Holding

The service of notice was not an integral part of the cause of action; the Calcutta High Court lacked jurisdiction, and its interim prohibitory order was set aside.

Summary

The Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 authorized the acquisition of land in Jaipur for a public development scheme. A notice under s.52(2) was served on the respondents at their Calcutta office, and the land was later vested in the State of Rajasthan by a notification under s.52(1). The respondents filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court under Art.226, seeking a mandamus and obtaining an ex‑parte interim prohibitory order staying the acquisition. The Supreme Court held that service of the notice in Calcutta was not an integral part of the cause of action, that the cause of action arose wholly in Rajasthan, and therefore the Calcutta High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition or grant the interim order. The Court also warned against the routine grant of interlocutory orders staying development schemes. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the Calcutta High Court’s orders were set aside, and costs were awarded.

Issues considered

Whether service of notice under s.52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, served in Calcutta, constitutes an integral part of the cause of action for a writ under Art.226 of the Constitution.
Whether the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ challenging a land acquisition order issued by the Rajasthan Government.
Whether a High Court may grant ad‑interim prohibitory orders staying a government development scheme in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Section 20
Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959s. s.52(1), s. s.52(2), s. s.52(3), s. s.52(5), s. s.52(6)
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976s. Section 20

Subjects

cause of actionterritorial jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionArticle 226interim prohibitory orderland acquisitionpublic purposedevelopment schemeservice of notice

Judgment

598
A

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.

B v.
)

SWAIKA PROPERTIES & ANR.

April 8, 1985

[A.P. SBN AND V. BALl\KRlSHNA ERA.DI, JJ.]
c
Constitution of India 1950, Article 226-

High Court to determine extent of its territorial jurisdiction before ntaking
interlocutory orders-Ad interim ex parte orders-Passing of-Der'lrecated 'cause
of action'-Service of notice whether an integral part of 'cause of action'-
Acquisilion of land-By State Government of Raja1than-Notice ser~·ed on owner
at Calcutta-Calcutta High Court-Whether can exercise writ jurisdiction.
D
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act 1959, Section 59(2)

Land in Jaipur -Acquisition for p:4b/ic purpose-Notice issuel- to owner at
Cafcutta -Whether writ m1hrtai11a?/e in Calcutta High Court.

Words & Phrases :

E 'Cause of action' -,\leaning (1/-Civil Proced11re Codt! 1908, Section 20
at1d Constitution of India 1950, Article 226.

The Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur issued a notice
under s. 52 (2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 at the instance
of the Improvement Trust to the respondent-company which owned ellteosive '
F land on the outskirts of Jaipur City stating that it. was proposed by the State
Government to acquire the said land under s. 52 (I) for a public purpose, the
Y'
implementation of a developing scheme at public expense viz. the Civil Lines
Extension Scheme,· and the said notice \vas duly served on the respondents at
their registered office at 18B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta. In comp1iancc there-
with, the respondents appeared before the Special Officer and while denying
the existence of a public purpose for acquisition of the said land under s. 52 (I)
G of the Act, asserted that they needi.:d the land to start new business in the
State of Rajasthan viz. for establishment of a branch office, construction of
residential houses for their Director and Senior Executives etc. The Special ·
Officer 00 being satisfied from the material on record that the alleged need of
the respondents was not bona fide and that the land was required by the lmpro·
vement Trust for a public purpose viz. the Civil Lines Extension Scheme, rccom·
B
RAiASTHAN v. SWAIKA PROPBRTiES ·599
mended that the entire land be acquired under s. 52 (I) of the Act.
A
Having failed in their effort to get the land released from acqusition. the
respondents made an application to the State Government under s. 20 of the
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 for exemption of the land from
the Purview of that Act aileging that the land was needed for constructing a
three-star hotel, but it appears that they were not serious in undertaking any
such venture. While the matter was under the consideration of the State B
Government, the Improvement Trust represented that the notified land in
entirety was needed for the afores_aid ·development scheme and accordingly
the State Goveroment issued the impugned notification.

