Holding

Convicts whose death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment before the commencement of Section 433A are entitled to consideration for premature release under the then‑applicable executive instructions, and the State must act in accordance with the Supreme Court’s 10 December 1980 order irrespective of the 14‑year rule.

Summary

The State of Haryana appealed against High Court orders directing it to consider premature release of two convicts whose death sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment. The convicts were sentenced before the 1978 amendment introducing Section 433A of the CrPC, which mandates a minimum of 14 years’ actual imprisonment before a life‑sentence holder can be considered for release. The Supreme Court held that Section 433A is prospective and does not apply to those convicted prior to its commencement, but the convicts are still entitled to consideration for premature release under the prevailing executive instructions. The Court observed that the State Government’s failure to act within six months of the Supreme Court’s 10 December 1980 order violated that direction and could not be justified by the 14‑year rule in the instructions. Consequently, the State must consider the respondents’ premature release in accordance with the applicable rules, and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a life‑convict whose death sentence was commuted before the enactment of Section 433A has a vested right to premature release after serving 14 years of actual imprisonment.
Whether the executive instructions (Punjab Jail Manual paragraph 516‑B and subsequent Government memoranda) are applicable to such convicts for consideration of premature release.
Whether the State Government must comply with the Supreme Court’s order dated 10 December 1980 to consider the respondents’ release despite the 14‑year substantive‑sentence requirement.
Whether Section 433A of the CrPC, being prospective, affects the rights of convicts sentenced before 18 December 1978.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 432, s. 433, s. 433A, s. 433(b)
Constitution of Indias. Article 161, s. Article 72
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 54, s. 55

Subjects

life imprisonmentdeath sentence commutationpremature releaseSection 433Aexecutive instructionsprospective legislationstate governmentmercy petitionremissionCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

_/
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR ..
v. A
RAM DIYA

·APRIL 10, 1990
\ -

[S: RAT;'· ~'EL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA B
REDDY, JJ.J

Codi' of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Seciions 432, 433 and 433A-
Death sentence commuted to life sentence-'-Convictlon prior to intro-
duction of section 433A-Premature release of such life convicts-
Consideration by° State Government-Compliance with Court's direc-
tions. C·

·Punjab Jail Manual: Paragraph 516-B-Executive instroctions-
Convicts whose sentence of death commuted to· life imprisonment-
Conviction prior to amendment of Cr.P. C: in 1978-Premature release
· ~-- of-Applicability of the instructions. · - D

Paragraph 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual provides for prema-
ture release of prisoners, and is in the nature of executive instructions.
The State Government modified the instructions in 1971 and 1976. The
1976 instruction was to the effect that cases or life convicts whose sen-
tence bas been commuted should be considered for premature release E
only after completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment. The State
Government further liberalised its policy and decided that such cases
might be reviewed by a state level committee and directed that cases of
life convicts who have completed 8~ yearS substantive sentence and
sentence of 14/10 years including remission be submitted to the Com-
mittee. Later on the State Government clarified that the liberalised F
policy would not be applicable to the life convicts whose death sentence
has been commuted to life imprisonment. ·

In 1978, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1~73 was amended
introducing . section 433A providing that such life convicts · should
undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in jail. This Court declared G
that section 433A of the Code is prospective in effect and did not operate .
against those cases which were decided by the trial court before
18.12.1978 (Maru Ram etc. etc. v. Union of India and Anr., (1981] I
SCR 1196). -. . .

.The cases of respondents were in fact covered by the said decision. H

431
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990j 2 S.C.R.

A They have filed writ petitions before the High Court for premature
,release and the High Court directed the State Government to consider
their cases. The State Government has .preferred these appeals, by
special leave, against the orders of the High Court.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court,
B
HELD: 1.1. No one has gQt a vested right to claim pre-mature
release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual impri·
sonment as prescribed under section 433A Cr.P.C. because a sentence ~
of 'imprisonment for life' is incarceration until death, that is, for the
remaining period or convicted person's actual life. There is no questi<in ~
C . of releasing suth a lifer early in the absence of an order of commutation
under section SS IPC by the appropriate Government, or under section
433(b) of Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 by the appropriate Govern-
ment or on a clemency order in exercise of power under Article 72 or
'161 of the Constitution oflndia. [43SE-F; G-Hl · ' · ~

