Supreme Court of India
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESHversusCHAMAN LAL
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 57
- Decided
- 15 January 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B V NAGARATHNA
Holding
The dying declaration was voluntary, truthful and reliable, and sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC, leading to the reversal of the High Court's acquittal.
Summary
The State of Himachal Pradesh prosecuted Chaman Lal for allegedly pouring kerosene on his wife Saro Devi and setting her on fire, leading to her death. The trial court convicted him based largely on the wife's dying declaration recorded by a Tehsildar, but the High Court acquitted him, extending the benefit of doubt due to alleged discrepancies in the timing and manner of recording the statement. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing that it need not be corroborated if found voluntary, truthful and reliable. The Court held that the declaration was made when the deceased was conscious, was recorded by a competent authority in the presence of senior officers, and was consistent with other evidence, rendering the High Court's rejection untenable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the conviction and life sentence, and ordered the respondent to surrender.
Issues considered
- The admissibility and evidentiary value of the dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether minor discrepancies in the timing and method of recording the dying declaration affect its credibility.
- Whether the lack of corroboration precludes reliance on a dying declaration for conviction.
- The propriety of the High Court's extension of the benefit of doubt to the accused.
- The standards for appellate interference with a High Court acquittal.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the credibility of the dying declaration of the wife, and the correctness of the order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent-husband by extending to him the benefit of doubt. Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying case that owing to marital discord between the parties, the respondent-husband allegedly poured kerosene on his wife at their residence and set her on fire – Some villagers rushed to her rescue and the respondent also attempted to extinguish the fire – Wife was rushed to the
Subjects
Credibility of the dying declarationBenefit of doubtDying declarationMarital discordHusband poured kerosene on his wifeAttempt to extinguish the fireImprisonment for lifeAcquittal
Judgment
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 821 : 2026 INSC 57
State of Himachal Pradesh
v.
Chaman Lal
(Criminal Appeal No. 430 of 2018)
15 January 2026
[B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the credibility of the dying declaration of the
wife, and the correctness of the order passed by the High Court
acquitting the respondent-husband by extending to him the benefit
of doubt.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying declaration – Evidentiary
value – Prosecution case that owing to marital discord
between the parties, the respondent-husband allegedly poured
kerosene on his wife at their residence and set her on fire –
Some villagers rushed to her rescue and the respondent also
attempted to extinguish the fire – Wife was rushed to the
hospital where she succumbed to her burn injuries, after a
month – Tehsildar had recorded the dying declaration of the
wife – Trial court convicted the respondent for the offence
punishable u/s. 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life – High Court acquitted the respondent by extending
to him the benefit of doubt – Correctness:
Held: Dying declaration inspires full confidence – Declaration
clearly and unequivocally attributes the act of pouring kerosene
oil and igniting the fire to the respondent – It bears the thumb
impression of the deceased and was recorded in the presence
of senior officers – No material on record suggestive of tutoring,
coercion or manipulation – In any event, the law does not prescribe
any rigid form for recording a dying declaration – So long as the
Court is satisfied that the declaration is voluntary, truthful and
reliable, hyper-technical objections cannot form the basis for its
rejection – Dying declaration itself refers to persistent matrimonial
discord and ill-treatment thereby furnishing a plausible background
* Author
822 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
for the commission of the offence – Upon an overall appraisal of
the evidence, the dying declaration of the deceased, voluntary,
truthful and reliable – It was recorded by a competent authority at
a time when the deceased was conscious, oriented and capable
of making a statement – Minor discrepancies highlighted by the
High Court do not create any dent in the credibility of the dying
declaration – Plea of self-immolation on behalf of the respondent
does not inspire the confidence – Thus, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the
offence punishable u/s.302 IPC – Trial court correctly relied upon
the dying declaration and the surrounding circumstances to record
the conviction of the respondent – High Court erred in discarding
this crucial piece of evidence on speculative and hyper-technical
grounds and in placing undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile
and defence witnesses – It cannot be said that a dying declaration
must invariably be discarded in the absence of corroboration – Each
case must necessarily turn on its own facts – High Court erred
in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of conviction recorded
by the trial court by re-appreciating the evidence in a manner
contrary to the settled principles governing appellate interference –
Impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court set
aside – Judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by
the trial court restored. [Paras 17-27]
Case Law Cited
State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [2002] 1 SCR 208 : (2002) 2 SCC
426; Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab (2009) 16 SCC 487; Sadhu
Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2016] 1 SCR
913 : AIR 2016 SC 1160 : (2016) 4 SCC 357; Rajesh Prasad v.
State of Bihar and Another Etc. [2022] 3 SCR 1046 : (2022) 3 SCC
471; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore [2023] 5
SCR 601 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537; State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Ajmal Beg Etc., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801; Khushal Rao v. State
of Bombay [1958] 1 SCR 552 : AIR 1958 SC 22; Smt. Paniben v.
State of Gujarat [1992] 2 SCR 197 : 1992 SCC OnLine SC 355 :
AIR 1992 SC 1817; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra [2002] Supp.
1 SCR 697 : (2002) 6 SCC 710; State of U.P. v. Veerpal [2022] 1
SCR 1163 : (2022) 4 SCC 741; Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh
[2012] 5 SCR 37 : (2012) 4 SCC 327; Gurdeep Singh v. State of
Punjab [2025] 8 SCR 690 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1669; State
of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and Another (1986) 3
SCC 637; Dasin Bai @ Shanti Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh [2015]
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 823
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
1 SCR 1060 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 107; Purshottam Chopra v.
State (NCT of Delhi) [2020] 1 SCR 341 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC
6 – referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
List of Keywords
Credibility of the dying declaration; Benefit of doubt; Dying
declaration; Marital discord; Husband poured kerosene on his
wife; Attempt to extinguish the fire; Imprisonment for life; Acquittal.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
430 of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.08.2014 of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in CRLA No. 295 of 2010
Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Appellant(s):
Abhishek Gautam.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Krishna Pal Singh/Amicus Curiae, Ms. Anvita Aprajita, Mohan
Singh Bais, Seemab Qayyum.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
1. The instant Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the State of
Himachal Pradesh assailing the Final Judgment and Order dated
26.08.2014 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at
Shimla1 in Criminal Appeal No. 295 of 2010, whereby the High Court
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
824 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent and set aside the
judgment of conviction dated 16.07.2010 and the consequential
order of sentence dated 03.08.2010 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Chamba Division, Chamba, Himachal Pradesh2 in Sessions Trial No.
