Holding

The dying declaration was deemed trustworthy, the conviction under Section 302 IPC stands, and the death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment.

Summary

Vishweshwar K. Kol was accused of pouring kerosene on his second wife and four daughters, resulting in their deaths. The eldest daughter, Jyoti, gave a dying declaration to the police after a doctor certified her fitness to testify. The trial court convicted Kol under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to death based on the dying declaration and corroborating medical evidence. The High Court acquitted him, rejecting the dying declaration on grounds that the victims were asleep, no kerosene smell was found, and a chimney might have caused the fire. The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was reliable, restored the conviction, but, considering the lapse of time, substituted the death sentence with life imprisonment.

Issues considered

The admissibility and reliability of a dying declaration recorded by police without a magistrate.
Whether the High Court's reasons for discarding the dying declaration were legally justified.
Whether the death penalty could be re-imposed after a six‑year acquittal and whether life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 366
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

dying declarationadmissibilitySection 302 IPCmurderlife imprisonmentdeath penaltyevidentiary reliabilitycriminal appeal

Judgment

[2011] 1 S.C.R. 790 -
A STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
...\,.
v.
VISHWESHWAR K-OL
(Criminal Appeal No. 1,361 of 2006)
JANUARY 18, 2011
B
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 - Brutal murder - Accused
c bumt his wife and daughters - Dying dealaration of daughter
recorded- by police ..... The declarant stated that accused ca!"'e
home late at night in inebriated state and poured kerosene
oil first on her mother and then on her and her sisters and
when declarant tried to escape, accused caught hold of her,
D and in the process he himself received burn injuries -
Conviction by trial court based on dying declaration - High T-
Court held that the dying declaration did not inspire
confidence and ordered acquittal - Held: The fact that the
accused received burn injuries was corroborated by the
E medical evidence - Dying declaration was recorded after the
doctor certified fitness of the declarant to give dying
declaration - There was no reason to disbelieve the dying
declaration - High Court erred in passing order of acqui(t_al - ......
Order of conviction passed by trial court restored and accused
directed ·to u.ndergo sentence of life imprisonment.
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1361 of 2006.

From the Judgment & Order dated 06.12.2004 of the High
G Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Reference
No. 855 of 2004.

Aishwar1a Bhati, Rashid Khan, C.D. Singh for the
Appellant.
H 790
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. VISHWESHWAR , 791
KOL. ..
Rajesh for the Respondent. A
,_,f
The following order oi the Court was delivered

ORDER

This appeal, at the instance of the State of Madhya 8
Pradesh, arises out of the following facts:

.. """ The first wife -of the respondent (hereinafter called "the
accused"), had died of tuberculosis and several years prior to
the date of occurrence (19th October 2003) he had started c
living with Leelawati Bai deceased as a second wife. Out of
this arrangement, 4 daughters, namely, Sandhya about 6 years,
Lovely 3 years, Madhu 1 year and Jyoti 10 or 11 years had been
born. As Leelawati Bai· had abandoned her previous husband
and b,elonged to a community different from that of the
D
-y accused, she had not been accepted as a member of his family
and even otherwise there was suspicion that she ~not of
good character. On the evening of 18th October 003 the
a
accused went to see dance performance at Chandiya. He,
however, returned home at about .1.00 a.m. i.e. in the early .
morning hours of 19th October 2003 before the performance E --
. had ended and after picking- up a plastic can which contained
.... _ '+- kerosene oil, he poured the oil on his wife and four daughters .
Jyoti who was the eldest, woke up and tried to escape but the
. accused got hold of her and in that process, he too sustained
bum injuries on his body. As a consequence of the serious bum F
injuries, Leelawati Bai, Sandhya, Lovely ~nd Madhu died almost
instanteously and house was completely burnt down. Jyoti, who
had sustained severe jnjuries, was removed to the Primary
Health Centre by her uncle and brother of the accused, Nandi
Kol PW-7 where she was examined by Doctor Ashish Pandey, G
PW-1. The Doctor also informed the police on which Sub-
Inspector S.K.Mishra, PW-10 reached the hospital and after
ascertaining from Dr. As~ish Pandey as to Jyoti's fitness to
make a statement, recorded the same between 1.40 and 2.15
a.m .. In this dying declaration, she gave the story as already H
,792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 1 S.C.R.

