STATE OF HARYANAversusPREM CHAND AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1989 INSC 387
- Decided
- 14 December 1989
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B C RAY
Holding
The review petitions were dismissed as there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and a victim's character or reputation is not a relevant factor for sentencing under Section 376 of the IPC.
Summary
The State of Haryana sought review of a Supreme Court judgment that confirmed the conviction of Prem Chand and others for rape under IPC Section 376 but reduced their sentences from ten to five years by invoking the proviso to Section 376(2) on the basis of the victim's conduct. The Court examined the scope of review in criminal matters under Article 137 of the Constitution and Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, which permits review only on an error apparent on the face of the record. Finding no such error, the Court dismissed the review petitions. It further clarified that a victim's character or reputation is irrelevant to guilt or sentencing under Section 376, and that the term “conduct” was used only to describe the delay in reporting, not to impugn character. Consequently, the Court upheld the principle that victim character cannot be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance in rape cases.
Issues considered
- The scope of review of a criminal judgment under Article 137 and Supreme Court Rules – whether grounds other than error apparent on the face of the record are permissible.
- Whether the lower court erred in considering the victim's conduct/character in reducing the sentence under the proviso to Section 376(2) of the IPC.
- Whether a rape victim's character or reputation can be taken into account as a mitigating factor under IPC Section 376.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 137, s. Article 145
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Proviso to Section 376(2), s. Section 376
- Supreme Court Rules, 1966s. Order XL, Rule I
Subjects
Judgment
STATE OF HARYANA
.A v.
PREM CHAND AND ORS.
DECEMBER 14, 1989
B [B.C. RAY ANDS. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 137 and 145-Review of
judgment-Power exercisable subject to the rules.framed.
Supreme Court Rules, 1966: Order XL, Rule I-Review of judg-
ment in criminal proceeding-Only on ground of error apparent on the
c face of the record.
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 376---Character or reputation
of victim-Not relevant in awarding sentence-Not a mitigation or
extenuating circumstance under proviso to so. S.376(2).
D
This Court rendered a judgment in this case on 31.1.1989
confirming the conviction of both the respondents and reducing the
sentence of imprisonment from 10 years to 5 years by invoking the
proviso to Section 376(2) I.P.C.
E The petitioner State has sought review of the said judgment.
Dismissing the review petitions, this Court,
HELD: 1. As per order XL Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966,
review in criminal proceedings is limited to errors apparent on the face
F of record. In the instant case, there is no error apparent on the face of
the record necessitating review of the judgment. [498F]
P.N. Eswara Iyer and Ors. v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India,
[1980] 4 SCC 680: Sow Chandra Kanta and Anr. v. Sheikh Habib,
[1975] 3 SCR 933; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors.,
G [1983)4SCC 104,reliedon.
2. The very confirmation of the conviction accepting the sole
testimony of the victim, rejecting the arguments of the defence counsel,
is itself a clear indication that this court was of the view that the charac-
ter or reputation of tbe victim has no bearing or relevance either in the
H matter of adjudging the guilt of the accused or imposing punishment
496
STATE OF HARYANA v. PREM CHAND [RAY, J.] 497
under Section 376 I.P.C. Such factors are wholly alien to the very scope
and object of Section 376 and can never serve either as mitigating or
extenuating circumstances for imposing the sub-minimum sentence
with the aid of the proviso to Section 376(2) of the I.P.C. [499G-H]
3. This Court neither characterised the victim, as a woman of
questionable character and easy virtue nor made any reference to her B
character or reputation in any part of the judgment but used the ex-
pression "conduct" in the lexigraphical meaning for the limited
purpose of showing as to how she had behaved or conducted herself in ••
not telling any one for about 5 days about the sexual assault perpetrated
on her till she was examined on 28.3.1984 by the sub-Inspector of
Police. The word "conduct" was not used with reference to the charac- c
ter or reputation of the victim. [SOOB-C]
4. This Court is second to none in upholding the decency and
dignity of womanhood and this Court has not expressed any view in the
judgment that character, reputation or status of a raped victim is a D
relevant factor for consideration by the Court while awarding the
sentence to a rapist. [SOOD I
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Review Petition
(Criminal) Nos. 241-242of1989.
E
IN
Criminal Appeal Nos. 544-545 of 1986.
Mahabir Singh for the Petitioner.
F
A.N. Molla, S.B. Upadhyay for the Respondents.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
RAY, J.It is very unfortunate that a controversy has arisen follow-
ing the judgment sought to be reviewed in Criminal Appeal.Nos. 544-45 G
of 1986 rendered by this Bench on 31st January 1989 whereby this Court
while confirming the conviction of both the respondents/accused
reduced the sentence of imprisonment in respect of each of the respon-
dents from 10 years to 5 years by invoking the proviso to Section
376(2) of the Indian Penal Code observing· "the peculiar facts and·
H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A circumstances of this case coupled with the conduct of the victim girl,
in our view, do not call for the minimum sentence as prescribed under
Section 376(2) ." The State of Haryana has filed the above petitions
seeking review of the judgment and to "pass such other or further
order( s) as may be necessary in the circumstances of the case."
