STATE OF RAJASTHANversusSH. B.K. MEENA AND ORS.

A                          STATE OF RAJASTHAN
                                         v.
                         SH. B.K. MEENA AND ORS.

                             SEPTEMBER 27, 1996

B          (B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.]

          Service Law:

          Disciplinary Proceedings--Stay of disciplinary proceedings by Court
C Tribunal-Not to be a matter of course but a considered decision-Both
    criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings can go simultaneously-No
    legal bar.

         Approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary
  proceedings is altogether distinct and different-1he standard of proof, mode
D of Enquiry and the ntles goveming the Enquiry and Trial in disciplinary
  proceedings and Criminal proceedings are entirely distinct and dif-
  f erent-Prevention of Corruption Ac~ 1988---Criminal Proceedings.



E
          Respondent, as IAS Officer of Rajasthan Cadre, working as Addi-
    tional Collector, Development-4:um-Project Director, Distt. Rural Develop-
    ment Agency (DRDA) Jaipur was transferred. Complaint against
    respondent was filed by his successor alleging misappropriation of public
                                                                                   -
    funds to the tune of Rs. 1.05 C1·ores. After investigations, Anti Corruption
    Department of State of Rajasthan registered an FIR. The respondent was
    arrested and be remained in custody.
F        Government of India refused sanction to prosecute respondent
    under the Prevention of Con:11ption Act, 1988 and advised the State
    Government to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent.
    Memo of charges accompaniE~d by articles of charges was issued to
    respondent.
G
         Respondent submitted detailed written statement rebutting charges
    framed against him reserving his right to add new point.

          Respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, chal-
    lenging the various orders passed against him including the memo of
H   charges.
                                        68
                                STATE v. B.K MEENA                              69
            The Central Administrative Tribunal stayed the disciplinary A
       proceedings against the respondent. Petitioner State reinstated the
       respondent in service, revoking the order of suspension pending enquiry.

            Charge sheet was filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
       who took cognizance thereof.
                                                                                     B
             Thereafter respondent amended his 0.A. requesting that discipli-
       nary enquiry against him be stayed pending the criminal trial. Appellant
       State contended that since respondent has disclosed all possible defence
       in the said written statement there is no occasion or warrant for staying
       the disciplinary proceedings.                      ·                          C

             The Tribunal held that charge sheet in the Criminal case and the
       memo of charges in the discipli11ary proceedings were based upon same
       facts and allegations. Allowing respondent's plea and staying the discipli-
       nary proceedings pending Criminal Trial, the Tribunal observed that the D
       respondent may have to put forward further defence as and when material
       against him emerges during the enquiry proceedings and disclosure of the
       defence at that stage could prejudice his defence in the Criminal Trial.

           State preferred the present Appeal against the order of Central
       Administrative Tribunal.                                                      E
            Allowing the appeal, this Court

              HELD: 1. There is no legal bar for both proceedings- disciplinary and
       criminal-to go on simultaneously and in certain situations it may not be·
       "desirable", "advisable" or "appropriate" to proceed with the disciplinary F
       enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. The staying
       of disciplinary proceedings is a matter to be determined having regard to
       the facts and circumstances of a given case and no hard and fast rules can
       be enunciated in that behalf. The only ground for staying the disciplinary
       proceeding is "that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may G
       not be prejudiced". It means that not only the charges must be grave but th_at
>-~~   the case must involve complicated questions of Law and facts. [75-D-E; F]
                                                                            I

             SA. Venkataraman v. Union of India &Anr., AIR (1954) SC375,'1Je/hi
       Cotton and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, (1960) 3 SCR 227 and Tafa
       Oil Mills Company Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 7 SCR 555, relied on.          H
    70                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A         2. Disciplinary enquiry canlllot be and should not be delayed unduly.
    Where High Officers or persons holding high public offices are involved,
    criminal cases drag on endlessly. This is the reality inspite of repeated
    advice and admonitions from this Court and the High Courts. The inter·
    ests of administration and good government demand that these proceed·
    ings are concluded expeditiously. The disciplinary proceedings are meant
B   not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery
    unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. [75-G-H; 76-A·B]

          3. Stay of disciplinary proceedings can not be and should not be a
    matter of course. All the relevant factors for and against should be weighed
C   and a decision taken in view of the various principles laid down. It is in
    the interest of the charged officE:r that the proceedings are expeditiously
    concluded. [76-E; F]