D 1.2. In the instant case, the conviction of the respondents was
recorded early to the introduction of section 433A and, therefore, as per ·
the ratio laid down in Maru Ram's case, the two respondents are
entitled for consideration of release by the appropriate Government 8s ·
per the prevailing rules or executive instructions. Further, admittedly,
,the State Government did not take up the cases of the respondents for
E premature release within six months of the order of this Court tlated
10th December 1980 in Sant Ram's case, (W.P. Nos. 1252-64/80 etc.
etc.) and deferred the consideration of premature release till the
·respondents bad completed 14 years of substantive sentence. It has
become obligatory for the State to conside~ the cases of premature
release of the respondents in accordance with the rules or executive
F in5tructions prevailing and applicable to them at the relevant time i:e.
between tlje period 10.12.1980 and 9.6.1981. The plea of the appellant
that the premature release of the respondents was not considered since
they have not completed 14 years of substantive imprisonment ls in vio-
lation of the d~ions of the order dated 10th December, 1980 of this
Court and so the appellant cannot be permitted tO make such a plea on
G the stength of the executive instructions overlooking and ignoring the
above directions. There is no hllmnity in the judgments of the High
Court calling for interference. [436E-F; 437F; '!31!H; 439A-C] ·

Kishori Lal v .Emperor, AIR 194S P.C. 64; Gopal Vinayak Godse
v. T.he State of Maharashtia and Others, (1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram
·: H . etc. etc, v. Un!on of Jndifl_& ,-t~r., _(1981) I ~CR 1~6; Kartar Singh~
' .
--
STATE OF HARYANA v. RAM DJYA [PANDIAN, J.] 433

Others v.State of Haryana, (1982] 3 SCC I and Sadhu Singh v. State of
Punjab, [1984] 2 SCR 741, relied on. A

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 365 of 1986 and 245 of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21. 12.1984 of the Punjab B
and Haryana High Court in Crl. Writ Petition No. 399 of 1983 and 251
.., of 1983 .

. "" Mahabir Singh (N .P.) and Dalveer Bhandari for the Appellants .

A.K. Goel for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
--......__
S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. Leave granted in Special Leave
Petition (Criminal) No. 1158 of 1985.
D
The State of Haryana has preferred these two appeals against the
Judgment and Order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dated
21.12.1984 in Writ Petition Nos. 399/83 and 251/83 respectively pas-
sing similar orders directing the State Government to consider the
cases of the respondents for premature release.
~ E
The facts which lie ma very narrow compass ~ay ~e-stated thus:

The respondents were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge,
> Kamal which sentence inflicted on each of them was subsequently
commuted to life imprisonment on mercy petitions. F
).. It seems that the State Government issued various executive
instructions from time to time either altering or amending the existing
instructions by fresh executive instructions specifying the minimum
period of actual detention to be undergone by a convict sentenced to
life imprisonment before his case for premature release could be con- G
sidered by the State Government. To appreciate the case:ofthe•respec-
tive parties it would be apposite to make reference to the relevant
T instructions. At the outset,. the instructions contained in paragraph
516-B of Punjab Jail Manual which are in the nature of executive in-
structions by way of guidance may be referred to which instructions
are based on a Government of India resolution No. 159-167 dated 6th H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

A September, 1905. The aforesaid paragraph reads thus:

"516-B(a) With the exception of females and who were
under 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence,
the cases of every convicted prisoner sentenced to:

8 (i) imprisonment for life

(iv) ............................................... .

(a) who has undergone a period of detenton in jail
c amounting together with remission earned to 14 years,
shall be submitted through the Inspector General of Pris-
ons, Punjab for the orders of the State Government".

The substance of the above paragraph is that the case of a male
D lifer who was above 20 years of age at the time of commission of
offence sentenced to life imprisonment and who has undergone deten-
tion in jail amounting together with remission earned to 14 years,
should be submitted to the State Government for consideration of his
premature release. It further appears in the year 1971, the State
Government after a considerable deliberation took a policy decision
E and issued instructions through its Memorandum No. 13311-6JJ-71/ ·
39656 dated 10th of Novemper, 1971 providing that a period of actual
sentence of 81/2 years in the case of adult life convicts and 6 years in the
case of female convicts as well those male convicts below 20 years of
age at the time of commission of offence should be regarded as the
qualifying period of consideration for premature release. This
F memorandum was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent
for consideration of their premature release in the light of the said
policy decision with effect from 2nd November, 1971.