19 of 2010, thereby acquitting the respondent of the charge under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603.
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 07.12.2009, the respondent-
husband Chaman Lal allegedly poured kerosene on his wife Saro Devi
(deceased) at their residence situated in Village Rampur, Pargana
Dhundi, Tehsil and District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh and set her on
fire by lighting a matchstick. On seeing her engulfed in flames, some
villagers rushed to her rescue and the respondent also attempted
to extinguish the fire. Despite these efforts, the deceased sustained
severe burn injuries. The information was conveyed to her brother,
Ramesh Kumar, who arrived at the spot and made arrangements to
take her to the District Hospital, Chamba where she was provided
with medical treatment. After receiving initial treatment at Chamba,
her condition did not improve and she was referred to Tanda Medical
College and Hospital on 15.12.2009 where she was provided with
further treatment. When the doctor opined that there was no chance
of improvement, the brother of the deceased took her back to his
home on 22.12.2009, after which he continued to look after her. On
15.01.2010, she succumbed to her injuries.
3. Based on the information given by the brother of the deceased,
FIR No. 292 of 2009 was registered under Section 302 IPC against
the respondent at Police Station Sadar, Chamba on 08.12.2009.
During the investigation, it was revealed that the respondent had
contracted a love marriage with the deceased and three children
were born out of the said wedlock. However, their relationship had
become strained and on the fateful day, i.e. on 07.12.2009, the
accused poured kerosene upon the deceased and set her on fire,
thereby causing her death. Upon information given by the brother
of the deceased, ASI Mukesh Kumar came to the hospital. On his
intimation, the Tehsildar of the Chamba region reached the hospital
and recorded the statement of the deceased, which was treated as
Dying Declaration.
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
3 For short, “IPC”
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 825
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
4. After completion of the investigation, a challan under Section 302 IPC
was prepared and filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba.
The Magistrate upon examining the record and complying with the
provisions of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734,
found that the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions
and accordingly, committed it to the Sessions Court.
5. The trial Court, after hearing the respondent and the prosecution
and on the basis of the materials available on record, framed a
charge under Section 302 IPC. The respondent pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
6. The prosecution led its evidence. Thereafter, the statement of the
respondent was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He was given
an opportunity to lead evidence in defence. After trial and upon
perusal of the materials brought on record by the parties, the trial
Court found the respondent guilty of the offence under Section 302
IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default thereof, to
undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three years.
The period of detention undergone during investigation and trial was
directed to be set off against the sentence imposed.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence
imposed by the trial Court, the respondent preferred Criminal Appeal
No. 295 of 2010 before the High Court. By its judgment dated
26.08.2014, the High Court set aside the judgment of conviction and
the order of sentence dated 16.07.2010 and 03.08.2010 respectively
and acquitted the respondent of the charge under Section 302 IPC
by extending to him the benefit of doubt.
8. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of acquittal, the State of Himachal
Pradesh has preferred the present Criminal Appeal before this Court.
9. Mr. Vivek Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant – State submitted that the deceased Saro Devi was
married to the respondent in the year 2002. The couple resided in
Village Rampur, Tehsil and District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. It
was alleged that there were disputes and frequent quarrels between
the husband and wife owing to the respondent’s suspicion regarding
4 For short, “Cr.P.C”
826 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the character of the deceased. On the evening of 7th December
2009, it was alleged that the respondent poured kerosene oil upon
his wife and set her on fire with a matchstick at their residence.
The deceased sustained severe burn injuries to the extent of 70%
and the respondent also sustained about 3% burn injuries on his
hand. Despite treatment, the deceased succumbed to her injuries
on 15.01.2010.
9.1. It was further submitted that on 08.12.2009, the Tehsildar-cum-
Executive Magistrate, Amar Singh (PW-1) recorded the dying
declaration (Ext. PW-1/B) of the deceased at the hospital, after
medical certification of her fitness and in the presence of the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, K.D. Sharma (PW-10) and
the Investigating Officer, ASI Mukesh Kumar (PW-12). In her
statement, the deceased categorically stated that her husband
had set her on fire after insulting her by calling her a “Kanjri”
(woman of bad character). It was contended that the trial Court
rightly relied upon the dying declaration and convicted the
respondent. However, the High Court erroneously acquitted
the respondent by discarding the dying declaration on the sole
ground of alleged discrepancies relating to the time of arrival
of the Tehsildar at the hospital.
9.2. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court committed a
serious error in holding that the time of arrival of the Tehsildar
was doubtful relying selectively on one statement of the brother
of the deceased (PW-2). The High Court failed to appreciate
that PW-2 upon being specifically questioned, corroborated the
version of PW-1, PW-10 and PW-12, all of whom consistently
stated that the Tehsildar reached the hospital around 11.00-11.15
a.m. The High Court thus erred in isolating one portion of PW-
2’s testimony and ignoring consistent corroborative evidence.
9.3. It was submitted that the High Court further erred in discarding
the testimony of PW-10, who was an independent witness to
the recording of the dying declaration. He deposed that the
statement of the deceased was dictated by the Tehsildar word
by word. The defence did not put any question or suggestion
to PW-1 during cross-examination and that the statement was
improperly recorded. In the absence of any challenge, the High
Court could not have drawn an adverse inference on this aspect.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 827
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
9.4. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court wrongly
relied upon the testimonies of the ward member Om Prakash
(PW-4) and Ravindra (PW-5). PW-4, who for the first time
before the Court introduced a version that the deceased had
poured kerosene upon herself, which he admittedly did not
make in his statement before the police thereby rendering his
testimony a material improvement and inherently unreliable.