            4. In the present case th1!re is no question of respondent being
D compelled to disclose his defenc:e in the disciplinary proceedings which          .-
    would prejudice him in a criminal case. The charges against respondent
    are very serious. The observation of the Tribunal that in the course of
    examination of evidence, new material may emerge al,lainst the respondent
    and he may be compelled to discllose his defence is, at best a surmise or a
    speculatory reason. Respondent is continuing in office. It is in the interest
E   of administration that truth or falsity of charges against him is determined
    promptly. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated
    early; he should be dealt with appropriately without any delay. [77-C-D]

          5. The approach and objective in the criminal proceedings and dis·
    ciplinary proceedings is altogeth1!r different and distinct. The standard of
F   proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in
    both the cases are entirely distilllct and different. Staying of disciplinary
    proceedings pending criminal proceedings should not be a matter of course
    but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage the decision may
    require reconsideration if the criminal cases get unduly delayed,
G                                                                 [77-F-H; 78-A]
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 12563 of
    1996.

            From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.94 of the Central Ad-
H ministrative Tribunal, Jaipur in 0.A. No. 212 of 1993.
                                                                                    I
                                                                                    I
             STATEv. B.KMEENA[B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.)                       71

     Aruneshwar Gupta, Manoj K. Das and Manish Garg, Advs. for the            A
Appellant.

     K. Madhva Reddy, S.K. Jain, A.P. Dhamija and K.K. Gogna for the
Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                              B

      B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted. Heard counsel for the
parties.

      This appeal is preferred against the order of the Central Administra-   C
tive Tribunal, Jaipur staying the departmental enquiry against the respon-
dent till the conclusion of the criminal trial pending against him.

       The respondent is a member of the Indian Administrative Service
belonging to the Rajasthan cadre. He was working as Additional Collector,
Development-cum-Project Director, District Rural Development Agency D
(DRDA), Jaipur during the year 1989. He was transferred from the said
post on 21.10.89. On 8.12.89, the successor to the respondent lodged a FIR
(No. 346 of 89) against the respondent in Police Station Bani Park, Jaipur
inter alia alleging misappropriation of public funds by the respondent to
the tune of Rs. 1.05 crores. The Anti-Corruption Department of the State E
of Rajasthan investigated into the said offence and found that the respon-
dent was involved in the offence and accordingly registered FIR No. 10/90
dated 12.3.90. On 22.5.90, the respondent was placed under suspension.
The respondent was arrested on 26.3.90 and remained in custody till 10th
August, 1990.
                                                                              F
       On 31.3.92, the State of Rajasthan requested the Government of
India for grant of sanctiOn for prosecuting the respondent under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On 9.9.92, the Government of India,
while not granting the sanction for prosecution, advised the Government
of Rajasthan to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. G
Accordingly, on 13.10.92, the State Government issued the memo of char-
ges accompanied by articles of charges. On 9.2.93, the respondent sub-
mitted his written statement (running into 90 pages) in reply to the charges
served upon him. At our direction, the learned counsel for the respondent
has filed a copy of the said written statement. It purports to be in response
to the memo of charges dated 13.10.92 communicated to him. Though at H
    72                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A the end, the respondent reserves his "right to add new points when and if
    the documents as mentioned above are furnished to me or if the investigat-
                                                                                   ..,
    ing agency furnish other documents of additional points not disclosed to
    me till now", the written statement is a detailed rebuttal of the charges
    framed against the respondent. The respondent, no doubt, says that since
    all the documents were not furnished to him, he proposes to file a fuller
B   statement after receiving those documents but that does not mean that the
    respondent has not put forward his case in reply to the charges framed
    against him. Putting forward his case in reply to memo of charges cannot
    but mean putting forward his defence.

C        On 13.4.93, the respondent filed O.A. No. 212 of 1993 before the
    Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur challenging the various orders
    passed against him including the memo of charges.

          On 15.5.93, charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial
    Magistrate, Jaipur, against the respondent and cognizance thereof taken by
D   the learned C.J.M.

          At the instance of the respondent, the Central Administrative
    Tribunal· issued an order on 4.8.93 staying the disciplinary proceedings
    against the respondent. The State of Rajasthan thereupon reinstated the
E   respondent in service, revoking the order of suspension pending inquiry.
    The respondent amended his 0.A. requesting that the disciplinary enquiry
    against him be stayed pending the criminal trial.

        When the Original Application came up for final hearing, the only
  ground urged by the respondent was that the departmental proceedings be
F not allowed to go on so long as the criminal proceedings are pending
  against him. It was opposed by the State of Rajasthan stating inter alia that
  inasmuch as the respondent has filed a detailed written statement of
  defence on 9.2.93 (in response to ·memo of charges framed against him)
  and because the respondent has disclosed all possible defences in the said
G written statement, there is no occasion or warrant for staying the discipli-
  nary proceedings.

