Holding

The Supreme Court held that the decision to cancel the select list was neither Wednesbury unreasonable nor disproportionate, and therefore the High Court's order was set aside.

Summary

The Assam government advertised 104 constable posts in 2014, conducted selection in 2016, and after a change of political regime, the incumbent PCCF highlighted serious anomalies, leading the government to cancel the select list. Two writ petitions challenged the cancellation and a fresh advertisement; the Gauhati High Court allowed the petition seeking to rectify the list, a decision upheld by its Division Bench. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the cancellation was vulnerable to the doctrines of Wednesbury unreasonableness or proportionality and whether the respondents' legal rights were infringed. Relying on precedents, the Court held that the successor government’s decision to cancel the entire process was a bona fide policy decision, not arbitrary, unreasonable, or disproportionate, and that the respondents had no vested right to the list. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the appeal was allowed, permitting the government to re‑advertise the vacancies.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the Government's decision to cancel the select list.
Whether the cancellation of the select list was vulnerable to the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
Whether the cancellation of the select list was susceptible to the doctrine of proportionality.
Whether the cancellation infringed the legal rights of the respondents, giving rise to a writ petition under Article 226.

Legislation cited

Constitution of India

Subjects

Service LawSelectionCancellation of select listDoctrine of Wednesbury unreasonablenessDoctrine of proportionalityAssam Forest Protection ForceArticle 226 of Constitution of IndiaLegal RightsPolicy decisionRecruitment for public employment

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 598 : 2025 INSC 334

State of Assam & Ors.
v.
Arabinda Rabha & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No.2350 of 2025)
07 March 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in its interference with
the decision made by the Government to cancel the select list;
Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select list
was either vulnerable on application of the doctrine of Wednesbury
unreasonableness or suspect applying the doctrine of proportionality
and, therefore, liable to invalidation; Whether the decision of the
appellants to cancel the select list infringed the legal rights of the
respondents for which a writ petition u/Art.226 of the Constitution
could be maintained.

Headnotes†
Service Law – Selection – Cancellation of select list – An
advertisement was issued in the year 2014 to fill up 104 posts
of constables in Assam Forest Protection Force – Process of
selection was conducted in the year 2016 – Thereafter, there
was a change in political regime – The incumbent PCCF noted
serious anomalies in the selection process – Based on such
note, the Government cancelled the select list – Subsequent
thereto, a fresh advertisement dated 14.04.2017 was issued –
Two sets of writ petitions were filed – The first writ petition
challenged the decision of cancellation of the select list and
the other writ petition challenged the advertisement dated
14.04.2017 – The Single Judge of the High Court allowed first
of the two writ petitions and held that the irregularities from
which the select list allegedly suffered can be rectified – The
said decision was upheld by the Division Bench of High
Court – Correctness:
Held: It is true that the law does not postulate a fetter on the
authority of the employer-State and it is within the domain of the

* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 599

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

Government when to initiate a process of recruitment for public
employment, either according to recruitment rules or even in the
absence thereof, it is for the Government of the day to decide in
which manner it proposes to conduct selection, what would be
the various stages the candidates aspiring for appointment have
to pass through in order to be placed in the select list, who would
be the selectors, and how weightage is to be given to each of the
testing methods, a great deal of credence is lent to a process if
it is fairly and transparently conducted in accordance with rules,
whatever be its source, without the slightest hint of any bias or
favouritism or nepotism – Normally, it is not for the courts to
interfere unless the process smacks of mala fides – The facts
presented evince that it is the successor Government that had
taken an informed decision not to proceed with the earlier process
and to start a new process – At that stage of decision making,
possibly, three options were available to the Government, being –
(i) allow the process to be taken to its logical conclusion, without
being unduly bothered by the illegalities/irregularities detected
and referred to by the PCCF; (ii) cancel the entire process and
start it anew; and (iii) separate the grain from the chaff and to
proceed with the former and complete the process – Once the
Government arrived at the decision considering the illegalities/
irregularities detected by the PCCF that the process ought to be
started afresh and preferred the second option to the first and
third options, thereby cancelling the previous process, the High
Court ought to have applied the proportionality test to adjudge
whether the perfect balance was struck by preferring that option
out of the other available options – Such test was not applied
by the High Court – The larger public interest that the successor
Government had in mind was not kept in view by the single
Judge of the High Court – The decision to cancel the select list
has the marks etched to proceed towards such commitment and
achieving the greater good – Such a noble initiative was, by no
means, open to scrutiny by the judicial review court – This Court,
thus, unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that based on the
note of the PCCF dated 04.07.2016 and the recommendation
made by him for cancellation of the select list, the decision of the
Government to approve the said note and, thereby, cancel the
select list did not stand vitiated to attract its invalidation either by
application of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or
proportionality. [Paras 35, 37, 39, 45]
600 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Constitution of India – Art.226 – Whether the decision of the
appellants to cancel the select list infringed the legal rights
of the respondents for which a writ petition u/Art.226 of the
Constitution could be maintained:
Held: Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being
vacancies and a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a
policy decision – The law is clear that the policy decision not to
carry the process forward must be taken bona fide, there has to
be justifiable reason if the process is abandoned mid-way, and
such decision must not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or the
whims of the decision maker – A writ court may, upon reaching the
requisite satisfaction, intervene in such manner and make such
directions as the facts and circumstances warrant – This Court,
therefore, do not find it acceptable that the aspirants, not having
an indefeasible or vested right of appointment, do not also have
the right to question any decision adverse to their interest affecting
achievement of their goals to secure public employment – Whether,
and to what extent, any relief should be granted, must depend
on the facts of each case – On facts and in the circumstances,
however, the respondents’ legal rights were not infringed because
of absence of grant of legitimacy to the select list by way of an
approval from the Government. [Paras 54, 55]
Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of Wednesbury
unreasonableness – Doctrine of proportionality – discussed.