Thereafter, in January 1976 the question of releasing prema-
turely life convicts whose death sentence has been commutted was
G again considered by the State Government and it took a policy deci-
sion that cases of such life convicts should be considered for premature
release only after completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment and in
that behalf Memorandum No. 403-611-76/3456 dated 30th January
1976 containing the necessary instructions was issued by the State
Government. It is culled out from the impugned judgment of the High
H Court in Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1986 (arising out of Writ Petition
STATE OF HARYANA v. RAM DIYA IPANDIAN, J.] 435

No. 399/83) that the State Government with a view to liberalise the
policy of premature release of prisoners decided that such cases might A
~

----.,..~ be reviewed by a State Level Committee comprising of four members
inclusive of Minister for Prisons and directed the concerned Superin-
tendent of Jail to submit cases of life convicts two months before they
completed 81/2 years substantive sentence and sentence of 14/10 years
including remission along with his comments to the Inspector General B
of Prisons, Haryana who thereupon would put up all cases along with
his recommendations for consideration before the Committee and

.• further directed the Inspector General of Prisons to submit a copy of
the decision taken by the said Committee along with the roll of each
prisoner to Government within one week.

Be that as it may, the Parliament introduced Section 433(A) by c
the code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978 (45 of 78)
with effect from 18.12.1978. According to Section 433(A) that a
.'- person who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has
been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who
have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which D
death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual
imprisonment of 14 years in jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in
this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the
introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview
of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of
... actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one
has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he
E
has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under
Section 433(A) because a sentence of 'imprisonment for life' is incar-

, ceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted.
person's actual life vide Kishori Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Privy
Council 64; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra and F
Others, [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India &
)- Anr., [1981] 1 SCR 1196; Kartar Singh and Others v. State of Haryana,
[1982] 3 SCC I and Sadhu Singh v. State of Punjab, [1984] 2 SCR 741.

There is no question of releasing such a lifer early in the absence
of an order of commutation under Section 55 IPC by the appropriate G
Government which term is defined under Section 55(A) IPC or under
Section 433(b) of Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 by the appropriate
Government or on a clemency order in exercise of power under Article
T 72 or 161 of the Constitution of India. Incidentally, it may be stated
that Section 54 empowers the appropriate Government to commute
the sentence of death for any other punishment provided by the Indian H
Penal Code.
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990) 2 S.C.R.

Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the power to
A the appropriate Government either to suspend or to remit the sen-
tences. The meaning of the expression 'appropriate Government'
occurring in Section 432 and 433 is given under sub-section 7 of Section
432. .

.B The Constitution Bench of this Court in Maru Ram Etc. Etc. v.
Union of India & Anr., [1981] 1SCR1196 after thoroughly examining
the intendment of Section 433{A) concluded by formulating its various
findings one of which is as follows:

"We declare thats. 433A, in both its limbs (i.e. both types
of life imprisonment specified in it), is prospective in
c effect. To put the position beyond doubt, we direct that the
mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment will
not operate against those whose cases were decided by the
trial court before the 18th December 1978 (directly or
ratro-actively, as explained in the judgment) when
D s. 433(A) came into force. All 'lifers' whose conviction by
the Court of first instance was entered prior to that date. are
entitled to considera'tion by Govemineni for release on the
strength of earned remissions although a release can take
place only if Government makes an order to that effect."·

R Now, coming to the facts of case on ha11d, admittedly the convic-
tion of the respondents was recorded early to the introduction of Sec-
tion 433{A) and, therefore, as per the ratio laid down in Maru Ram's
case (ibid), these two respondents are entitled for consideration of
release by the appropriate Government as per the prevailing rules or
executive instructions. ...
.

F
After the judgment dated 11.11.1980 in Maru Ram's case, a
number of life convicts filed batch of writ petitions in Writ Petition
Nos. 1252-64 etc. etc. captioned Sant Ram etc. etc. v. Union of India &
Ors. etc., and those writ petitions were disposed of by an order of this
Court dated December 10, 1980. Ram Diya, the respondent in Crimi-
G nal Appeal No. 365 of 1986 was one of the petitioners in the connected
batch of Writ Petition Nos. 1532-1539 of 1980. The common order
. passed in all those petitions reads thus:

"All of these Writ Petitions except Writ Petition Nos. 1477
and 1478 of 1980 shall stand disposed of in accordance with
the judgment of this Court dated November 11, 1980 in
STATE OF HARYANA v. RAM DIYA [PANDIAN, J.[ 437

Maru Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & Anr., W.P. No.
865/79 etc. etc. All persons who were released on bail shall A
surrender to their sentence and the respective State
Governments will pass appropriate orders in each indivi-
dual case or generally in any group or class of cases in the
light of the judgment aforesaid within six months from
today. B

If in particular cases, orders of release have been passed
prior to the introduction of Section 433(A), Criminal Pro-
cedure Code, the accused need not surrender to their bail."