The respondent-company approached the Calcutta High Court by a writ
·petitiori. A Single Judge entertaini::d the petition under Art. 226, issued a
rule nisi to the appe11ants to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not ,c
be issued, and also passed an ex parte ad·interim prohibitory order restraining
them fri.>1n taking a1y steps to require the respondents to surrender or deliver
possession of the lands acquired.

Allowing the Appeal,

HELD : l. l. Normally, the High Court should not, as a rule, in pro· D
ceedings under Art. 226 of the constitution grant any ad· ir,_teritn prohibitory
order staying the implementation of any development scheme framed by the
Government or by the local authorities, save under very exceptional circum-
stances and particularly without notice to the Government or ·such authority,
The Court deprecated !he tendency on the part of the High Court in spite of a
long line of decisions of this Court starting fro1n Si/iguri Mu"nicipa/ity v.
Amalendu Das, [1984] 2 SCC 436 to grant interlocutory orders for the mere E
asking. [60IB·El

1. 2 Although the powers of the High Courts under Art. 226 are far and
wide and the Judges must ever be vigilant to protect the citizen aginst arbitrary
Executive action, nevertheless, the Judges have a constructive role to ·play and
therefore there is always the need to use such extensive powers with due F
circumspection. There has to be in the larger public interest an element of
·self-ordained restraint. The effect of the impugned ad·interim prohibitory order
made by ,the learned Single Judge virtualJy·brought'.tO a standstill a development
schc!n-' frarned by the lmorov~ment :r,rU<>t in another .State. Such ar.bitrary
exercise of power by the High Court, at the public expense, reacts against the
development and prosperity of the country and is clearly detrimental to the
national interest. [606G-H] ; C-DJ'

2. 1. The question whether service of notice is or is not an integral part
of the cause of action within Art. 226 ·(2} of the Constitution-must depend
upon the nature of the impugned _order giving rise to a 'cause of action'.
'Cause of action' is a bundle of facts which taken with the law .applicable to
them gives the petitioner a right to relief against the respondent. [60SE, B·C]
'u
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i985] :\ s.c.ll.

2 .2 There was complete lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Calcutta
A High Court to have entertained the writ petition. The service of notice under
s .. 52 (2) of the Act was not an integral part of the cause of action within the
meaning of Art. 226 (2) of the Constitution and therefore the High Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ p:tition or issue an ad-interim
prohibitory order. [601H-602A, 605DJ

3. In the instant case, the notification dated February 8, 1984 issued )
B by the State Government under s. 52 ( 1) of the Act became effective the moment
It was published in the Offi.cal Gazette as thereupon ~he notified land became
vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not
necessary for the respondents to plead the Service of notice on them by the
Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under s. 52 (2) for the
grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 226 of tb.e Constitu..
tion for quashing the notification issued under s. S2 (1). If the respondents
c felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands at Jaipur and wanted to chaUen~
ge the validity of the impugned notification issued by the State Government
of Rajasthan under s. 52 (I), by a petition under Art. 226, the remedy of the
respondents to file such a petition lay before the Rajasthan H.igh Court,
Jaipur Bench, .where the cause of action wholly or in pirt arose. [605~-H; 606A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2085 of
D
1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.1984 of th~
Calcutta High Court in C. P. No. 5972 (W) of 1984.

K. Parasaran, Attn. Genl. and Badridas Sharma for the
E
Appellants.
G.L. Sanghi, Praveen Kum-Jr and Ashok Mathur for the
Respondents.

The'Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
SEN., J. The issue involved in this appeal by special leave is:
Whether the service of notice under sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 ('Act' for short) served on
the respondents at their registered offic~ at 18-B, Brabpurne Road,
Calcutta by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department,
G Jaipur was an integral part of the cause of action and was sufficient
to invest the Calcutta High Court with jurisdiction to entertain a
petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity
of a notification dated Fedruary 8, 1984 issued by the State
Government of Rajasthan under s. 5 (21) of the Act for the acquisi·
RAJASTHAN v. SWAJKA PROPERTIES (Sen, J.) 601

- tion of certain lands belonging to them required by the Urban
Improvement Trust, Jaipur for a public purpose, namely, for A
implementation of a development scheme viz. Civil Lines
Extension Scheme.