A given above. The accused was accordingly brought to trial for
an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the _;,.__'
.·.completion of the investigation. The trial court relying on the
··dying· declaration and partly on the evidence of Nandi Kol PW-
7 a!ld Jognibai PW-8, the mother of the accused, held that the
B fact that the accused and Leelawati Bai were living as a man
' ~ and wife had been proved on record. The court, however, held
that 1he story as to the motive for the burning of Leelawati Bai
and particularly her daughters could not be entirely accepted ,,.... ...
as the witnesses aforesaid had resiled from their police
c statements in an attempt to help the accused who was a very
close relative and accordingly the primary evidence against the
accused was the dying declaration made by Jyoti. The court
observed that this was the main link in the chain of
circumstances against the accused. It was pointed out that the
dying declaration had been recorded by PW~10 after the Doctor
D -..,.- -
had opined that Jyoti was fit to make a statement. Support for
the dying declaration was also found from the evidence of PW-·
4 Balwant, a medical assistant, who too had been presentin
the Primary Health Centre. PW-10 also deposed that no
Executive Magistrate was posted at Chandiya and as Jyoti was
E · in a very serious condition it had not been feasible to secure
the services of an Executive Magistrate from Umariya which
was about one hour distant and that in any case the wireless ~.. "
set at the Headquarters had been shut down at midnight and
the telephone too was not in working order. PW-10 also
F explained that soon after the recording of the dying declaration
Jyoti too had died. The trial court observed that a dying
declaration to be more reliable and plausible ought to be
recorded by a Magistrate but if the circumstances did not make
that possible and a dying declaration was recorded by a police
' - G officer and was found to be credible, there was no law or · ~
practice that it could not be relied upon. The trial court also
noted that in the light of the fact that PWs. 7 and 8, the brother
and the mother of the accused, had resiled from their
statements though admittedly PW-7 had brought Jyoti to the
H hospital, no other evidence could be produced as the incident
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. VISHWESHWAR 793
KOL
had happened at 1 a.m., an extremely awkward time. The court A
/,+ then took up the question of the sentence to be awarded and
held that the case fell within the rarest of the rare category as
four innocent girls between the ages of 1 and 10 and their
mother had been murdered by their father only because he had
some strained relations with the mother. ll was found that the B
murders had been committed in an excessively brutal manner.
An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court and a
~ reference was also made under Section 366 of the Cr.P.C. The
High Court has, by the impugned judgment, allowed the appeal
'
and acquitted the accused, thereby declining the murder c
reference. The High Court analyzed the law relating to dying
declarations and held that such a statement could by itself form
the basis for conviction provided it inspired confidence and with
this background examined the dying declaration and gave a few
rather unusual reasons for discarding it; they being (1) that as D
_. -y
per the dying declaration, all victims had been sleeping. when
the oil had been poured on them and the fire lit but .if all
(including Jyoti) were asleep, there was no question of Jyoti
having seen the incident; (2) that there was no smell of
kerosene oil on the dead bodies of the children which belied
E
the story that kerosene oil had first been poured on the victims
and they had subsequently been set afire and (3) that it
.,
--..+- appeared that a bottle containing kerosene oil which-was being
used as a crude lamp (chimney) appeared to have caused the
fire and that the story that the kerosene oil had been poured
directly on the victims was a concoction. The High Court also .F
· referred to certain passages from Dr. Modi's Medical
Jurisprudence and Toxicology to support its views. The State
is in appeal before us.

-f. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned counsel for the State of G
Madhya Pradesh,.has argued that the three reasons given by
the High Court for making an order of acquittal were completely
unjustified, as they ignored the basic fact that the dying
declaration had been recorded within a very short time of the
incident and by PW-10 after getting a fitness certificate from H
I
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 1 S.C.R.

A the Doctor who had given the certificate in the presence of PW-
4 Balwant, an employee of the hospital. She has pointed out
that realizing the gravity and urgency of the situation and Jyoti's
serious condition, it had not been possible to secure the.
services of a Magistrate from Umariya which was some
B distance away and that PW-10 was thus fully justified in
recording the dying declaration. These pleas have been
controverted by Mr. Rajesh, the learned counsel for the
accused who has supported the judgment of the High Court.

We have gone through the evidence with the help of the
C learned counsel and also examined the reasons which have
weighed with the High Court in rendering its judgment. With
great respect, we are unable to accept any of the reasons given
by the. High Court. It has· to be highlighted that a dying
declaration cannot be analyzed as if it were a statute and it was
D only if the Court was to find that the injured was not in a fit
condition to make a statement or the possibility that it was
tutored or motivated or the story given was completely
unacceptable could be some of the reasons for discarding it.
It has come in Jyoti's statement that her father had returned
E home completely inebriated and before the dance performance
had ended is -supported by PW-7 as well. Jyoti also stated that
the accused had walked to the kitchen and picked up a can of
kerosene oil and had first poured its contents on her mother
and thereafter on her and her siblings and then set them ablaze.
f She further stated that she being the eldest had managed to
get up and had attempted to escape but she had been got hold
of by the accused with the result he too had received bum
injuries in that process. The fact that the accused received bum
injuries is corroborated by the medical evidence.
G
We find absolutely no reason as to why the story given in
the dying declaration should not be believed. Admittedly, Jyoti
had been brought to the hospital by PW-7 and he so admitted
in his statement. Dr. Pandey, the attending doctor, had
H immediately sent for the police which had brought PW-10 to
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. VISHWESHWAR \'79$
KOL . ~· . r

the hospital and after ascertaining from the doctor as to Jyoti's A
fitness, the dying declaration had been recorded' In the
\·
·presence of the doctor as also Balwant PW. The argument that
had found favour with the High Court that a.s the presence of a
. chimney was conceded by the prosecution, it appeared that the
kerosene oil. flad spilt out after the chimney had l;>een 8 "
accidentally broken and caused the burn injuries to all the
victims. !his story is, however, not based on any material but
is an inference which does not flow from the evidence.

· The question is as to the sentence that is to be awarded -
in such a matter. The trial court had rightly held that the incident · C
was in the category of the rarest of the rare cases. Nothing can
be said in exoneration of the. accused on the facts of the case,
and we are constrained to hold that the High Court by rendering
a judgment which is completely against the evidence makes it
·~·T difficult for us to re-impose the capital sentence at this stage. D
As already indicated above, the incident had happened in
· October 2003. The trial court had convicted the accused under·
Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to death vide
judgment dated 30th April 2004. The acquittal judgment was
.rendered on the 6th December 2004. The accused has been · E
free on acquittal for more than 6 years now. In this view of the
matter, notwithstanding the horrendous nature of the crime and
that it called for the capital punishment, we find it difficult to re-.
impose the death sentence on the accused at this stage. We ..._
nevertheless give this .opinion with regret. We accordingly allow F
the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 6th
December 2004 and restore that of the trial· court in so far as
the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC in concerned, but
direct the accused to undergo a sentence of life imprisonment.·

O.G. Appeal allowed. G