        The Tribunal found that the charge-sheet in the criminal case and
  the memo of charges in the disciplinary proceedings are based upon same
  facts and allegations. It rejected the State's plea that the respondent having
H already disclosed his defence, will not be prejudiced in any manner by
                  STA1Ev. B.K.MEENA(B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.]                       73

     ·proceeding with the disciplinary enquiry. The Tribunal observes :             A
             "We cannot say at this stage what will emerge during the enquiry
             proceedings after examination of the evidence. The applicant may
             well have to put forward further defence as and when material
             against him emerges during the enquiry proceedings and disclosure
             of his defence at that stage could well prejudice his defence in the   B
             criminal trial."

           Purporting to follow the decision of this Court in Kusheshwar Dubey
     v. Mis Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Others., AIR (1988) SC 2118 =
     [1988] 4 SCC 3191, the Tribunal allowed the respondent's plea and stayed       C
     the disciplinary proceedings pending the criminal proceedings.

            We are of the opinion that the. order of the Tribunal is unsustainable·
     both in law and on the facts of the case. In SA. Venkataraman v. Union of
     India and Another, AIR (1954) SC 375, the petitioner therein was sub-
     jficted to disciplinary proceedings in the first instance and was dismissed D
     from service on 17th September, 1953. On 23rd February, 1954, the police
     submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioner therein in a Criminal Court
     in respect of the very same charges. The petitioner challenged the initiation
     of criminal proceedings on the ground that it amounts to putting him in
     double jeopardy within the meaning of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the E
     Constitution of India. A Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the said
     plea holding that there is no legal objection to the initiation or continuation
     of criminal proceedings merely because he was punished earlier in discipli-
     nary proceedings. It is thus clear - and the proposition is not disputed by
     Mr. K. Madhava Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent - that in law
     there is no bar to, or prohibition against, initiating simultaneous criminal F
     proceedings and disciplinary proceedings. Indeed not only the said two
     proceedings, but if found necessary, even a civil suit can also proceed
     simultaneously. Mr. Madhava Reddy, however, submits that as held by this·
     Court in certain later decisions, it would not be desirable or appropriate
     to proceed simultaneously with the criminal proceedings as well as discipli- G
     nary proceedings.

            In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, (1960] 3 SCR
     221, it was held that the principles of natural justice do not require that
     the employer should wait for the decision of the criminal court before
     talcing disciplinary action against the employee. At the same time, the        H



1I
    74                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A   Court observed: "We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature
    or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be
    advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that
    the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced."
    In Tata Oil Mills Company Limited v. Workmen, (1964) 7 SCR 555, it was
    observed, following D.C.M., that:
B
            "it is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed
            against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal
            court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the
            final disposal of the criminal case. It would be particularly ap-
c           propriate to adopt such a course where the charge against the
            workman is of a grave character, because in such a case, it would
            be unfair to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he
            may take before the criminal court. But to say that domestic
            enquiries may be stayed pending criminal trial is very different
            from saying that if an employer proceeds with the domestic enquiry
D           inspite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for
            that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion reached in such
            an enquiry is either bad in Jaw or malafide."

          In Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, (1969) 1 SCR 134, the
E   contention that initiation of disciplinary proceedings during the pendency
    of criminal proceedings on the same facts amounts to contempt of court
    was rejected. After consid,ering the ratio of these three decisions, this Court
    held in Kusheshwar Dubey:


F            "The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to
             support the position that while there could be no legal bar for
             simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases
             where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings
             awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases
             it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order
G            of stay or injunction from the court. Whether in the facts and
             circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be
             such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial
             consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances
             of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should
H            be interdicted, pending criminal trial.As we have already stated that
              STATE v. B.K. MEENA [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.)                   75
         it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast,          A
         strait-jacket formula valid for all cases :and of general application
         without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For
         the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to
         say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down
         any general guideline.                                                   B
         In the· instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary
         proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of
         the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed
         and the High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court's
         order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal."                  C

        It would be evident from the above decision that each of them starts
 with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both
 proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain sit.uations,
 it may not be 'desirable', 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the D
·disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges.
 The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be
 determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case
'and that no hard and fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf. The only
 ground suggested in the above decisions as constituting a valid ground for
 staying the disciplinary proceedings is "that the defence of the employee in E
 the criminal case may not be prejudiced." This ground has, however, been
 hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave
 nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it
 µieans that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must
 involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, 'advisability', F
 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the case may be, has to be determined in
 each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the
 case. The ground indicated in D..C.M. and Tata Oil Mills is not also an
 invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales while judging
 the advisability or desirability of staying the disciplinary proceedings. One G
 pf the contending consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be
 - and should not be - delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are con-
 cerned, it is well-known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or
 persons holding high public offices are involved. They get bogged down on
 one or the other ground. They hardly ever reach a prompt conclusion. That
 is the reality inspite of repeated advice and admonitions from this Court H
     76                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A and the High Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself
     be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where
     the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests
     of administration and good government demand that these proceedings are
     concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that interests of ad-
     ministration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any
B    charge of misdemeanour is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary
     proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the ad-
     ministrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest
     of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary
     proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be
C    vindicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be
     dealt with promptly according to law. It is not also in the interest of
     administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be
     continued in office indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of
     crimina~ proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only
D    serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is not possible to
     enumerate the various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary
     proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasise some of the important
     considerations in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceed-
     ings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. Stay
     of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of
E    course. All the relevant factors, for and against, should be weighed and a
     decision taken keeping in view the various principles laid down in the
     decisions referred to above.

           We are quite aware of the fact that not all the disciplinary proceed-
     ings are based upon true charges; some of them may be unfounded. It may
.F
     also be that in some cases, charges are levelled with oblique motives. But
     these possibilities do not detract from the desirability of early conclusion
     of these proceedings. Indeed, in such case,s, it is all the more in the interest
     of the charged officer that the proceedings are expeditiously concluded.
     Delay in such cases really works against him.
G
         Now, let us examine the facts of the present case. The memo of
  charges against the respondent was served on him, alongwith the articles
  of charges, on 13.10.92. On 9.2.93, he submitted a detailed reply/defence
  statement, running into 90 pages, controverting the allegations levelled
H agaillst him. The challan against him was filed on 15.5.93 in the criminal
                   STAIB v. B.K. MEENA (B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.]                  77
      court. The respondent promptly applied to the Tribunal and got the              A
     disciplinary proceedings stayed. They remain stayed till today. The ir-
     regularities alleged against the respondent are of the year 1989. The
     conclusion of the criminal proceedings is nowhere in sight. (Each party
     blames, the other for the said delay and we cannot pronounce upon it in
     the absence of proper material before us.) More than six years have passed       B
     by. The charges were served upon the respondent about 4 years back. The
     respondent has already disclosed his defence in his elaborate and detailed
     statement filed on 9.2.93. There is no question of his being compelled to
     disclose his defence in the disciplinary proceedings which would prejudice
     him in a criminal case. The charges against the respondent are very serious.
     They pertain to misappropriation of public funds to the tune of more than        C
     Rupees one crore. The observation of the Tribunal that in the course of
     examination of evidence, new material may emerge against the respondent
     and he may be compelled to disclose his defence is, at best, a surmise - a
     speculatory reason. We cannot accept it as valid. Though the respondent
     was suspended pending enquiry in May, 1990, the order has been revoked           D
     in October 1993. The respondent is continuing in office. It is in his interest
     and in the interest of good administration that the truth or falsity of the
     charges against him is determined promptly. To wit, if he is not guilty of
     the charges, his honour should be vindicated early and if he is guilty, he
-.   should be dealt with appropriately without any avoidable delay. The
     criminal court may decide - whenever it does - whether the respondent is         E
     guilty of the offences charged and if so, what sentence should be imposed
     upon him. The interest of administration, however, cannot brook any delay
     in disciplinary proceedings for the reasons indicated hereinabove.

            There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the        F
     criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether dis-
     tinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether
     the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from
     service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal
     proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him          G
     under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if
     any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed
     upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules
     governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and
     different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceed-
     ings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision.     H
    78                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the
    criminal case gets unduly delayed.

         We must make it clear that we have not cast, and we should not be
    understood to have cast, any reflection on the merits of either party's case.
    What we have said is confined to the question at issue, viz., the desirability
B   or advisability of staying the disciplinary proceedings against the respon-
    dent pending the criminal proceeding/case against him.

        For the above reasons, it must be held that the Tribunal was in error
  in staying the disciplinary proceedings pending the criminal proceedings
  against the respondent. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. The
C order of the Tribunal is set aside. The disciplinary proceedings against the
  respondent shall go on expeditiously without waiting for the result of the
  criminal proceedings. The costs of the appellant are estimated at Rs. 5,000.

    S.S.                                                         Appeal allowed.




                                                                                     J