It is somewhat strange that a learned Single Judge of the
Calcutta High Couri (R.N.Pyne,J.) should have by his order dated B
March 13, 1984 entertained a petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution filed by the respondents, issued a rule nisi thereon
requiring the reasons as to why a writ in the natnre of mandamus
should not be issued directing the appellants herein, the State of·
-~
Rajasthan, the Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur and the Land
\ Acquisition Officer, Jaipur to forbear from giving effect to the c
impugned notification dated February 8, 1984 and passed an ad-
.interim exparte prohibitory order restraining them from. taking any
steps requiring the respondents under sub-s. (5) of 52 of the Act to
surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith or
upon their failure to do so to take immediate steps under sub-s. (6) D
thereof to secure such possession. We are distressed to find that
the learned Single Judge despite a long line of decisions of this
Court starting from Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das<'>
deprecating the practice prevalent in the High Court of passing
such interlocutory orders for the mere asking, should have passed
the impugned orders in the manner that he did. It seems that E
the pronouncements of this Court have had little effect on the
learned Single. Judge.

The learned Attorney General appearing for the State of
Rajasthan takes serious exception to the authority and jurisdiction of
the learned Single Judge to have entertained the writ petition filed F
by the respondents and issued the rule nisi and to have inade the
ad-interim exparte prohibitory order which virtually has brought
the entire acquisition proceedings pending at Jaipur in the State of
Rajasthan t J a standstill. He contends that the petition filed by
the respondents purporting to be under. Art. 226 of the Constitution
in the Calcutta High Court and the rule nisl thereon and the ad- G
interim exparle prohibitory order secured by them on the basis of
such petition from the learned Single Judge on March 13, 1984
when there was total lack of inherent jurisdiction on the part of

(1) [1984) 2 s.c.c. 436,

ff
602 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 s.c.R.

A

,_ The facts of the cas·e _are as follows: Me:;srs S~3.ib ProPC~ties
Pvt. Limited;' Calcutta owned Khasra No. 383 area.14 bighas 16
, . ·biswas situate .in village Madrampura on the outskirts of Jaipur
B city. On- June 25, 1975 the Special Officer, Town Planning
Department, Jaipur "issued a notice under s. 52 (2) of the Act at
the instance of the. Improvem~nt Trust, Jaipur stating that it was
proposed by the State Government to acquire the said land admeasu-
ring more or less 44,770 squire yards under-s. 52 (I) of the Act
__,-·
c for a public purpose, namoly, for the implementation ofa develoir
ment scl;eme at public expense viz. · the Civil Lines Extension
-Scheme, Th'e said notice was duly served on the respondents a'nd
th(.y in c~mpliance therewith appeared before the Special Officer,
Town Planning - Department, Jaipur and filed their reply dated
September 8, 1975. In the reply, the respondents while denying·
D" the existence of a public purpose for acquisition of the lands under
s. 52(1) of the Act asserted that they needed the said land to start
new businesses in the State of Rajasthan and for that purpose to
utilize -the notified land for establishment of.a branch office and for
construction -of residential houses for their Director and other
Seriicir Executives. The Special Officer adjourned the case from
E tinie to time arid issued -several notices to the respondents for
personal hearing under s. 52 (3) of the Act. The respondenis
through their 'epresentative appeared at each of these hearings and
sought adjournment on . one pretext or another. . Significantly
although ·the respondents - participated in the proceedings
before ,the ·-Special Officer, they did not raise any objection'
as 'to the--power and authority of the· State - Government · of -
Rajasthan to 'acquire the notified land under s. 52 (I) of the Act
or _the-- legality _and propriety of the· notice issued -by the
Specfal Officer -under -s , 52 (2) or his jurisdiction to proceed with
-the inquiry_ under s. 52_ (3). Nor did the respondents_ place any
G material before -the. Special Officer to show that they really needed
,I
the notified land for the purpose of expansion of -their business
- activities io the State ofRajasthan. It is pertinent to observe that
the respondents had h-een shifting their stand before the Special
officer. · As already stated, they had In their reply dated September
8, 1975 alleged that they genuinely required the land for starting
11ew businesses in the State, to cpen a branch office at Jaipur am!

