken into custody and the procedure
as prescribed be followed. It is also observed that neither appellant
Govind Singh shall threaten nor influence the witnesses and the
complainant side.”
6. After notice was issued in these proceedings on 18 November
G
2020,counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh was granted an
adjournment on 11 January 2021 to file a counter affidavit. In the
meantime, on 12 February 2021,counsel for the appellant apprised this
Court of the fact that on 8 January 2021, the Additional Sessions Judge
(“ASJ”) at Aurangabad, issued summons to the second respondent under
H Section 319 of the CrPC in the course of the sessions trial arising out of
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 703
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the charge sheet filed in FIR 143 of 2019. The Court was apprised that A
though a warrant of arrest has been issued against the second respondent,
he was resisting arrest. The order of the ASJ summoning the second
respondent to stand trial has been placed on the record.
7. Subsequently, when the proceedings were listed before this
Court on 12 March 2021, the Court took note of an order dated 8 January B
2021 passed by the ASJ, Hata District, Damoh in Sessions Trial No 30
of 2019 (Addl. No. 143 of 2019).
8. The order dated 8 January 2021 passed by the ASJ specifically
refers to the criminal record of the second respondent, and is extracted
below: C
“Details of criminal records of accused Govind Singh are
accordingly:-

D
IPC.

E

F

G

H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A

B

C

D

E

F

The ASJ provided reasons in his order for taking steps in pursuance
of the provisions of Section 319 of CrPC to arraign the second respondent
as an accused.
G 9. Thereafter, in his order dated 8 February 2021, the ASJ noted
that though he was taking action in compliance with the directions of this
Court for ensuring service on the second respondent, the process of the
court was being obstructed. The ASJ expressed a serious apprehension
that the accused and the Superintendent of Police (“SP”), Damoh had
H colluded with the subordinates of the latter “to frame serious charges”
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 705
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

against the judge. The accused, the trial judge noted, is a “highly influential A
political person” and though false allegations had been made against the
judge for transfer of the case, the application for transfer had been
dismissed by the District Judge. The relevant extract from the order
dated 8 February 2021 reads as follows:
“The action in this case is being taken in compliance with the B
directions given by Hon. Supreme Court expeditiously. But accused
persons are highly influential political persons and have raised
false allegations against me and made application for transfer of
case before Hon. District Judge which was found false and Hon.
District Judge had dismissed the application with cost and being
contemptuous. But like accused persons, now Police C
Superintendent Damoh had connived with his subordinates and
made false and fabricated pressure onme. From the above such
acts it is clear and I am confident that accused persons with Police
Superintendent Damoh had colluded with his subordinates to frame
serious charges against me in future or any unpleasant incident D
can be done with me.”
10. Adverting to these developments, this Court took serious note
of the anguish expressed by the ASJ on 8 February 2021 and noted in its
order dated 12 March 2021 that:
“8. The order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 8 E
February 2021 indicates that he is being pressurized by the
Superintendent of Police, Damoh, who, together with his
subordinates, is attempting to pressurize the judicial officer. The
judicial officer has expressed the apprehension that the accused
who are “highly influential political persons” have raised false
allegations against him and applied for transfer of the pending F
case which was dismissed by the District Judge after it was found
to be false. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has
apprehended that he may be subjected to an “unpleasant incident”
in the future.”
11. The order of this Court dated 12 March 2021 took note of the G
fact that:
(i) Despite the registration of an FIR on 15 March 2019 where
the appellant had alleged that the second respondent was
complicit in the murder of his father no steps were being
taken by the investigating authorities to arrest him; H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A (ii) In this backdrop, it was the ASJ who was constrained to
issue summons to the second respondent under Section 319
of the CrPC to face trial;
(iii) Despite the issuance of warrants against him, the second
respondent continued to abscond; and
B (iv) It had been stated during the course of the proceedings
that the spouse of the second respondentis an MLA and
“all possible steps are, therefore, being adopted to shield
the second respondent from the coercive arm of the law”.
Taking note of the apprehension expressed by the ASJ that he
C was being targeted, this Court observed:
“10. We take serious note of the manner in which the Additional
Sessions Judge, Hata who is in charge of the criminal case has
been harassed by the law enforcement machinery in Damoh. We
have no reason to disbelieve a judicial officer who has made an
D impassioned plea that he was being pressurized as a result of his
orders under Section 319 of the CrPC. The State which had moved
the High Court for cancellation of the bail which was granted to
the second respondent as an incident of the suspension of sentence
on 3 February 2016, has failed to apprehend the second respondent
E who continues to evade arrest. A warrant of arrest was issued
against the second respondent. Mr Saurabh Mishra, Additional
Advocate General appearing for the State, states that a
proclamation has been issued against the second respondent under
Section 82 of the CrPC on 4 March 2021 with an award of Rs
10,000. Yet the second respondent continues to evade arrest. The
F rule of law must be preserved.”
12. In this backdrop, the Director General of Police (“DGP”) of
Madhya Pradesh was directed “to immediately ensure the arrest of the
second respondent and report compliance by filing a personal affidavit
in this Court”. The DGP was also directed to enquire into the allegations
G levelled by the second respondent against the SP by the ASJ in his order
dated 8 February 2021.
13. Notice was issued to the SP, Damoh.
14. In pursuance of the order dated 12 March 2021, the DGP
filed an affidavit stating that despite efforts to secure the presence of
H
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 707
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the second respondent, the police were unable to apprehend and arrest A
him. The affidavit provided the following details:
(i) After the ASJ by his order dated 8 January 2021, arraigned
the second respondent as an accused, an arrest warrant
was issued against him. Steps were taken by the Damoh
Police to arrest the second respondent from 8 January 2021. B
However, the second respondent was absconding and
evading arrest. As a result, an award of Rs. 10,000 was
announced for giving information on the whereabouts of
the accused;
(ii) The DGP directed the formation of a “special team” under C
the Additional Superintendent of Police (“ASP”), Damoh,
to arrest the second respondent to comply with this Court’s
order dated 12 March 2021. The Special Task Force, Bhopal
(“STF”) was also tasked to apprehend the accused. The
affidavit details the steps taken by Damoh police and the
STF; D