Similarly, PW-5 though declared hostile, was nevertheless
relied upon by the High Court despite her close relationship
with the respondent-she being his paternal aunt (bua). Her
testimony being naturally biased, ought to have been discarded
and could not have formed the basis of any finding in favour
of the respondent.
9.5. It was further submitted that the High Court gravely erred
in accepting the testimony of DW-2, the minor son of the
respondent who sought to set up a plea of alibi by stating that
his father was working in the kitchen garden at the relevant
time. The testimony of DW-2 stands in direct contradiction to
that of PW-12, the Investigating Officer, who categorically stated
in his cross- examination that during the course of inquiry, the
children of the deceased had informed him that they were
playing outside at the time of the incident. The High Court
therefore committed a manifest error in placing reliance on
defence evidence which was inconsistent and stood expressly
contradicted by the prosecution witnesses.
9.6. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court failed to
properly appreciate the credible and independent testimony
of the Tehsildar (PW-1) who categorically deposed that the
deceased had stated before him that her husband poured
kerosene upon her after calling her a “Kanjri”. The said
statement coming from an independent and disinterested
public servant, not only establishes the overt act attributable
to the respondent but also furnishes a clear and proximate
motive for the commission of the offence. Significantly, nothing
adverse was elicited in the cross-examination of PW-1 so as
to cast any doubt on his credibility or veracity. The High Court
therefore fell into manifest error in holding that no motive stood
established against the respondent. The further observation
that the absence of any pending court proceedings between the
828 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
spouses indicated lack of animosity is wholly misconceived and
legally unsustainable. It is well settled that matrimonial discord
and animosity between spouses do not necessarily manifest
in the form of litigation. The surrounding circumstances, when
read conjointly with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 clearly
demonstrate strained marital relations and provide sufficient
motive for the commission of the offence.
9.7. It was submitted that the High Court has erred in discarding
the dying declaration which was duly recorded by the Tehsildar-
cum-Executive Magistrate in the presence of responsible
officers and stood fully corroborated by both medical and
ocular evidence.
9.8. The learned counsel further drew our attention to the suspicious
post-incident conduct of the respondent. PW-2 deposed that
the respondent did not contact him directly to inform him about
the condition of his sister. Instead, as testified by Yashpal (PW-
3) the respondent contacted PW-3, who in turn conveyed the
information to PW-2. Such conduct is wholly unnatural for a
husband and strongly indicative of a guilty mind.
9.9. The learned counsel ultimately submitted that the findings
recorded by the High Court are based on a clear misappreciation
of evidence and consideration of wholly irrelevant factors
while completely ignoring the cogent, reliable and trustworthy
testimonies of independent witnesses including PW-1, PW-10
and PW-12. Conversely, undue reliance was placed on hostile
witnesses and contradictory defence evidence, leading to a
manifest miscarriage of justice.
9.10. It was therefore urged that the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the High Court be set aside and that the conviction
and sentence recorded by the trial Court be restored thereby
allowing the present criminal appeal.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Krishna Pal Singh, learned counsel appointed
as amicus curiae for the respondent refuted the submissions
advanced on behalf of the appellant – State. At the outset, he drew
our attention to the deposition of Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) who stated
that he was informed by Yashpal (PW-3) that his sister Saro Devi
had sustained burn injuries. Thereafter, PW-2 went to the house of
the respondent and found the deceased in a serious condition with
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 829
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
extensive burn injuries. PW-3 corroborated this version and deposed
that the respondent had telephonically informed him on 07.12.2009
that Saro Devi had been burnt and that efforts should be made to
save her. The statement of Ramesh Kumar (PW-2) recorded vide
Ext. PW-12/A was treated as the FIR in the present case. The High
Court found that in the said Rukka (FIR), PW-2 specifically stated that
when he asked his sister as to who had set her on fire she did not
disclose the name of any person. This, according to the defence, was
the earliest version of the incident recorded on 07.12.2009 wherein
the deceased merely stated that she had been set on fire. Though
the trial Court placed primary reliance on the dying declaration (Ext.
PW-1/B) recorded by PW-1 Tehsildar, the High Court found the same
to be suspicious and not worthy of reliance.
10.1. The learned counsel further submitted that it is an admitted
fact that villagers including the respondent himself, made
efforts to extinguish the fire and rescue the deceased. PW-2
stated that he spoke to his sister on the mobile phone of the
respondent during which she only said, “I got burnt, save me”.
Even in his statement Ext. PW-12/A treated as the FIR, she
made no allegation that the respondent had poured kerosene
on her or set her on fire with a matchstick. PW-2 admitted that
despite repeatedly asking her as to who had set her on fire,
she did not name anyone, though he personally suspected
the respondent.
10.2. The learned counsel placed reliance on the testimonies of PW-4
Om Prakash, the Ward Member, PW-5 Ravindra (declared
hostile), DW-2 Kamal Kishor, the eight-year-old son of the
deceased and DW-1 Kamla, a friend of the deceased from the
same village to contend that the respondent did not commit the
alleged offence and that the deceased caught fire on her own.
It was argued that the cumulative effect of the evidence on
record creates serious doubt about the prosecution allegation
that the respondent poured kerosene on the deceased and set
her on fire. To support the plea of self-immolation, emphasis
was laid on the fact that the respondent himself sustained burn
injuries while attempting to rescue the deceased.
10.3. In this regard, PW-11 Dr. Vishal Thakur examined the
respondent on 10.12.2009 and found burn injuries on his
830 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
left hand to the extent of 3% along with a bruise on the right
elbow and issued the MLC (Ext. PW-11/C). It was submitted
that the conduct of the respondent in immediately informing
the relatives of the deceased further strengthens the defence
version that the deceased herself poured kerosene and set
herself on fire.