l
RAJASTHAN v. SWAIKA PROPERTIES '(Sen, J.) 603
to co>truct residential quarters for their Director and other Senior A
Exceutives, but at a later stage they alleged that they wanted to
construct a Three Star Hotel on the said land. Eventually, the
Special Officer by his order April 9, 1976 held that the alleged
need of the respondents was . just a pretence and he, was satisfied
on the material on record that the land was really not needed by
them bona fide anll their real object was just to get the land relea-
sed. from acquisition on one ground or the other. with· these B
observations he rejected the prayer of the respondents for release
of the land.and recommended that the ·entire land be .acquired by
the State Government under s. 52 (I) of the Act for the Urban
Improvement Trust, Jaipur, and forwarded the. papers lo .the.
Secretary to the State Government,· Town Planning Dep.utment,
Rajasthan· for issue of the reqnlsite notification under s.• 52 (1) of C
the Act.

It appears from the material on record that the respondents
having failed in their effort to get the land released from acquisition
then took up the matter with the State Government. · They made 0.
an· application to the State Government on· February 10; 1977,
seeking exemption of' the notified land under s. 20 of the Urban
Land• (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 stating that they required
the land _for construction of a Three Star Hotel. The State
Government in the Urban Development & Housing Department
by letter dated April 4, 1977 informed the respondents that there E
was no possibility of an exemption being granted under s. 20 of tlie
Act in their favour allowing tliem to-retain vacant land in· excess of
6,000 squace yards for the construction of a Three Star Hotel.
The State Government stated that the remaining land was required
·by the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur for development of house
F
sites and for construction of two 'Ministers' bungalows in Civil
lines and therefore the proceedings for acquisition of the notified
land would'not be withdrawn. The State Government required the
respondents· to submit detailed proposals in respect of 6,000 square
yards of land· for their proposed Three Star Hotel· showing com-
mitments made, financial resources etc. through the Director of. G
Tourism, Rajasthan, Jaipur and were intimated that they would be
entitled to retain the said land on payment of the preseribed fee
for converting the land use from agriculture to hotel business.
Apparently, the respondents were not serious in undertaking tho
H
604 SUPREME COURT RePORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

new venture of startieg a Three Star Hotel on an area .of 6' 000
A
square yards as their real object was to get the notified land released
from acquisition.

The Februrary 21, 1979, there was a meeting at the Secre-
tariat in the Urban Development & Housing Department between
officers of that Department and those of the Urban Improvement
Trust, Jaipur. It was clarified on behalf of the Improvement Trust
that the notified land in its entirety was needed for implementa-
tion of the development scheme of the Trust. The Improvement
Trust accordingly by its letter dated March 5, 1979 requested the ·
State Government that necessasy orders be passed for acquisition
c of Khasra No. 383 in village Madrampura admeasuring 14 bighas
16 biswas and a notification to that effect issued under s. 52(1)
of the Act. It was pointed out that a public notice under s. 55(2)
of the Act as regards the notified land had already been issued
by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur dated
June 25, 1975, and the necessary procedure as laid down in sub-
D s. (3) thereof followed. As a result of this, the State Govern-
ment issued the impugned notification dated February 8, 1984
under s. 52(1) of the Act and the notified land vested in the
State Government free from all encumbrances. The State Go-
vernment in their special leave petition have explained that the
notification under s. 52(1) of the Act could not be issued till
E February 8, 1984 because the Government were primarily think-
i111f of making the land available for constructi·on of residential
houses before making provisions for construction of a Three Star
or Five Star Hotel but nothing came out of the said proposal as
there was no response from the respondents.
F
Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action
neither wholly nor in part arose within the territo:rial limits of the
Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had
no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the
respondents under Art. 226 of the Constitution or to make the
G
ad-interim exparte prohibitory order restraining the appellants
from taking any steps to take possession of th1~ land acquired.
Under sub-s. (5) of s. 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled
to require the respondent to surrender or delive•r possession of
the lands acquired fortnwith and upon tneir failure• to <lo so, tal<;e
R\JAITrHN v. SWAIKA PROPERTIES ('>~1, J.) 605

immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-s. (6) A
thereof.

The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's
Code of Civil Procedure :

"The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if B
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to support his right to a judgment of the
Court."

In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the c
law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against
the defendant. The mere service of notice under s. 52(2) of the
Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Bra·
bourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the
State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action
within that territory unless the service of such notice was an n
integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under s. 52(1) of the
Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench.
The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral E
part of the cause of action within the meaning of Art. 226(2) of
the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned
order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated
February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under s. 52(1)
of tho Act became effective the moment it was published in the
official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in F
the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not
necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on
them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur
unders. 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or
order under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the noti-
fication issued by the State Government under s. 52(1) of the G
Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their
lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of
the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under
s. 52(1) of the .Act by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution,
the remedy of the respondents fo• ".lie grant of such relief had to
H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1985) 3 S.C.R.

A be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court,
Jaipur Bench, v.here the cause of action wholly or in part arose.

It is to be deeply regretted that despite a series of deci·~
of this Court deprecating the practice prevalent in the High Court
B of passing such interlocutory orders for the mere asking, the
learned Single Judge should have passed the impugned ad-interim
exparte prohibitory order the effect of which, as the learned
Attoreny General rightly complains, was virtually to bring to a
standstill a development scheme of ihe Urban Improvement Trust,
Jaipur viz. Civil Lines Extension Scheme, irrespective of the
c fact whether or nut the High Court had any territorial jurisdiction
to entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Such
arbitrary exerci~e of power by the High Court at the public ex-
pense reacts against the development and prosperity of the country
and is clearly detrimental to the national interest.

D
Quite recently, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court
in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, West Bengal v. Dunlop
India Limited and Ors.(') administered strong admonition depre-
cating the practice of the High Court of granting ad-interim exparte
orders which pratically have the effect of th<: grant of the main
E relief in the petition under Art. 226 of the Constltution irrespective
of the fact whether the High Court had any territorbl jurisdiction
to entertain such a petition or whether the Petition under Art. 226
was intended and meant to circumvent the alternative remedy
provided by law or filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim
orders and thereafter. delaying and protracting the proceedings by
F one device or the other particularly in matters relating to public
revenue or implementation of various measures and schemes
undertaken by the Government or the local authorities for general
public benefit. Although the powers of the High Courts under
Art. 226 of the Constitution are far and wide and the Judges must
ever be vigilant to protect the citizen against arbitrary executive
G
action, nonetheless, the Judges have a constructive role and
therefore there is always the need to use such extensive
powers with due circumspection. There has to be in the larper
public interest an clement of self-ordained rcHraint. We hope

H (1) [198SJ I S.C.C. 260.
RAiASTHAN v. SWAIKA PROPERTIES (Sen, J.) 607 •

and trust tbat the High Court will determine the extent of its A
territorial jurisdiction before making such inkrlocutory orders.

In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs.
The impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge of the
Calcutta High Court dated March 13, 1984 issuing a rule nisi on
tbe petition filed by the respondents under Art. 226 of the Cons- B
titution and the ad·interim exparte prohibitory order made by
him are set aside and the proceedings before the Calcutta High
C'1urt are quashed. We qucintify the costs at Rs. 5,000.

c

N.V.K. Appeal allowed.'