Case Law Cited
Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [1991] 2 SCR 567 : (1991) 3
SCC 47; B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore [1966] 3 SCR 682:
AIR 1966 SC 1942 – followed.
Kiran Gupta v. State of U.P [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 474 : (2000) 7
SCC 719; Anamica Mishra v. UPPSC [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 124 :
(1990) Supp SCC 692; Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U.,
Puthuvalnikathu [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 883 : (2003) 7 SCC 285;
Sachin Kumar v. Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board & Ors.
[2021] 2 SCR 1073 : (2021) 4 SCC 631 – relied on.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commission [1978] 2 SCR
272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana
[2007] 13 SCR 98 : (2008) 2 SCC 161; State of Haryana v.
Subash Chander Marwaha [1974] 1 SCR 165 : (1974) 3 SCC 220;
Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 816 :
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 601

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

1993 Supp. 2 SCC 600; All India Railway Recruitment Board v.
K. Shyam Kumar (2010) 6 SCC 614; Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of
India [1979] 2 SCR 953 : (1979) 3 SCC 165; R.S. Mittal v. Union
of India [1995] 2 SCR 1127 : 1995 Supp. 2 SCC 230; Dinesh
Kumar Kashyap v. South East Central Railway [2018] 14 SCR
947: (2019) 12 SCC 798 – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Service Law; Selection; Cancellation of select list; Doctrine of
Wednesbury unreasonableness; Doctrine of proportionality; Assam
Forest Protection Force; Article 226 of Constitution of India; Legal
Rights; Policy decision; Recruitment for public employment.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2350 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2021 of the Gauhati
High Court in WA No. 102 of 2021

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Sr. A.A.G., Ms. Diksha Rai, Piyush Vyas,
Ms. Purvat Wali, Vijay Deora, Irfan Hasieb, Krishnajyoti Deka.
Adv. for the Respondents:
Manish Goswami, Sr. Adv., Priyank Adhyaru, Priyonkoo Gogoi,
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

Facts
1. A process of recruitment was set in motion by the office of the
Principal Chief Conservator of Forest & Head of Forest Force,
602 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Assam,1 Government of Assam, by issuing an advertisement dated
23rd July, 2014 to fill up of 104 posts of Constables in the Assam
Forest Protection Force.2
2. Process of selection was conducted in May, 2016. The respondents,
who had applied pursuant to the advertisement, participated in the
process. They qualified in the physical efficiency test,3 whereafter
they were interviewed. It was claimed by the respondents that the
select list prepared by the Central Selection Committee, headed by
the then PCCF, contained names of candidates found, prima facie,
fit for selection and appointment as Constables in the AFPF and
that such list, wherein their names figured, had been submitted to
the Government for approval.
3. In May, 2016 itself, there was a change in the political regime of Assam
pursuant to the elections held to the Assam Legislative Assembly.
4. On 4th July, 2016, the incumbent PCCF submitted a note to the
Government highlighting serious anomalies that had crept in,
in the selection process. Based on such note of the PCCF but
without conducting any inquiry, as alleged by the respondents, the
Government approved cancellation of the select list vide order of the
Secretary to the Government of Assam, Environment and Forests
Department dated 18th July, 2016. The sole reason assigned for such
cancellation was that the process had been conducted in violation
of the reservation policy as well as judgments of this Court, as
suggested by the PCCF.
5. On 17th August, 2016, a notice was published from the office of the
PCCF in a daily newspaper informing all concerned of cancellation
of the select list. It was conveyed that further action to be taken in
the matter of recruitment of constables in the AFPF would be notified
in due course.
6. Subsequent thereto, a fresh advertisement dated 14th April, 2017
was issued.

1 PCCF
2 AFPF
3 PET
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 603

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

7. Two sets of writ petitions4 were instituted in the Gauhati High Court.5
The first writ petition challenged the decision of cancellation of the
select list and the notice dated 17th August, 2016. The other writ
petition challenged the advertisement dated 14th April, 2017. Notice
was issued on the first writ petition on 28th April, 2017. In course of
hearing, a single Judge was informed that the advertisement dated
14th April, 2017 pertains to appointment of 132 constables. Such
advertisement was different from the 104 posts, which formed the
subject matter of the first writ petition. Considering the same, interim
stay of the advertisement dated 14th April, 2017 was not granted.

The judgments of the High Court
8. Vide judgment and order dated 7th May, 2019, the single Judge
allowed the first of the two writ petitions, referred to above, holding,
inter alia, that the irregularities from which the select list allegedly
suffered can be rectified without disturbing the selection process
by refixing or reallocating the candidates in accordance with merit,
category and status by giving due notice to those who are likely to
be adversely affected. The single Judge was also of the view that
the chaff could be separated from the grain without much difficulty
and, therefore, the decision to view the entire selection process as
vitiated, leading to cancellation of the select list, is untenable.
9. The appellants carried the judgment and order dated 7th May, 2019
in an intra-court appeal.
10. An Hon’ble Division Bench6 of the High Court, vide judgment and
order dated 8th October, 2021, upheld the view taken by the single
Judge and dismissed the writ appeal. The Division Bench was of
the view that prior to cancellation of the select list, no finding of fact
had been arrived at pursuant to an inquiry conducted by any duly
constituted inquiry committee and consequently, the veracity of the
irregularities or illegalities alleged had not been ascertained and that
the note of the then PCCF dated 4th July, 2016, which highlighted the
anomalies, could not have been treated to be definitive finding of fact
arrived at by the Government warranting cancellation of the selection

4 W.P. (C) 4532 of 2016 and W.P. (C) 2428 of 2017
5 High Court
6 Division Bench
604 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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list. A view was also expressed therein that the irregularities could
have been rectified and the process taken to a logical conclusion.

The challenge
11. The judgment and order of the Division Bench is the subject matter
of assail in this civil appeal, by special leave, at the instance of the
State of Assam and its officers.

The notice issuing order
12. We have noted that the notice issuing order dated 1st August, 2022
recorded that the co-ordinate bench was apprised of no written
examination being conducted and that the selection was made on
the basis of interview alone preceded by a physical test, which was
a qualifying test for appearing in the interview. It was also noted
that out of 104 selected candidates, 64 belonged to Kamrup (Metro)
and Kamrup (Rural) districts and that not a single candidate had
been selected from as many as 16 districts. Concerned thereby, the
co-ordinate bench granted stay of operation of the judgment and
order under assail till the next date of hearing.