10.4. It was further submitted that although the prosecution relied
heavily on the dying declaration allegedly recorded by PW-1
Tehsildar on 08.12.2009, the High Court rightly found the
same to be suspicious and untrustworthy. PW-1 stated that he
reached the hospital at around 11.00-11.15 a.m. on 08.12.2009
to record the dying declaration and claimed to have informed
the police about the same. However, when confronted with
his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. no such fact was
found recorded therein. PW-2 in his examination-in-chief
stated that the Tehsildar came to the hospital in the evening
of 08.12.2009, though later stated that the dying declaration
was recorded at about 11.30 a.m. PW-1 further stated that
the Deputy Superintendent of Police was present at the time
of recording of the dying declaration and had appended his
signature thereto.
10.5. The learned counsel contended that the very presence of
police officers at the time of recording the dying declaration
casts a serious doubt on its authenticity as ideally no police
official ought to be present at that stage. This circumstance,
according to the defence, gives rise to a strong suspicion that
the statement was manipulated in connivance with the police
and that PW-1 merely signed a statement that had already
been prepared. This submission was sought to be supported by
the testimony of PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
who stated that the statement was recorded by the Tehsildar
and signed by him. However, in cross examination, PW-10
admitted that he could not recall whether the statement had
been recorded by ASI Santosh Kumar and stated that it was
dictated by the Tehsildar word by word after questioning the
deceased. It was argued that this indicates that the statement
was, in fact, written by a police official signed by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police and subsequently shown as having
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 831
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
been recorded by PW-1. The defence further argued that ASI
Santosh Kumar though cited as a prosecution witness, was
deliberately withheld to conceal the true manner in which the
dying declaration came to be recorded. Consequently, the
dying declaration (Ext. PW-1/B), according to the defence, is of
doubtful credibility and was rightly discarded by the High Court.
10.6. On the issue of motive, the learned counsel submitted that
no motive whatsoever was established for the respondent to
set the deceased on fire. The allegation that the respondent
called the deceased a “Kanjri” even if accepted, could have
caused humiliation to the deceased and may have prompted
her to take the extreme step of self-immolation. This possibility,
it was contended, is consistent with the evidence on record.
10.7. It was lastly submitted that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent set the deceased
on fire by pouring kerosene upon her. On the contrary, the
evidence supports the defence theory of self-immolation arising
out of a sense of humiliation. The dying declaration relied
upon by the prosecution being suspicious in nature could not,
in the absence of reliable corroboration, form the sole basis
for conviction. It was argued that the trial Court discarded
the defence evidence without cogent reasons, whereas
defence evidence is entitled to the same degree of scrutiny
as prosecution evidence and cannot be rejected outright.
10.8. Placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ram Singh5and Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab6,
the learned counsel submitted that defence witnesses must be
subjected to careful and critical evaluation and ought not to
be discarded merely on the ground that they were produced
by the defence.
10.9. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the impugned judgment
of acquittal does not call for any interference by this Court
and the present criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.
11. We have carefully considered the submissions made on bothsides
and perused the materials available on record.
5 (2002) 2 SCC 426
6 (2009) 16 SCC 487
832 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
12. In the present case, the appellant – State has challenged the
judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondent of the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC. The trial Court earlier found
the respondent guilty of committing the offence under Section 302
IPC, holding that he had caused the death of his wife by setting her
on fire. Accordingly, the trial Court convicted the respondent and
sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs. 50,000/- and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment
for a further period of three years.
13. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it would be apposite
to refer to certain decisions delineating the contours of appellate
interference with an order of acquittal. In Sadhu Saran Singh v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others7, this Court, while considering
appeals against a judgment of acquittal rendered by the High Court,
categorically observed that there is no absolute restriction in law on
the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded. It was further reiterated
that where, upon scrutiny, the appellate court finds that the decision
of the court below is based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence
or is contrary to settled principles of law, interference with such an
order becomes not only permissible but also imperative.
13.1. In Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another etc.8 (one
of us, B.V. Nagarathna, J., was a member of the Bench) this
Court, after undertaking a detailed survey of the case law,
summarised the circumstances under which in an appeal
against an order of acquittal an order of conviction may be
passed. The following paragraphs are relevant:
“31. The circumstances under which an appeal
would be entertained by this Court from an order of
acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized
as follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering
with an order of acquittal, especially when the order
of acquittal has been confirmed upto the High Court. It
is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court,
7 (2016) 4 SCC 357 : AIR 2016 SC 1160
8 (2022) 3 SCC 471 – 3 Judge Bench
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 833
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a
legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts
of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has
acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed
by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136
of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai, AIR 1981
SC 1442] Such fetters on the right to entertain an
appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose
a person, who has been acquitted by a competent
court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension
of a further examination of the case, even though it
is held by a superior court. [Arunachalam v. P.S.R.
Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 (SC) 1284] An appeal
cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal
which, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has
arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which
justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh,
(1990) CrLJ 2274 (SC)]
31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions,
set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High
Court. The circumstances under which this Court
may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal
and pass an order of conviction, may be summarised
as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High
Court is perverse:
a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected
by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises,
which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v.
Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207] For example, where
direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were
discounted without cogent reasoning; [State of UP v.
Shanker, AIR 1981 SC 879]
b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of
relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were
discounted on the ground that they were ‘interested’
witnesses; [State of UP v. Hakim Singh, AIR 1980
SC 184]
834 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved
by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of
personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate
the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe
to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v.
Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207]
d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was
rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground
that they did not explain the injury found on one of
the persons present at the site of occurrence of the
crime. [Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, AIR
1979 SC 1284]
e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic
standard of ‘implicit proof’ rather than that of ‘proof
beyond reasonable doubt’ and therefore evaluated
the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of UP v.
