STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.versusRAJESH SYAL

A                        STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.
                                     v.
                                RAJESH SYAL

                                OCTOBER 4, 2002

.B               [B.N. KIRPAL, CJ., K.G. BALAKRISHNAN AND
                            ARIJIT PASA YAT, JJ.]


          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

c         s.218(1), Proviso 220 and 482-Conso/idation of cases-A company
 . and its director defrauding members of public-Cases filed against them in
   various courts thr.oughout the State-Director filing petition before High Court
  for quashing the charges against him as also praying/or transfer of all cases
   to one court-High Court treating the order of Supreme Court in V.K.
D Sharma's ·case* as precedent, directed all the cases to be transferred to one
   court-Held, proviso to s.218 would apply only in such a case where the
   distinct offences for which accused is charged are being tried before the same
   Magistrate-In the instant case, offences were being tried before different
   Magistrates or courts-Different people have alleged to have been defrauded
    by the respondent and the Company and, therefore, each offence is a distinct
E one and cannot be regarded as constituting a single series offacts/circumstances
 · and, therefore, s.220 would also not apply-High Court erred in mechanically
   following the order of this Court in V.K. Sharma's case even though the said
    order states that it should not be treated as a precedent-The decision to
    direct the applicant to move the High Court for consolidating of all criminal
F cases pending in different courts for different offences and to be tried in a
    single court was not in accordance with law-Order ofHigh Court set aside-
    Penal Code, 1860-Ss.406, 420, 468, 471 and 1208-Punjab Reforms Act,
    1972-s.7(2).

          *V.K. Sharma v. Union of India, (2000] 9 SCC 449 and P.K. Sharma
 G   v. Union of India, (W.P. (Crl.) Nos.72-75/2000 decided on 5.5.2000),
     overruled.

          Constitution of India, 1950

          Article 142-Supreme Court has ample jurisdiction to pass orders under
 H                                       124
                          STATE OF PUNJAB v. RA.TESH SYAL                      125
      Article 142(1) which may be necesswy for doing complete justice in any case    A
      or matter-But even in exercising this power it is more than doubtful that an
      order can be passed contrary to law---ln V.K. Sharma's case, the Court did
      not purport to exercise any jurisdiction under Article 142.

           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
      1037 of 2002.                                                                  B
           From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.2001 of the Punjab and
      Haryana High Court in CrL M. No. 3300 of 2001.

            Bimal Roy Jad and Ms. Sunita Pandit for the Appellants.
                                                                                     c
            Puneet Bali, Prabhjit Jauhar and S.S. Jauhar for the Respondent.

            The following Order of the Court was delivered:

           Special leave granted.
                                                                                     D
              The respondent is a former Director of Messrs. Golden Forest (India)
       Limited. This Company had collected money from the general public for
       purchasing the land and had promised that the amount would be returned
       after expiry of the maturity period fixed through cheques. When monies were
       not repaid and complaints were received by the State, the Vigilance Department
       registered FIRs against the respondent as a co-accused in the case registered E
       against Messrs. Golden Forest (India) Limited. The offences were under
       Sections 406, 420, 468, 471, 1208 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
       "IPC") and Section 7(2) of the Punjab Reforms Act, 1972. According to the
       prosecution, crores of rupees had been obtained by the said Company from
     . members of the public. But on the maturity date the sums were not returned. p-
       When proceedings were initiated in different courts the respondent filed an
       application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for
       short "Cr.P.C.") in the High Court praying that the charges framed against
       him may be dropped. Another application under Section 482 was filed to the
       effect that the cases which have been instituted against him should be tried
_,     in one Court. Jn this connection, reliance was placed by the respondent on a G
 •     decision of this Court in the case of VK. Sharma v. Union of India, (W.P.
       (Crl.) No. 256/1999) to which decision we shall presently revert to. In the
       said case by the order dated 28th March, 2000; liberty was granted to move
       the appropriate High Courts for bringing all the criminal cases pending before
       different courts within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court to one H



                                      ..
                                                                      •
    126                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] .SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A single court or more than one court consolidated, in a petition filed under
    Article 32 of the Constitution of India, I950 (in short "the Constitution"). But
    while passing the said order it was observed that the said order was not to
    be treated as a precedent.

          The High Court, by treating the order in V.K. Sharma 's case (supra) as
B a precedent allowed the petition under Section 482 transferred those cases
    which were pending in different courts in the State of Punjab against the
    respondent to the Special judicial Magistrate.

          It is the aforesaid decision of the High Court transferring the cases
C   pending before different Courts to the Court of Special judicial Magistrate,
             .
    Patinla which is challenged before us .

        Learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to another order
  passed by this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 72-75/2000 (P.K. Sharma v.
  Union ofIndia) dated 5th May, 2000; whereby it directed that the said petition
D be disposed of in terms of the earlier order of 28th March, 2000 in V.K.
  Sharma 's case.

           On a query being raised by this Court, the learned counsel for the
    respondent sought to rely on Sections 218 and 220 of Cr.P.C. in an effort to
    justify his plea for the consolidation of the cases. Mr. Bali submitted that
E   because of the proviso to Section 218, even where there are distinct offences
    being tried the Magistrate can direct that the same be tried together. In our
    opinion, proviso to Section 218 would apply only in such a case where the
    distinct offences for which the accused is charged are being tried before the
    same Magistrate. In the instant case, offences were being tried before different
    Magistrates and proviso to Section 218 cannot give any single Magistrate the
F   power to order transfer of cases to him from different Magistrates or Courts.
    Even Section 220 does not help the respondent as that applies where any one
    series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction and
    where more than one offence is committed, there can be a joint trial.

G         In the present case, different people have alleged to have been defrauded
    by the respondent and the Company and therefore each offence is a distinct
    one and cannot be regarded as constituting a single series of facts/transaction.

        We are not convinced that as presently advised, that there is any
  provision which could be of assistance to the respondent in seeking such a
H transfer. ·This is also not a case where the High Court has sought to invoke



                 •
                    STA TE OF PUNJAB v. RA.JESH SYAL                      127
its jurisdiction under Section 482 and transfer the cases so as to prevent the   A
abuse of the process of any Court or to secure ends of justice. The High
Court has mechanically followed the order of this Court in V.K. Sharma 's
case even though the said order states that the order should not be treated as
a precedent.

       Before concluding, we would like to observe, with respect, that by B
directing that the order which was passed in V.K. Sharma 's case should not
be treated as a precedent implies that the said order is otherwise not in
accordance with law and therefore should not be regarded as a precedent.
This Court has ample jurisdiction to pass orders under Article 142 (I) of the
Constitution which may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case C
or matter. But even in exercising this power, it is more than doubtful that an
order can be passed contrary to law. In V.K. Sharma's case, this Court did
not purport to exercise any jurisdiction under Article 142. The decision to
direct the applicant to file applications to be moved for consolidations of the
cases pending in different Courts for different offences to be tried in a single·
court was not in accordance with law, and the said decision of V.K. Shai:ma D
and that of P.K. Sharma are over-ruled.

      For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed and the impugned
decision of the High Court is set aside. We make it clear that any observations
made in this order shall not prejudice the respondent in the trial of the cases E
against him.

R.P.                                                         Appeal allowed.