B At the outset, we may examine the scope of review of a judgment
in a criminal case already pronounced by this Court. Article 137 of the
Constitution of India gives the power to the Supreme Court to review
its judgment but such special power is exercisable in accordance with,
and subject to, the rules of this Court made under Article 145 of the
Constitution of India.
c Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules provides:
"The Court may review its judgment or order but no appli-
cation for review will be entertained in a civil proceeding
except on the ground mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of
D the Code and in a criminal proceeding except on the
ground of an error on the face of the record."
This Court in a series of decisions has examined the scope of
review in criminal cases after the judgment pronounced or order
made. Though we are not citing all those decisions, we may refer to a
E few.
In the case of P.N. Eswara Iyer and Ors v. Registrar, Supreme
Court of India, [ 1980] 4 SCC 680 the Constitution Bench of this Court
while considering the rule observed thus:
F "The rule (Order XL, Rule 1), on its face affords a wider
set of grounds for review for orders in civil proceedings,
but limits the ground vis-a-vis criminal proceedings to
'errors apparent on the face of the record.'."
See also Sow Chandra Kanta & Anr. v. Sheik Habib, (1975] 3
G SCR 933 and Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Orders, [1983]
4SCC 104.
In our considered view, when the present matter is exanined in
the light of the decisions referred to above, we find no error apparent
on the face of the record necessitating review of the judgment and as
H such these review petitions are liable to be dismissed.
STATE OF HARYANA v. PREM CHAND [RAY, J.] 499
We have heard the arguments of the learned senior counsel,
Mr. Rajinder Sachar who though initially started his arguments on A
behalf of the People's Union for Civil Liberties ultimately advanced
his arguments on behalf of the State in these review petitions on the
representation made by Mr. Mahabir Singh, the learned counsel for
the State. Mr. R.K.P. Shankar Dass who advanced his arguments on
behalf of Mahila Sanyukt Morcha stated that his arguments may also B
be treated as supplemental to the arguments of Mr. Rajinder Sachar.
Mr. Mulla, the learned senior counsel appeared on behalf of the
respondents.
Although we have found that the Review Petitions are liable to
be dismissed on the ground that. there is no error apparent on the face
of the record, we, however, in view of the elaborate submissions made
by the various learned counsel appearing before us, would like to
make the following observations.
The facts of the case are briefly stated in the Criminal Appeals
and, therefore, it is not necessary to restate the same. Suffice to say D
that during the course of the hearing on the appeals on behalf of the
respondents/accused, it has been urged by the learned defence counsel
that the victim Suman Rani was a woman of questionable character
and easy virtue with lewd· and lascivious behaviour and as such her
version is not worthy of acceptance. After considerable debate on the
merits of the case, the argument was confined only with regard to the E
quantum of sentence. after meticulously examining the entire matter,
this Court came to the conclusion that the proviso to Sectiol) 376(2)
l.P.C. could be invoked having regard to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case coupled with the conduct of the victim and
the mandatory sentence provided under the penal provision is not
called for. F
At this juncture, we would like to point put that the very confir·
mation of the conviction accepting the sole testimony of the victim
Suman Rani rejecting ·the arguments of the defence counsel is itself a
clear indication that this Court was of the view that the character or
reputation of the victim has no bearing or relevance either in the G
matter of adjudging the guilt of the accused or imposing punishment
under Section 376 I.P.C. We would like to state with all emphasis that
such factors are wholly alien to the very scope and object of Section
376 and can never serve either as mitigating or extenuating circum-
stances for imposing the sub-minimum sentence with the aid of the
proviso to Section 376(2) of the l.P.C. In fact, we have expressed our H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A views in the judgment itself staiing "No doubt an offence of this nature
has to be viewed very seriously and has to be dealt with condign
punishment."
We have neither characterised the victim, Suman Rani as a
B woman of questionable character and easy virtue nor made any re-
ference to her character or reputation in any part of our judgment but
used the expression "conduct" in the lexigraphical meaning for the
limited purpose of showing as to how Suman Rani had behaved or
conducted herself in not telling any one for about 5 days about the
sexual assault perpetrated on her till she was examined on 28.3.1984
by the Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-20) in connection with the comp-
C taint given by Ram Lal (PW-14) on 22.3.1984 against Ravi Shanker. In
this connection, we make it further clear that we have not used the
word 'conduct' with reference to the character or reputation of the
victim-Suman Rani.
Before parting with this matter, we would like to express that
D this Court is second to none in upholding the decency and dignity of
woman-hood and we have not expressed any view in our judgment that
character, reputation or status of a raped victim is a relevant factor for
consideration by the Court while awarding the sentence to a rapist.
With the above observations, we dismiss the Review Petitions.
E
G.N. Petitions dismissed.
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