Ranjha Ram, AIR 1986 SC 1959]
f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial
evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious
theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused;
[State of Maharashtra v. ChampalalPunjaji Shah, AIR
1981 SC 1675] or where acquittal rests merely in
exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt
in favour of the accused. [Gurbachan v. Satpal Singh,
AIR 1990 SC 209].
g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on
the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit
the offence, although, in the said case, there was
strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the
accused, thereby making it unnecessary on the part
of the prosecution to establish ‘motive.’ [State of AP v.
Bogam Chandraiah, AIR 1986 SC 1899]
31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross
miscarriage of justice:
a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting
the accused persons with the crime, were based on
a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 835
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
UP v. Pheru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205] or based on
extenuating circumstances which were purely based
in imagination and fantasy. [State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Pussu 1983 AIR 867 (SC)]
b) Where the accused had been acquitted on
ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay
was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference
of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of
the accused himself; or where accused had been
acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial
relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature.
[State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah,
AIR 1981 SC 1675]
[Source: Durga Das Basu – “The Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973” Sixth Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX]”
13.2. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore9, this
Court reiterated that it is ordinarily slow to interfere with orders
of acquittal. However, it was clarified that where the High
Court has adopted a wholly erroneous process of reasoning,
misread material evidence, or ignored vital circumstances
resulting in a grave miscarriage of injustice, interference is
clearly permissible. The following paragraphs are instructive:
“20. Having considered the submissions and perused
the record, before we proceed further, it would be
useful for us to notice the law as to when it would be
appropriate for this Court, exercising its power under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India, to reverse
an acquittal into a conviction. Normally, the Court
is reluctant to interfere with an order of acquittal.
But when it appears that the High Court has on an
absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally
erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of
the case and ignoring some of the most vital facts,
acquitted the respondent and the order of acquittal
passed by the High Court has resulted in a grave
9 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537
836 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and substantial miscarriage of justice, extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India may rightfully be exercised (See: State of U.P. v.
Sahai & Others, (1982) 1 SCC 352).
21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah &
Others (2005) 3 SCC 169, reiterating the same view
it was observed:
“8. … This being an appeal against
acquittal, this Court would be slow in
interfering with the findings of the High
Court, unless there is perverse appreciation
of the evidence which resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice and if the High Court
has taken a plausible view this Court
would not be justified in interfering with the
acquittal passed in favour of the accused
and if two views are possible and the High
Court had chosen one view which is just
and reasonable, then also this Court would
be reluctant to interfere with the judgment
of the High Court.”
22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in
Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim & Others, (2020)
11 SCC 174, it was observed:
“190. … Reversal of a judgment and order
of conviction and acquittal of the accused
should not ordinarily be interfered with
unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by
perversity. In other words, the court might
reverse an order of acquittal if the court
finds that no person properly instructed
in law could have upon analysis of the
evidence on record found the accused to
be “not guilty”. …”
13.3. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg Etc.10, this Court
while considering appeals against an order of acquittal passed
10 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 837
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
by the High Court, undertook a comprehensive examination
of the scope and ambit of its power in criminal matters. The
following paragraphs are opposite in this context:
“15.1. In Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2022) 11
SCC 800, it was held:
“25. It may be highlighted at the outset that
although the powers vested in this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution are wide,
this Court in a criminal appeal by special
leave will ordinarily loath to enter into a fresh
reappraisement of evidence and question
the credibility of witnesses when there is a
concurrent finding of fact, save for certain
exceptional circumstances. While it is difficult to
lay down a rule of universal application, it has
been affirmed time and again that except where
the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by
an error of law or procedure, or is based on
misreading of evidence, or is inconsistent with
the evidence and thus has led to a perverse
finding, this Court will refrain from interfering
with the findings of the courts below.”
15.2. On a reading of various judgments, viz.,
Ramaniklal Gokaldas v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 1
SCC 6, Nadodi Jayaraman v. State of T.N., 1992 Supp
(3) SCC 161, Banwari Ram v. State of U.P. (1998)
9 SCC 3, the generally accepted standard – which
it ought to be stated, is not a rule – is that when the
Courts below concurred, this Court does not enter
into the reappreciation of the evidence, in a criminal
case. In the present case, the Courts below have, in
fact, arrived at opposite findings and as such, to set
the matter to rest either by conviction or acquittal,
this Court must analyse the evidence on record.”
13.4. Thus, it is vivid that where a judgment of acquittal is found to
be manifestly erroneous, perverse, or founded on a misreading
of evidence or incorrect application of law, this Court would
838 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be justified to set aside the acquittal and record a conviction,
albeit exercising such power with circumspection and in
exceptional circumstances.
14. Guided by the above principles, we now proceed to examine the facts
of the present case. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution
examined twelve witnesses (PW-1 to PW-12) and marked the relevant
documents and material objects. The defence, in turn, examined two
witnesses (DW-1 and DW-2). A brief and structured appreciation of
the oral evidence is as under:
• PW-1 Amar Singh, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate,
deposed that pursuant to a written direction (Ext. PW-1/A), he
proceeded to the Civil Hospital, Chamba on 08.12.2009 at about
11.00-11.15 a.m. for the purpose of recording the statement
of Saro Devi. Before recording the statement, he ascertained
from the attending doctor that the patient was in a fit condition
to make a statement. Thereafter, he recorded her statement,
which is on record as Ext. PW-1/B. According to PW1, the
deceased stated in clear and unequivocal terms that her husband
had sprinkled kerosene oil upon her and set her on fire with
a matchstick. She further stated that the respondent used to
abuse her by calling her “Kanjri” and had asked her to leave the
house. PW-1 deposed that the deceased remained conscious
throughout, affixed her thumb impression on the statement and
that he appended the requisite certificate regarding her fitness
and consciousness. He further stated that PW-10, K.D. Sharma,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, was present at that time and
signed the statement as a witness. In his cross examination,
PW-1 categorically denied the suggestion that the statement
was recorded at the instance of the police or that the deceased
had not made such a statement.
