STATE OF KARNATAKAversusSMT. SUVARNAMMA & ANR.

                       [2014] 10 S.CR. 778


                     STATE OF KARNATAKA
                                 v.
                  SMT. SUVARNAMMA & ANR.
                (Criminal Appeal No. 785 of 2010)
                       OCTOBER 14, 2014
B
                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA AND
                  ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860: ss. 498-A and 304-B - Dowry death
C caused by bum injuries - Allegation that victim-deceased was
  harassed by accused husband and in-laws on account of
  dowry - Mother-in-law poured kerosene on the deceased and
  ignited the fire - Deceased was taken to hospital by the
  mother-in-law - Trial Court convicted the accused rejecting
o the plea that prosecution had withheld the dying declaration
  that the deceased had caught fire accidentally - High Court
  reversed the decision of trial court - Appeal against acquittal
  - Held: Death of the deceased was within 7 years of marriage
  and she was subjected to harassment for dowry soon before
E her death - The death was in circumstances other than natural
  - Mere lapse of investigating agency could not be enough to
  throw out overwhelming evidence clearly establishing the
  case of the prosecution - Inmates of the house cannot get
  away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on
F the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case
  lies upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an
  accused to offer any explanation - Case against accused
  stood established - Dowry Prohibition Act - ss.3, 4 and 6.

      Criminal trial: False plea by accused - Held: Can be
G taken as additional circumstance against the accused.

        Investigation: Faulty investigation - Held: Suppression
    or unfair conduct of the investigating agency would not

H                               778
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                         779


  absolve the Court of its duty to find out the truth - Penal Code,    A
  1860.

       Appeal against acquittal: Held: In appeal against the
  acquittal, if a possible view has been taken, no interference
  is required, but if the view taken is not legally sustainable, the   B
  Court has ample powers to interfere with the order of acquittal.

      Allowing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1. In the absence of direct evidence, the
  circumstantial evidence can be the basis of conviction if            C
  the circumstances are of conclusive nature and rule out
  all reasonable possibilities of accused being innocent.
  Once the prosecution probabilises the involvement of the
  accused but the accused takes a false plea, such false
  plea can be taken as an additional circumstance against              D
  the accused. Though Article 20(3) of the Constitution
  incorporates the rule against self incrimination, the scope
  and the content of the said rule does not require the
  Court to ignore the conduct of the accused in not
  correctly disclosing the facts within his knowledge. It is           E
/ also well settled that though the investigating agency is
  expected to be fair and efficient, any lapse on its part
  cannot per se be a ground to throw out the prosecution
  case when there is overwhelming evidence to prove the
  offence. [para 12, 13] [786-E-H; 787-A]
                                                                       F
       2. It was held in *State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram that
  where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy
  inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case
  would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the
  nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish           G
  the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required
  in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden
  would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of
  Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a
  corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to                  H
   780     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was
  committed. Admittedly, the marriage of the deceased took
  place within seven years of her death. Her death was by
  burn injuries. There was evidence of demand of dowry
  soon before the death. [Paras 14, 15] [807-B-C-G-H]
B
       3. Merely showing that the prosecution withheld
  dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) could not be a ground for
  the Court not finding out the cause of death from the
  material on record and inferring that the death was
C accidental. Once dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) was
  produced even by defence, the Court has to go into the
  authenticity of two rival versions in the dying
  declarations. It was required to be ascertained whether
  (Exhibit D-7) was a genuine and reliable dying declaration
  or the oral dying declarations made before PW-1, PW-3,
D PW-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-14, PW-15 and PW-16 were more
  reliable in the circumstances on record. The stand of the
  accused who were husband and mother in-law of the
  deceased, living in the same house that they had no idea
  that the deceased received burn injuries is clearly
E incompatible with the stand in Exhibit D-7 that the
  accused mother in-law of the deceased was very much
  present in the house and she shifted the deceased to the
  hospital. The deceased could not have made any
  voluntary and independent dying declaration in such
F circumstances as the influence of the accused could not
  be ruled out. According to the said dying declaration, she
  raised hue and cry when she received burn injuries which
  attracted her mother in-law and the tenant, while
  according 1to the mother in-law as well as the tenant they
G never heard such cries. There is no evidence of struggle
  or cries and the burn injuries are to the extent of 95%. In
  the case of an accident, the deceased would have tried
  to run away oi;le,Scape. In these circumstances, there was
  hardly any p0ssibility of accidental burn injuries.
H Extensive burns and other circumstances supported the
     STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                           781


version of unnatural death. [paras 16, 17) [808-D-H; 809-             A
A-CJ

    4. In appeal against the acquittal, if a possible view
has been taken, no interference is required, but ifthe view
taken is not legally sustainable, the Court. has ample
                                                                      8
powers to interfere with the order of acquittal.
Accordingly, the case against the accused stood fully
established. [paras 22, 23) [810-F, G]

     Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra
(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1974 (1) SCR 489; Bharwada                          C
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217:
 1983 (3) SCR 280; Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat (1988)
Supp SCC 241; State of Haryana vs. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC
96: 1999 (3) SCR 529; Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana
(1999) 9 SCC 525: 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 435; State of H.P.              D
VS. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 sec 247: 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 286;
Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa (2005) 6 SCC 101:
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 786; State of Punjab vs. Swarqn Singh
(2002) 8 SCC 381: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 183; Zahira
Habibullha Sheikh (5) vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 3 SCC 37 4:         E
2006 (2) SCR 1081; Mani Pal vs. State of Haryana (2004)
10 SCC 692: 2004 (3) SCR 768; *State of Rajasthan vs.
Jaggu Ram (2008) 12 SCC 51 - relied on.
                     Case Law Reference:
                                                                      F
    1974 (1) SCR 489               relied on               Para 14
    1983 (3) SCR 280               relied on               Para 14
    (1988) Supp sec 241            relied on               Para 14
                                                          . Para 14   G
    1999 (3) SCR 529               relied on          r-   ..
    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 435        relied on '
                                                          •.Para14
                                                      0


    1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 286        relied- on              .Para 14
    2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 786        relieCI on;             Para 14    H
                                            ~




                                                ""'
    782      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         2002 (3) Suppl. 5_CR 183      relied on       Para 14
          2006 (2) SCR 1081             relied on      ·Para 14
          2004 (3) SCR 768              relied on       Para 14
          c2008) 12 sec s1              relied on       Para 14
B
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 785.of 2010.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2005 of the
c   High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.
    1818 of 2004.

         K. Parameshwar V.N. Raghupathy, Sanjay R. Hegde for
    the Appellant.                                  · ·

D         Senthil Jagadeesan for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.1. This appeal has been
     preferred against the Order dated 22nd December, 2005, of
E the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal
     No.1818 of 2004 setting aside the conviction of the accused-
     respondent Nos.1 and 2 passed by the Trial Court under
     Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC")
F .. and Sections 3,4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and
     sentence imposed including the sentence to undergo
     imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section
     304-B of the IPC.

      2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased
G Soumya was married to the accused-Manjunath on 13th May,
  1996. She,..W'1S living with her husband and his mother co-
  accused! 'Suvarnamma.
               •     • ' .
                            She was not treated well and•
                                                           was
  harassed for.Clowry. On 31st August, 1998 at about 6.15 P.M.,
  when her lltisband 'had gone out, the accused Suvarnamma
H brought kerosener,can, poured kerosene on the deceased-
                       " _..
                       ~
                   I
                   I
     STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                       783
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
Soumya and ignited the fire. She cried for help but                A
Suvernamma put a rug on her. Thereafter, she shifted her to
Chigateri General Hospital, Davangere. PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari
Devi, examined her. Next day in the morning of 1st September,
1998, at about 7 AM., PW-26, V. Dhananjaya, PSI, in the
presence of PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi recorded her                B
statement and on that basis registered First Information Report.
Soumya died on 3rd September, 1998. After investigation, the
accused-the husband, the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law,
were sent up for trial.

     3. The prosecution examined 26 witnesses which included
                                                                   c
the family members of the deceased who gave evidence of
demand of dowry and also the oral dying declarations made
before them. PW-22, Taluqa Executive Magistrate, was
examined to prove the inquest report. The prosecution also         D
examined the medical experts and the investigating officers.
The accused denied the prosecution allegations and stated that
they were taken out of their house by the police at 12 AM. mid-
night and arrested and were not aware of anything.

     4. The Trial Court held that the offences were proved         E
against the respondents-accused. However, co-accused
Geetha, sister of Manjunath was acquitted. The Trial Court held
that the demand of dowry soon before the death was
established by the evidence of family members of the
deceased which was reliable. The Trial Court rejected the plea     F
that the prosecution had withheld the dying declaration (Exhibit
D-7) recorded by PW-22 that the deceased caught fire
accidentally; she had switched on the gas stove and had gone
to change her clothes; when after returning back, she lit the
match stick, as a result of which fire broke out resulting in      G
accidental burn injuries.

      5. On appeal, the High Court reversed the decision of the
Trial Court for reasons which can be summed up as follows :

      "(i)   According to PW-1, the brother of the deceased,       H
    784           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 10 S.C:R.


A                   the police had come to the hospital on the night
                    itself on 31st August, 1998 and he gave a
                    complaint to the police at that time, while,
                    according to the Investigating Officer he came to
                    the hospital on 1st September, 1998 and recorded
B                   the statement of the deceased.

           (ii)     The dying declaration recorded by PW-22 was not
                    produced though recording of such statement was
                    admitted by the PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi and
                    the Taluka Executive Magistrate, PW-22.
c
           (iii)    It was doubtful that the death was either homicidal
                    or suicidal. The pro&_.:;ution failed to discharge the
                    burden to prove this fact. In absence thereof, the
                    death had to be taken to be by accident.
D
           (iv)      There were discrepancies in the evidence
                    regarding the demand and payment of dowry
                    about the place where the negotiations took place,
                    the persons present at the time of negotiations
                    and the items of dowry demanded.
E
           (v)      The Trial Court had not recorded the statement
                    under Section 313 Cr.P.C. properly resulting in
                    prejudice to the accused."