Appellants’ Contentions
13. Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, learned senior counsel and Additional
Advocate General for the appellants, contended that the writ petition
should not have been entertained in the first place by the single Judge.
According to him, neither did the empanelled candidates have any
indefeasible right of appointment against the existing vacancies nor
was the Government under any obligation to fill up the vacancies.
Inclusion of the names of the respondents in the select list was at
best a condition of eligibility without creating any vested right of
appointment; hence, such inclusion by itself did not confer upon
them the right to invoke the writ jurisdiction and seek certiorari to set
aside the decision to cancel the process as well as for mandamus
to take the process forward. The Government was well within its
right to cancel the process, for, serious irregularities had crept in
tainting the process. In such circumstances, the Government being
the sole judge of facts, its decision demanded deference rather than
being quashed on the ground that the irregularities were curable.
Heavy reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 605

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 7 in support of the contention
that the High Court – both single Judge and the Division Bench – fell
in error in making the directions it did.
14. It was also contended that apart from the fact that the respondents
lacked any legal right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court,
bare perusal of the note of the PCCF would reveal that sufficient
justification was provided in support of the proposed cancellation of the
select list. The said note having been approved by the Government,
led to issuance of the notice dated 17th August, 2016. However, the
single Judge without even considering as to whether the decision
of the Government did suffer from any of the vices attracting judicial
review, proceeded to make directions which normally would be within
the province of an appellate authority but certainly not a judicial
review court.
15. Insofar as the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench
is concerned, Mr. Sharma contended that the note of the PCCF
was based on meticulous examination of the records and without
there being any material placed by the respondents before the High
Court to suggest that the PCCF had ignored relevant and germane
material or had considered extraneous material, the intra-court
appeal ought not to have been dismissed on the ground that no
inquiry was conducted to ascertain whether the claims made in the
said note were correct.
16. Resting on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Sharma prayed that the
appeal be allowed and the appellants be permitted to start the
process afresh.

Respondents’ Contentions
17. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Manish Goswami, learned senior
counsel contended as follows:
(i) The order dated 18th July, 2016 and the notice published in the
newspaper dated 17th August, 2016 would make it evident that
the only reason weighing with the Government for cancellation
was violation of the reservation policy and violation of judgments
of this Court. Therefore, the appellants cannot now be permitted

7 (1991) 3 SCC 47
606 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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to improve their case by pleadings etc., and urge new reasons
justifying the cancellation. The appellants misled this Court
while obtaining the notice issuing order dated 1st August, 2022.
(ii) No rules were violated in preparation of the select list since
no rules had been framed to govern the selection process and
none was in operation at the relevant point of time, which is
an admitted position.
(iii) Cancellation of the process was based solely on the note dated
4th July, 2016 of the PCCF and no inquiry was ever conducted
into the alleged anomalies. On this ground alone, the appeal
is liable to be dismissed.
(iv) No challenge was laid to the select list by any unsuccessful
candidate alleging corrupt practice and/or fraudulent activity
having been resorted to by the selected candidates including the
respondents and the selection process was free from any taint.
(v) Assuming, but not admitting, that there was some violation of
the reservation policy, even then the same was limited to only
34 selected candidates. This is evident from the averment of the
appellants before the High Court; hence, there was absolutely
no justification to cancel the entire select list containing names
of 104 persons. The impugned decision to cancel the select
list is hit by the doctrine of proportionality.
(vi) Both the single Judge as well as the Division Bench was
correct in returning findings that the alleged violation of the
reservation policy was a curable defect and could be rectified
by the authorities without disturbing the selection process by
re-fixing or reallocating the candidates in accordance to their
merit, category and status by giving due notice to those who
are likely to be adversely affected.
18. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance was placed by Mr.
Goswami on the following decisions of this Court:
(i) Anamica Mishra v. UPPSC ; 8
(ii) Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U., Puthuvalnikathu;9

8 (1990) Supp. SCC 692
9 (2003) 7 SCC 285
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 607

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

(iii) Sachin Kumar v. Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board
& Ors.;10 and
(iv) Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commission.11
19. Mr. Goswami finally urged that in view of the foregoing contentions
raised by him, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. He also prayed
that this Court may be pleased, in addition, to order that the directions
passed by the single Judge, as affirmed by the Division Bench, be
implemented by the appellants without any further delay.

Questions Arising for Decision
20. The broad question of law arising for decision in the light of the
judgment(s) and order(s) of the High Court is:
Whether the High Court was justified in its interference with the
decision to cancel the select list and to require the process to be
carried forward in the manner directed by it?
Answering the aforesaid question would also require us to notice
the grounds based whereon the appellants cancelled the select list.
Thus, we have to necessarily answer two other questions:
(a) whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select
list was either vulnerable on application of the doctrine of
Wednesbury unreasonableness or suspect applying the doctrine
of proportionality and, therefore, liable to invalidation?
(b) Whether the decision of the appellants to cancel the select
list infringed the legal rights of the respondents for which a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be
maintained?
One incidental question arising for decision is, whether the appellants
have urged new grounds to support the cancellation in addition to
those assigned earlier in any affidavit/pleading?
The final question is, what would be the just relief that can be granted
to the parties to this civil appeal?

10 (2021) 4 SCC 631
11 (1978) 1 SCC 405
608 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Analysis and Reasons
21. We have perused the judgment(s) and order(s) of the High Court and
given due consideration to the contentions advanced by the parties.
22. It would be profitable to note the precedents in the field having a
bearing on the questions arising for decision in the appeal, before
we venture to answer the questions formulated above. In our view,
these could provide valuable guidance to steer us towards the right
direction.
23. In State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha,12 this Court
held that the mere fact of certain candidates being selected for
appointment to vacancies pursuant to an advertisement did not confer
any right to be appointed on the post in question and thereby, entitle
the selectees to a writ of mandamus or any other writ compelling
the authority to make the appointment.
24. The Constitution Bench in Shankarsan Dash (supra) considered
the aforesaid decision and, taking cue from it, held that:
“7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies
are notified for appointment and adequate number of
candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire
an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be
legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely
amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply
for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire
any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules
so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all
or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that
the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner.
The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken
bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or
any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the
comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the
recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. …”
25. Close on the heels of the above decision, a three-Judge Bench in
Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana13 had the occasion to observe:

12 (1974) 3 SCC 220
13 (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 600
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 609

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

“7. It will thus be seen that at the time when the writ petition
which has given rise to the present proceedings was filed,
the State Government had withdrawn the aforesaid two
notifications by the notification dated December 30, 1991.
The stage at which the last-mentioned notification came
to be issued was the stage when the HPSC was still in
the process of selecting candidates for appointment by
special recruitment. During the pendency of the present
proceedings the State Government finalised the criteria
for special recruitment by the notification of March 9,
1992. Thus, the HPSC was still in the process of selecting
candidates and had yet not completed and finalised the
select list nor had it forwarded the same to the State
Government for implementation. The candidates, therefore,
did not have any right to appointment. There was, therefore,
no question of the High Court granting a mandamus or
any other writ of the type sought by the appellants. The
law in this behalf appears to be well settled. ….”
26. Having noticed the decisions on the point as to the rights that aspiring
candidates have, we move on to notice a decision which is not only
on the point of right of a selected candidate to seek appointment
through writ remedy but also dwells with decisions of subsequent
Governments upsetting the decisions of earlier Governments.
27. One finds an extensive discussion on the tests required to be satisfied
to invalidate a decision of a subsequent Government, nullifying
a previous Government decision, in Jitendra Kumar v. State of
Haryana.14 The case involved suspension of the process of selection
by the Government because, inter alia, the cadre strength was found
to be unjustly inflated by the previous Government. The appellants
before this Court indisputably were the selected candidates and
the principal question arising for decision, in the given facts and
circumstances, was whether they had a legal right to be appointed.
This Court held, “the legal principle obtaining herein is not in dispute
that the selectees do not have any legal right of appointment subject,
inter alia, to bona fide action on the part of the State”. Noticing the
decisions in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra), Shankarsan Dash