• PW-2, Ramesh Kumar, the brother of the deceased, deposed
that on 07.12.2009 he was informed by PW-3 Yashpal that his
sister had suffered burn injuries. He stated that he contacted
his sister telephonically on someone else’s phone and she
told him that she had been put on fire and sought help. PW-2
further stated that he immediately went to the house of the
respondent and found his sister lying on the bed in a seriously
burnt condition without clothes on her body. She was alive at
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 839
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
that time and was taken by him to the hospital at Chamba.
He reported the matter to the police and his statement Ext.
PW-12/A was recorded, on the basis of which the FIR came
to be registered. PW-2 further stated that on the next day, i.e.
08.12.2009, the Tehsildar came to the hospital and recorded
the statement of his sister in his presence. Although he initially
stated that the Tehsildar came in the evening, on a question
put by the Court he clarified that the statement was recorded
at about 11.30 a.m. He also stated that at the time of recording
of the statement, the deceased recognised him, his parents
and her mother-in-law. In his cross-examination, he denied the
suggestion that the deceased was unconscious or incapable
of making a statement.
• PW-3, Yashpal corroborated the version of PW-2. He stated that
on 07.12.2009 he received a telephonic call from the respondent
informing him that Saro Devi had sustained burn injuries and
seeking help to save her. He deposed that he immediately
conveyed this information to PW-2, Ramesh Kumar.
• PW-4, Om Prakash, a ward member, stated that upon reaching
the house of the respondent, he found the deceased crying and
shouting “bachao, bachao”. He further stated that upon enquiry,
the deceased told him that she had herself poured kerosene oil
on her. He also deposed that the police seized a kerosene can
and a matchbox from the spot and took photographs. He proved
the seizure memos Ext. PW-4/A and Ext. PW-4/B and identified
the seized articles including the kerosene can, matchbox and
burnt clothes, namely, salwar, shirt, bra, dupatta and scalp hair.
• PW-5, Ravindra, the aunt of the respondent stated that the
deceased did not say that the respondent had set her on fire
but stated that she had herself caught fire.
• PW-6, Pawan Kumar, Head Constable deposed that on
18.12.2009 ASI Mukesh Kumar deposited three sealed parcels
with him in the Malkhana, one containing burnt mat, another
containing burnt clothes of the deceased and the third containing
a matchstick and a plastic can with kerosene oil. He made the
requisite entries in the Malkhana register. He further stated that
on 19.12.2009 the said parcels were sent to the RFSL through
840 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Constable Rakesh Kumar. He also proved the deposit and
dispatch of the viscera of the deceased. His testimony remained
unchallenged as no cross examination was conducted.
• PW-7, Nazir Hussain, Patwari, stated that he was associated
with the investigation and issued the Jamabandi and Tatima at
the request of the police, which were proved as Ext. PW-17/A
and Ext. PW-17/B respectively. His testimony was not subjected
to cross-examination.
• PW-8, Gian Chand deposed that on 07.12.2009 at about 09.10
p.m., he received telephonic information that a woman in a burnt
condition had been brought to the hospital and that necessary
action be taken. He proved the recording and transmission of
this information. There was no cross- examination of this witness.
• PW-9, Kuldeep Singh, ASI deposed that on 08.12.2009 at about
12.05 a.m. he received a rukka through Home Guard Balbir, on
the basis of which FIR Ext. PW-9/A was registered. He proved
his endorsement Ext. PW-9/B and stated that thereafter the
file was handed over to ASI Mukesh Kumar for investigation.
• PW-10, Shri K.D. Sharma, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
supported the testimony of PW-1 and stated that the dying
declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Tehsildar and
that he signed the same as a witness. In his cross-examination,
he denied the suggestion that the dying declaration was
fabricated or that it was not recorded by the Tehsildar.
• PW-11, Dr. Vishal Thakur, Medical Officer, was declared hostile.
He initially stated that he did not remember whether any opinion
regarding the fitness of the deceased to make a statement
was sought or given. However, in the cross-examination by
the prosecution, he admitted having issued a written opinion
Ext. PW-11/B on 07.12.2009 declaring the patient unfit to
make a statement. Though he vacillated in his deposition
thereafter, significantly, no question was put to him regarding
the subsequent medical opinion recorded on Ext. PW-12/C
dated 08.12.2009 declaring the patient fit to make a statement.
• PW-12, Mukesh Kumar, ASI and Investigating Officer deposed
that on 07.12.2009 he moved an application Ext. PW-11/B
seeking medical opinion and the doctor declared the patient
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 841
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
unfit to make a statement. Based on the statement of PW-2,
Ramesh Kumar (Ext. PW-12/A), the FIR (Ext. PW-9/A) was
registered. He further stated that on 08.12.2009 he again
sought medical opinion vide Ext. PW-12/C and the doctor
declared the deceased fit, pursuant to which the Tehsildar
recorded her statement. He proved the site plan Ext. PW-12/D,
the seizure memos, arrest of the accused, the post-mortem
report Ext. PW-12/F and the FSL reports Ext. PX and PY.
• DW-1, Kamla deposed that the deceased while in the hospital
and later at Tanda, told her that she had herself sprinkled
kerosene oil and set herself on fire.
• DW-2, Kamal Kumar, the minor son of the deceased, stated
that his grandmother had gone to attend a marriage; that the
respondent was working in the kitchen garden; that on learning
that his mother had caught fire, the respondent attempted to
extinguish the fire with his hands and suffered burn injuries;
and that thereafter his maternal uncle came and took the
deceased to the hospital.