From the impugned judgment of the High Court, it is seen that
the respondent (Ram Saran) also filed a Criminal Writ Petition seek- c
ing direction to the State Government to consider his case for prema-
ture release and the same was disposed of by an order dated December
10, 1980 in accordance with the decision in Maru Ram's case, and that
Ram Saran who is said to have undergone 16 years 1 month and 28
days of imprisonment including 5 years 8 months and 27 days remis- D
sions as on July 21, 1982 was released on bail.

It appears the Government have issued letter No. 43/15783-JJ(2)
dated February 27, 1984 clarifying the earlier instructions dated
November 28, 1977 and reiterating their inapplicability to life convicts
whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment on E
their mercy petitions and further stating that consideration of prema-
ture release of such convicts shall continue to be considered in the light
of the Government policy decision dated December 12, 1967 thereby
making it obligatory for them to undergo 14 years substantive
sentence.
F
Admittedly, the State Government did not take up the cases of
}- the respondents for premature release within six months of the Order
of the Supreme Court dated 10th December 1980 and deferred the
consideration of premature relase till the respondents had completed
14 years of substantive sentence. Jn the written statement filed by the
Inspector General of Prisons, it is averred as follows: G

"It is submitted that the conduct of the petitioner during
his confinement in the jail was satisfactory but it is irrele-
T vant as far as the consideration of his premature release
case is concerned. According to the Government policy his
premature release case is to be considered when he has H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

undergone 14 years substantive sentence and 20 years sen-
A tence including remission. His jail conduct will be consi-
dered when he has completed 14 years substantive
sentence."

In Sadhu Singh's case (ibid), it has been urged on behalf of the
B lifers that the State Government relying upon the executive instruc-
tions issued on 30.1.76 had erroneously made a distinction between
cases of prisoners who had been sentenced to death but whose sen-
tence on mercy petitions had been commuted to life imprisonment and
cases of prisoners who had been straightaway sentenced to life impri-
sonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for premature
"'
i•

release and that it is not open to the State Government to rely upon
c those executive instructions dated 30.1.76 for making the distinction
and pc_i.8!)Jcinini the consideration of the cases of prisoners falling
within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has
/
been suffered by them. This argument was answered by this Court
holding thus:
D
"The second contention also must fail in view of the admit-
ted position that cases of prisoners who have been sen-
tenced to death but whose sentence on mercy petitions has
been commuted to life imprisonment (who constitute a dis-
tine! class) will now be governed by the 1976 instructions.
Here also the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of __/
E
Mehar Singh (supra) that the 1976 instructions issued on
30th of January 1976 will not be applicable to cases of
prisoners convicted earlier to that date is not tenable.
Clearly existifg cases of life convicts falling within that
category will be governed by those instructions." ...
F
So far as these cases are concerned, premature release of the
respondents has to be considered in view of the directions given by this .-l
Court in the Order dated December 10, 1980 in the batch of writ
petitions which instructions admittedly have not been complied with
merely on the ground that the respondents have not completed 14
G years of actual imprisonment since these respondents constitute a dis-
tinct class in that they have been initially sentenced to death which has
been commuted on their mercy petitions. This argument is not avail-
able to the appellant because the respondents' premature release is
required to be considered as per the directions of this Court vide ~
Order dated 10.12.1980. Hence it has become obligatory for the State
H to consider the cases of premature release of these respondents in
STATE OF HARYANA v. RAM DIYA [PANDIAN, J.[ 439

accordance witli the rules or executive instructions prevailing and A
applicable to them at the relevant time i.e. between the period
10.12.1980 and 9:l\: 1981. The plea of the appellant as reflected from
the written statement filed by the Inspector General of Police that the
premature release of the respondents was not considered since they
have not completed 14 years of substantive imprisonment is in viola-
B
tion of the directions of the Order dated 10th December 1980 of this
Court and so the appellant cannot be permitted to make such a plea on
the strength of the executive instructions overlooking and ignoring the
above directions. In the premises, we see no infirmity in the judgments
of the High Court calling for interference.

For the aforementioned reasons, we uphold the impugned Judg- C
ment and Order of the High Court and dismiss these appeals as devoid
of any merit.

G.N. Appeals dismissed.

T