F         6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

       7. Learned counsel for the State vehemently submitted that
  the view taken by the High Court is perverse. Mere defects in
  the investigation could not be the basis for acquitting the
G accused, if sufficient evidence to prove the prosecution case
  was available on record. Minor discrepancies about details of
  demand of dowry were not enough to discredit the
  overwhelming evidence that the deceased was harassed for
  dowry soon before her death. A pragmatic approach was
H required to be adopted by Court in dealing with cases of death
      STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                     785
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
of a young bride to advance the policy of law. Though, the         A
burden of proof is on the prosecution, the facts exclusively in
the knowledge of the accused had to be disclosed by the
accused. A false plea is to be taken as an additional
circumstance against the accused. Oral dying declaration
consistently made by the deceased before' her brothers, sisters,   B
mother and brother in-law also corroborated by the dying
declaration (Exhibit P-10) recorded by the PW-26, the Police
Officer after due certification by PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi,
could not be thrown out only on the plea of the defence that
dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) made by the deceased before        C
PW-22, Executive Magistrate, in the presence of PW-19,
Dr. Rajeshwari Devi was not produced. The evidence on record
has to be appreciated in its entirety. It was submitted that the
approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. If
two dying declarations are recorded, the Court has to find out     D
as to which one was genuine and truthful.

     8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
submitted that the acquittal recorded by the High Court could
not be reversed merely on the ground that a different view could
                                                                   E
be taken. He submitted that the lapses of the investigation and
discrepancies in evidence are serious enough to disbelieve the
prosecution version and to give benefit of doubt.

    9. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival
contentions and carefully perused the evidence on record.          F

     10. The questions which arise for our consideration are as
follows:

      (i)     Whether the acquittal recorded by the High Courl
                                                                   G
              ought to be interfered with?
      (ii)    Whether the case against the accused stands
              established beyond reasonable doubt?

      (iii)   Whether the infirmities in investigation and         H
    786          SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014) 10 S.C.R.


A                 discrepancies pointed out in the prosecution
                  evidence make out a ground for rejecting the
                  prosecution version?

          (iv)    Whether the plea of the accused is false and
                  conduct of the accused in taking false plea can be
B
                  treated as an additional circumstance against
                  them?

       11. Before dealing with the above questions, it may be
  necessary to refer to well known principles for appreciation of
C evidence.

        12. The Court dealing with a criminal trial is to perform the
  task of ascertaining the truth from the material before it. It has
  to punish the guilty and protect the innocent. Burden of proof is
o on the prosecution and the prosecution has to establish its case
  beyond reasonable doubt. Much weight cannot be given to
  minor discrepancies which are bound to occur on account of
  difference in perception, loss of memory and other invariable
  factors. In the absence of direct evidence, the circumstantial
E evidence can be the basis of conviction if the circumstances
  are of conclusive nature and rule out all reasonable possibilities
  of accused being innocent. Once the prosecution probabilises
  the involvement of the accused but the accused takes a false
  plea, such false plea can be taken as an additional
F circumstance          against      the     accused.        Though
  Article 20 (3) of the Constitution incorporates the rule against
  self incrimination, the scope and the content of the said rule
  does not require the Court to ignore the conduct of the accused
  in not correctly disclosing the facts within his knowledge. When
G the accused takes a false plea about the facts exclusively known
  to him, such circumstance is a vital additional circumstance
  against the accused.

       · 13. It is also well settled that though the investigating
    agency is expected to be fair and efficient, any lapse on its part
H
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                      787
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
cannot per se be a ground to throw out the prosecution case        A
when there is overwhelming evidence to prove the offence.

    14. We may refer to the well known observations from
decisions of this Court :

       (i)    Shivaji Sahabrao      Bobade     vs.   State    of   B
              Maharashtra 1

      "8. Now to the facts. The scene of murder is rural, the
      witnesses to the case are rustics and so their behavioural
      pattern and perceptive habits have to be judged as such.     c
      The too sophisticated approaches familiar in courts
      based on unreal assumptions about human conduct
      cannot obviously be applied to those given to the
      lethargic ways of our villages. When scanning the
      evidence of the various witnesses we have to inform          D
      ourselves that variances on the fringes, discrepancies in
      details, contradictions in narrations and embellishments
      in inessential parts cannot m1fitate against the veracity
      of the core of the testimony provided there is the impress
      of truth and conformity to probability in the substantial    E
      fabric of testimony delivered. The learned Sessions
      Judge has at some length dissected the evidence, spun
      out contradictions and unnatural conduct, and tested with
      precision the time and sequence of the events connected
      with the crime, all on the touchstone of the medical
                                                                   F
      evidence and the post-mortem certificate. Certainly, the
      court which has seen the witnesses depose, has a great
      advantage over the appellate Judge who reads the
      recorded evidence in cold print, and regard must be had
      to this advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge of observing    G
      the demeanour and delivery, of reading the
      str,aightforwardness and doubtful candour, rustic naivete
      and clever equivocation, manipulated conformity and
      ingenious unveracity of persons who swear to the facts

1.   (1973) 2 sec 793.                                             H
    788           SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2014) 10 S.C.R. .


A         before him. Nevertheless, where a Judge draws his
          conclusions not so much on the directness or dubiety of
          the witness while on oath but upon general probabilities
          and on expert evidence, the court of appeal is in as good
          a position to assess or arrive at legitimate conclusions
B         as the Court of first instance. Nor can we make a fetish
          of the trial Judge's psychic insight."