(iii) Provision of security was made for the ASJ Hata; and
(iv) An enquiry into the allegations levelled by the ASJ against
the SP in his order dated 8 February 2021 was entrusted to
the Additional Director General of Police (“ADGP”), STF, E
Police headquarters, Bhopal.
15. Finding the explanation provided by the DGP for the failure of
the police to arrest the second respondent to be unacceptable, this Court
in its order dated 26 March 2021 observed:
“2 We find the affidavit of the Director General of Police to be F
completely unacceptable. It defies reason as to how an accused
who is the spouse of a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly
has not been arrested despite being arraigned in pursuance of the
provisions of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
to face trial for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
G
Code 1860.
An effort is being made to shield the accused from the due process
of criminal law. The Court was informed that earlier,the accused was
even given security by the police though it is stated by Counsel for the
State that it is now withdrawn.”
H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 16. Accordingly, the DGP was directed to ensure that the previous
order of this Court dated 12 March 2021 is complied with, failing whichthis
Court would be constrained to take coercive steps in accordance with
law. At that stage, this Court was also apprised by counsel for the
appellant that though the second respondent had been summoned under
Section 319 of the CrPC to face trial for an offence punishable under
B
Section 302, he continued to abscond. On the other hand, security had
been provided to him by the State of Madhya Pradesh. Accordingly, a
further affidavit was directed to be filed by the DGP stating:
(i) The date on which and the cause on the basis of which
security was granted to the accused;
C
(ii) Whether the security continues to be provided as on date;
and
(iii) If the answer to (ii) above is in the negative, the date on
which the security was withdrawn.
D 17. A further affidavit dated 3 April 2021 was filed by the DGP in
compliance with this Court’s order dated 26 March 2021 explaining that:
(i) Pursuant to the steps taken by the Damoh Police and the
STF, the second respondent was arrested from a bus stand
in Bhind District on 28 March 2021. The second respondent
E was presently in the judicial custody at Sub-Jail, Hata
District, Damoh; and
(ii) The SP had recommended grant of security to the second
respondent in view of his enmity with several persons and
his political background. On the basis of the recommendation,
F the second respondent was provided security of one officer
on 11 July 2020. This was ratified by State Security
Committee on 25 September 2020. The security was
withdrawn on 9 January 2021.
18. On 6 April 2021, another affidavit was filed by the DGP detailing
G the reasons for grant of security to the second respondent. The affidavit
stated that:
(i) Smt. Rambai Govind Singh,who is an MLA,made an
application dated 3 July 2020 for providing security to her
spouse(the second respondent) “on the basis of his political
H background and enmity with several persons”;
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 709
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(ii) A security officer was detailed to the second respondent A
on 11 July 2020;
(iii) A threat assessment report was sought from the SP who
recommended grant of security on 24 September 2020. The
recommendation of the SP was ratified by the State Security
Committee on 25 September 2020; B
(iv) Thereafter, a final order for grant of security was passed
on 7 October 2020; and
(v) The ASP by an order dated 10 January 2021 directed the
removal of the security provided to the second respondent
on the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the ASJ on 8 C
January 2021.
19. Mr Varun Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant has, during the course of his submissions, outlined the basis on
which cancellation of bail granted pursuant to the order suspending
sentence is sought. Learned counsel urged that the second respondent D
has been implicated in a serious offence punishable under section 302 of
the Penal Code after he was enlarged on bail. It has been urged that the
sequence of events indicates that despite the order under Section 319 of
the CrPC, the second respondent evaded the due course of law despite
a warrant against him and a proclamation. It has been submitted that the E
investigating authorities were complicit in this and continued to protect
the second respondent whose spouse is an MLA. Despite the order of
this court, the DGP reported initially that the second respondent could
not be apprehended. The state had provided security to him despite the
conviction of an offence under Section 302. The order of the ASJ is a
clear indicator of the police attempting to pressurize the trial judge. Hence F
a cancellation of bail is warranted.
20. These submissions have been contested on behalf of the State
and its authorities by Mr Saurabh Mishra, learned Additional Advocate
General. Mr Mishra submitted that the following sequence of events
may be borne in mind: G
(i) 15 March 2019– an FIR was registered against certain
accused including the second respondent;
(ii) 13 June 2019 – a chargesheet was submitted to the
competent court. Though, the second respondent was named
H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A as an accused in the FIR, the charge sheet did not name
the second respondent as further investigation was pending
against him under Section 173(8) of the CrPC;
(iii) 23 July 2019– the impugned order was passed by the High
Court;
B (iv) 7 September 2019 – a closure report was submitted before
the competent court absolving the second respondent;
(v) 24 March 2020– a new government was formed in the State
of MP following a floor test in the legislative assembly on
18 March 2020; and
C
(vi) 8 January 2021– an application was filed by the appellant
under Section 319 of the CrPC for the issuance of summons
to the second respondent to face trial. The State did not
oppose the application.