14.1. The evidence on record establishes that on 08.12.2009,
PW-1 recorded the statement of the deceased in the hospital,
after obtaining medical opinion regarding her fitness, which
was treated as her dying declaration. PW-2 supported the
prosecution version and affirmed that the deceased was
conscious and capable of making a statement. PW-10
corroborated the recording of the dying declaration while PW-
12 supported the prosecution case through the investigative
narrative. PW-4 and PW-5 turned hostile, whereas PW-3,
PW-6, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 are largely formal witnesses
whose testimonies do not directly bear upon the core issue
of culpability.
15. Having noticed the evidence of the witnesses and the rival
submissions, it is now necessary to evaluate whether the prosecution
has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt.
15.1. As noticed earlier, the prosecution case is that on 07.12.2009,
the respondent poured kerosene oil upon his wife, Saro Devi,
at their residence and set her ablaze by lighting a matchstick.
842 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
On hearing her cries, neighbours rushed to the spot and
attempted to rescue her; the respondent also participated in
extinguishing the fire and sustained minor burn injuries. The
deceased suffered extensive burn injuries and was admitted
to the hospital at Chamba. On 08.12.2009, her statement was
recorded in the hospital by PW-1, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive
Magistrate, after obtaining medical opinion regarding her
fitness, in the presence of PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent
of Police. The deceased ultimately succumbed to her injuries
on 15.01.2010 due to septic shock. The prosecution relies
upon the said statement as a dying declaration under Section
32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
16. Before examining the evidentiary value of the dying declaration,
it is apposite to note the settled legal principles governing dying
declarations. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act renders
admissible statements made by a deceased person as to the
cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in
death. It is well settled that a dying declaration need not be made
in expectation of immediate death; that a conviction under Section
302 IPC can rest solely on a dying declaration if it is found to be
voluntary, truthful and reliable; and that corroboration is not a rule
of law but one of prudence.
16.1. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay11, this Court laid down
the foundational principles governing appreciation of dying
declarations. In that case, the deceased had made three
successive dying declarations within a span of two hours,
which were to some extent contradictory. However, one aspect
remained consistent in all three declarations namely that he had
been attacked by two persons, Kushal Rao and Tukaram with
swords and spears. Relying upon this common thread running
through the declarations, which was further corroborated by
medical evidence disclosing punctured and incised wounds on
various parts of the body, this Court held that the declarations
could be safely relied upon to convict the accused who had
been named therein. While so holding, this Court expounded
the principles governing the circumstances under which a
11 1958 SCR 552
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 843
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
dying declaration may be accepted without corroboration. In
this regard, Paragraph 16 of the judgment is apposite:
“16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the
Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different
High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come
to the conclusion,
1. that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule
of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated;
2. that each case must be determined on its own
facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the
dying declaration was made;
3. that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition
that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence
than other pieces of evidence;
4. that a dying declaration stands on the same footing
as another piece of evidence and has to be judged
in the light of surrounding circumstances and with
reference to the principles governing the weighing
of evidence;
5. that a dying declaration which has been recorded
by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner,
that is to say, in the form of questions and answers,
and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker
of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing
than a dying declaration which depends upon oral
testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of
human memory and human character, and
6. that in order to test the reliability of a dying
declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the
circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man
for observation, for example, whether there was
sufficient light if the crime was committed at night;
whether the capacity of the man to remember the
facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he
was making the statement, by circumstances beyond
his control; that the statement has been consistent
844 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
throughout if he had several opportunities of making
a dying declaration apart from the official record of
it; and that the statement had been made at the
earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring
by interested parties.”
16.2. The above principles were subsequently summarised by this
Court in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat12, as follows:
“(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that
dying declaration cannot be acted upon without
corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976)
3 SCC 104])
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration
is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it,
without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar
Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552])
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not
the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The
deceased had opportunity to observe and identify
the assailants and was in a fit state to make the
declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public
Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618]
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should
not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264])
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could
never make any dying declaration the evidence with
regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State
of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25])
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity
cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v.
State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654])
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not
contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to
12 1992 SCC OnLine SC 355 : AIR 1992 SC 1817
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 845
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti
Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455])
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it
is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness
of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo
Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769])
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself
whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition
to make the dying declaration look up to the medical
opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the
deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make
this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. (Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp
SCC 152])
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the
version as given in the dying declaration, the said
declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v.
Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390])”
16.3. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra13, a Constitution Bench
held that medical certification of fitness is not an absolute
requirement and that the testimony of the Magistrate recording
the dying declaration would suffice if the Court is otherwise
satisfied about the mental fitness of the declarant.
16.4. In State of U.P. v. Veerpal14, it was reiterated that a conviction
can be sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration even
in the absence of corroboration, provided it inspires confidence.
In the said case, the deceased in her dying declaration named
the person who had set her on fire. Even in the statement
recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., the deceased stated that
her father-in-law had attacked her with a stick with the intention
to kill her and that as a result, she locked herself in the room
and set herself ablaze. Considering the dying declaration of
the deceased, which was found to be voluntary, truthful and
reliable, this Court set aside the judgment of acquittal passed
13 (2002) 6 SCC 710
14 (2022) 4 SCC 741
846 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the High Court and restored the conviction of the accused
for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section
34 IPC recorded by the trial Court.
17. In light of the aforesaid principles, the dying declaration in the present
case inspires full confidence. It was recorded on 08.12.2009 by
PW-1, the Tehsildar, a neutral and independent public officer. Prior
to recording the statement, medical opinion regarding the fitness
of the deceased was duly obtained. PW-1 categorically stated that
the deceased was conscious, oriented and capable of making a
statement. This version stands corroborated by PW-10, the Deputy
Superintendent of Police and PW-2, the brother of the deceased,
both of whom deposed that the deceased recognised them and
responded appropriately to questions. Although PW-11, the Medical
Officer vacillated on certain aspects, the dying declaration cannot
be discarded on that ground alone. The declaration clearly and
unequivocally attributes the act of pouring kerosene oil and igniting the
fire to the respondent. It bears the thumb impression of the deceased
and was recorded in the presence of senior officers. There is no
material on record suggestive of tutoring, coercion or manipulation.