14 (2008) 2 SCC 161
610 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(supra) as well as other decisions on the point, this Court further held
that whereas the selectee as such has no legal right, the superior court
in exercise of its judicial review would not ordinarily direct issuance
of any writ in the absence of any pleading and proof of mala fide
or arbitrariness on the part of the authority, and each case has to
be considered on its own merit. Examining the point as to whether
the impugned action of the respondent-State lacked bona fide, this
Court answered in the negative. Finally, this is what was observed:
“55. We are not oblivious of the constitutional scheme that
the decisions taken by one Government in public interest
itself cannot be a ground for review thereof at the hands
of the successor Government. It is not the Government
which is in the seat of the power, matters in this behalf,
but what matters is the public interest.
56. Mr Dwivedi has drawn our attention to a decision of
this Court in State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers
Organisation [(2006) 4 SCC 683] wherein it was held:
(SCC pp. 708-09, para 66)
‘66. Taking an overall view of the matter, it appears
that there could hardly be a dispute that the Project
is a mega project which is in the larger public interest
of the State of Karnataka and merely because there
was a change in the Government, there was no
necessity for reviewing all decisions taken by the
previous Government, which is what appears to have
happened. That such an action cannot be taken every
time there is a change of Government has been
clearly laid down in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [(2004) 4
SCC 714] and in State of Haryana v. State of Punjab
[(2002) 2 SCC 507] where this Court observed thus:
‘[I]n the matter of governance of a State or in
the matter of execution of a decision taken
by a previous Government, on the basis of a
consensus arrived at, which does not involve any
political philosophy, the succeeding Government
must be held duty-bound to continue and carry
on the unfinished job rather than putting a stop
to the same.’
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 611

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

57. There cannot be any doubt in regard to the
aforementioned proposition of law but the question herein
is whether public interest would be subserved by asking
the State to proceed to make appointments. Whereas, on
the one hand, an action on the part of the State to interfere
with the good work done by the previous Government solely
on the basis of change in the regime must be deprecated,
there cannot however be any doubt whatsoever that the
successor Government cannot blink over the illegalities
committed by the previous Government. If illegalities have
been committed, the same should be rectified. When
there exists a reasonable apprehension in the mind of
the State, having regard to the overall situation including
the post-haste manner in which actions had been taken,
to cause an inquiry to be made and suspend the process
of making appointments till the result of such inquiry is
obtained, such a decision on its part per se cannot be
said to be an act of arbitrariness or unreasonableness.”
28. It has not escaped our notice that the decision in Jitendra Kumar
(supra) has been doubted in All India Railway Recruitment
Board v. K. Shyam Kumar15 on the point as to whether Wednesbury
unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality.
The facts in K. Shyam Kumar (supra) bear close resemblance to
the facts of the present appeal and, thus, may be noticed. Therein,
the Railway Recruitment Board (RRB) had called for applications for
appointments on Group D posts in the South-Central Railway Zone,
Secunderabad. Consequently, in excess of three lakh candidates
appeared for the written examination. Of them, ten short of two
thousand seven hundred candidates having achieved the minimum
qualifying marks in the written examination, were called for a PET.
Candidates who qualified in the PET were called for verification,
during which certain malpractices were detected in the written
examination. Additionally, there was a deluge of allegations of mass
copying, question paper leakage, and impersonation committed
during the written examination. A vigilance enquiry was conducted
and the report prima facie revealed these abovementioned illegalities.
Relying on the vigilance report, the RRB decided to conduct a re-test

15 (2010) 6 SCC 614
612 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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of the candidates who had obtained the minimum qualifying marks
in the written examination. This decision was challenged by some
candidates before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad.
The tribunal did not find any irregularity or illegality with the decision
of the RRB, due to which the candidates were constrained to move
the High Court. Before the High Court, the candidates termed the
decision of the RRB as arbitrary and unreasonable. The High Court
agreed with the candidates and set aside the order directing the re-
test as, in the High Court’s opinion, the decision was unreasonable
and violative of the Wednesbury principles. The RRB approached
this Court in appeal. In the resultant decision, this Court while
reversing the decision of the High Court discussed the scope of
both the unreasonableness test as well as the proportionality test.
It was held that the unreasonableness test looks, not necessarily at
the merits of the decision, but the way the decision was made; the
available courses of action of the deciding authority are scrutinised
to ascertain what a reasonable man would do. On the other hand,
the proportionality test is more wide reaching in its approach, closely
analysing the course of action vis-à-vis the situation requiring a
remedy. Hon’ble K.S.P. Radhakrishnan, J. explained the interplay
between these two tests as follows:
“36. Wednesbury applies to a decision which is so
reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
or ethical standards that no sensible person who had
applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have
arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of
being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness
test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a
decision made by a public authority which requires the
courts to ‘assess the balance or equation’ struck by the
decision-maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions
is also described as the ‘least injurious means’ or ‘minimal
impairment’ test so as to safeguard the fundamental rights
of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual
rights and public interest. Suffice it to say that there has
been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and
structure, it is difficult to compartmentalise or lay down a
straitjacket formula and to say that Wednesbury has met
with its death knell is too tall a statement...”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 613