D It was urged on behalf of the State that there is no substance in
the charge of collusion since as a matter of fact, the State had not opposed
the application under Section 319 of the CrPC.
21. The second limb of the submission is that pursuant to the
directions issued by this Court on 12 March 2021, an enquiry was
conducted by the ADGP and STF, Bhopal. The ADGP in his report
E
dated 22 March 2021 to the DGP stated that no substance was found in
the observations of the ASJ in his order dated 8 February 2021. The
conclusions in the enquiry indicate:
“24. Upon analyzing the whole incident the following conclusions
are drawn :
F
(a) Ms. Bhawna Dangi, SDOP, had joined her new posting, 6
days prior to appearance before Hon’ble Court and it was
her first field posting.
(b) Ms. Bhawna Dangi, SDOP informed the incident with
G herself in the court to her senior officers.
(c) Superintendent of Police, Damoh, immediately apprised of
the incident happened with Ms. Bhawna Dangi to the senior
most Judge of the District i.e. Hon’ble District and Session
Judge, Damohon 06.02.21.
H
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 711
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(d) For coordination at the district level between judiciary and A
executive, the District and Additional Session Judge and
Superintendent of Police remain in touch. Under the same
protocol, the Superintendent of Police informed about the
incident to the District and Session Judge.
(e) During the enquiry, the Hon’ble Additional Session Judge, B
Hata and both the JMFC, Hata were contacted but they
showed their inability to give any statement unless permitted
by the Hon’ble High Court of Jabalpur. In this context on
17.03.21 an application was filed before the Hon’ble
Registrar General, Madhya Pradesh High Court,Jabalpur.
C
(f) The application dated 12.02.21 filed by Ms. Bhawna Dangi
is pending in the office of Hon’ble Registrar General,
Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur and only after its
inquiry any comment can be given on the application filed
by SOOP, Ms.Dangi.
D
25. It is proved from the facts came in inquiry that the
Superintendent of Police has endorsed the grievance of his subordinate
to his senior officers which is a part of his duty. No evidence of
Superintendent of Police intention in connivance with accuseds to level
false charges is found out.”
E
Based on the above report, it has been submitted that the SDOP
had joined at her new place of posting on 31 January 2021. On 6 February
2021, she appeared before the ASJ and explained the efforts which
were made to arrest the second respondent. It is alleged that the ASJ
was not satisfied with the explanation and had made her stand in the
court for over four hours and had insulted her. The SDOP had expressed F
her desire to the ASP to resign from service. This incident was narrated
by the ASP to the JMFC, Hata who has attempted to sort out the matter.
Subsequently, the SDOP had submitted a complaint to the High Court
and had met the Registrar General on 12 February 2021. The order
dated 8 February 2021 was made known for the first time when it was G
published in the newspapers on 20 February 2021.
22. In this context, it has been submitted that the enquiry against
the SP has been conducted in pursuance of the orders of this Court and
no substance has been found in the allegations leveled by the judicial
officer.
H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 23. The report of the ADGP states that though the ASP haddenied
communicating to the JMFC that, “it is an order of the … Superintendent
of Police that the Magistrate …of Hata should be informed that SDOP
Dangi is disturbed, she is resigning, Sonkar Sahab to show some leniency”,
he had communicated with the JMFC “to maintain better coordination
between the Hon’ble Court and the Executive” on his own accord. The
B
relevant extract of the report is as follows:
“21. In this entire incident, the Additional Superintendent of Police,
Damoh communicated with the Hon’ble JMFC’s, Hata to maintain
the better coordination between the Hon’ble Court and the
Executive. During his statement, Addl. Superintendent of Police
C admitted some comments mentioned in the order sheet and denied
some other comments. In his statement, the Additional
Superintendent of Police, absolutely denied some references came
in between the Hon’ble JMFC, Hata about the Superintendent of
Police, Damoh. He further states that Superintendent of Police,
D Damoh didn’t instruct him to communicate with JMFC, Hata. He
had discussed the matter with both the Hon’ble JMFCs’ on his
own to maintain better coordination between the parties.”
24. Mr Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the SP submitted that on 6 February 2021, the SDOP had made a
E complaint about being humiliated by the judicial officer in court and the
SP had informed the District and Sessions Judge about the incident on
the same date. On 7 February 2021, the Registrar General of the High
Court was informed on phone. On 8 February 2021, the ASJ passed an
order expressing his apprehension that he was being targeted in the
discharge of his duties. However, on the same day, the ASJ addressed a
F communication to the SP making no such allegations. On 12 February
2021, the Registrar General of the High Court was furnished with the
application of the SDOP and met her. The order dated 8 February 2021,
it has been submitted, was published in the newspapers on 20 February
2021. In this backdrop, Mr Luthra urged that there is no substance in the
G allegation which have been leveled against the SP.
25. Mr Shakeel Ahmed, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the second respondent has submitted that no adverse order may be passed
against the second respondent. At this stage, it may be necessary to
note that an application for bail was moved before this Court on behalf
H of the second respondent in IA No 50800 of 2021 in SLP (Crl) Diary
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 713
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