18. The High Court disbelieved the dying declaration primarily on two
grounds: (i) an alleged inconsistency with respect to the time at
which the statement was recorded; and (ii) a doubt as to whether
PW-1 himself recorded the statement or merely dictated it. In our
considered opinion, neither ground is sustainable.
18.1. As regards the first aspect, PW-2 initially made a vague
reference to the evening; however, upon a clarification sought
by the Court, he categorically stated that the statement was
recorded at around 11.30 a.m. This clarification aligns with the
testimonies of PW-1 and PW-10. Such a minor discrepancy,
which stood satisfactorily explained, does not go to the
root of the prosecution case, especially when the factum of
recording of the dying declaration on 08.12.2009 stands firmly
established.
18.2. With regard to the manner of recording, PW-1 clearly deposed
that he recorded the statement of the deceased after putting
questions to her. PW-10 clarified that the statement was
recorded under the supervision and authority of PW-1, who
ensured that the answers given by the deceased were correctly
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 847
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
reduced into writing. Recording a dying declaration under
the supervision of a Magistrate does not render it invalid. No
suggestion was put to PW-1 in cross-examination that he did
not record the statement or that he abdicated his responsibility.
The High Court thus discarded the dying declaration on
conjectures not borne out by the evidence.
18.3. In any event, the law does not prescribe any rigid form for
recording a dying declaration. So long as the Court is satisfied
that the declaration is voluntary, truthful and reliable, hyper-
technical objections cannot form the basis for its rejection.
19. In the present case, it is true that the Rukka (FIR) records that the
deceased did not initially name the assailant. However, it is settled
law that an FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of the entire
prosecution case. At that stage, the immediate concern of the family
members was the survival of the victim who had sustained nearly
70% burn injuries. Such an omission in the earliest version, in these
circumstances, cannot ipso facto discredit the subsequent dying
declaration recorded in accordance with law.
20. PW-4 and PW-5 were declared hostile and attempted to attribute
oral statements to the deceased suggesting self-immolation. The
trial Court rightly rejected their testimony. Their version is essentially
hearsay and was never disclosed at the earliest available opportunity.
In Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh15, this Court held that the
testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon only to the extent
it is corroborated by other reliable evidence. Recently, in Gurdeep
Singh v. State of Punjab16, this principle was reiterated. In the present
case, no such corroboration exists in respect of the testimony of PW-4
and PW-5, whose statements are unsupported by any independent
or reliable evidence on record.
21. The defence witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2, stand on no better footing.
DW-1 admitted in cross-examination that she had reached the
spot only after the deceased had already caught fire and was not
present at the time of the incident. Her testimony is thus not based
on direct knowledge and lacks corroboration. DW-2, the minor son of
15 (2012) 4 SCC 327
16 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1669
848 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the deceased, does not claim to have witnessed the act of pouring
kerosene or igniting the fire. At best, his testimony indicates that
the respondent attempted to extinguish the fire, a circumstance
which does not negate or dilute the evidentiary value of the dying
declaration. The High Court without a proper appreciation of the
probative value of these testimonies, erred in placing reliance upon
them to overturn the conviction recorded by the trial Court.
22. The plea of self-immolation on behalf of the respondent does not
inspire the confidence of this Court. The alleged conduct of the
respondent in attempting to extinguish the fire and sustaining minor
burn injuries does not, by itself, exonerate him from culpability. Such
conduct can equally be consistent with an attempt to create an
appearance of innocence after the commission of the offence. The
defence witnesses are either interested or partisan and fail to rebut
the consistent and cogent prosecution evidence.
23. Motive assumes significance, primarily in cases based on
circumstantial evidence. Where there is direct evidence in the
form of a credible and trustworthy dying declaration, the absence
of strong proof of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case. This
position has been consistently affirmed by this Court in State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and another17, Dasin
Bai @ Shanti Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh18, and Purshottam
Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi)19. In the present case, the evidence
on record discloses that the respondent subjected the deceased to
frequent quarrels, humiliation and verbal abuse, including branding
her a “Kanjri” and repeatedly asking her to leave the matrimonial
home. The dying declaration itself refers to persistent matrimonial
discord and ill-treatment thereby furnishing a plausible background
for the commission of the offence. In any event, the prosecution is
not required to establish motive with mathematical precision and
failure to conclusively prove motive does not weaken an otherwise
reliable and cogent case.
24. Upon an overall appraisal of the evidence, we are satisfied that the
dying declaration of the deceased, Saro Devi, is voluntary, truthful
17 (1986) 3 SCC 637
18 2015 SCC OnLine SC 107
19 2020 SCC OnLine SC 6
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 849
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal
and reliable. It was recorded by a competent authority at a time
when the deceased was conscious, oriented and capable of making
a statement. The minor discrepancies highlighted by the High Court
do not create any dent in the credibility of the dying declaration.
Therefore, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the respondent committed the offence punishable under Section
302 IPC.
25. The trial Court correctly relied upon the dying declaration and the
surrounding circumstances to record the conviction of the respondent.
The High Court erred in discarding this crucial piece of evidence
on speculative and hyper-technical grounds and in placing undue
reliance on the testimonies of hostile and defence witnesses. The
judgments relied upon by the respondent do not lay down any absolute
proposition that a dying declaration must invariably be discarded in
the absence of corroboration. Each case must necessarily turn on
its own facts.
26. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the High Court fell into
manifest error in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of conviction
recorded by the trial Court by re-appreciating the evidence in a manner
contrary to the settled principles governing appellate interference.
27. Accordingly, the criminal appeal filed by the appellant – State is
allowed. The impugned judgement of acquittal passed by the High
Court is set aside. Consequently, the judgement of conviction
and order of sentence passed by the trial Court are restored. The
respondent shall surrender forthwith to undergo the remaining
sentence, failing which the trial Court shall take appropriate steps
in accordance with law.
28. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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