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

Keeping in mind these two tests, this Court noticed that the RRB
had three courses of action once the irregularities had been brought
to light. The first option was to conduct the written examination
again for all the eligible candidates, which would be expensive and
time consuming. The second option was to conduct re-test for the
candidates who had obtained the minimum qualifying marks. The
third option would have been to exclude the sixty-two candidates
who were identified as having indulged in impersonation. The RRB,
relying on the vigilance report, held that there were allegations and
prima facie evidence of mass copying as well as leakage of question
papers and these irregularities could not be tackled by just excluding
the sixty-two candidates accused of impersonation. This Court held
that the actions of the RRB to conduct the re-test for candidates who
obtained the minimum qualifying marks struck the right balance, as
the first option would have been too expensive and time consuming
and the third option would have been too restrictive in combatting
the irregularities in the examination.
29. The decision in K. Shyam Kumar (supra) further sheds light on
another aspect, that is, whether the authority can rely on subsequent
information to justify its decision. In the process, the decision in
Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) was distinguished in the following
manner:
“45. …The principle laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill case
is not applicable where larger public interest is involved and
in such situations, additional grounds can be looked into
to examine the validity of an order. The finding recorded
by the High Court that the report of CBI cannot be looked
into to examine the validity of the order dated 4-6-2004,
cannot be sustained.”
30. Bearing in mind the aforesaid precedents, we have to examine the
facts in some more detail.
31. A close look at the note of the PCCF dated 4th July, 2016 is indeed
imperative, for, it is the basic document providing justification for the
ultimate decision of cancellation. The single Judge in the judgment
dated 7th May, 2019 quoted the said note in full. We consider it
appropriate not to reproduce the note but to summarise its contents,
hereunder:
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¾ The Central Selection Committee was directly constituted
by the Minister, Environment & Forests, as per the enclosed
communication.
¾ All the original documents relating to PET were collected directly
by the Central Selection Committee, as per the enclosed order
of the Minister.
¾ A total of 104 candidates, as per the enclosed list, were
recommended for selection/appointment as Constables by the
Central Selection Committee.
¾ Out of 104 candidates, 64 selected candidates belonged either
to Kamrup or Kamrup Metro districts, which raises serious
questions about the fairness of the selection process.
¾ While 18 and 46 candidates who were selected for appointment
hailed from Kamrup (Metro) and Kamrup (Rural) districts,
respectively, the other selectees hailed from the 8 named
districts with the number of candidates ranging between 1 to
9 from each district.
¾ No candidate was selected from the 16 named districts which
included the Hill districts, the Barak Valley districts and the
Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) districts.
¾ These 16 districts, from where not a single candidate had
been selected, represented a population of 1.60 crore out of
the population of 3.11 crore of the State of Assam as per 2011
census; thus, a population of 52% comprised in the said 16
districts would go unrepresented.
¾ Not a single candidate has been selected from the Hill districts
or the Barak Valley districts or the BTC districts except one
candidate from Baksa district.
¾ A total of 3518 candidates were called for interview against 104
posts, thus, making it a ratio of about 34 candidates per post.
However, reservation for the various categories like Scheduled
Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Tribes (Plain), etc. as
shown in the note were given a complete go-bye. Figures
of the number of candidates who were called from different
categories, i.e., General, ST (Plain), ST (Hills), SC, OBC/MOBC
were indicated in a chart, thereby demonstrating how the law
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 615

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

governing reservation and the judgments of this Court had been
violated in calling the candidates for interview. It was observed
that candidates who ought not to have been called were called,
whereas those deserving of a call were not called.
¾ Although, 15 OBC/MOBC candidates, 17 ST (Plain) candidates,
1 ST (Hills) candidate and 1 SC candidate had qualified on
merit and could have been counted as General category
candidates, they were shown to have been selected against
their respective reserved categories. As a result, a number of
candidates belonging to the reserved categories were deprived
of selection and undeserving candidates selected.
¾ Reference was made to a particular candidate who was placed
at Serial No.162 in the list of General category candidates.
However, she was included in the select list for General
candidates with only 50 vacancies. Similar type of serious
irregularities or illegalities had taken place in selection of many
other candidates.
¾ The entire process of recruitment is highly questionable, unfair
and non-transparent.
32. What can be deduced from the above points flagged by the PCCF,
ultimately approved by the Government, is this.
33. Papers/documents relating to the process of selection manifested
selection of aspirants from certain specified districts and without there
being any representation from a major cross-section of the population
of the State of Assam. That apart, illegalities were detected in the
process leading to preparation of the select list. Non-meritorious
aspirants, undeserving of figuring in the select list, were included.
Besides, appropriate earmarking of posts for reserved candidates
were given a complete go-bye. In addition, meritorious aspirants
belonging to the reserved category were not considered for filling
up open category vacancies but were placed against the reserved
category to which they belonged, thereby depriving other reserved
category aspirants from entering the zone of consideration for
appointment and paving the way for not so meritorious open category
candidates to be placed in the select list. The Government, having
serious reservations about the efficacy of the selection process, felt
that the situation called for cancelling the process. The question is,
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whether it was so unjustified that interference in writ jurisdiction was
warranted?
34. Although the ball had been set rolling in 2014, the interview of the
candidates qualifying in the PET commenced in May, 2016 when
admittedly the elections were knocking at the door. This, per se, may
not be seen as a vitiating factor in the absence of any reference in the
note of the PCCF dated 4th July, 2016 as well as in any subsequent
decision of the Government. That apart, proceeding to conduct a
process of recruitment without there being recruitment rules but based
on executive instructions under Article 162 of the Constitution is not
open to invalidation only on such ground. The Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore,16 since
followed by a coordinate bench in Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of
India,17 may be referred to in this context. In addition, one would find
the absence of any requirement for the aspiring candidates to take
a written examination, thereby, leaving the fate of such candidates
to be determined solely and wholly on the basis of an interview.
Once again, we cannot feign ignorance of the decision of another
coordinate bench in Kiran Gupta v. State of U.P.18 where the law
was laid down in clear terms as follows:
“22. It is difficult to accept the omnibus contention that
selection on the basis of viva voce only is arbitrary and
illegal and that since allocation of 15% marks for interview
was held to be arbitrary by this Court, selections solely
based on interview is a fortiori illegal. It will be useful to bear
in mind that there is no rule of thumb with regard to allotment
of percentage of marks for interview. It depends on several
factors and the question of permissible percentage of marks
for an interview-test has to be decided on the facts of each
case. However, the decisions of this Court with regard
to reasonableness of percentage of marks allotted for
interview in cases of admission to educational institutions/
schools will not afford a proper guidance in determining
the permissible percentage of marks for interview in cases