No. 21783 of 2020. On 1 June 2021, the following order was passed by A
this Court:
“1 After arguing the application for bail, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf ofthe applicant (the second respondent in the
Special Leave Petitions) seeks thepermission of the Court to
withdraw the application for bail. B
2 The application for bail is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.”
The IA was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
26. Before we deal with the rival contentions, it is necessary at
the outset to advert to the correctness of the order passed by the High C
Court on 23 July 2019. FIR No143 of 2019 was registered on 15 March
2019 for offences under Sections 294, 323, 324, 307, 147, 148, 149 and
506 of the IPC against several accused including the second respondent.
It was alleged in the FIR that the accused had assaulted the victim,
Devendra Chaurasia, by rods and sticks. The injured victim having
succumbed to his injuries, an offence under Section 302 was D
added.Among other accused, the FIR named the second respondent.
On 13 June 2019, a chargesheet was filed before the competent court,
which did not name the second respondent. Investigation under Section
173(8) of the CrPC was kept pending against the second respondent.
27. In another case, the second respondent was convicted under E
Section 302 by the Sessions Court on 27 October 2015 against which he
had filed Criminal Appeal No. 3107 of 2015 before the High Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, the sentence was suspended on 3
February 2016. In view of the allegation that the second respondent had
committed offence of murder when his sentence was suspended, the F
State government filed an application before the High Court for the
revocation of the order suspending the sentence/ granting bail to the
second respondent. Another application was filed by the appellant. The
High Court disposed of the two applications by noting the statements of
the Additional Advocate General that the State government is further
investigating the application filed by the second respondent stating that G
he has been falsely implicated. The High Court directed that the
investigation may be completed as far as possible within three months
but not later, and if upon investigation the second respondent is involved
in the commission of the crime, he should be taken into custody
immediately and “the procedure as prescribed be followed”.
H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 28. On 7 September 2019, the police filed a closure report in relation
to the second respondent before the competent court in FIR No. 143 of
2019 dated 15 March 2019. An application under Section 319 of the
CrPC was filed before the ASJ for summoning the second respondent.By
an order dated 8 January 2021,the application was allowed and the
second respondent was arraigned as an accused. A warrant of arrest
B
was issued against the second respondent. Despite the issuance of the
warrant of arrest and a proclamation, the second respondent was not
arrested.The order of this Court dated 12 March 2021 speaks for itself.
29. The High Court by its impugned order dated 23 July 2019
allowed the second respondent,who allegedly committed murder during
C the period when his sentence was suspended, to continue on bail until his
claim that he was being falsely implicated was first investigated in ninety
days. In adopting such a procedure, the High Court has clearly
transgressed into an unusual domain. The High Court has in effect
stultified the administration of criminal justice.
D 30. Section 389 (1)1 of the CrPC allows the court to release a
convicted person on bail. The second proviso to Section 389 (1) of CrPC
provides that where a convicted person has been released on bail, it is
open to the public prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of
bail. However, the grant of bail post-conviction is governed by well-
E defined procedures and parameters. The factors that govern the grant
of suspension of sentence under Section 389 (1) have been discussed by
this Court (speaking through Justice Kurian Joseph) in Atul Tripathi
vs. State of U.P.2 in the following terms:
“It may be seen that there is a marked difference between the
F procedure for consideration of bail under Section 439, which is
1
"Section 389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of Appellant on
bail.—(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order
appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on
bail, or on his own bond.
G Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a
convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to
the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release:
Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be
open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.”
2
H (2014) 9 SCC 177
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 715
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

pre conviction stage and Section 389 Code of Criminal Procedure, A
which is post-conviction stage. In case of Section 439, the Code
provides that only notice to the public prosecutor unless impractical
be given before granting bail to a person who is accused of an
offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions or
where the punishment for the offence is imprisonment for life;
B
whereas in the case of post-conviction bail under Section 389
Code of Criminal Procedure, where the conviction in respect of a
serious offence having punishment with death or life imprisonment
or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, it is mandatory
that the appellate court gives an opportunity to the public prosecutor
for showing cause in writing against such release. C
15. Service of a copy of the appeal and application for bail on the
public prosecutor by the Appellant will not satisfy the requirement
of first proviso to Section 389 Code of Criminal Procedure. The
appellate court may even without hearing the public prosecutor,
decline to grant bail. However, in case the appellate court is inclined D
to consider the release of the convict on bail, the public prosecutor
shall be granted an opportunity to show cause in writing as to why
the Appellant be not released on bail. Such a stringent provision
is introduced only to ensure that the court is apprised of all
the relevant factors so that the court may consider whether
it is an appropriate case for release having regard to the E
manner in which the crime is committed, gravity of the
offence, age, criminal antecedents of the convict, impact
on public confidence in the justice delivery system, etc.
Despite such an opportunity being granted to the public prosecutor,
in case no cause is shown in writing, the appellate court shall F
record that the State has not filed any objection in writing. This
procedure is intended to ensure transparency, to ensure that there
is no allegation of collusion and to ensure that the court is properly
assisted by the State with true and correct facts with regard to
the relevant considerations for grant of bail in respect of serious
offences, at the post conviction stage.” G

31. This Court in Ramji Prasad vs. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal and
Anr.3 has observed that in cases involving conviction under Section 302
of the IPC, the sentence should be suspended only in exceptional cases.
3
(2002) 9 SCC 366 H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 32. In Masood Ali Khan vs. State of U.P. and Ors.4, this Court
has held that the mere fact that the accused, who were on bail during
the period of trial, did not misuse their liberty is not a sufficient reason
for the grant of suspension of sentence post-conviction. This Court by
placing reliance on Vijay Kumar vs Narendra5 reiterated that all the
relevant factors including “nature of accusation made against the accused,
B
the manner in which the crime was alleged to have been committed, the
gravity of the offence, desirability of releasing the accused on bail after
they have committed the serious offence of murder” must be looked
into.
33. The High Court had suspended the sentence. We are not in
C these proceedings called upon to consider whether the order of the High
Court granting a suspension of sentence was valid in the first place.
34. There are distinct doctrinal concepts in criminal law namely
(i) the grant of bail before trial or, what is described as the ‘pre-conviction’
stage; (ii) setting aside an order granting bail when the principles which
D must weigh in the decision on whether bail should be granted have been
overlooked or wrongly applied; (iii) the post-conviction suspension of
sentence under the provisions of Section 389(1); and (iv) the cancellation
of bail on the ground of supervening events, such as the conduct of the
accused during the period of bail,vitiating the continuance of bail.
E 35. The present case falls in the last of the above genres where
bail was sought to be cancelled on the ground that the second respondent
was implicated in an offence under section 302 during the period when
his sentence was suspended.
36. This Court in Abdul Basit vs. Abdul Kadir Choudhary6,
F while discussing the powers of the High Court to cancel bail granted to
an accused under Section 439 (2) of the CrPC, has observed that typically
the following conduct of the accused would result in the cancellation of
bail – (i) misuse of liberty by engaging in similar criminal activity; (ii)
interference with the course of investigation; (iii) tampering of evidence
or witnesses; (iv) threatening of witnesses or engaging in similar activities
G
which would hinder the investigation; (v) possibility of fleeing to another
country; (vi) attempts to become scarce by becoming unavailable for
investigation or going underground; and (vii) being out of the reach of
4
(2009) 3 SCC 492
5
(2002) 9 SCC 364
H 6
(2014) 10 SCC 754
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 717
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

their surety. Similar considerations govern the cancellation of bail at the A
post-conviction stage under the second proviso to Section 389 (1) of the
CrPC. This Court in Pampapathy vs. State of Mysore7, had held that
the High Court had the power to revoke the suspension of sentence
granted under sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 4268 of the erstwhile
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“CrPC, 1898”) using its inherent
B
powers under Section 561-A of the CrPC, 1898. The accused were
alleged to have misused their liberty while their sentence was suspended.
Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 426 of the CrPC, 1898 are similar to
Section 389 (1) of the present CrPC. It may be noted that in Pamapathy
(supra), the issue of cancellation of bail of a convict, by taking recourse
to Section 561-A of the CrPC, 1898, arose because the second proviso, C
which, now, has been added to sub-Section (1) of Section 389 CrPC, did
not exist under the earlier legal framework. However, since the second
proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 389 CrPC., now, deals with the
cancellation of bail, no inherent power, would be required for revocation
of suspension of sentence and bail granted to a convicted person during
D
the pendency of appeal at the appellate court. This Court in its order
passed in Ramesh Kumar Singh vs. Jhabbar Singh & Ors.9, has
held that if the accused misuses their liberty by committing other offences
during the suspension of sentence under Section 389 (1) of the CrPC,
they are not entitled to the privilege of being released on bail. In that
case, the accused was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for killing E
the father of the complainant and during the suspension of his sentence,
when he was out on bail, he had committed the murder of the brothers
of the complainant. This Court set aside the bail that was granted to the
accused by the High Court.
37. The present case was a fit case for the cancellation of bail by F
the High Court. The narration in the earlier part of the judgment highlights
the following facets:

7
1966 Supp SCR 477
8
“426. (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate court may, for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order G
appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on
bail or on his own bond.
(2) The power conferred by this section on an appellate court may be exercised also by
the High Court in the case of any appeal by a convicted person to a court subordinate
thereto.”
9
(2003) 10 SCC 195 H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A (i) The registration of FIR 143 of 2019 implicating the second
respondent in the murder of the appellant’s father during
the period when the sentence of the second respondent
was suspended after his conviction of a prior offence under
Section 302.
B (ii) The criminal antecedents of the second respondent;
(iii) The strong likelihood of the second respondent using his
political clout to prevent a fair investigation of FIR 143 of
2019;
(iv) The truth in the apprehensions of the appellant having
C become evident by the abject failure of the police to properly
investigate the FIR lodged against the second respondent
on the allegation that he had committed the murder of the
appellant’s father on 15 March 2019 after his sentence was
suspended by the High Court;
D (v) The submission of a closure report by the police against the
second respondent absolving him;
(vi) The order of the ASJ dated 8 January 2021 summoning the
second respondent under Section 319 of the CrPC;

E (vii) The second respondent having evaded arrest despite the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and a proclamation;
(viii) The failure of the law enforcement authorities to effectuate
the arrest of the second respondent in spite of the order of
this Court dated 12 March 2021;
F (ix) The peremptory directions issued by this Court on 26 March
2021 requiring the DGP to take necessary steps for
compliance with the previous order failing which the Court
would be constrained to take coercive steps in accordance
with law;
G (x) The eventual arrest of the second respondent on 28 March
2021 ostensibly from a bus stand;
(xi) The apprehension expressed by the ASJ in his order dated
8 February 2021 that he was being targeted at the behest
of a politically influential accused; and
H
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 719
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(xii) The provision of security to the second respondent by the A
State government at the behest of his spouse who is an
MLA despite a prior conviction under Section 302 of the
IPC.
38. The High Court mis-applied itself to the legal principles which
must govern such a case. The serious error by the High Court in its B
impugned order can be considered from two perspectives. First, the
High Court by simply disposing of the IAs seeking cancellation of bail
ignored material considerations which ought to have weighed in the
decision. Some of the events which we have narrated above have
undoubtedly transpired after the order of the High Court. However, taking
C
the position as it stood when the High Court considered the issue, a clear
case for cancellation of bail was established. The second aspect which
is also of significance is the impact of the order of the High Court. The
High Court was apprised of the fact that FIR No 143 of 2019 had been
lodged against the second respondent. The investigation into the FIR
had to proceed according to law. Instead, the High Court gave a period D
of ninety days to the police to enquire into the complaint of the second
respondent that he was being targeted and allowed the police to thereafter
proceed in accordance with law. This order had the effect of obstructing
a fair investigation into the FIR at the behest of the accused despite the
nature and gravity of the allegations against him. The events which have
E
transpired since go to emphasize the fact that the High Court was in
grievous error in passing its directions which were misused to defeat the
investigation. The police submitted a closure report absolving the second
respondent. Thereafter, despite the order under section 319, the second
respondent evaded arrested in contravention of the warrant of arrest
which was issued by the ASJ. The facts which have been narrated in F
the earlier part of this judgment indicate that the police have been complicit
in shielding the second respondent. The criminal antecedents of the second
respondent and the prior conviction on a charge of murder have been
adverted to earlier. The second respondent, whose spouse is an MLAwas
provided security by the State. The DGP was sanguine in informing this
court that the second respondent could not be arrested despite the G
directions issued by this Court. It was only after this Court issued a
peremptory direction indicating recourse to the coercive arm of law that
the second respondent was arrested, ostensibly from a bus-stand. The
material on the record indicates that an effort has been made to shield
the accused from the administration of criminal justice. The apprehensions H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A expressed by the ASJ in his order dated 8 February 2021 of the
machinations of a highly influential accused evading the process of law
are amply borne out by the facts which have been revealed before this
Court. There is no reasonable basis to doubt the anguish and concern of
a judicial officer. That the state did not oppose the application under
section 319 is a feeble attempt to justify the inaction of the police.
B
Unfortunately, the High Court failed in its duty to ensure that the sanctity
of the criminal justice process is preserved. This court has had to step in
to ensure that the rule of law is preserved.
39. We accordingly order and direct that the order of the High
Court dated 23 July 2019 shall standset aside.IA Nos 6837 and 5781 of
C 2019 shall in the circumstances stand allowed. The bail granted to the
second respondent shall stand cancelled. We also direct that the second
respondent shall be moved under the directions of the DGP to another
jail in Madhya Pradesh to ensure that the fair course of the criminal
proceedings is not deflected.
D 40. During the course of this proceeding, an enquiry was directed
to be made into the apprehensions expressed by the ASJ in his order
dated 8 February 2021. An independent and impartial judiciary is the
cornerstone of democracy. Judicial independence of the district judiciary
is cardinal to the integrity of the entire system. The courts comprised in
E the district judiciary are the first point of interface with citizens. If the
faith of the citizen in the administration of justice has to be preserved, it
is to the district judiciary that attention must be focused as well as the
‘higher’ judiciary. Trial judges work amidst appalling conditions – a lack
of infrastructure, inadequate protection, examples of judges being made
targets when they stand up for what is right and sadly, a subservience to
F the administration of the High Court for transfers and postings which
renders them vulnerable. The colonial mindset which pervades the
treatment meted out to the district judiciary must change. It is only then
that civil liberties for every stakeholder – be it the accused, the victims
or civil society – will be meaningfully preserved in our trial courts which
G are the first line of defense for those who have been wronged.
41. The functioning of the judiciary as an independent institution
is rooted in the concept of separation of powers.Individual judges must
be able to adjudicate disputes in accordance with the law, unhindered by
any other factors. Thus, “for that reason independence of judiciary is
H the independence of each and every judge”. The independence of
SOMESH CHAURASIA v. STATE OF M.P. & ANR. 721
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

individual judges also encompasses that they are independent of their A
judicial superiors and colleagues. 10 This Court in Madras Bar
Association v. Union of India & Anr.11 speaking through Justice L.
Nageswara Rao has observed:
“29. Impartiality, independence, fairness and reasonableness in
decision-making are the hallmarks of the judiciary. If “impartiality” B
is the soul of the judiciary, “independence” is the lifeblood of the
judiciary. Without independence, impartiality cannot thrive.
Independence is not the freedom for Judges to do what they like.
It is the independence of judicial thought. It is the freedom from
interference and pressures which provides the judicial atmosphere
where he can work with absolute commitment to the cause of C
justice and constitutional values. It is also the discipline in life,
habits and outlook that enables a Judge to be impartial. Its existence
depends however not only on philosophical, ethical or moral
aspects but also upon several mundane things—security in tenure,
freedom from ordinary monetary worries, freedom from D
influences and pressures within (from others in the judiciary) and
without (from the executive). The independence of an individual
Judge, that is, decisional independence; and independence of the
judiciary as an institution or an organ of the State, that is, functional
independence are the broad concepts of the principle of
independence of the judiciary/ tribunal.” E
42. Our Constitution specifically envisages the independence of
the district judiciary. This is implicit in Article 50 of the Constitution which
provides that the State must take steps to separate the judiciary from the
executive in the public services of the State. The district judiciary operates
under the administrative supervision of the High Court which must secure F
and enhance its independence from external influence and control. This
compartmentalization of the judiciary and executive should not be
breached by interfering with the personal decision-making of the judges
and the conduct of court proceedings under them.
43. There is no gainsaying that the judiciary should be immune
G
from political pressures and considerations. A judiciary that is susceptible
to such pressures allows politicians to operate with impunity and
incentivizes criminality to flourish in the political apparatus of the State.
10
M.P. Singh, Securing the Independence of the Judiciary – The Indian Experience,
Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 10, No. 2 (2000): 245-292.
11
2021 SCC OnLine SC 463 H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 44. India cannot have two parallel legal systems, “one for the rich
and the resourceful and those who wield political power and influence
and the other for the small men without resources and capabilities to
obtain justice or fight injustice.” The existence of a dual legal system
will only chip away the legitimacy of the law. The duty also falls on the
State machinery to be committed to the rule of law and demonstrate its
B
ability and willingness to follow the rules it itself makes, for its actions to
not transgress into the domain of “governmental lawlessness”. 12
45. At the same time, we believe that judges, while being
undeterred in their commitment to follow the law and do justice, should
be wary of launching into a diatribe against the State authorities without
C due care and reflection.
46. The apprehensions expressed by the ASJ should be duly
enquired into by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on its administrative
side so that if they are found to be true, necessary action should be
taken in order to secure the fair administration of justice. We have already
D taken note of the fact that the SDOP Hata had submitted a complaint to
the Registrar General. The complaint by the SDOP as well the the order
of the ASJ dated 8 February 2021 shall be placed before the Chief justice
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the administrative side by the
Registrar General within two weeks. The Chief Justice of the High Court
E of Madhya Pradesh is requested to cause an enquiry to be made on the
administrative side so that an appropriate decision in that regard is taken.
Having regard to this direction we are not expressing any views on the
report which has been submitted by the ADGP and STF, Bhopal. The
enquiry as directed above should be concluded expeditiously and
preferably within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of a
F certified copy of this judgment. A copy of this order shall be
communicated by the Registrar (Judicial) of this court to the Registrar
General of the High Court for compliance. The appeals shall stand
disposed of in the above terms.
47. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
G

Devika Gujral Appeals disposed of.

12
Upendra Baxi, The Crisis of Legitimation of Law in The Crisis of the Indian Legal
H System: Alternative Developments in Law (Vikas Publishing House, 1982).