           (ii)     Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of
                    Gujarat2
c         "5. .......... We do not consider it appropriate or
          permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation
          of the evidence in the context of the minor discrepancies
          painstakingly highlighted by learned Counsel for the
          appellant. Overmuch importance cannot be attached to
D         minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious :

                "(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to
          possess a photographic memory and to recall the details
          of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on
          the mental screen.
E
                (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is
          overtaken by events. The witness could not have
          anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element
          of surprised. The mental faculties therefore cannot be
F         expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

               (3) The powers of observation differ from person to
          person. What one may notice, another may not. An object
          or movement might emboss its image on one person's
G         mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of
          another.

               (4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a
          conversation and reproduce the very words used by them
H 2. (1983) 3 sec 211.
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                       789
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
      or heard by them. They can only recall the main purporl         A
      of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness
      to be a human tape-recorder.
            (5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time
      duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
                                                                      8
      estimates by guess-work on the spur of the moment at
      the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people
      to make very precise or reliable estimates in such
      matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of
      individuals which varies from person to person.
                                                                      c
             (6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall
      accurately the sequence of events which takes place in
      rapid succession or in· a short time span. A witness is
      liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later
      on.                                                             D

            (7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
     overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
     cross-examination made by counsel and out of
     nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding                 E
     sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on
     the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the
     witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of
     looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness
     is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence        F
     witnessed by him - Perhaps it is a sort of a
     psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur
     of the moment."

       (iii}   Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat3
                                                                      G
               "13 . ......... The court while appreciating the
               evidence must not attach undue importance to
               minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do

3.   (1988) Supp sec 241.
                                                                      H
    790       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A                 not shake the basic version of the prosecution
                  case may be discarded. The discrepancies which
                  are due to normal errors of perception or
                  observation should not be given importance. The
                  errors due to lapse of memory may be given due
B                 allowance. The court by calling into aid its vast
                  experience of men and matters in different cases
                  must evaluate the entire material on record by
                  excluding the exaggerated version, given by any
                  witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain
                  facts alleged by such witness, the proper course
c                 is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the
                  root of the matter so as to demolish the entire
                  prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on
                  adding embellishments to their version perhaps
                  for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the
D                 court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve
                  the evidence of such witnesses a/together if they
                  are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.,
                  speaking for this Court in Sohrab v. State of
                  Madhya Pradesh observed: {SCC p. 756, SCC
E                 (Cri) p. 824, para BJ

          ''This Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus
          is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes
          across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain
F         of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
          embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when
          asked about details venture to give some answer, not
          necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence
          may not be accepted in respect of the main incident
G         which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their
          evidence as to the salient features of the case after
          cautious scrutiny cannot be considered."

           (iv)   State of Haryana vs. Bhagirath4
H 4. (1999) s sec 96.
  STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                       791
        [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
 "B. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove     A
 all the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal
 court could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the
 range of a reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression
 "reasonable doubt" is incapable of definition. Modem
 thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a          B
 reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords
 moral certainty to the Judge.

 9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law
 in the United States has quoted from judicial
 pronouncements in his book Wharton's Criminal                  C
 Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1 of the 12th Edn.) as follows:

 "It is difficult to define the phrase 'reasonable doubt'.
 However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of
 the term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or       D
 followed is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the
 Webster case. He says: 'It is not mere possible doubt,
 because everything relating to human affairs and
 depending upon moral evidence is open to some
 possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case      E
 which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
 all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
 consideration that they cannot say they feel an abiding
 conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.'
 "                                                              F
 10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored
 by H. C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th
 Edn.) thus:

  "The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an          G
. honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with reason,
  entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to
  ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt
  is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an
  inference of the possibility of the innocence of the          H
     792          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.

A          accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt
           is one which arises from a consideration of all the
           evidence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a
           candid consideration of all the evidence and if, after this
           candid consideration is had by the jurors, there remains
l3         in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the accused, then
           there is no room for a reasonable doubt."

           11. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra·
           (1973) 2 SCC 793) this Court adopted the same
           approach to the principle of benefit of doubt and struck
c          a note of caution that the dangers of exaggerated
           devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of
           social defence demand special emphasis in the
           contemporary context of escalating crime and escape.
           This Court further said: (SCC p. 799, para 6)
D
           ''The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The
           cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond
           reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law
           should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every
E          hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt."

            (v)     Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana 5

            "9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction
           being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence,
F          bJJt the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two
           witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the
           credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are
           bound to be some discrepancies between the naffations
           of different witnesses when they speak on details, and
G          unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the
           same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its
           entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with
           mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal
           cases. Minor embellishment, there .may be, but
H 5. (1999) 9 sec 525.
 STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                        793
       [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
variations by reason therefor should not render the            A
evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial
discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise
acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be
made to the decision of this Cowt in State of UP. v. M.K.
Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505). In para 10 of the Report,           B
this Court observed: (SCC pp. 514-15)

"10. While appreciating the_ evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that
impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the C
court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping
in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities
pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate
them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of
the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier D
evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it
unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on lrivial matters
not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical
approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or
there from the evidence, attaching importance to some E
technical error committed by the investigating officer not
going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before
whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to
form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence F
given by the witness, the appellate court which had not
this benefit will have to attach due weight to the
appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless
there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be
proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor G
variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even
honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details
unrelated to the main incident because power of
observation, retention and reproduction differ with
individuals."                                                    H
    794         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State M.P with
          Bhura v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649) this Court
          observed: (SCC p. 656, para 24)

          "24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
          possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true
B
          witness can possibly escape from making some
          discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well
          tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-
          discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only
          when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
c         incompatible with the credibility of his version that the
          court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too
          serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling
          in the narration of an incident (either as between the
          evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements
D         of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial
          scrutiny."

          This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras 25-
          27)
E           '

          "25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out
          contradicti()ns from the previous statement of a witness
          for confronting him during cross-examination. Merely
          because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not
          sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt
F         Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for
          impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an
          inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the
          section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are
          not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The
G         material portion of the section is extracted below:

          '155. Impeaching credit of witness.-The credit of a
          witness may be impeached in the following ways by the
          adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the
H         party who calls him-
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                       795
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
      (1)-(2)                                                         A

     (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any
     part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;'

      26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent
      with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to         B
      amount to contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent
      statement which is liable to be 'contradicted' would affect
      the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act
      also enables the cross-examiner to use any former
      statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is         C
      intended to 'contradict' the witness the cross-examiner is
      enjoined to comply with the formality prescribed therein.
      Section 162 of Code also permits the cross-examiner to
      use the previous statement of the witness (recorded under
      Section 161 of the Code) for the only limited purpose i.e.      D
      to 'contradict' the witness.

      27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit
      the particular version of the witness. Unless the former
      statement has the potency to discredit the present              E
      statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former
      to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that
      witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR (1959)
      SC 1012)."

       (vi}     State of H.P. vs. Lekh Ra.f                           F

      "10. The High Court appears to have adopted a technical
      approach in disposing of the appeal filed by the
      respondents. This Court in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh
      (1974} 3 SCC 277) held: (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23)               G

      "23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is
      free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It
      concerns itself with the question as to whether the

e.   (2000) 1 sec 247.                                                H
    796       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 10 S.C.R.


A         accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with
          which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is
          the product of interplay of different human emotions. In
          arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused
          charged with the commission of a crime, the court has
B         to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its
          intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case
          in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own
          facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt
          should be given to the accused, the courts should not at
c         the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy
          on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of
          conjectures."

          The criminal trial cannot be equated with a mock scene
          from a stunt film. The legal trial is conducted to ascertain
D         the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned. In
          arriving at a conclusion about the truth, the courts are
          required to adopt a rational approach and judge the
          evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of the
          witnesses. The hyper technicalities or figment of
E         imagination should not be allowed to divest the court of
          its responsibility of sifting and weighing the evidence to
          arrive at the conclusion regarding the existence or
          otherwise of a particular circumstance keeping in view the
          peculiar facts of each case, the social position of the
F         victim and the accused, the larger interests of the society
          particularly the law and order problem and degrading
          values of life inherent in the prevalent system. The
          realities of life have to be kept in mind while appreciating
          the evidence for arriving at the truth. The courts are not
G         obliged to make efforts either to give latitude to the
          prosecution or loosely construe the law in favour of the
          accused. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical
          approach has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and
          genuine approach for administering justice in a criminal
H         trial. Criminal jurisprudence cannot be considered to be
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                     797
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
     a utopian thought but have to be considered as part and       A
     parcel of the human civilization and the realities of life.
     The courts cannot ignore the erosion in values of life
     which are a common feature of the present system. Such
     erosions cannot be given a bonus in favour of those who
     are guilty of polluting society and mankind."                 B

       (vii)   Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa7

       "15. To the same effect is the decision in State of
     Punjab v. Jagir Singh (1974) 3 SCC 277) and Lehna v.
     State of Hafyana (2002) 3 SCC 76). Stress was laid by C
     the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of
     evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about
     desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In
     essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno,
     falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). D
     This plea is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of
     the evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is
     sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding
     acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons, his
     conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court E
     to separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff can be
     separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to
     convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence
     has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other
     accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness F
     or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning
     to end. The maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has
     no application in India and the witnesses cannot be
     branded as liars. The maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in
     omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has G
     this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is
     merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in
     such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that
     it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the
1.   c2002) s sec 381.                                             H
    798       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         question of weight of evidence which a court may apply
          in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be
          called "a mandatory rule ·of evidence". (See Nisar Ali v.
          State of U.P. (AIR (1957) SC 366) Merely because some
          of the accused persons have been acquitted, though
B         evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony
          went, was the same does not lead as a necessary
          corollary that those who have been convicted must also
          be acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate
          the accused who had been acquitted from those who were
c         convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR
          (1956) SC 460). The doctrine is a dangerous one
          specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were
          to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking
          an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that
          administration of criminal justice would come to a dead
D
          stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to
          a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be
          appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence
          is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some
          respects the court considers the same to be insufficient
E         for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does
          not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be
          disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to
          be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound
          rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a
F         witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
          untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
          embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972) 3
          SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC
          277). An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in
G         terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the
          chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to
          separate the truth from falsehood, because grain and
          chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in_ the process of
          separation an absolutely new case has to be
H         reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                    799
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
      the prosecution completely from the context and the          A
      background against which they are made, the only
      available course to be made is to discard the evidence
      in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. (AIR (1954)
      SC 15) and Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4
      SCC 511 ). As observed by this Court in State of             B
      Rajasthan v. Kalki (1981) 2 sec 752) normal
      discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to
      normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory
      due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
      shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are     c
      always there however honest and truthful a witness may
      be. Material discrepancies are those which are not
      normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts
      have to label the category to which a discrepancy may
      be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not            0
      corrode the credibility of a party's case, material
      discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted
      recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 sec
      81). Accusations have been clearly established against
      the accused-appellants in the case at hand. The courts
      below have categorically indicated the distinguishing        E
      features in evidence so far as the acquitted and the
      convicted accused are concerned."

       (viii) State of Punjab vs. Swaran Singh 8
                                                                   F
      "10. The questioning of the accused is done to enable
      him to give an opportunity to explain any circumstances
      which have come out in the evidence against him. It may
      be noticed that the entire evidence is recorded in his
      presence and he is given full opportunity to cross-          G
      examine each and every witness examined on the
      prosecution side. He is given copies of all documents
      which are sought to be relied on by the prosecution. Apart
      from all these, as part of fair trial the accused is given
a.   (2005) e sec 101.                                             H
    800       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R ..


A         opportunity to give his explanation regarding the
          evidence adduced by the prosecution. However, it is not
          necessary that the entire prosecution evidence need be
          put to him and answers elicited from the accused. If there
          were circumstances in the evidence which are adverse
B         to the accused and his explanation would help the court
          in evaluating the evidence properly, the court should
          bring the same to the notice of the accused to enable him
          to give any explanation or answers for such adverse
          circumstance in the evidence. Generally, composite
c         questions shall not be asked to the accused bundling so
          many facts together. Questions must be such that any
          reasonable person in the position of the accused may be
          in a position to give rational explanation to the questions
          as had been asked. There shall not be failure of justice
          on account of an unfair trial.
D
      · 11. In State (Delhi Admn.) v. Dharampal (2001) 10 SCC
        372) it was held as under: (SCC pp. 376~77, pafa 13)

          "13. Thus it is to be seen that where an omission, to bring
E         the attention of the accused to an inculpatory material has
          occurred, that does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings.
          The accused must show that failure of justice was
          occasioned by such omission. Further, in the event of an
          inculpatory material not having been put to the accused,
F         the appellate court can always make good that lapse by
          calling upon the counsel for the accused to show what
          explanation the accused has as regards the
          circumstances established against the accused but not
          put to him."
G         12. In Jai .Dev v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 489) it
          was observed thus: (SCR p. 510)
             .
          "The ultimate test in determining whether or not the
          accused has been fairly examined under Section 342
H         would be to enquire whether, having regard to all the
   STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                       801
         [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
  questions put to him, he did get an opportunity to say          A
  what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution case
  against him. If it appears that the examination of the
  accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice
  has been caused to him, that would no doubt be a serious
  infirmity."                                                     B
  13. In Bakhshish Singh Dhaliwal v. State of Punjab (1967)
  1 SCR 211) a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that:
  (SCR p. 225 D)

  "It was not at all necessary that each separate piece of        C
  evidence in support of a circumstance should be put to
  the accused and he should be questioned in respect of
  it under that section;"

   14. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra         0
   (1973) 2 SCC 793) a three-Judge Bench of this Court
   considering the fallout of omission to put to the accused
   a question on a vital circumstance _?ppearing against him
   in the prosecution evidence, widening the sweep of the
   provision concerning examination of the accused after          E
-- closing prosecution evidence made the following
   observations: (SCC p. 806, para 16)

  "It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the
  prisoner's attention should be drawn to every incu/patory
  material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic   F
  fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may
  gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if
  consequential miscarriage ofjustice has flowed. However,
  where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso
  facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned          G
  by such defect must be established by the accused. In
  the event of evidentiary material not being put to the
  accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material
  from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court
  to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what           H
    802           SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         explanation the accused has as regards the
          circumstances established against him but not put to him
          and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court
          any plausible or reasonable explanation of such
          circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable
s         answer exists and that even if the accused had been
          questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would
          not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out
          of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied
          for its conviction."
c          (ix)    Zahira Habibullha Sheikh (5) vs. State of Gujarat.9

          "37. A criminal trial is a judicial examination of the
          issues in the case and its purpose is to arrive at a
          judgment on an issue as to a fact or relevant facts which
D          may lead to the discovery of the fact in issue and obtain
          proof of such facts at which the prosecution and the
           accused have arrived by their pleadings; the controlling
           question being the guilt or innocence of the accused.
           Since the object is to mete out justice and to convict the
E         guilty and protect the innocent, the trial should be a
          search for the truth and not a bout over technicalities, and
          must be conducted under such rules as will protect the
          innocent, and punish the guilty. The proof of charge
           which has to be beyond reasonable doubt must depend
F         upon judicial evaluation of the totality of the evidence,
           oral and circumstantial, and not by an isolated scrutiny.

          40. .. .. .. .. .. Consequences of defective investigation
          have been elaborated in Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab
          (2004) 3 sec 654). It was observed as follows: (SCC p.
G         657, paras 5-7)

          "5. In the case of a defective investigation the court has
          to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But it would

H 9. (2006) 3 sec 374.
     STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVAR.NAMMA                    803
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
    not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on       A
    account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to
    playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the
    investigation is designedly defective. (See Kamel Singh
    v. State of M.P. (1995) 5 sec 518).
                                                                 B
    6. In Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC 126) it
    was held that if the lapse or omission is committed by
    the investigating agency or because of negligence the
    prosecution evidence is required to be examined dehors
    such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is      C
    reliable or not, the contaminated conduct of officials
    should not stand in the way of evaluating the evidence
    by the courts; otherwise the designed mischief would be
    perpetuated and justice would be denied to the
    complainant party.
                                                                 D
     7. As was observed in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar
     (1998) 4 sec 517) if primacy is given to such designed
    or negligent investigation, to the omission or /apses by
    perfunctory investigation or omissions, the faith and
    confidence of the people would be shaken not only in the     E
     /aw-enforcing agency but also in the administration of
    justice. The view was again reiterated in Amar Singh v.
    Ba/winder Singh (2003) 2 SCC 518). "

    (x} Mani Pal vs. State of Haryana 10
                                                                 F
      "12. There is no embargo on the appellate court
     reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal
     is based. As a matter of fact, in an appeal against
     acquittal, the High Court as the court of first appeal is
     obligated to go into greater detail of the evidence to see G
      whether any miscarriage has resulted from the order of
      acquittal, though it has to act with great circumspection
     and utmost care before ordering the reversal of an
      acquittal. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be
10. c2004) °lo sec 692.                                         H
    804       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         interfered with because the presumption of innocence of
          the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The
          golden thread which runs through the web of
          administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
           views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
B         one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to
          his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
          should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the
          court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented.
          A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal
c         of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
          innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is
          ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to
          reappreciate the evidence where the accused has been
          acquitted, for the pwpose of ascertaining as to whether
          any of the accused really committed any offence or not.
D
           (See Bhagwan Singh v. State.of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85)
           The principle to be followed by the appellate court
          considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal
          is to interfere only when there are compelling and
          substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned
E
          judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and
          convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated
          in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference.
           This position has been recently reiterated in Joseph v.
           State of Kera/a (2003) 1 SCC 465), Devatha
F          Venkataswamy v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.
           (2003) 10 SCC 700, State of Punjab v. Pho/a Singh
           (2003) 11 SCC 58), State of Punjab v. Kamai/ Singh
           (2003) 11sec271), State of UP. v. Babu (2003) 11 sec
          280) and Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal (2003) 11 SCC 527)."
G
          (xi) State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram11

          "27. In our considered view, this was a fit case for invoking
          Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that
H   11. c2oos) 12 sec s1.
 STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                   805
      · [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any A
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In
Ram Gu/am Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC
311) this Court considered the applicability of Section
106 of the Evidence Act in a case somewhat similar to
the present one. This Court noted that the accused after B
brutally assaulting a boy carried him away and thereafter
the boy was not seen alive nor his body was found. The
accused, however, offered no explanation as to what they
did after they took away the boy. It was held that for the
absence of any explanation from the side of the accused c
about the boy, there was every justification for drawing an
inference that they had murdered the boy. It was further
observed that even though Section 106 of the Evidence
Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its
burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
                                                            0
reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases
like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded
in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can
be drawn regarding death. The accused by virtue of their
special knowledge must offer an explanation which might E
lead the court to draw a different inference.

28. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra
(2006) 10 sec 681) a two-Judge Bench of which one of
us (G. P. Mathur, J.) was a member, considered the
applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and        F
observed: (SCC pp. 689-691, paras 13-15)

"13. The demand for dowry or money from the parents
of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last
few years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts,   G
where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of
killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes
are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the
house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution
to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is    H
    806       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose
          against another family member. The neighbours, whose
          evidence may be of some assistance, are generally
          reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof
          and do not want to antagonise a neighbourhood family.
B         The parents or other family members of the bride being
          away from the scene of commission of crime are not in
          a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate
          the real accused except regarding the demand of money
          or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does
c         not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the
          houses should go unpunished.

          14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house
          and in such circumstances where the assailants have all
          the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time
D         and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely
          difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish
          the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of
          circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted
          upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a
E         criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is
          punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man
          does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stir/and
          v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1944) AC 315)-.
          quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of
F         PulJjab. v. Kamai/ Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271.) The law
          does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead
          evidence of such character which is almost impossible
          to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The
          duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which
G         it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and
          circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep
          in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that
          when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
          person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
          Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light
H
      STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                        807
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
    on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: ·A

    '(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket.
    The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.'

    15. Where an offence like murder is committed in
    secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the      8
    case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the
    nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish
    the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required
    in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden
    would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of        C
    Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a
    corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give
    a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed.
    The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply
    keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the                 D
    supposed premise that the burden to establish its case
    lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at
    all on an accused to offer any explanation."

    Similar view has been expressed in State of Punjab v.            E
    Kamai/ Singh, State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006)
    12 SCC 254) and Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State
    of Bihar (2007) 10 sec 433).

    29. We are sure, if the teamed Single Judge of the High
    Court had adverted to Section 106 of the Evidence Act            F
    and correctly applied the principles of law, he would not
    have committed the grave error of acquitting the
    respondent."

    15. In the light of above principles, we may now examine         G
the questions arising in the present case. Admittedly, the
marriage of the deceased took place within seven years of her
death. Her death is by burn injuries. There is evidence of
demand of dowry soon before the death. Plea of the deceased
who were living with the deceased is that they had no idea about     H
                                          -,._)..
    808     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.       •

A the incident and were sleeping when plice picked them up at
  the night. During the trial, inference of death being an accident
  is sought to be drawn on the basis of alleged dying declaration
  (Exhibit D-7) coupled with the conduct of the prosecution in not
  producing the said dying declaration recorded by the Executive
B Magistrate, PW-22 in the presence of Dr. Rajeshwari Devi and
  also the fact that though PW-1 admitted that the police came
  to the hospital in the night itself, the stand of the Investigating
  Officer was that he came in the morning.

C      16. Does the alleged suppression or unfair conduct of the
  investigating agency absolve the Court of its duty to find out the
  truth? Though we are governed by the adversorial system, the
  Court cannot be a mute spectator, particularly in criminal cases
  and shun its primary duty of finding out the truth from the material
D on record. Thus merely showing that the prosecution withheld
  dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) could not be a ground for the
  Court not finding out the cause of death from the material on
  record and inferring that the death was accidental. Once dying
  declaration (Exhibit D-7) was produced even by defence, the
E Court has to go into the authenticity of two rival versions in the
  dying declarations. It was required to be ascertained whether
  (Exhibit D-7) was a genuine and reliable dying declaration or
  the oral dying declarations made before PW-1, PW-3, PW-4,
  PW-5, PW-8, PW-14, PW-15 and PW-16 were more reliable
F in the circumstances on record.

       17. What is surprising and wholly unacceptable is the stand
  of the accused who were husband and mother in-law of the
  deceased, living in the same house and that they had no idea
  that the deceased received burn injuries. This stand is clearly
G incompatible with the stand in Exhibit D-7 that the accused
  mother in-law of the deceased was very much present in the
  house and she shifted the deceased to the hospital. Even if the
  dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) was recorded, the fact remains
  that when it was recorded, even according to the said dying
H
      STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                        809
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
declaration, the deceased was accompanied by her mother in-           A
law who is one of the accused. The deceased could not have
made any voluntary and independent dying declaration in such
circumstances as the influence of the accused could not be
ruled out. According to the said dying declaration, she raised
hue and cry when she received burn injuries which attracted her       B
mother in-law and the tenant, while according to the mother in-
law as well as the tenant they never heard such cries. There is
no evidence of struggle or cries and the burn injuries are to the
extent of 95%. In the case of an accident, the deceased
would have tried to run away or escape. In these circumstances,       C
there is hardly any possibility of accidental burn injuries.
Extensive burns and other circumstances support the version
of unnatural death. In these circumstances, the dying declaration
(Exhibit P-10) is consistent with the circumstances on record
while Exhibit D-7 is not.                                             D

    18. The overwhelming evidence to prove the demand of
dowry has been rejected on account of minor discrepancies
about the place at which the negotiations took place or the
persons in whose presence demand was made. Such minor                 E
contradictions are not enough to discredit the version of
demand of dowry.

      19. The High Court has not at all discussed the truthfulness
or otherwise of the plea of the accused that though they were
at home, they had no knowledge of burn injuries. This stand in        F
their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is clearly false. They
were expected to know the incident and make disclosure
thereof, absence of which was a circumstance against them.
Mere contradiction of PW-1 admitting presence of the police
in the night while 1.0. stating that he came in the morning was       G
not enough to discard the entire evidence. Even if dying
declaration Exhibit D-7 was recorded and not produced, this
could not absolve the Court from considering the truthfulness
of available evidence. There is no justification to hold that death
                                                                      H
    81   o           SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   was accidental nor to reject evidence of demand of dowry.
    There is objective medical evidence which by itself shifts the
    burden on the accused to explain circumstances in which burn
    injuries were caused in their house. In these circumstances, any
    infirmity in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. could not
B   be treated to be fatal.

        .20 ..As a result of above discussion, it is clearly established
    that:

              (i)     Death of the deceased was within 7 years of
c                     marriage and she was subjected to harassment for
                      dowry soon before her death. The death was in
                      circumstances other than natural, and not
                      accidental;

D             (ii)    Mere lapse of investigating agency could not be
                      enough to throw out overwhelming evidence
                      clearly establishing the case of the prosecution.

              (iii)   False plea of the accused that they had no
                      knowledge of burn injuries having been caused to
E                     the deceased was an additional circumstance
                      against them.

          21. In view of the above, the view taken by the High Court
    is clearly unsustainable.
F
         22. In appeal against the acquittal, if a possible view has
    been taken, no interference is required, but if the view taken is
    not legally sustainable, the Court has ample powers to interfere
    with the order of acquittal.
G    · 23. Accordingly, we hold that the ~se against the accused
    stands fully established. The view taken by the High Court for
    acquittal is not a possible view.

             24. The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High
H
       STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA                      811
             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
Court is set aside and that passed by the Trial Court is restored   A
with the modification that the sentence of imprisonment
awarded to the accused under Section 3048 will stand reduced
to R.I. for seven years while maintaining sentence under other
heads.
                                                                    B
    25. The accused may be arrested to serve out the
sentence imposed by the Trial Court, as modified above.

Devika Gujral                                     Appeal allowed.