16 AIR 1966 SC 1942
17 (1979) 3 SCC 165
18 (2000) 7 SCC 719
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 617

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

of selection/appointment to the posts in various services.
Even in this class, there may be two categories: (i) when
the selection is by both a written test and viva voce; and
(ii) by viva voce alone. The courts have frowned upon
prescribing higher percentage of marks for interview when
selection is on the basis of both oral interview and a written
test. But, where oral interview alone has been the criteria
for selection/appointment/promotion to any posts in senior
positions the question of higher percentage of marks for
interview does not arise. …”
35. It cannot be gainsaid that the factors of “when”, “which”, “what”, “who”
and “how” that are associated with a recruitment/selection process is
the prerogative of the recruiting authority and the selectors; however,
at the same time, the process has to be conducted consistent with
statutory provisions governing the same, if any, as well as principles
of absolute fairness and complete non-arbitrariness. Though it is
true that the law does not postulate a fetter on the authority of the
employer-State and it is within the domain of the Government when
to initiate a process of recruitment for public employment, either
according to recruitment rules or even in the absence thereof,
it is for the Government of the day to decide in which manner it
proposes to conduct selection, what would be the various stages the
candidates aspiring for appointment have to pass through in order
to be placed in the select list, who would be the selectors, and how
weightage is to be given to each of the testing methods, a great
deal of credence is lent to a process if it is fairly and transparently
conducted in accordance with rules, whatever be its source, without
the slightest hint of any bias or favouritism or nepotism. Normally, it
is not for the courts to interfere unless the process smacks of mala
fides. However, the right to be considered for public employment
being a Fundamental Right, it would be safe and prudent to have
recruitment rules to govern the process of selection so that the best
possible talent is appointed in public service. Obviously, assessing
the merit of the candidates aspiring for public employment on the
basis of a prescribed standard would not only provide a level playing
field for each of them, the excellence of any institution to which the
appointment is to be made would depend directly on the proficiency
of its members/staff and that would, in turn, depend on the quality
and merit of those who offer themselves for selection and ultimately
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get selected, necessitating the selection to be conducted without any
hidden taint or masked mala fides. Last but not the least, having
regard to present times when corruption has been held to be a walk
of life by certain responsible citizens of the country, it would have
been desirable if the process of recruitment of 104 Constables were
conducted after framing of recruitment rules and also prescribing a
written examination to keep the process absolutely above board.
36. Be that as it may, drawing from our joint experience on the bench,
we can say with some degree of conviction and authority that
conducting recruitment processes in terms of executive orders and in
the absence of statutorily prescribed standards, more often than not,
invite avoidable litigation producing undesirable results. Left to us, if
any process of selection was challenged by unsuccessful candidates
on the ground of absence of recruitment rules, or on the grounds of
absence of a written examination, or on the allegations of bias or
favouritism or nepotism which are nebulous, we would certainly not
interfere in the absence of other apparent vitiating factors. However,
the situation in the present case has taken a completely different
turn. It is the successor Government which nullified the select list.
Hence, the considerations for interference which ordinarily weigh in
the minds of the court, having regard to the peculiar fact situation,
are not exactly the same here. This aspect of the matter, discussed
in some more depth hereafter, seems to have escaped the notice
of the High Court.
37. As the factual narrative has unfolded, it is not that the High Court was
called upon by any unsuccessful candidate to test the bona fide of
the earlier Government decision not to frame recruitment rules and/or
not to prescribe a written examination and/or to require the aspiring
candidates to only go through an interview; on the contrary, the facts
presented evince that it is the successor Government that had taken
an informed decision not to proceed with the earlier process and
to start a new process. At that stage of decision making, possibly,
three options were available to the Government, being – (i) allow the
process to be taken to its logical conclusion, without being unduly
bothered by the illegalities/irregularities detected and referred to by
the PCCF; (ii) cancel the entire process and start it anew; and (iii)
separate the grain from the chaff and to proceed with the former
and complete the process. No doubt, the Government could have
set right the process by preferring the third option. However, once
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 619

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

the Government arrived at the decision considering the illegalities/
irregularities detected by the PCCF that the process ought to be
started afresh and preferred the second option to the first and third
options, thereby cancelling the previous process, the High Court
ought to have applied the proportionality test to adjudge whether the
perfect balance was struck by preferring that option out of the other
available options. Sadly, such test has not been applied.
38. The approach of the single Judge of the High Court, we are afraid,
has evinced an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Resting on the sole
premise that no allegation of corrupt practice or unfair means adopted
by the candidates (read, the respondents herein) had been levelled,
the single Judge found force in the submission advanced by learned
counsel for the respondents that the selection process cannot be
said to be vitiated by malpractice. The single Judge also expressed
the opinion that mere over-representation or under-representation,
though may be suggestive of irregularity or malpractice, that by itself
was not sufficient to arrive at a definitive conclusion that malpractice
had occurred. Insofar as the ratio of candidates called for interview
qua different categories, the single Judge observed as follows:
“29. As regards the non-conformity of ratio of candidates
called for interview, though it can be said to be an
irregularity, but the question is whether such irregularity
itself will be sufficient to vitiate the selection process.
It may be mentioned that adhering to certain ratio for
calling of candidates for interview is to ensure equitable
opportunities to the candidate for assessment and so that
deserving candidates are not unduly deprived of. In the
present case, it has been noted that the variation in the
ratio is not substantial to be considered unreasonable.
Hence, merely because the ratio has not strictly adhered,
that cannot be a ground for setting aside the recruitment
process.
30. Further, though this Court has also noted that the
ratio had not been consistently followed by the Selection
Committee, in absence of any allegation of any corrupt
practice or fraudulent activity, this Court is of the view
that mere non-adherence to specific ration ought not to
be a ground to interfere with the entire selection process.
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39. Viewed in isolation vis-à-vis the claim of the respondents, the opinion
expressed may not seem to be flawed. However, the larger public
interest that the successor Government had in mind was not kept
in view by the single Judge. Fostering diversity and inclusivity in
public service, ensuring that there is representation from almost all
the districts including from the hills and historically backward classes
without, however, compromising merit should be the commitment of
all Governments of States in the North-Eastern part of the country.
The decision to cancel the select list has the marks etched to proceed
towards such commitment and achieving the greater good. Such a
noble initiative was, by no means, open to scrutiny by the judicial
review court. Two distinct conclusions in the given set of facts being
clearly possible and the successor Government having taken a view,
which by no means was unreasonable and/or implausible, the writ
court instead of substituting its view and/or imposing its own decision
as to what would have been and was the correct option that the
Government should have preferred in lieu of the other option actually
preferred, ought to have stayed at a distance instead.
40. It is further useful to remember that the Government itself felt that
the selection being entirely based on interview, the same admitted an
element of arbitrariness and that the assessment of candidates being
based merely on the basis of marks at the interview, was reasonable
for drawing a presumption of being misused for favouritism and
could well be regarded as suffering from the vice of arbitrariness.
In such circumstances, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, for
a court to law to substitute its decision for the one taken by the
Government reasoning that the selection has not been challenged
by any unsuccessful candidate.
41. Insofar as the candidate referred to in the penultimate point of the
note of the PCCF, the single Judge was of the following opinion:
31. As regards the allegation of including one non
meritorious candidate namely, xxx , this Court is of the
opinion that her name can certainly be struck off and the
more meritorious candidate can be included and such
one off illegality cannot said to have vitiated the entire
selection process.
The illegal recommendation of xxx is an instance where
the authorities can themselves rectify by cancelling her
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 621

