Holding

The writ petition was not maintainable due to constructive res judicata, concealment of material facts, and the respondents' unreasonable delay, and no relief could be granted.

Summary

The respondents claimed ownership of land that had been recorded in the 1962 Record of Rights and later allotted to the Reserve Bank of India. They appealed to the Settlement Officer in 1990, filed a civil suit in 2003 (withdrawn in 2007 without permission to re‑file), and finally filed a writ petition in 2008 seeking an alternative plot. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata, the respondents' concealment of material facts, and the inordinate delay of 46 years in challenging the finalised record of rights. It also ruled that inter‑departmental notings do not constitute a government order. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and dismissed the writ petition, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

The effect of delay and laches in availing remedies against the final publication of the record of rights.
Whether a writ petition is maintainable when a civil suit for the same relief was withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh suit and material facts were concealed.
Whether a party can rely on inter‑departmental notings in government files without a communicated order.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 23 Rule 1
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 181, s. 182
Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, 1958s. 12, s. 15(b)
Right to Information Act, 2005

Subjects

delaylachesconstructive res judicatawrit petitionrecord of rightsadverse possessiongovernment notingsclean handscivil suit withdrawalArticle 226Section 12Section 15(b)Orissa Survey and Settlement Act

Judgment

[2023] 10 S.C.R. 1049 : 2023 INSC 619 1049

STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. A
v.
LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) THR. LRS & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8072 of 2010)
JULY 12, 2023 B
[ABHAY S. OKA AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.]
Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, 1958 : ss. 12, 15(b) – Final
publication of record of rights – Revision of record of rights –
Respondent claimed to have right over certain land – Record of
C
rights finalised in the year 1962 – Appeal by the respondents before
the Settlement Officer in the year 1990 – Though appeal was not
maintainable, however, the Settlement officer decided the same and
directed the respondent to raise their claim before the General
Administrative Department-GAD – Till then, said land already
allotted to Reserve Bank of India-RBI by the GAD – Respondents D
alleged non-consideration of their objections during the course of
settlement – After thirteen years, the respondent filed suit claiming
ownership on the basis of adverse possession – However, suit
dismissed as withdrawn without granting liberty to file fresh suit –
Writ petition by the respondents challenging the allotment of land
E
to RBI, claiming allotment of land equivalent to the land given to
RBI – Disposal of the writ petition without granting any relief –
However, the Division Bench set aside the record of right finalised
in 1962 and directed to allot a suitable plot in exchange of stitiban
land of the respondent – On appeal held: There was huge delay on
the part of the respondents to avail the appropriate remedy – Writ F
petition, which is the subject matter of dispute, was filed after 46
years of the finalisation of record of rights, which was highly belated
– Thus, respondents not entitled to any relief.
Writ petition: Maintainability of, when the civil suit filed for
same relief was withdrawn without liberty to file fresh one and G
concealment of material facts from the Court – Held: On the
application of principle of constructive res judicata, the writ petition
filed by the respondents after withdrawal of the civil suit was not
maintainable as no liberty was granted – In case still filing of writ
petition was to be justified, at least complete facts need to be
H
1049
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A disclosed for the purpose, which were missing – In the writ petition
there was no mention regarding filing of civil suit earlier for the
same relief and withdrawal thereof – A litigant can be non-suited in
case he is found guilty of concealing material facts from the court
or mis-stating the same – Thus, the respondents not entitled to any
relief.
B
Delay and laches: Final publication of record of rights – Delay
in availing the remedies thereagainst – Writ petition to claim relief
filed after 46 years of finalisation of record of rights – Entitlement
to relief – Held: Not entitled – There was huge delay on the part of
the respondents to avail of the appropriate remedy against the final
C publication of record of rights.
Government orders: Inter-departmental communications –
Official notings in the file – Reliance upon – Held: Inter-
departmental communications are merely in the process of
consideration for an appropriate decision – Reliance cannot be
D placed upon as a basis to claim any right – Mere notings in the file
do not amount to an order unless it is communicated to a party,
thus, no right accrues – On facts, no order passed by the Government
and conveyed to the party for allotment of any land, thus, no relief
admissible to them solely relying on the official notings.
E Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 There is a huge delay on the part of the
respondents to avail of their appropriate remedy against the final
publication of record of rights. Hence, the respondents are not
entitled to any relief. [Para 54(i)][1082-A]
F
1.2 On the application of principle of constructive res
judicata, the writ petition filed by the respondents after withdrawal
of the civil suit was not maintainable as no liberty was granted. In
case still filing of writ petition was to be justified, at least complete
facts need to be disclosed for the purpose, which were missing.
G In the writ petition there was no mention regarding filing of civil
suit earlier for the same relief and withdrawal thereof. A litigant
can be non–suited in case he is found guilty of concealing material
facts from the court or mis–stating the same. Hence,
the respondents are not entitled to any relief. [Para 54(ii)]
[1082-B-C]
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1051
THR. LRS & ORS.

1.3 There was no order passed by the Government and A
conveyed to the respondents for allotment of any land in their
favour. Hence, the respondents are not entitled to any relief solely
based on the official notings. [Para 54 (iii)][1082-D]
Effect of delay and laches in availing the remedies against
the final publication of record of rights B
2. It is evident that there is huge delay on the part of the
respondents to avail of their appropriate remedy. Record of rights
was finalised in the year 1962. As admitted in the writ petition,
objections were filed by the respondents or their predecessors–
in–interest before that. Remedy, after publication of final record C
of rights, was revision under Section 15(b) of the Orissa Survey
and Settlement Act, 1958 to be filed within one year. No remedy
was availed of. Nearly three decades after finalisation of record
of rights, application was filed before the Settlement Officer, which
was not maintainable after final record of rights is published. When
no relief was granted by the Settlement Officer, the respondents D
kept quite for 13 years before filing a civil suit in the year 2003.
It was dismissed as withdrawn in the year 2007. The writ petition
was filed in the year 2008, which is subject matter of dispute in
the instant appeal. The said facts show that the writ petition to
claim relief was filed after 46 years of finalisation of record of E
rights, which was highly belated. Hence, the respondents were
not entitled to any relief. [Para 34][1070-C-E]
Maintainability of writ petition when the civil suit filed for
same relief was withdrawn without liberty to file fresh one and on
the concealment of material facts from the Court F
3.1 Having regard to the principles laid down in M.J.
Exporters Private Limited’s case, applying the principles of
constructive res judicata, the instant writ petition filed by the
respondents af ter withdrawal of the civil suit, was not
maintainable, in the sense that it ought not to have been G
entertained. In case the respondents still wanted to justify filing
of the writ petition, they should have at least disclosed
complete facts and then justify filing of the writ petition.
[Para 38][1072-A-B]

H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 3.2 The writ petition also ought to be dismissed on the
ground of concealment of material facts regarding filing and
withdrawal of the civil suit claiming the same relief. Neither in
the writ petition nor in the appeal against the order passed in the
writ petition, the respondents disclosed the filing of civil suit and
B withdrawal thereof. It only transpired only that at the time of the
hearing of the appeal. [Para 39][1072-C]
3.3 As to how a litigant who conceals material facts from
the Court has to be dealt with, has been gone into by this Court,
time and again and the consistent opinion is that, he is not entitled
C even to be heard on merits. [Para 40][1072-D]
3.4 If the case of the respondents is considered on factual
material, it is evident that the respondents waived off their right
to challenge the record of rights which stood finalised way back
in the year 1962 and till date there has been no challenge made
D to the same. Indirectly relief was sought by filing appeal before
the Settlement Officer, which was not maintainable; civil suit which
was ultimately withdrawn and then filed the writ petition and
thereafter writ appeal which is the subject–matter of the present
proceedings. [Para 50][1077-G-H]
E Whether a party can rely on notings in the Government file
without having communication of any order on the basis thereof
4. In inter-departmental communications are merely in the
process of consideration for an appropriate decision. These cannot
be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. Mere notings in the
F file do not amount to an order unless an order is communicated
to a party, thus, no right accrues.On facts,there is no order passed
by the Government and conveyed to the respondents for allotment
of any land, hence, no relief was admissible to them only relying
on the official notings. [Paras 51 and 53][1078-B-C; 1081-G]
G 5. The order passed by the High Court is set aside,
consequently the writ petition filed by the respondents is
dismissed. [Para 55][1082-F]
M.J. Exporters Private Limited v. Union of India and
others (2021) 13 SCC 543; Mahadeo and others v.
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1053
THR. LRS & ORS.

Sovan Devi and others (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1118 – A
relied on.
Abdulla Kabir v. Md. Nasiruddin (1989) 2 SCC 361 :
[1989] 1 SCR 396; P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil
Nadu (1975) 1 SCC 152 : [1975] 2 SCR 356; New
Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others (2007) B
9 SCC 278 : [2007] 3 SCR 711; State of Uttaranchal
and another v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others (2013) 12 SCC 179 : [2013] 9 SCR 609;
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board and others v. T. T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC
108 : [2014] 1 SCR 987; State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. C
R. K. Zalpuri and others (2015) 15 SCC 602 : [2015]
12 SCR 285; Union of India and others v. Chaman
Rana (2018) 5 SCC 798 : [2018] 3 SCR 640; Senior
Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of
India Ltd. and others v. Shree Lal Meena (2019) 4 SCC
D
479 : [2019] 5 SCR 391; Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and
others v. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 411 :
[2020] 2 SCR 597; Union of India and others vs. N.
Murugesan and others (2022) 2 SCC 25; Abhyudya
Sanstha Vs. Union of India and others (2011) 6 SCC
145 : [2011] 7 SCR 611; Hari Narain v. Badri Das E
AIR 1963 SC 1558 : [1964] SCR 203; G.
Narayanaswamy Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and another v.
Govt. of Karnataka and another (1991) 3 SCC 261 :
[1991] 2 SCR 563; Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and others (2010) 2 SCC 114 : [2009] 16 SCR 111;
Moti Lal Songara Vs. Prem Prakash @ Pappu and F
another (2013) 9 SCC 199 : [2013] 6 SCR 496; ABCD
Vs. Union of India and others (2020) 2 SCC 52 : [2019]
15 SCR 1; Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995)
1 SCC 421 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 465; K.D. Sharma
Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and others (2008) G
12 SCC 481 : [2008] 10 SCR 454; Dhananjay Sharma
vs. State of Haryana and others (1995) 3 SCC 757 :
[1995] 3 SCR 964; Municipal Committee, Barwala,
District Hisar, Haryana through its Secretary/President
v. Jai Narayan and Company and another 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 376 – referred to. H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
[1989] 1 SCR 396 referred to Para 2
[1975] 2 SCR 356 referred to Para 24
[2007] 3 SCR 711 referred to Para 25
B [2013] 9 SCR 609 referred to Para 26
[2014] 1 SCR 987 referred to Para 27
[2015] 12 SCR 285 referred to Para 28
[2018] 3 SCR 640 referred to Para 29
C
[2019] 5 SCR 391 referred to Para 30
[2020] 2 SCR 597 referred to Para 31
(2022) 2 SCC 25 referred to Para 32
(2021) 13 SCC 543 relied on Para 37
D
[2011] 7 SCR 611 referred to Para 41
[1964] SCR 203 referred to Para 42
[1991] 2 SCR 563 referred to Para 42
[2009] 16 SCR 111 referred to Para 44
E
[2013] 6 SCR 496 referred to Para 45
[2019] 15 SCR 1 referred to Para 46
[1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 465 referred to Para 47

F [2008] 10 SCR 454 referred to Para 48
[1995] 3 SCR 964 referred to Para 49
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8072
of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.2009 of the High Court
G
of Orissa at Cuttack in WA No. 108 of 2009.
Shibashish Misra, Adv. for the Appellants.
Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Adv., S. K. Biswal, Azim H. Laskar, Bikas
Kar Gupta, Ms. Debarati Sadhu, Shahrukh Ali, Chandra Bhushan Prasad,
H Advs. for the Respondents.
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1055
THR. LRS & ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
RAJESH BINDAL, J.
1. The order dated October 30, 2009 passed by the Orissa High
Court in Writ Appeal No. 108/2009 is under challenge in the present
appeal. Vide aforesaid order, the order passed by the Single Judge in
W.P.(C) No. 9069 of 2008 dated 21.11.2008, was reversed. B

FACTS
2. Briefly the facts of the case available on record are that a writ
petition was filed by Laxmi Narayan Das (dead) through LRs,
Satynarayan Das, Birenchi Narayan Das (respondents herein) on C
27.6.2008 challenging the order passed by the Settlement Officer in
Settlement Appeal No. 537/90 dated 01.03.1990. The writ petition was
filed more than 18 years after the impugned order was passed. The
grievance raised was that the objections filed by the writ petitioners
during the course of settlement were not considered by the authority
concerned and the land was recorded in the name of General D
Administration Department (GAD). Liberty was granted to the writ
petitioners to file representation to the GAD. The grievance was that
the representation was filed, however, the same has not been decided.
The stand of the learned counsel for the State was also recorded that
when final record of rights was published, it was open to the writ E
petitioners to file appropriate revision application under Section 15(b) of
the Orissa Survey & Settlement Act, 1958 (for short, ‘the 1958 Act’).
The same was not filed. There is no scope for interference in the writ
jurisdiction. It was further submitted that the observation was made by
the authority in the order referred to in the writ petition that the petitioners
can make representation to the GAD against the final record of rights, if F
so advised. The writ petition was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the
same, intra court appeal was filed by the respondents. The matter was
taken in a different direction altogether. In fact, with the observations
made by the Division Bench the record of right, which was prepared
way back in the year 1962, was set aside. The direction was given for G
consideration of the representation of the appellants before the High
Court and allot them a suitable plot in exchange of their stitiban/sthitiban
land.1 It is the aforesaid order which has been impugned by the State.

1
The expression ‘Stitiban/Sthitiban’ signifies the status of a settled raiyat or homestead
of a raiyat (i.e., an agriculturist). See, Abdulla Kabir v. Md. Nasiruddin, (1989) 2 SCC H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A ARGUMENTS
3. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the record of
rights in the case in hand was finalised way back in the year 1962. The
land at that time was not in occupation of anyone rather wild bushes
were existing on the land. No objection was raised by the land owners.
B The appeal was filed in the year 1990, which was disposed of on 1.3.1990.
Since it was claimed that the land was stitiban plot, it was observed that
claim could be raised with the GAD. Accordingly, the entry in the name
of the appellant was not possible. After passing of the aforesaid order,
the respondents kept quiet. A civil suit came to be filed in the year 2003
for declaration. It was pleaded therein that 0.601 decimal of the land
C was in possession of the Reserve Bank of India (for short, ‘RBI’) where
the staff quarters had been constructed. It was on account of the allotment
thereof by the GAD. However, finally the relief sought in the suit was
that the plaintiffs therein who are the respondents herein, had become
the owners by way of adverse possession of the land, as mentioned in
D Schedule ‘B’ attached to the Suit and further a declaration was sought
that they are owners in possession of the land as mentioned in the
Schedule ‘A’ and their possession needs to be protected. This included
the land which was admittedly allotted to the Reserve Bank of India and
on which staff quarters had already been constructed. The aforesaid
suit was dismissed as withdrawn by the respondents on 28.7.2007.
E Permission was sought to file a fresh suit. However, the same was
specifically declined by the court.
4. Thereafter, the respondents filed a writ petition before the High
Court in 2008 praying for a direction to the respondents therein to record
the land in the name of the writ petitioners, which was transferred to the
F Reserve Bank of India. It was 0.518 decimals which was allotted to
Reserve Bank of India and 0.083 decimals which was allotted to someone
else from plot no. 1506 and 1507 (P), respectively of Mauza Jaidev
Vihar. A direction was also sought that in terms of the order dated 1.3.1990
passed by the Settlement Officer, the claim of the petitioner for allotment
G of an equal alternative land be considered. The land already in possession
of the writ petitioners forming part of plot no. 1474 (P) Mauza Jaidev
Vihar be considered and allotted in exchange. While filing the writ petition,

361. The expression ‘Raiyat’ is defined as an individual who acquires land primarily for
purposes of cultivation under Section 3(3)(d) of the Orissa Government Land Settlement
H Act, 1962 and Section 2(26) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960.
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1057
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

the writ petitioners were silent about the civil suit filed by them praying A
for a similar relief, which was dismissed as withdrawn without liberty to
file a fresh suit, what to talk of writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant further argued that the writ
petition was disposed of by the Single Bench while holding that there is
no scope for interference in the order of Settlement Officer, and in case B
the petitioner has any grievance, he may take appropriate steps against
the final record of rights which was prepared way back in the year
1962. The Division Bench of the High Court had gone wrong in issuing
a direction for allotment of an alternative plot in exchange of the alleged
stitiban land belonging to the respondents when their right was yet to be
established. C

6. The record of rights was prepared in the year 1962 and there
was no challenge thereto. For the first time, the respondents filed an
appeal in the year 1990 which was disposed of on 1.3.1990. Thereafter,
the respondents kept quiet for a period of more than 13 years before
they filed the suit. After the same was dismissed as withdrawn on D
28.7.2007 without any liberty to institute fresh suit, the writ petition was
filed in June 2008 claiming the same reliefs. The Division Bench of the
High Court while granting relief to the respondents has indirectly set
aside the record of rights which was prepared way back in the year
1962 without there being any challenge to the same in the writ petition. E
To that extent, the order passed by the Division Bench is totally illegal.
Unless record of rights is corrected, no right can accrue to the
respondents. In fact, the respondents were fighting a luxury litigation.
7. It is the admitted case of the respondents themselves that they
are in possession of the part of the plot number 1506, some part of
F
which was allotted to the Reserve Bank of India. Meaning thereby, that
they were aware of the developments which were taking place ever
since the record of rights was prepared. In any case, they cannot deny
filing of Settlement Appeal and thereafter civil suit and the writ petition.
In fact, it is a case of forum hunting. Without availing appropriate remedy
against the finalisation of record of rights, in case the respondents were G
having any grievance, they kept quiet for decades together, hence no
relief would be admissible to them at this stage.
8. It was further submitted that even in the appeal filed against
the order passed by the learned Single Judge, there was no mention of
the civil suit filed by the respondents and its withdrawal. It only transpired H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A at the time of hearing before the Court that there was a civil suit filed by
the respondents. However, this fact was not given due weightage by the
Division Bench and the same was just brushed aside. Otherwise, they
could not file the civil suit or the writ petition claiming the same relief.
Though it was sought to be claimed by the respondents that the matter is
pending consideration with the Government and is likely to be
B
compromised as the reason for withdrawal of the suit. However, the
learned Civil Judge had not referred to any reason as it had simpliciter
permitted the respondents to withdraw the suit without permission to file
afresh. The observation by the Division Bench that withdrawal of the
suit was with consent of both parties that the respondents will be allotted
C an alternative plot was neither here nor there.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the appeal was filed in the year 1990, raising the issue
regarding wrongful preparation of record of rights. The same was disposed
of on 1.3.1990 with the observation that the claim regarding the plot of
D land belonging to the respondents which was allotted to the Reserve
Bank of India for construction of staff quarters, representation could be
made to the GAD. Ever since then, representations were being made.
However, when nothing came out, the civil suit came to be filed. He
further submitted that the civil suit was filed with three prayers, firstly
that the plaintiffs therein be declared owners of the portion of the land in
E their possession as they had become the owners thereof by way of
adverse possession. Secondly, declaration was sought that they are the
owners in possession of the land forming part of Schedule annexed with
the suit and lastly, an injunction be issued against the defendants therein
not to interfere in their possession of the suit land. As during the pendency
F of the suit, the representations made by the petitioner therein for allotment
of alternative land against the land of the respondents which was allotted
to the Reserve Bank of India and other persons were being actively
considered by the Government therefore, the suit was withdrawn. Official
notings were recorded at different levels wherein positive notes were
prepared and opined that the respondents are entitled to allotment of
G land in lieu of the land belonging to the respondents which was allotted
to the Reserve Bank of India. However, as there was no positive result,
the respondents did not have any option but to file writ petition seeking
direction to the concerned authorities to decide their claim. The learned
Single Judge had failed to consider this issue in right spirit. However, in
H appeal, the High Court had considered the genuine claim of the
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1059
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

respondents and granted the relief. Learned counsel for the respondents A
was fair enough to state that the land in dispute is same even though the
identification numbers have changed with the passage of time in the
revenue records.
DISCUSSION
10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant B
records.
11. The case in hand is a classic case in which a litigant had been
able to mislead the courts and authorities at different levels to put life
into his stale claim.
C
12. The facts of the case having chequered history are being
summed up in the following table, for better understanding, when
elaborated in latter part of the judgment.

D

E

F

G

H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1061
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

A

B

C

D

13. From the narration of the facts, in the aforesaid table, it is
evident that the respondents including their predecessors-in-interest have E
been sleeping over their rights for decades. The process for finalisation
of record of rights must have been started much prior to 1962, as final
publication of rights was made at that time. It was stated before the
learned Single Bench, that the objections were filed before finalization
of the record of rights. If those objections were not considered at the
F
time of final publication of record of rights in terms of Section 12-B of
the 1958 Act, the appropriate remedy was to file an application before
the Board of Revenue within one year of the final publication of record
of rights under Section 12-B of the 1958 Act.
14. The record of rights was finalised way back in the year
1962. It was admitted by the respondents that a part of the same plot G
number, regarding which issue has been raised with reference to its
allotment to the Reserve Bank of India by the GAD, is in possession of
the respondents. Meaning thereby that when the record of rights was
prepared, the respondents had enough knowledge of the fact that there
is some error in the same. The claim is that the status of the property H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A in possession of the respondents was stitiban property and their
predecessors-in interest were in possession thereof. It was claimed
that there was no reason for its transfer in the name of Forest
Department.
15. Twenty-eight years after the finalisation of record of rights,
B an appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer, which was not
maintainable as that stage had been crossed. As the land was recorded
in the name of Forest Department, notice was issued to the Forest
Department. The Settlement Appeal was disposed of on 1.3.1990. It
was noticed in the order that the changed identity number of part of land
was plot number 1506/1, a part of which had already been given to the
C Reserve Bank of India for construction of staff quarters and the quarters
had been constructed thereon. It was observed in the order that in case
the same is stitiban plot, the appellant before the Settlement Officer
could raise a claim with the GAD. The prayer before the Settlement
Officer to record their names against plot number 1506 was declined.
D 16. Thereafter, the respondents slept over the matter for more
than a decade. After 13 years, a civil suit was filed in the year 2003.
Even at the time of filing of the civil suit i.e., 13 years after the disposal
of the appeal by the Settlement Officer and more than four decades
after the record of rights was finalised, the respondents did not challenge
E the final record of rights. In fact, if they had challenged, the same would
not have been maintainable. The appropriate remedy was not filing a
civil suit. Even the allotment of land to Reserve Bank of India was not
challenged.
17. It was pleaded in the civil suit that the plaintiffs therein are in
F possession of certain portion of the government land on which they are
residing since 1965, hence, they have become owners thereof by way of
adverse possession. The civil suit was filed with the following prayers: -
“(a) Let it be declared that the Plaintiffs are in peaceful continuous
and uninterrupted physical possession over ‘B’ Schedule property
G consisting of Plot No.1474 (Part) & Plot No. 1493 (Part) under
Khata No.1427 (GA) admeasuring an area of Ac.0.430 decimals
as mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ with hostile animus to the true
knowledge of Defendant and thereby perfected their title, by way
of adverse possession, since from the year 1965 for more than
statutory period.
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1063
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

(b) Let it be declared that the plaintiffs are the lawful owner in A
possession having right title and interest over ‘A’ Schedule property
and the Defendant, has no manner of right to interfere with the
peaceful possession of the Plaintiffs not only over ‘A’ schedule
property but also over ‘B’ schedule property.
(c) Let the Defendant his henchmen contractor agents and officials B
be restrained by way of permanent injunction, with direction not
to interfere or part with the possession of the Plaintiffs over Plot
No.1474 (Part) and Plot No.1493 (Part) under Khata No.1427
(GA) i.e.’B’ Schedule Property, which being amalgamated to the
plots of the Plaintiffs mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ are very much
inside the boundary of the Plaintiffs. C
(d) ……
(e) ……”
18. A perusal of the prayer (b) in the suit shows that the plaintiffs
therein had not approached the court with clean hands. On the one hand, D
it was admitted in the plaint, that part of the suit land, which is allegedly
belonging to the plaintiffs therein, had been allotted by the GAD to the
Reserve Bank of India and staff quarters had been constructed thereon
but still it was sought to be declared that the plaintiffs are owners in
possession of that portion of land and their possession need to be protected.
Furthermore, permanent injunction was also sought against the E
defendants from interfering in their possession. The Reserve Bank of
India, which was admittedly in possession of the part of the land was not
impleaded as a defendant in the suit. The aforesaid suit was dismissed
as withdrawn on 28.07.2007. The Court passed the following order:-
“This order arises out of the petition filed by the plaintiff to withdraw F
the suit.
Perused the petition, objection, plaint averment so also the W.S.
filed by the defendant.
I have already heard on the withdrawal petition from both the
G
sides.
Considering the fact and circumstances of the case, the petition
for withdrawal is party allowed.
The suit is withdrawn but no permission as sought for by the plaintiff
to file fresh suit is allowed.” H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 19. In the application for withdrawal of suit, the plaintiffs stated
that the negotiations are going on with the GAD, hence, they sought
permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file the same again.
However, no permission was granted by the Court to file fresh suit.
20. When the respondents were not able to put life to their stale
B claim, a writ petition was filed bearing W.P.(C) No. 9069 of 2008 before
the Orissa High Court. A perusal of the paper book of the writ petition
shows that there was no mention of filing of a civil suit claiming the
same relief and withdrawal thereof. Rather simpliciter a case was sought
to be made out on the basis of order dated 01.03.1990 passed in
Settlement Appeal No. 537/90 by the Settlement Officer. May be at the
C cost of repetition, it is reiterated here that even in the civil suit, the reliance
was on the aforesaid order dated 01.03.1990 passed by the Settlement
Officer. The writ petition was disposed of on 21.11.2008. The stand of
the writ petitioners was that they had filed objections during the course
of settlement of record of rights, however, still without appreciating the
D objections, the land in dispute was recorded in the name of GAD. This
statement of fact by the counsel for the writ petitioners shows that they
were aware of the finalisation of record of rights way back in the year
1962. However, still they kept quiet and did not avail of the appropriate
remedy available to them against the same, in case they were aggrieved
by it. Certain office notings which the respondents obtained under the
E Right to Information Act, 2005, have been placed on record with reference
to the allotment of alternative land in exchange. These notings were
from the year 2001 onwards. As to whether these notings confer any
right on the respondents without there being any order communicated to
the respondents, will be dealt with in the latter part of the judgment.
F 21. The Division Bench of High Court without appreciating any
of the legal issues, the delay in filing the writ petition despite knowledge
of the facts to the writ petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest, went
on to disturb the final records of rights which were finalised way back in
the year 1962. Direction was issued to consider the representation of
G the writ petitioners to allot a suitable plot of land in exchange of their
stitiban land.
22. The issues which require consideration by this Court in the
present appeal would be :
(1) Effect of delay and laches in availing the remedies against the
H final publication of record of rights.
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1065
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

(2) Maintainability of writ petition when the civil suit filed for same A
relief was withdrawn without liberty to file fresh one and on the
concealment of material facts from the Court.
(3) Whether a party can rely on notings in the Government files
without having communication of any order on the basis thereof ?
1. EFFECT OF DELAY AND LACHES IN AVAILING B
THE REMEDIES AGAINST THE FINAL
PUBLICATION OF RECORD OF RIGHTS
23. Before applying the principles laid down by this Court on delay
and laches. We deem it appropriate to refer the legal position.
C
24. In P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1
SCC 152, it was laid down that a person aggrieved by an order of
promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within
six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is
any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under
Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts D
cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time,
but it should be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to
refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the
case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for the relief.
25. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others, E
(2007) 9 SCC 278, this Court has opined that though there is no period
of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time. In the said case the respondents had filed the writ
petition after seventeen years and the court, as stated earlier, took note F
of the delay and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order passed
by the High Court which had exercised the discretionary jurisdiction.
26. In State of Uttaranchal and another v. Sri Shiv Charan
Singh Bhandari and others, (2013) 12 SCC 179, this Court, while
considering the issue regarding delay and laches observed that even if
G
there is no period prescribed for filing the writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable
time. Relief to a person, who puts forward a stale claim can certainly be
refused relief on account of delay and laches. Anyone who sleeps over
his rights is bound to suffer.
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 27. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board and others v. T. T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, this
Court opined as under:-
“13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
B Service, Amravati and others, AIR 1969 SC 329, the Court referred
to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram
Farewall, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221, which is as follows:-
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
C arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has,
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party
in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him
D if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of
E that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval, which might affect either party and cause
a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
F
15. In State of M. P. and others etc. etc. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and
others etc. etc., AIR 1987 SC 251, the Court observed that it is
well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate
writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the
High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist
G the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It
has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on
the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene
and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis
H was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1067
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated A
stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and
bring in injustice.
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear B
in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize C
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances
delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who
knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and D
inaction on the part of a litigant “a litigant who has forgotten the
basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time”
and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. ……A
court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-
who compete with `Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van E
Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve
any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should
have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.”
28. In State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. R. K. Zalpuri and
others, (2015) 15 SCC 602, this Court considered the issue regarding F
delay and laches while initiating a dispute before the Court. It was opined
that the issue sought to be raised by the petitioners therein was not
required to be addressed on merits on account of delay and laches. The
relevant paras thereof are extracted below:-
“27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to G
be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had
already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not
spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the
attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim
“Deo gratias - thanks to God”. H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding
a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim
and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale
claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would
cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise,
did not justify adjudication. It deserves to be thrown overboard at
B
the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order
of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he
could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant
present.”
29. The aforesaid view was followed by this Court in Union of
C
India and others v. Chaman Rana, (2018) 5 SCC 798.
30. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Senior
Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. and
others v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479, considering the
principle of delay and laches, opined as under:-
D
“36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent for years
together and that this Court, taking a particular view subsequently,
in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited,
(2011)12 SCC 197 would not entitle stale claims to be raised on
this behalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept
E
over the matter for almost a little over two years even after the
pronouncement of the judgment.
37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach this Court
seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a misadventure, which
is liable to be rejected, and the appeal is dismissed.”
F
31. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others v. Shyam Kishore
Singh - (2020) 3 SCC 411, the issue regarding the delay and laches
was considered by this Court while dismissing the petition filed belatedly,
seeking change in the date of birth in the service record.
G 32. The issue of delay and laches was considered by this Court in
Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and others, (2022) 2
SCC 25. Therein it was observed that a neglect on the part of a party to
do an act which law requires must stand in his way for getting the relief
or remedy. The Court laid down two essential factors i.e. first, the length
of the delay and second, the developments during the intervening period.
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1069
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

Delay in availing the remedy would amount to waiver of such right. A
Relevant paras 20 to 22 of the above mentioned case are extracted
below:
“20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence
are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However,
they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can B
say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are
species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by
name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where
acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are
common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these C
principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period
of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain
circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice
requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law.
The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one
D
of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to
be taken note of by the court.
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language
meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves
unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an E
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is
neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires
while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of
the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay F
and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would
also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching
the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum.
Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer
a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would
G
indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the
other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a
man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be
allowed to avail a remedy.”
H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 33. Finally, in paras 37 and 38, it was observed as under :
“37. We have already dealt with the principles of law that may
have a bearing on this case. … there was an unexplained and
studied reluctance to raise the issue ....
38. ….Hence, on the principle governing delay, laches …
B Respondent No. 1 ought not to have been granted any relief by
invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”.
34. If the aforesaid principles of law are applied in the facts of the
case in hand from the table of list of dates as available in para no. 12, it
is evident that there is huge delay on the part of the respondents to avail
C of their appropriate remedy. Record of rights was finalised in the year
1962. As admitted in the writ petition, objections were filed by the
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest before that. Remedy, after
publication of final record of rights, was revision under Section 15(b) of
the 1958 Act, to be filed within one year. No remedy was availed of.
D Nearly three decades after finalisation of record of rights, application
was filed before the Settlement Officer, which was not maintainable
after final record of rights is published. When no relief was granted by
the Settlement Officer, the respondents kept quite for 13 years before
filing a civil suit in the year 2003. It was dismissed as withdrawn in the
year 2007. The writ petition was filed in the year 2008, which is subject
E matter of dispute in the present appeal. The aforesaid facts show that
the writ petition to claim relief was filed after 46 years of finalisation of
record of rights, which was highly belated. Hence, the respondents were
no entitled to any relief.
2. Maintainability of writ petition when the civil suit filed
F for same relief was withdrawn without liberty to file
fresh one and on the concealment of material facts
from the Court.
35. From the facts on record, it is evident, that the respondents
had filed a civil suit in January 2003, claiming that the plaintiffs therein
G be declared owner of the land which is in their adverse possession
since 1965 as mentioned in Schedule ‘A’, annexed to the plaint. The
second prayer was that the plaintiffs therein be declared lawful owner
in possession of the land as mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ and the defendant
therein had no right to interfere with the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs. The property, as mentioned in Schedule ‘B’, included the
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1071
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

same which was the subject matter of consideration at the time of A
finalisation of record of rights. Part of which was allotted to the Reserve
Bank of India on which staff quarters had been constructed long back
as has been noticed in Order dated 01.03.1990 passed by the Settlement
Officer.
36. After withdrawal of the aforesaid suit, the writ petition was B
filed to call upon the respondents to show cause as to how the land
owned by the writ petitioners was allotted to the Reserve Bank of India.
The writ petitioners be allotted land equivalent to the same in terms of
the observation made in the order dated 01.03.1990 passed by the
Settlement Officer. Both the aforesaid prayers are co-related. In fact,
C
the real dispute started after the finalisation of the record of rights.
Reference in the writ petition was made to the order passed by the
Settlement Officer on 01.03.1990. Implementation of the aforesaid order,
by which apparently no relief was granted to the petitioner, was sought.
The fact remains that at the time of the filing of the writ petition, it was
not mentioned that the writ petitioners had already filed a civil suit claiming D
the same relief which was dismissed as withdrawn without liberty to file
fresh one for the same cause of action.
37. On the question, as to whether after the withdrawal of a suit
claiming the same relief without having permission to institute fresh one
for the same relief, a writ petition will be maintainable before the Court, E
the guidance is available from the judgment of this Court in M.J.
Exporters Private Limited v. Union of India and others (2021) 13
SCC 543, wherein the principle of constructive res judicata was applied.
The case concerns a litigant who sought to file a fresh writ petition after
withdrawal of the earlier writ petition filed for the same relief without F
permission to file fresh one. The Court held that the principles contained
in Order 23, Rule 1 CPC are applicable even in writ proceedings. Para
15 thereof is extracted below:
“15. In these circumstances, we feel that when this issue was
raised and abandoned in the first writ petition which was dismissed G
as withdrawn, the principles of constructive res judicata which
are laid down under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, and which principles are extendable to writ proceedings as
well as held by this in Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT, (1987)
1 SCC 5.”
H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 38. Having regard to the principles laid down in M.J. Exporters
Private Limited (supra), in our view, applying the principles of constructive
res judicata, the present writ petition filed by the respondents after
withdrawal of the civil suit, was not maintainable, in the sense that it
ought not to have been entertained. In case the respondents still wanted
to justify filing of the writ petition, they should have at least disclosed
B
complete facts and then justify filing of the writ petition.
39. The writ petition also ought to be dismissed on the ground of
concealment of material facts regarding filing and withdrawal of the
civil suit claiming the same relief. Neither in the writ petition nor in the
appeal against the order passed in the writ petition, the respondents
C
disclosed the filing of civil suit and withdrawal thereof. It only transpired
only that at the time of the hearing of the appeal.
40. As to how a litigant who conceals material facts from the
Court has to be dealt with, has been gone into by this Court, time and
again in plethora of cases and the consistent opinion is that, he is not
D
entitled even to be heard on merits.
41. In Abhyudya Sanstha Vs. Union of India and others, (2011)
6 SCC 145, this Court, while declining relief to the petitioners therein,
who did not approach the court with clean hands, opined as under:
E “18. … In our view, the appellants deserve to be non suited because
they have not approached the Court with clean hands. The plea
of inadvertent mistake put forward by the learned senior counsel
for the appellants and their submission that the Court may take
lenient view and order regularisation of the admissions already
made sounds attractive but does not merit acceptance. Each of
F the appellants consciously made a statement that it had been granted
recognition by the NCTE, which necessarily implies that
recognition was granted in terms of Section 14 of the Act read
with Regulations 7 and 8 of the 2007 Regulations. Those managing
the affairs of the appellants do not belong to the category of
G innocent, illiterate/uneducated persons, who are not conversant
with the relevant statutory provisions and the court process. The
very fact that each of the appellants had submitted LPASW No.
82/2019 Page 7 application in terms of Regulation 7 and made
itself available for inspection by the team constituted by WRC,
Bhopal shows that they were fully aware of the fact that they can
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1073
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

get recognition only after fulfilling the conditions specified in the A
Act and the Regulations and that WRC, Bhopal had not granted
recognition to them. Notwithstanding this, they made bold
statement that they had been granted recognition by the competent
authority and thereby succeeded in persuading this Court to
entertain the special leave petitions and pass interim orders. The
B
minimum, which can be said about the appellants is that they have
not approached the Court with clean hands and succeeded in
polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statement.
Therefore, they are not entitled to relief under Article 136 of the
Constitution. This view finds support from plethora of precedents.
42. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, G. C
Narayanaswamy Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and another v. Govt. of
Karnataka and another (1991) 3 SCC 261 and plethora of other
cases, this Court denied relief to the petitioner/appellant on the ground
that he had not approached the Court with clean hands. In Hari Narain
v. Badri Das (supra), the Court revoked the leave granted to the D
appellant and observed:
“It is of utmost importance that in making material statements
and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made
under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to
make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. E
In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally
takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the
petitions at their face value and it LPASW No. 82/2019 Page 8
would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making
statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing
of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material F
statements made by the appellant in his application for special
leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled
to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave
from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises
as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special G
leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in
such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be
revoked.”
43. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka’s case
(supra), this Court while noticing the fact regarding the stay order passed H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A by the High Court which prevented passing of the award by the Land
Acquisition Officer within the prescribed time period was concealed
and in the aforesaid context, it observed that :
“2. … Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave
petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about
B these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to
the notice and filed their counter- affidavit. In our view, the said
interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and
the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression
of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions
are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief
C
under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner
who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank
and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses
material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We
accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions.”
D
44. In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010)
2 SCC 114, this Court noticed the progressive decline in the values of
life and observed:
“1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values
of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahinsa” (non- violence). Mahavir,
E
Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain
these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of
the justice- delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-
Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in
the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
F Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system.
The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest
for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in
litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court
G proceedings.
2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up.
Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth.
They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for
achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this
H new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1075
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts A
to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain
of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or
final.” (emphasis supplied)
45. In Moti Lal Songara Vs. Prem Prakash @ Pappu and
another (2013) 9 SCC 199, this Court, considering the issue regarding B
concealment of facts before the Court, observed that “court is not a
laboratory where children come to play”, and opined as under:
“19. The second limb of the submission is whether in the obtaining
factual matrix, the order passed by the High Court discharging
the accused-respondent is justified in law. We have clearly stated C
that though the respondent was fully aware about the fact that
charges had been framed against him by the learned trial Judge,
yet he did not bring the same to the notice of the revisional court
hearing the revision against the order taking cognizance. It is a
clear case of suppression. It was within the special knowledge of D
the accused. Any one who takes recourse to method of
suppression in a court of law, is, in actuality, playing fraud with the
court, and the maxim supressio veri, expression faisi , i.e.,
suppression of the truth is equivalent to the expression of falsehood,
gets attracted. We are compelled to say so as there has been a
calculated concealment of the fact before the revisional court. It E
can be stated with certitude that the accused- respondent tried to
gain advantage by such factual suppression. The fraudulent
intention is writ large. In fact, he has shown his courage of
ignorance and tried to play possum.
20. The High Court, as we have seen, applied the principle “when F
infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse”.
However, as the order has been obtained by practising fraud and
suppressing material fact before a court of law to gain advantage,
the said order cannot be allowed to stand.”
(emphasis supplied) G

46. In a recent judgment, ABCD Vs. Union of India and others
(2020) 2 SCC 52, this Court in a matter where material facts was
concealed, while issuing notice to the petitioner therein, exercising its
suo-motu contempt power, observed as under :
H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A “15. Making a false statement on oath is an offence punishable
under Section 181 of the IPC while furnishing false information
with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the
injury of another person is punishable under Section 182 of the
IPC. These offences by virtue of Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Code
can be taken cognizance of by any court only upon a proper
B
complaint in writing as stated in said Section. In respect of matters
coming under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code, in Pushpadevi
M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan etc., (1987) 3 SCC 367
prosecution was directed to be launched after prima facie
satisfaction was recorded by this Court.
C
47. It has also been laid down by this Court in Chandra Shashi v.
Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421 that a person who makes an
attempt to deceive the court, interferes with the administration of justice
and can be held guilty of contempt of court. In this case, a husband who
had filed a fabricated document to oppose the prayer of his wife seeking
D transfer of matrimonial proceedings was found guilty of contempt of
court and was sentenced to two weeks imprisonment. It was observed
as under:
“1. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted
so that purity of court’s atmosphere may give vitality to all the
E organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore,
required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court’s
environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to
the satisfaction of all concerned.
2. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of
F
judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive,
the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons
are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for
the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar
acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration
G of justice.
* * *
14. The legal position thus is that if the publication be with intent
to deceive the court or one made with an intention to defraud,
the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1077
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

administration of justice. It would, in any case, tend to interfere A
with the same. This would definitely be so if a fabricated
documents is filed with the aforesaid mens rea. In the case at
hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the
court; the intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is,
therefore, guilty of contempt.”
B
48. In K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and
others (2008) 12 SCC 481 it was observed:
“39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income
Tax Commrs., (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT
136 (CA) is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with C
candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court
with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts
is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or
misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative
jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts
fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads D
the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself
and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi
and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on
merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the
court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires E
to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of
the court.”
49. In Dhananjay Sharma vs. State of Haryana and others
(1995) 3 SCC 757, the filing of a false affidavit was the basis for
initiation of action in contempt jurisdiction and the concerned persons F
were punished for the same.
50. If the case of the respondents is considered on factual material,
in view of the settled position of law, as has been referred in previous
paras, it is evident that the respondents waived off their right to challenge
the record of rights which stood finalised way back in the year 1962 and G
till date there has been no challenge made to the same. Indirectly relief
was sought by filing appeal before the Settlement Officer, which was
not maintainable; civil suit which was ultimately withdrawn and then
filed the writ petition and thereafter writ appeal which is the subject-
matter of the present proceedings.
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 3. WHETHER A PARTY CAN RELY ON NOTINGS IN
THE GOVERNMENT FILE WITHOUT HAVING
COMMUNICATION OF ANY ORDER ON THE
BASIS THEREOF ?
51. The aforesaid legal issue was considered by this Court in
B Mahadeo and others v. Sovan Devi and others, (2022) SCC
OnLine SC 1118. It was pointed out therein, that an inter-departmental
communications are merely in the process of consideration for an
appropriate decision. These cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim
any right. Mere notings in the file do not amount to an order unless an
order is communicated to a party, thus, no right accrues. Relevant paras
C 14 to 16 are extracted herein below:
“14. It is well settled that inter-departmental communications are
in the process of consideration for appropriate decision and cannot
be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. This Court examined
the said question in a judgment reported as Omkar
D Sinha v. Sahadat Khan, (2022) 12 SCC 228. Reliance was placed
on Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395 to
hold that merely writing something on the file does not amount to
an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State
Government, two things are necessary. First, the order has to be
E expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1)
of Article 166 and second, it has to be communicated. As already
indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue
Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the
State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound
by what was stated in the file. The said judgment was followed in
F K.S.B. Ali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2018) 11 SCC 277 and
Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Limited,
(2019) 20 SCC 1. In Bachhittar Singh, it has been held as under:
“8. What we have now to consider is the effect of the note recorded
by the Revenue Minister of PEPSU upon the file. We will assume
G for the purpose of this case that it is an order. Even so, the question
is whether it can be regarded as the order of the State Government
which alone, as admitted by the appellant, was competent to hear
and decide an appeal from the order of the Revenue Secretary.
Article 166(1) of the Constitution requires that all executive action
H of the Government of a State shall be expressed in the name of
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1079
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

the Governor. Clause (2) of Article 166 provides for the A
authentication of orders and other instruments made and executed
in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) of that article enables the
Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of
the business of the Government and for the allocation among the
Ministers of the said business. What the appellant calls an order
B
of the State Government is admittedly not expressed to be in the
name of the Governor. But with that point we shall deal later.
What we must first ascertain is whether the order of the Revenue
Minister is an order of the State Government i.e. of the Governor.
In this connection we may refer to Rule 25 of the Rules of Business
of the Government of PEPSU which reads thus: C
“Except as otherwise provided by any other Rule, cases shall
ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister
in charge who may by means of standing orders give such
directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in the
Department. Copies of such standing orders shall be sent to the D
Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister.”
According to learned counsel for the appellant his appeal pertains
to the department, which was in charge of the Revenue Minister
and, therefore, he could deal with it. His decision and order would,
according to him, be the decision and order of the State E
Government. On behalf of the State reliance was, however, placed
on Rule 34 which required certain classes of cases to be submitted
to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of
orders. But it was conceded during the course of the argument
that a case of the kind before us does not fall within that rule. No
other provision bearing on the point having been brought to our F
notice we would, therefore, hold that the Revenue Minister could
make an order on behalf of the State Government.
9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an
order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an
order. Before something amounts to an order of the State G
Government two things are necessary. The order has to be
expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1)
of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already
indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue
Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound
by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with
him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or
minutes on the file and write fresh ones.
x x x
B 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the order
of the Revenue Minister, PEPSU are of no avail to the appellant.”
15. This Court in Municipal Committee v. Jai Narayan & Co.,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 376 held that a noting recorded in the file is
merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents
C expression of an opinion by the particular individual. It was held
as under:
“16. This Court in a judgment reported as State of
Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Vaish, (2011) 8 SCC 670 held
that a noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter
D and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion
by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such
noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. It was
held as under:
“24. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter
E and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion
by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination,
such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government.
Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the
file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the
F same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government
unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in
accordance with Articles 77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1)
and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets
culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only
when it is expressed in the name of the President or the
G Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the
manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting
or even a decision recorded in the file can always be
reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court
cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for
exercise of the power of judicial review. (See: State of
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. v. LAXMI NARAYAN DAS (DEAD) 1081
THR. LRS & ORS. [RAJESH BINDAL, J.]

Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493, A
Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395,
State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar, (1987) 3 SCC 34,
Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC
84, Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180
and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India (2009) 15 SCC B
705).”
17. Thus, the letter seeking approval of the State Government
by the Deputy Commissioner is not the approval granted by
him, which could be enforced by the plaintiff in the court of
law.” C
16. The basis of the claim of the writ petitioner is a letter written
by the Secretary of the Soldier Welfare Department to the District
Collector, Udaipur on 19.03.1971 for allotment of land. The Rules
contemplate that if the possession is not taken within 6 months,
the allotment shall be deemed to have been cancelled. Firstly, the D
inter-departmental communication dated 19.03.1971 cannot be
treated to be a letter of allotment. Alternatively, even if it is
considered to be a letter of allotment, the writ petitioner could not
claim possession on the basis of such communication after more
than 30 years in terms of the Rules applicable for allotment of
land to the disabled ex-servicemen.” E

(emphasis supplied)
52. Reference can also be made to an another judgment of this
Court in Municipal Committee, Barwala, District Hisar, Haryana
through its Secretary/President v. Jai Narayan and Company and F
another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 376, wherein the Court took a similar
view.
53. Admittedly, in the case in hand there is no order passed by the
Government and conveyed to the respondents for allotment of any land,
hence, no relief was admissible to them only relying on the official notings. G
CONCLUSION :
54. Considering the factual circumstances and the law laid down
by this Court, the answer to the three issues framed in para no.22 is as
under:
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A (i) There is a huge delay on the part of the respondents to
avail of their appropriate remedy against the final publication
of record of rights. Hence, the respondents are not entitled
to any relief.
(ii) On the application of principle of constructive res judicata,
B the writ petition filed by the respondents after withdrawal
of the civil suit was not maintainable as no liberty was
granted. In case still filing of writ petition was to be justified,
at least complete facts need to be disclosed for the purpose,
which were missing. In the writ petition there was no
mention regarding filing of civil suit earlier for the same
C relief and withdrawal thereof. A litigant can be non-suited
in case he is found guilty of concealing material facts from
the court or mis-stating the same. Hence, the respondents
are not entitled to any relief.
(iii) There was no order passed by the Government and
D conveyed to the respondents for allotment of any land in
their favour. Hence, the respondents are not entitled to any
relief solely based on the official notings.
RELIEF

E 55. For the reasons mentioned above, we find merit in the appeal.
The same is allowed. The order passed by the High Court in Writ Appeal
No.108/2009 is set aside. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the
respondents is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
F (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

G

H