Holding

The offences alleged to have been committed in the forged bail bond were "in or in relation to" the bail proceedings, and the transferee magistrate was competent to make a complaint under Section 476 Cr.P.C.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra prosecuted Sk. Bannu, Shankar and Mohammad Nazir for forging a bail bond and affidavit in a bail application filed under the Bombay Prohibition Act. The first magistrate who granted bail later transferred the case to another magistrate, who, after discovering the forgery, filed a complaint under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) invoking the bar in Section 195(1)(b) and (c). The High Court held that the complaint was invalid because the proceedings before the second magistrate were not the same as those before the first, thus lacking jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed this view, holding that bail proceedings constitute judicial proceedings and form part of a single integrated judicial process, so the offences were committed "in or in relation to" the later proceedings, making the complaint valid. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment and remitted the matter for fresh hearing. The decision clarifies the scope of "in or in relation to" in Section 195 and the competence of a transferee magistrate to invoke Section 476.

Issues considered

The scope and meaning of "in or in relation to" in Section 195(1)(b) and (c) of the Cr.P.C.
Whether bail proceedings constitute "proceedings in any Court" for the purpose of Section 195.
Whether a magistrate who takes over a case after bail is granted can make a complaint under Section 476 Cr.P.C. for offences alleged to have been committed in relation to the earlier bail proceedings.

Legislation cited

Bombay Prohibition Act
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898s. 192, s. 195(1)(b), s. 195(1)(c), s. 207A, s. 476
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109, s. 205, s. 419, s. 465, s. 467, s. 471

Subjects

Section 195 Cr.P.C.Section 476 Cr.P.C.bail proceedingsforged surety bondjurisdictionintegrated judicial processcriminal procedure

Judgment

\

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
v..
SK. BANNU AND SHANKAR
September 12, 1980
IR. s. SARKARIA AND 0 . CHINNAPPA REDDY]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898-Section 195(1) (b) and (c) and Section
476-Scope of.
Words and phrases--"ln or in relation to"-meaning of.
Section 195(1)(b) of the. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provides that
no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 205
(among othe:rs) I.P.C. when such offence: is· alleged to have been committed
in or in relation to any proceedings in any Court, except on the complaint
in writing of such Court. Clause (c) of this sub-section, provides that no Court
shall take cognizance of any offence described in, among others,
D section 471 when snch offence is alleged to have · been commit-
ted by a party to any proceedings in any Court in respect of a
document produced except on the complaint in writing of such Court. Sec-
tion 476 Cr.P.C. provides that when any Criminal Court is, whether on appli-
cation made to it or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests
of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in sec-
tion !95(1)(b) and (c) which appears to have been committed in or in relation
E to a proceeding in that court such court may make a complaint thereof and
forward tbe same to a Magistrate First Class.

The prosecution alleged that in an application for release of a person
arrested under the Bombay Prohibition .Act on bail accused no. 2 identified
the surety and that he attested the bail application. Accused no. 3 was the
scribe of the bail application and the affidavit accompanying it. The Magistrate
F ordered his release on bail.

The case was transferred to another judicial magistrate who, when' the
accused failed to appear before him on the elate of hearing, i~sued notice to
tbe surety. The person to whom the no1tice was issued (the purported surety)
appeared before the Magistrate and stated that he had never stood surety in
the case, nor had he ever made an affidavit nor signed any papers in this,
G regard and being a literate person there was no question of putting his thumb
impression on the affidavit and bail bond.

· Accused no. 1 who was later named by accused no. 2 ~s the real surety
admitted before the trial Magistrate that the bail application and the affidavit
had been thumb marked by him at the instance of accused no. 2 and that
he had no knowledge about the contents either of the application or of the
H affidavit. The Magistrate made a complaint to the judi)!ial Magistrate, First
Class for prosecution of the three accused for the offences under sections 205,
419, 465, 467 and 471 IPC. On finding that there was a prima facie case
against all the accused the Magistrate committed them for trial.
MAHARASHTRA V. S. K. HANNU 695

The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted accused no. 3 but found accused A
no. 1 guilty·of offence under sections 205, 419, 465 and 471 I.P.C. and accused
no. 2 for offences under section 205 read with sections 109, 419, 465 and 471
read with section 109 I.P.C. and sentenced them variously.
On appeal by accused nos. 2 and 3 the High Court held that the proceed-
ings before the transferee Magistrate were not the same proceedings or conti-
nuation of the same proceedings which were before the previous court in
which or in relation to which the offence was committed within the meaning
B
of section 476 read with section ·195, Cr.P.C. and that such a complaint could
have been made only by the magistrate who released the accused on bail prior
to the initiation of the case or his successor in office in that court but since
the transferee Magistrate was not the successor in office of the Magistrate grant-
ing the bail, the proceedings before the committing Magistrate were without
jurisdiction.
c·
Allowing the appeals,
HELD : 1. The High Court was not right in holding that the bail proceed-
ings before the 'first' Magistrate were "distinct and different" from those initiated,
i on police challan before the transferee Court and that, therefore, the latter was
I
not competent to hold a preliminary inquiry under section 476 Cr.P.C. and/ or
to make a complaint for prosecuion' of the respondents in respect of offences
under sections 205, 419, 465, 467 and 471 IPC. [706A-C]. D
,
2. An offence under section 205 I.P.C. will fall within the ambit of
clause (b) and an offence under section 471 IPC, will fall under clause (c)
of section 195(1). The words "in or in relation to" occurring in clause (b)
are not repeated in clause (c). But these words occur in section 476 both
with reference to clause (b) and cfause (c) of section 195(1). [701B].
3. The settled position on the interpretation of these provisions is that the E
bar in section 195(1)(b) does not apply if there is no proceeding in any· court
at all when the offence mentioned in section 195(1) had been committed. In
other words, the section contemplates only proceedings pending or concluded
and not in c<;>ntemplation. [701 HJ.
In the instant case, the forged bail-bond and the false affidavit were pre-
sented in bail proceedings before the 'first' Magistrate. That Magistrate had
jurisdiction to try the case which was then under investigation. While consider- F
ing a bail application of a person accused of an offence under investigation
of the police, the Magistrate acts as a court, the proceedings in the bail appli-
cation being judicial proceedings. [702B].
Kamalapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 777 relied on.
4. The bail proceedings before the 'first' Court could not be viewed in
isolation but had to be taken as a stage in and part of the entire judicial G
process, the ·second stage of which commenced on presentation of the challan
by the police in the court of the magistrate for an enquiry or trial of the
accused person to whom the bail had been granted. [702G].
5. The very terms of the bail bond in the instant case show that they
were intended to be a preliminary part of the proceedings of inquiry or trial
before the magistrate commencing with the presentation of a charge-sheet under
section 173 Cr.P.C. against the accused. This being the real position, the bail H
proceedings before the 'first' magistrate and the subsequent proceedings before
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A' the transferee magistrate commencing with the presentation of the challan by
the police for the prosecution of the accused in th~ prohibition· case c0uld'
not be viewed as distinct and different proceedings but as stages in and p~rts
of the same judicial process. Neither the time lag between the order of bait
and the challan, nor the fact that on presentation of tho challan, the case
was not marked to the 'first' Magistrate but was transferred under section 192.
of the Code to the transferee magistmte~ would make any difference to the
B earlier and subsequent proceedings being parts or stages of the same integral
whole. If the earlier proceedings before the 'first' court and the subsequent
proceedings befor~ the transferee court were stages in or parts of the one and.
the same process, then it logically follows that the aforesaid offences could be
said to have been committed "in or in relation to" the proceedings in the
Court of the transferee Magistrate also, for the purpose of taking action under
section 476 of the Code. [7030-H].
c 6. The rationale behind decided cases is that if the two proceedings,
one in which the offence was committed and the other, the fi!!al proceedings
in the same or a transferee court are, in substance, different stages of the
same integrated judicial process, the offence can be said to have been com-
mitted "in relation to" the proceedings before the Court to which the case
was subsequently transferred or which finally tried the case. By the same
\
token, the offences under sections 205 and 471 Penal Code in t!le present case
D can be vi~wed as hning been committed "in relation to" the proceedings before
the court of transferee magistrate to whom the case was transferred for disposal.
Therefore, the transferee magistrate was competent to make a complaint in
respect of the offences, after conducting a preliminary inquiry under section 476,
a .P.C. [704F·H].
In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the bail proceedings before
E the 'first' magistrate were judicial procec~dings before a court, although such
proceedings t.ook place at a stage when the offence against the accused, who
was bailed out, was under police investigation. [705G].
Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., A.I.R. 1972 S.C.
2639 distinguished. ·

F CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
282-283 of 1974.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19-4-1973 of the Bombay
High Court (Nagpur Bench) Nagpur in Criminal Appeal Nos. 216
and 243 of 1971.
G J. L. Nain and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.
J. C. Batra (Amicus Curiae) for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.-These two appeals by the State of Maharashtra are
H directed against a common judgment, dated April 19, 1973, of the
High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur. Both will be dis-
posed of by this judgment. They arise out of these facts :
MAHARASHTRA v. SK. BANNU (Sarkaria, l.) 697

Three persons, namely, Shankar, Sk. Bannu and Mohamad A
Nazir were tried for offences punishable under Sections 205, 419,
465, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, on the basis of a com-
plaint made on August 12, 1978 by Shri R. K. Karandikar, Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Akola, under Section 476 read with Section
195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sk. Bannu, accused 2
was, at the relevant time, serving as a Clerk to an Advocate at B
Akola. Mohamad Nazir, accused 3, is the son of Sk. Bannu.
Accused 1, Shankar, was a milkman residing at Dabki Road, Akola.

On October 25, 1968, in respect of offences under Section
85(1)(2) and (3) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, one Deolal Kishan
was arrested. He was produced before Shri L. G. Deshpande, Judi- c
•• cial Magistrate (First Class), Akola, and was remanded to custody
tHI November 2, 1968.
Ort November 1, 1968, an application was made before that
Court for releasing Deolal Kishan. Along with· that application, an
affidavit was filed which purported to have been sworn by one
Gulabrao Rupchand Tikar as a surety. This affidavit was sworn D
before the Senior Clerk (P.W. 2) and accused 2, Sk. Bannu is alleged
to have identified him as Gulabrao and attested that appli:cation for
this purpose. The Senior Clerk accordingly accepted what they
stated and he made the necessary endorsement on the affidavii. Thus,
on the basis of that affidavit, Deolal Kishan was released on bail on
November 1, 1968. The Bail Application and the affidavit were E

, scribed by accused 3.

The case against Deolal Kishan was transferred on April 20,
1969 to the Court of Mr. Karandikar, Judicial Magistrate (First
Class), Akola, before whom it came up for hearing on May 12,
1969. On that date, Deolal Kishan did not appear. Consequently, E
the Court issued a non-bailable warrant against him for his arrest
and production. Notice was also issued to the surety, Gulabrao Rupe
chand Tikar (P.W.3). Gulabrao appeared before the Magistrate on.
June 2, 1969 in response to the notice and filed a reply in writing
(Ex. 25 I A) contending that he had never stood as surety for the
accused Deolal Kishan; and that he did not make any affidavit, nor
did he sign the application or the affidavit or the bail bond. Accord-
ing to him, he was literate and could sign his name, while the
application and the affidavit, in question, bore thumb-impressions of
the surety. Gulabrao denied that he swore any affidavit for standing
surety of Deolal Kishan. Thereupon, the Magistrate recorded the
statement of Gulabrao and initiated an inquiry. He called Mohd. H
3-645 S. C. India/SO
698 SUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A Nazir, accused 3, the scribe of the bail application, and recorded his
statement. He also called accused 2, Sk. Bannu, and directed him
to produce the real surety on June 10, 1969 as the Magistrate was
satrsfied on the inquiry made by him that ,the person named in the ~
bail application as the surety was not the real surety.

B On November 9, accused 3, Mohd. Nazir, made an application
to the Magistrate on behalf of his father, accused 2, that the real
name of the surety was Shankar Kishan Kawitkar. Thereupon, the
Magistrate, on June 10, 1969, issued summons to accused 1, Shankar
Kishan Kawitkar. The latter appeared in response to the. summons
on June 17, 1969. The Magistrate :recorded his statement (Ex. 29), ,
c in which he admitted that the bail application and the affidavit had
been thumb-marked .by him at the instance of accused 2, and that he
had no knowledge about the contents of the application and the •·
affidavit.
On the preceding facts, the Magistrate made a complaint to the
D Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Akola, for prosecution of the three
accused persons in respect of the aforesaid offences. 111e complaint
came up before Shri P. N. Panchawadkar, Judicial Magistrate, who
after holding an inquiry under Section 207 A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, recorded the evidence of the material witnesses and find-
ing that there was a prim a facie case against all the accused. Accord-
E ingly, he committed them for trial to the Court of Sessi:on.
The case came up for trial before the Additional Sessions Judge,
who, after recording the prosecution evidence, came to the conclusion ~
that there was no case against a1:cused 3 and acquitted him. He
found that accused 1, Shankar was guilty of an offence under Section
205 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted him under that Section
F
and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonmel]t for ,three years
and a fine of Rs. 1,000, or, in default of payment of fine, to six
months further rigorous imprisonment. Accused 1 was further con-
victed in respeat of offences under Sections 419, 465 and 471, Penal
Code, and was sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment on
each count, with a .direction that the sentences on all .the counts,
would run concurrently. Accused 2, Sk. Bannu was convicted under
Section 205 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and -,,...
sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonme~t and a fine of
Rs. 1,000, or, in default!, to suffer six montll's further rigorous
imprisonment. He was further found guilty of the offences under
H Sections 419, 465. and 471 all read wi:th Section 109, Penal Code,
and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment on each count,
with a direction that the sentenci;:s would run concurrently.

•
1
MAHARASHTRA v. SK; BANNU (Sarkaria, J.) 699.

Against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, A
Shankar and Sk. Bannu preferred an appeal before the High Court.
The High Court held that the proceedings before Shri Karandikar
:are not the same proceedings or continuation of the same proceeding
which was before Shri L. G. Deshpande, the previous court, in which
<>r in relation to which the offence is said to have been committed
within the meaning of Section 476 read with Sec.ron 195,. Criminal B
Procedure Code; that the investigation stage is quite a dtl;tirict pro-
<:eeding than the one which came to be transferred on the file of Shri
Karandikar, it being a regular trial. In this view of the matter, the
High Court concluded :
"We are of the view that such a complaint could have only
been made by. Mr. L. G. Deshpande who had released the
' c
accused on -bail prior to the initiation of the case or his succes·-
sor-in-office in that Court. So far as these proceedings in which
the accused were released on bail by Mr. L. G. Deshpande are
concerned, Mr. Karandikar cannot be said to be the successor-
in-office of Mr. L. G. Deshpande."
D
On this reasoning, the High Court held that the complete proceedings
before the Committing Magistrate were without jurisdiction, and by
a writ quashed the same. In the result, the appeals of Shankar and
Sk. Bannu were allowed and their convictions were set aside. The
High Court, however, granted a certificate under Article 134 of the
Constitution that the case was fit for appeal to this Court. E

The question that falls for consideration in this case is·, whether
Shri Karandikar, Jucjicial Magistrate who made the complaint for
prosecution of the accused in respect of offences under Sections 205,
419, 465, 467 and 471, Penal Code, was competent to initiate the
proceedings within the meaning of Section 195 read with Section 476 F
<>f the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The relevant provisions
-0f that Code are as under :
"S. 195 (1) No Court shall take cognizance-
(a) ..................... .
(b) of any offence punishable under any of the follow-
G
ing sections of the same Code, namely, Ss. 19J, .194, 195,
196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228,
when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or
in relatron to any proceedings in any Court, except on the
complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court
.to which such Court is subordinate; or H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A (c) of any offence described in Sectfon 463 or puni-
shable under Section 471, Se1:tion 475 or Section 476 of the
same Code, when such offence is alleged to have beett
committed by a party to any 'proceeding in any Court in
respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such
proceeding except on tl1e complaint in writing of such Court,
B or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate..
(2) In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term
"Court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does
not include a Registrar or Sub-Registn1r under the Indian Regis-
tration Act, 1877.
c (3) For the purposes of this section, a· Court shall be
deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals orlii-
narily He from the appealable decrees or sentences of such
former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose
decrees no appeal ordinarily Hes tdc-the principal Court havin~
ordinary original civil jurisdictio~ within the local limits of
D whose jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate :
Provided-
( a) where appeals lie to more than one Court; the
appeallate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to.
which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; and·
E
(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue
Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the
Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case
or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alle-
ged to have been committed ..''
F The material part of Section 476 of the Code of 1898 is as.
follows:-
"S. 476. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195.-
(1) When any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, is, whether 011
application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion
G that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry
should be made into any offence referred to in Section 195, sub-
section (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been.
committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such:
Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks.
necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint
H thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court,
and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the First Class.
having jurisdiction ...........•.•..•••••••••• "
MAHARASHTRA v. SK. BANNU (Sarkaria, J.) ·101

-Section 476A gives powers to the superior court to complain A
when the subordinate court has omitted to do so.
It may be noted that an offence under Section 205, Penal Code,
as in the present case, will fall within the ambit of clause (b) and an
offence under Section 471, Penal Code will fall under clause (c) of
-sub-section (1) of Section 195. The words "in or in relation to" B
which occur in clause (b) are not repeated in clause (c). But these
words occur in Section 476 both with reference to clause (b) and
clause (c) of Section 195(1). The interpretation of these words is
not res integra. There was a conflict of judicial opinion in regard to the
meaning and ambit of these words. One line of decisions tookI the
view that the words "in relation to" are vide enough to cover- a pro- O
-ceeding in contemplation though i1 may not have begun at the date
of the commission of the offence, but was subsequently instituted in
court. This view is no longer good law in view of the pronouncement
of this Court in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur(1). That case related to -
the commission of an offence under Section 211, Indian Penal Code.
The question was whether the expression "in or in relation to", D
according to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 is applicable
to cases where there can even in future be a proceeding in any court
in relation to which the offence under Section 211, Indian Penal
Code may be alleged to have been committed. The Court answered
this question in the negative, with these observations :
"When examining the question whether there Is' any pro- E
·ceeding in any court there are three situations that can be envi-
s·aged. One is that there may be no proceeding in any court at
all. The second is that a proceeding in a court may actually be
pending at the point of time when cognizance is sought to be taken
of the offence under s. 211, I.P .C. The third is that, though there
may be no proceeding pending in any court in which or in relation F
to which the offence under s. 211, I.P.C. could have been commit-
ted, there may have been a proceeding which had already con-
cluded and the offence under s. 211 may be alleged to have been
committed in, or in relation to, that proceeding. It seems to us
that in both the latter two circumstances envisaged above, the
bar to taking cognizance under s.195(1)(b) would come into G
operation."

Now, thus, the settled position is that the bar in Section
195 ( 1) (b) does not apply if there is no proceeding in any court at
all when the offence mentioned in the aforesaid clause ( 1) has been
(I) A.LR. 1967 S. C. '528. H
702 SUPR:EME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A committed. In other words, the Section contemplates only the pro-
ceedings pending or concluded and not in contemplation.
In ·the instant case, it is common ground that ithe forged bail-
bond and the false affidavit were presented in the court of Shri Desh-
pande, Magistrate in bail proceedings. Shri Deshpande, it is not
B disputed before us, had also the jurisdiction to try the case which
was then under investigation with the police. While considering a
:bail application of a person accused of an offence under investigation
of the police, the Magistrate acts as a 'court', the proceedings in the
bail application being judicial proceedings. This position has been
clarified recently by this Court in Kamalapati Trivedi v. State of West
c Benga/(1). I:t was held by this Court (per majority) that while
deciding the question of bail, the Magistrate cannO't but be
regarded as a Court acting judicially, notwithstanding the fact that
an offence o.f the accused is still under investigation by the police or
has progressed to the stage of an inquiry or trial by the Magistrate.
It was added •tfo1t the taking of cognizance o.f any offence by a
Magistrate under Section 190 is not a condition precedent for him
D
to be regarded as a Court. It was further explained that an order
of bail passed by a Magistrate, also, decides the rights of the State
and the accused and is made by the Magistrate' after the application
of his mind and therefore in the discharge of his judicial duties whiclz
factor constitutes it an act of a Court. It was further observed :
E " .. all orders passed by a Magistrate acting judicially (such
as orders of bail and those passed under sub-section (3) of
s. ,183 of the Code discharging an accused or orders taking cog-
nizance of the offence complained of) are parts of an integral
whole which may end with a definitive judgment after an inquiry
or a trial, or earlier according to the exigencies of the situation
F obtaining at a particular stage, and which involves, if need be,
the adducing of evidence and the decision of 1ihe Magistrate on
an appreciation thereof. They cannot be viewed in isolation and
given a character different from the entire judicial process of
which they are intended to form a part."
Considered in the light of the above enunciation in Kamalapati
G Trivedi' s case, the bail proceedings before the Court of the Magis-
trate, Shri Deshpande could not be viewed in isolation but had to
be taken as a stage in and part of the entire judicial process the second
stage of which commenced on presentation af the challan by the
Police in the Court of the Magistrate for an enquiry or trial of the
H (I) A.LR. 1979 S. c. 777.
MAHARASHTRA v. SK. BANNU (Sarkaria, J.) 703

accused person to whom ·the bail had been granted. Indeed, the surety- A
bond, which is alleged to have been forged in the name of Gulabrao
Roopchand Tikar, in terms, was intended to be used for procuring
the attendance of the accused, by the Court before whom the charge-
sheet under Section 173, Cr.P.C. might be presented by the Police
for inquiry or trial. The material part of the surety-bond dated Novem-
ber 1, 1968, rendered into English, reads as under :

"I undertake that the said Deolal Kishan, Maratha, shall be
present before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate. First Class,
Akola, or, ............ before any other Magistrate conduct-
ing the preliminary inquiry . . . . . . . . . . to answer the charges,
"and on his failure to do so, I do hereby bind myself to pay the
sum of Rs. 500/- to the Government by way of fine."

Under the terms of the Personal Bond, accompanying the surety bond,
also, the execu'tant had undertaken to, appear before the Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Akola or before any other Magistrate who
would hold an inquiry into or trial of charges framed against him. D
In other words, the very terms of these bail~bonds show thiit they were
intended to be a preliminary part of the proceedings of inquiry or
trial before .the Magist,rate commencing with the presentation of a
charge-sheet under Section 173, Cr.P.C. agains.t the accused. This
being the real position, the bail proceedings before Shri Deshpande,
and the subsequent proceedings before Shri Karandikar commencing E
with the presentation of the cha.Jlan by the Police for the prosecution
of Deofal Kishan, could not be viewed as distinct and different pro-
ceedings but as stages in and parts of the same judicial process. Neither
the time-lag between the order of bail and the cha.Uan, nor the fact
that on presentation of the challan. the case was not marked to Shri
'Deshpande but was transferred under Section 192 of the Code, to F
Shri Karandikar, would make any difference to the earlier and sub-
sequent proceedings being parts or stages of the same integral whole.
Indeed, the commission of the offences under Sections 205, 419, 465,
467 and 471, Penal Code, came to light only when Shri Karandikar,
on the basis of t:he forged surety-bond in question, attempted to pro-
cure the attendance of the accused. If the earlier proceedings before G
Shri Deshpande and the subsequent proceedings before Shri Karandi-
kar were stages in or parts of the one and the same process-as we
bold they were-then it logically follows that the aforesaid offences
could be said to have. been committed "in or in relation to" the
proceedings in the Court of Shri Karandikar, also, fror the purpose of
taking action under Section 476 of the Code. H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A In Behari Lal v. Sheikh Abdul Qadir Hamyari(1), ii was held
by the High Cotmt of Lahore that if a case or proceeding in which
the .offence is committed has been before various courts, all the courts
have the jurisdiction to complain, but normally, the court which
finally tried the case would be the proper court to make a complaint.
The Calcutta High Court in· Bhiku's( 2 ) case, held that if a false
B complaint made to a Magistrate is transferred under Section 192 of
t:he Code of Criminal Procedure to another Magistrate, the latter
who had seisin of the case, can make a complaint.
In Maromma & Ors. v. Emperor( 3 ), it was held by the High
Court of Madras that a false statement made during police investigation
c before a Magistrate and recorded by him under Section 164, Cr. P.C.
regarding an offence of murder, which is triable only by a Sessions
Court, must be held to be "in relation to" the trial in that Coun
and a complaint can be made for the prosecution of the persons
giving that1 false statement for an offence under Section 193, Penal
Code, by the Sessions Court. Similarly, in Athi Ambalayaran & Ors.
D v. Emperor(~), a Division Bench (consisiting of Waller & Pandalai
JJ.) held that a statement made by a witness at the preliminary en-
quiry leading up to the trial in the Sessions Court is to be regarded as
having been "in relation to" the subsequent proceedings in the
Sessions Court. Consequently, the Sessions Judge has jurisdiction
to direct prosecution of the person making that false statement even
E if he finds that the statement made before the Committal Court of
,the Magistrate, was false.

The rntionale behind these decisions is that if the two proc_ee-
dings, one in which the offence is committed and the other, the ·
:Bnal proceedings, in the same or a transferee court are, in substance,
F different stages of the same integrated judicial process, the
offence can be said to have been committed "in relation
to" the proceedings before the Court to whom the case was subse-
quently transferred or which finally tried the case. By the same token,
the offences under Sections 205 and 471, Penal Code, in the present
G case can be viewed as having been committed "in relation to " the
proceedings before the Court of Shri Karandikar to whom the case
was transferred for disposal. Thus considered, Shri Karandikar was
competent to make a complaint in respect of the aforesaid offences.
after conducting a preliminary inquiry under Section 476, Cr. P.C.
(l) A.LR. 1940 Lahore 292.
H (2) I.LR. 39 Cal. 104 J.
(3) A.LR. 1933 Mad. 125.
(4) A.LR. 1932 Mad. 494.
MAHARASHTRA v. SK. BANNU (Sarkaria, J.) 705

Before concluding, we think it necessary to notice and distin- A
guish the decision of this Court in Nirmaljii Singh Hoon v. The Srate
of West Bengal & Ors.( 1 ) In that case, the complaint was filed before
the Chief Presidency Magistrate in respect of a cognizable offence of
criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Magistrate without taking
cognizance of the case, sent that complaint under Section 156(3) of
the Code to the police for investigation. During that investigation or B
inquiry by the police, the alleged forged receipt was produced by
the accused. It was held that it could not be argued that this forged
document was produced in a proceeding before the Court of Chief
Presidency Magistrate, although the forged document formed part of
\ the record of the case which went to the Chief Presidency Magistrate c
together with the report of the police. The reason for so holding was
that investigation ordered by a Magistrate under Section 15 6 ( 3) is
an investigation made by a police officer in his statutory right under
~ub-sections (1) and (2). Moreover, the Magistrate ~ending
such a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) cannot be
said to have taken cognizance of the offence, and no proceeding could D
be ~aid to have been commenced before him, of which the inquiry
by the police could be said to be part and parcel. Further, it cannot
be said that the police officer acting under Section 156(3) was a dele-
gate of Chief Presi:dency Magistrate or that the investigation by him
was an investigation by or on behalf of the Magistrate. On these
E
premises, the Court held that the production of the forged receipt
in the course of such an investigation was not production in a pro-
ceeding before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, so as to attract the
ban under Section 195(1)(c).
In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the bail pro-
F
ceedings before Shri Deshpande were judicial proceedings before a
court, although such proceedings took place at a stage when the
offence against the accused, who was bailed out, was under police
investigation. Thus, the facts in Nirmaljit S{ngh's case were mate-
rially different. The ratio of that decision, therefore, has no appli-
cation to the case before us. G
For all the foregoing reasons, we are unable to agree with the
High Court that the bail proceedings before Shri Deshpande were
"distinct and different" from those which were initiated on police
challan in the Court of Shri Karandikar and, therefore, the latter
was not competent to hold a preliminary inquiry under Section 476,
H
(I) A.LR. 1972 S. C. 2639.
70€; SUPREME COURT REPORTS l1981] 1 S.C.R ..

A Cr. P.C. and/or to make a complaint for prosecution of the respon-
dents, herein, in respect of the offences under Sections 205, 419,
465, 467 and 471, Penal Code. We, therefore, allow this appeal set '
aside the impugned judgment and send the case back to the High
Court with the direction that it should restore the app'ea!s of Sk. Bannrr .
B and Shankar to their original numben and after hearing the parties,
decide the same afresh on merits, according to law.

P.B.R. Appeals allowed~

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