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

selection, which will not have any bearing on the merit
of the other remaining candidates.”
The aforesaid observations, admitting illegal recommendation having
been made, overlook that it was not a sole instance of favouritism but
the PCCF had also referred, albeit without giving detailed particulars,
to other illegalities/irregularities in respect of selection of many other
candidates.
42. On an overall study of the note, no person of reasonable prudence
would be left in doubt that the process had a coat of discernible taint
suggesting impropriety and bias, if not corruption; and applying the test
of proportionality, the decision taken by the successor Government
of cancelling the process initiated by the earlier Government cannot
be said to be so disproportionate and incommensurate with the
illegalities/irregularities detected that interference could have been
said to be legitimately warranted.
43. The Division Bench arrived at its own conclusion that the select
list should not have been cancelled without any detailed inquiry
having been conducted to find out the veracity of the irregularities
or illegalities alleged.
44. Whether or not a detailed inquiry was needed, despite the note of
the PCCF, ought to have been left undisturbed since the successor
Government reached a satisfaction of its own that for the various
reasons highlighted in the said note, it would be unjust to proceed
further. Such satisfaction could not have been tinkered by the
Division Bench on the ground that a detailed inquiry ought to have
been conducted.
45. We, thus, unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that based on the
note of the PCCF dated 4th July, 2016 and the recommendation
made by him for cancellation of the select list, the decision of the
Government to approve the said note and, thereby, cancel the select
list did not stand vitiated to attract its invalidation either by application
of the doctrine of Wednesbury unreasonableness or proportionality.
46. Before ending our discussion on the relevant issues, we record
having perused the decisions in Anamica Mishra (supra), Rajesh
P.U. (supra) and Sachin Kumar (supra).
47. In Anamica Mishra (supra), this Court held that “… when no
defect was pointed out in regard to the written examination and the
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sole objection was confined to exclusion of a group of successful
candidates in the written examination from the interview, there was
no justification for cancelling the written part of the recruitment
examination. On the other hand, the situation could have been
appropriately met by setting aside the recruitment and asking for a
fresh interview of all eligible candidates on the basis of the written
examination and select those who on the basis of the written and
the freshly-held interview became eligible for selection”. The decision
there turns on its facts, with a written examination being followed by
an interview. The reasons for cancelling the process were also trivial
as compared to the very different reasons with which the appellants
were faced. The cited decision is, therefore, distinguishable.
48. There were no serious grievances of malpractices in Rajesh P.U.
(supra) either. In fact, this Court held that “applying a unilaterally
rigid and arbitrary standard to cancel the entirety of the selections
despite the firm and positive information that except 31 of such
selected candidates, no infirmity could be found with reference to
others, is nothing but total disregard of relevancies and allowing to be
carried away by irrelevancies giving a complete go-by to contextual
considerations throwing to the winds the principle of proportionality
in going farther than what was strictly and reasonably to meet the
situation”. It was concluded that “the competent authority completely
misdirected itself in taking such an extreme and unreasonable
decision of cancelling the entire selections, wholly unwarranted and
unnecessary even on the factual situation found too, and totally in
excess of the nature and gravity of what was at stake, thereby virtually
rendering such decision to be irrational” (emphasis supplied by us).
49. Paragraph 35 of the decision in Sachin Kumar (supra) has been
relied on. There, this Court held that:
“35. In deciding this batch of SLPs, we need not reinvent
the wheel. Over the last five decades, several decisions
of this Court have dealt with the fundamental issue of
when the process of an examination can stand vitiated.
Essentially, the answer to the issue turns upon whether the
irregularities in the process have taken place at a systemic
level so as to vitiate the sanctity of the process. There are
cases which border upon or cross over into the domain of
fraud as a result of which the credibility and legitimacy of
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 623

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

the process is denuded. This constitutes one end of the
spectrum where the authority conducting the examination
or convening the selection process comes to the conclusion
that as a result of supervening event or circumstances,
the process has lost its legitimacy, leaving no option but
to cancel it in its entirety. Where a decision along those
lines is taken, it does not turn upon a fact-finding exercise
into individual acts involving the use of malpractices or
unfair means. Where a recourse to unfair means has
taken place on a systemic scale, it may be difficult to
segregate the tainted from the untainted participants in
the process. Large-scale irregularities including those
which have the effect of denying equal access to similarly
circumstanced candidates are suggestive of a malaise
which has eroded the credibility of the process. At the
other end of the spectrum are cases where some of the
participants in the process who appear at the examination
or selection test are guilty of irregularities. In such a case,
it may well be possible to segregate persons who are
guilty of wrongdoing from others who have adhered to
the rules and to exclude the former from the process. In
such a case, those who are innocent of wrongdoing should
not pay a price for those who are actually found to be
involved in irregularities. By segregating the wrongdoers,
the selection of the untainted candidates can be allowed to
pass muster by taking the selection process to its logical
conclusion. This is not a mere matter of administrative
procedure but as a principle of service jurisprudence
it finds embodiment in the constitutional duty by which
public bodies have to act fairly and reasonably. A fair and
reasonable process of selection to posts subject to the
norm of equality of opportunity under Article 16(1) is a
constitutional requirement. A fair and reasonable process
is a fundamental requirement of Article 14 as well. Where
the recruitment to public employment stands vitiated as a
consequence of systemic fraud or irregularities, the entire
process becomes illegitimate. On the other hand, where
it is possible to segregate persons who have indulged in
malpractices and to penalise them for their wrongdoing, it
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would be unfair to impose the burden of their wrongdoing
on those who are free from taint. To treat the innocent
and the wrongdoers equally by subjecting the former to
the consequence of the cancellation of the entire process
would be contrary to Article 14 because unequals would
then be treated equally. The requirement that a public
body must act in fair and reasonable terms animates the
entire process of selection. The decisions of the recruiting
body are hence subject to judicial control subject to the
settled principle that the recruiting authority must have
a measure of discretion to take decisions in accordance
with law which are best suited to preserve the sanctity of
the process. Now it is in the backdrop of these principles,
that it becomes appropriate to advert to the precedents of
this Court which hold the field.”
(emphasis supplied by us)

50. What follows from the above is that each case has to be decided
on its own peculiar facts. It has to be pleaded and proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that the decision of the recruiting authority
(to cancel the entire process because of wrongdoing by some tainted
elements and not save a part of the process, to the extent it could
be saved, to the utter detriment of the interests of the innocent) is
wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe relative to what
is at stake, thereby virtually rendering such decision to be irrational.
51. Based on what has been discussed in the paragraphs preceding
consideration of the authorities cited by Mr. Goswami, the appellants’
decision in cancelling the entire selection process initiated vide the
advertisement dated 23rd July, 2014 relying on the note of the PCCF
dated 4th July, 2016, and not part of it, in our considered opinion,
does not seem to be either arbitrary or unreasonable or without
any sense of proportion. Since the earlier process did border on
fraud, in the light of the reservation policy not being respected and
observance of the decisions of this Court (that meritorious reserved
category candidates are entitled to be accommodated in the open
category) in breach, there was a brazen violation which was sought
to be corrected and, if we may say, justifiably so. It has not been
proved to our satisfaction that the impugned decision of cancelling
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 625

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

the select list is the neat result of an injudicious exercise of discretion
and was ill-directed in the guise of achieving the sanctity of the entire
selection process.
52. The broad issue and issue (a) (supra) are, thus, answered in
favour of the appellants by holding that the impugned decision of
cancellation was neither unjustified nor was one which could be upset
by applying the doctrines of either Wednesbury unreasonableness
or proportionality.
53. Since we find question (b) supra to be a question of frequent
occurrence engaging the courts of law, it is considered fruitful to
take it up for an answer now. It has been argued that by dint of
mere empanelment/enlistment of an aspirant’s name for filling up a
public post, no right accrues in favour of such an aspirant to move
the writ court for redress. We do not consider that an empanelled
or a selected candidate has absolutely no right to move the writ
court. We are conscious of the line of decisions of this Court and
have noted some of them here, which lay down the law that mere
empanelment/enlistment does not result in accrual of any indefeasible
right in favour of such empanelled/selected candidate as well as the
law that the employer may, in its wisdom, either decide to cancel
the select list or not carry on the process further resulting in the
notified/advertised vacancy/vacancies not being filled up pursuant
to the selection process, which has been conducted. What it means
is that an empanelled/selected candidate can claim no right of
appointment, if the State has cogent and germane grounds for not
making the appointment. However, at the same time, it is also the
law that the appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel or
decline to make the appointment on its whims. Shankarsan Das
(supra) cautions that the State has no licence to act in an arbitrary
manner. In R.S. Mittal v. Union of India,19 a coordinate bench held
that when a person has been selected by the Selection Board and
there is a vacancy which can be offered to him, keeping in view
his merit position, then, ordinarily, there is no justification to ignore
him for appointment and that there has to be a justifiable reason to
decline to appoint a person who is on the select panel. The position
in law finds reiteration in a decision of recent origin in Dinesh Kumar

19 (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 230
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Kashyap v. South East Central Railway,20 where the majority
held that the employer must give cogent reasons for not appointing
selected candidates.
54. Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being vacancies and
a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a policy decision. It has
to be borne in mind that securing public employment is the dream
of many, who put their heart and soul to prepare for it. Nowadays,
aspirants undertake rigorous study sessions as well as training
modules to equip themselves, which also comes at a heavy cost.
That apart, since every process of recruitment necessarily involves
substantial expenses which are borne from the public exchequer
and at the same time the aspirants for the posts (who, as per their
own estimation, have performed sufficiently well and therefore stand
a good chance of being appointed upon figuring in the select list)
cherish fond hopes of a bright and secure future, the law is clear
that the policy decision not to carry the process forward must be
taken bona fide, there has to be justifiable reason if the process is
abandoned mid-way, and such decision must not suffer from the
vice of arbitrariness or the whims of the decision maker. This acts
as a check on the employer’s power deciding against not making
any appointment from the select list despite availability of vacancy/
vacancies on the advertised/notified public post(s). A writ court may,
upon reaching the requisite satisfaction, intervene in such manner
and make such directions as the facts and circumstances warrant.
We, therefore, do not find it acceptable that the aspirants, not having
an indefeasible or vested right of appointment, do not also have
the right to question any decision adverse to their interest affecting
achievement of their goals to secure public employment. Whether,
and to what extent, any relief should be granted, must depend on
the facts of each case.
55. On facts and in the circumstances, however, the respondents’ legal
rights were not infringed because of absence of grant of legitimacy
to the select list by way of an approval from the Government; hence,
the writ petition should not have been allowed.
56. Question (b) (supra) is, accordingly, answered.

20 (2019) 12 SCC 798
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 627

State of Assam & Ors. v. Arabinda Rabha & Ors.

57. The answer to the issue of the appellants urging new grounds need
not detain us for long. We have not looked into the counter affidavit
of the appellants but have confined our attention to the note of the
PCCF dated 4th July, 2016, containing the reasons based on which
cancellation of the select list was proposed. The law laid down in
Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) admits of no dispute; however, the said
decision has no application because of what has been immediately
observed by us.
58. We reiterate having read the note dated 4th July, 2016 of the PCCF
in between the lines and record that there were materials proffering
sufficient justification for the successor Government to cancel the
select list; hence, we endorse our approval of the same.
59. Having answered all the aforesaid crucial issues, ruling on the final
issue invariably has to be in favour of the appellants.

Relief
60. Consequently, the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) of the High
Court stand(s) quashed.
61. The civil appeal stands allowed, without order for costs.
62. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Concluding Directions
63. The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of
filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by
publishing fresh advertisement. It would be desirable if rules are
framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly
applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias
or arbitrariness. Even if rules are not framed, the selection process
may be taken forward in terms of administrative instructions which,
in any case, should be placed in the public domain.
64. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such
advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their
age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in
physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the
PET, considering that almost a decade has passed since the earlier
process was initiated. This concession is granted in exercise of our
628 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution. In addition, it
shall be open to the PCCF to grant such further relaxation to the
respondents as deemed fit and proper.
65. Let the fresh process be initiated and concluded without any delay.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan