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Supreme Court of India

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CENTRAL CRIME BRANCHversusR. VASANTHI STANLEY &ANR.

Citation
2015 INSC 1022
Decided
15 September 2015
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to quash criminal proceedings for forgery and bank fraud merely because the accused has settled the amount or on the basis of gender, and the High Court's order quashing the proceedings was erroneous.

Summary

The State, represented by the Inspector of Police (Central Crime Branch), appealed against the Madras High Court's order quashing criminal proceedings against R. Vasanti Stanley and her husband for allegedly forging documents to obtain loans from several banks. The High Court had set aside the charges on the basis that the accused had settled the dues, obtained a no‑due certificate and that she, being a woman, acted under her husband's direction. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 482 of the CrPC can be used to quash such cases, whether settlement extinguishes criminal liability in economic offences, and whether gender can be a ground for dismissal. Relying on precedents, the Court held that forgery and bank fraud are serious public offences that cannot be dismissed merely because the money was repaid or because the accused is female. It emphasized that inherent powers under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of process, not to shield offenders. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the trial magistrate to continue the prosecution. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

  • Whether Section 482 CrPC can be invoked to quash criminal proceedings for forgery and bank fraud on the ground of settlement of dues.
  • Whether the gender of the accused is a valid ground to dismiss criminal proceedings.
  • Whether a no‑due certificate or settlement with the bank extinguishes criminal liability in economic offences.
  • Whether the High Court erred in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash the case.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 482quashing of criminal proceedingseconomic offenceforgerybank fraudgender neutralitysettlementinherent jurisdictionhigh courtSupreme Court

Judgment

                       [2015] 9 S.C.R. 772


 A     STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CENTRAL
                       CRIME BRANCH
                                v.
                  R. VASANTHI STANLEY &ANR.

 B           (Criminal Appeal Nos.2006-2009 of 2014)
                      SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

          [Of PAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]

 c      Code of Criminal Procedure, 19 73: s. 482 - Quashing of
   criminal proceedings - Charge sheet filed against the first
   respondent on the ground that she along with her husband
   by forging documents obtained loans from various banks -
   s.482 application filed before the High Court - During
 o pendency of the matter, the husband of the first respondent
   died - Plea of first respondent that after demise of her
   husband, she came to know about the cas~s pending against
   her due to the alleged involvement of her husband and that
   she being lady was following the command of her husband
 E and signed the documents without being aware about the
   transactions entered into by the husband and nature of the
   business and that immediately she had take!} necessary
   steps to settle the entire dues of the banks and, therefore,
   there was no justification for continuance of the criminal
 F proceedin'gs - High Court quashed the proceedings- Held:
   High Court erred in quashing the proceedings - The
   assertions as regards the ignorance are a mere .pretence
   and sans substance given the facts - Lack of awareness,
   knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted
.G in economic offence -: An offence under the criminal law is
   an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an
   accused- Moreover proceedings cannot be quashed on the
   ground that the accused settled the amount with the bank.

 H                              772
   STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.            773
                VASANTHI STANLEY

    Allowing the appeal, the Court                           A

     HELD: 1. A person committing a murder or getting
involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents,
cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her
gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily B
a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this
case. A grave criminal offence or serious economic
offence or for that matter the offence that has the
potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the
institutions, is notto be quashed on the ground thatthere C
is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has
been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on
the system. That can never be an acceptable principle
or parameter, for that would amount to destroying the
stem cells of law and order in many a realm and further D
strengthen the marrows of the unscrupulous litigations.
[Paras 13, 14] [787-E-H; 788-A]

    Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226:
(1992) 4 SCC 305; CBI v. Maninder Singh 2015 (9) SCALE E
365; State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anantrai
Doshi and others 2014 (10) SCALE 690 - relied on.

    Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2008
(12) SCR 236: (2008) 9 SCC 677; Manoj Sharma v. State F
and others 2008 (14) SCR 539: (2008) 16 sec 1; State of
Kamataka v. L. MunesM1amy 1977 (3) SCR 113: (1977) 2
SCC 699; Madhvrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others 1988 (2) SCR
930: (1988) 1 SCC 692; Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. C.B. I., G
New Delhi (2002) 5 SCC 257; Shiji@ Pappu and other~ v.
Radhika and another 2011 (13) SCR 135: (2011) 10 SCC
705; Sushi/ Suri v. CBI and Anr. 2011 (8) SCR 1: (2011) 5
SCC 708; CBI v. A. Ravishankar Prasad and others (2009)
6 SCC 351; CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. (1996) 5 H
774      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A SCC 581; lnder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal 2007
  (10) SCR 847: (2007) 12 SCC 1; Gian Singh v. State of
  Punjab andAnother2012 (8) SCR 753: (2012) 10 SCC 303;
  Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 (4)
  SCR 1012: (2014) 6 SCC 466; Dimpy Gujral v. Union
B Territory through Administrator AIR 2012 SCW 5333; State
  ofRajasthan v. Sambhu Kevat2013 (14) SCALE 235; CBI,
  ACB, Mumbai v. Narendra Lal Jain & Ors. 2014 (3) SCR
  444: (2014) 5 SCC 364; Central Bureau of Investigation v.
c Jagjit Singh 2013 (17) SCR 361: (2013) 1o sec 686 -
  referred to.

                    Case Law Reference

       2008 (12) SCR 236       referred to.       Para 3
D
       2008 (14) SCR 539       referred to.       Para 3

       1977 (3) SCR 113        referred to.       Para 3.

       1988 (2) SCR 930        referred to.       Para 3
E
      (2002) 5 sec 257         referred to.       Para 3

       2011 (13) SCR 135       referred to.       Para 3

      2011 (8) SCR 1           referred to.       Para 3
F
       2014 (10) SCALE 690     relied on.         Para 8

      (2009) 6 sec 351         referred to.       Para 8

      (1996) 5 sec 581         referred to.       Para 8
G
      .2007 (10) SCR 847       referred to.       Para 8

      2012 (8) SCR 753         referred to.       Para 9

      2014 (4) SCR 1012        referred to.       Para 9
H
        STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE. CCB v. R.               775
                     VASANTHI STANLEY

         AIR 2012 sew 5333           referred to.      Para 9         A

         2013 (14) SCALE 235         referred to.      Para 9

         2014 (3) SCR 444            referred to.      Para 9

         2013 (17) SCR 361           referred to.      Para 10        B

         2015 (9) SCALE 365          relied on.          .
                                                       Para 11

         1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226 relied on.            Para 12

         CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal              c
     Nos. 2006-2009 of 2014.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 24.01.2012 of the
     High Court of Madras in Crl. O.P. {MO) Nos. 14759 to 14762
     of2011.                                                          D

           Subramonium Prasad, M. Yogesh Kanna, Jayant Patel
     for the Appella11t.

         Vivek Tankha, Kumanan, Senthil Jagadeesan, Shruti Iyer,
                                                                      E
     Govind Manoharan, Suchitra Kumbhat, Jinendra Jain, Puneet
     Taneja, Shaheen, Sudarsh Menon for the Respondents.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The seminal issues that emanate F
     for consideration, unequivocally on the bedrock of fiscal
     sanctity and decidedly on the plinth of prevalent mindset of
     borrowers from public financial institutions including banks, are
     whether a borrower or borrowers after availing finance by
     creating mortgage on the base of certain documents which, G
     as alleged, are forged, and ingeniously adopt the same modus
..   operandi to avail the benefit from number of banks, who in
     due course facing the problerrrset the criminal law in motion
     by lodging different Fl Rs and in the ultimate eventuate in an
                                                                       H
     adroit manrier enter into settlements and pay the amount and ·
776         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     thereafter, knock at the doors of the High Court seeking
      exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
      of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or the extraordinary jurisdiction
      under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashment of the
      criminal proceedings; a11d should the High Court on the
 B    foundation that the continuance of the criminal proceedings.
      would be a Sisyphean endeavour after the settlement has taken
      place to quash the same; and further whether a former Assistant
      Commissioner of Commercial Taxes can be allowed to
      advance a plea, obviously a remarkable one, that she had
C     signed the documents either as a guarantor or as a co-
      applicant, showing deference to her late husband's desire; and,
      therefore, this Court, in exercise of power under Article 136 of
      the Constitution, should not unsettle the common order by which
 D    the High Court has quashed criminal proceedings. Additionally,
      it has also become obligatory to decisively lay down whether
      continuance of such proceedings would be an unnecessary
      load on the criminal justice dispensation system and hence,
      there is neither any warrant nor justification for interference
 E    with the order of the High Court. We are invited by the astute
      proponements to dwell upon the said issues, and we shall do
      so in due course of our delineation.

       2. The fadual narrative has a narrow compass. The first
F respondent, accused no.2, along with her husband submitted
  an application for home loan to the Centurion Bank of Punjab,
  presently known as HDFC Bank Ltd. for a sum of Rs.6 lakhs
  by depositing the sale deed dated 31.10.2001. The HDFC
  Bank found that documents were forged and accordingly filed
G a complaint with the Commissioner of Police, Chennai on
  20.12.2005 which eventually gave rise to registration of FIR
  No. 579/06 dated 19. 7.2006. Another FIR came to be lodged
  on 3.8. 2006 by Bank of India, qathedral Branch from which
  the couple had availed a loan of Rs.25 lakhs for a Company
H Development (Medicrops and Medige!) on the grounds that
        STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.              777
             VASANTHI STANLEY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     the documents were forged. On 10.7.2006, Vijaya Bank, GN. A
     Chetty Road Branch filed a complaint that the husband of the
     accused had applied for a mortgage loan of Rs.18 lakhs with
     forged documents by depositing the title deed and the wife
     stood as a surety. Taking into consideration the complaints
     lodged by the aforesaid banks, the Inspector of Police, Central B
     Crime Branch, Team-XII, Egmore Chennai, registered the FIRs
     and commenced the investigation. When the matter stood thus,
     the Syndicate Bank, Mylapore Branch filed a complaint with
     the Commissioner of Police, Chennai on 11.01.2007 to the
     effect that the husband of the first respondent herein had C
     submitted an application for grant of honie improvement loan
     for a sum of Rs.12 lakhs with forged documents and the wife
     was the guarantor and on that basis another FIR was registered
     and investigation took place. Thus, the first respondent was D
     a co-applicant in respect of the loans availed from HDFC Bank
     and Bank of India and was a guarantor in respect of the loans
     availed from Vijaya Bank and Syndicate Bank. FIR Nos. in
     respect of HDFC Bank, Bank of India, Vijaya Bank and
     Syndicate Bank were 579/06, 643/06, 550/06 and 206/07 E
     respectively. After due investigation, chargesheets were filed
     before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai
     and Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidepet, Chennai and the
     proceedings before the trial court were instituted bearing CC
     No. 1624/2010, CC No. 5669/2010, CC No. 6258/2010 and F
     CC No. 11697/2010.

          3. After placing of the chargesheets, the accused persons
     moved the High Court in Criminal OP No. 14759-14762 of
     2011 for quashing of the criminal proceedings. During the G
     pendency of the cases, the husband, accused No.1 breathed
     his last and thereafter before the High Court it was contended
••   that she was not aware of any transaction done by her husband
     as she was working as a public servant and that apart she
     was not aware of the business activities carried on by her H
778           SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A husband; that she had signed the documents as instructed by
  her husband without any intention or knowledge to cheat the
  banks; that after demise of her husband, she had come to know
  about the cases pending against her due to the alleged
  involvement of her husband and immediately she had taken
B necessary steps to settle the entire dues of the banks and,
  therefore, there was no justification for continuance of the
  criminal proceedings. The stand and stance put forth by the
  accused person was combated bi the prosecution on the
  ground that she was in employment in Commercial Tax
c Department ir:i the n~mk of Assistant Commissioner and had
  availed voluntary retirement and hence, she could not claim
  ignorance of the transaction despite being a co-applicant to
  the loans by executing the pronotes jointly along with her
  husband as a borrower and being a guarantor in respect of
D
  the loans availed of by her husband from two banks. The
  quashment of the criminal proceedings was also resisted by
  the respondent Bank in Criminal O.P. No. 14762 of2011 that
  certain loan availed of by her husband had remained unpaid
E and One Time Settlement was arrived at without prejudice to
  the rights regarding pending cases against her before the
  learned 11 1h Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai.
  Learned counsel for the accused had placed reliance on Nikhil
  Merchant v. Central Bureau of lnvestigation 1, Manoj
F Sharma v. State and others2, State of Karnataka v. L.
  Muneswamy3, Madhvrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others v.
  Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others4, Hira Lal
  Hari Lal Bhagwati v. C.B.I., New Deihl', and Shiji @Pappu
  and others v. Radhika and another6 before the High Court
G 1 (2008) 9 sec 677
          (2008) 16 sec 1
      2

      3   (1977) 2 sec 699
                                                                  •.
      • (1988) 1 sec 692

 H    • (2002) 5 sec 257
      • (2011) 10 sec 705
     STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.                779
          VASANTHI STANLEY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

for quashing of the criminal proceedings. On behalf of the · A
prosecution, reliance was placed on Sushi/ Suri v. CBI and
Anr. 7
     4. The High Court adverted to the authorities cited at the
Bar and thereafter came to hold that as "No due certificate" B
had been issued by the respective banking institutions and
further settlements had been arrived at under the scheme,
continuance of the prosecution would be an exercise in futility
and, therefore, quashing of the criminal proceedings was
required to prevent the abuse of the process of law. Being of C
this view, the High ~ourt has quashed all the proceedings.

    5. We have heard Mr. Subramonium Prasad, learned
senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned
senior counsel for the first respondent.                          o
     6. It is submitted by Mr. Subramonium Prasad, learned
senior counsel for the State that regard being had to the facts
and circumstances of the case, it was absolutely inapposite
on the part of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings E
as the allegation by the prosecution pertain to availing of loan
by depositing documents which were forged. It is urged by
him that the plea taken by the respondent-accused that she
was unaware of any transaction does not remotely appeal to
the common sense and, in any case, such a plea cannot be F
entertained for the purpose of quashing criminal cases. It is
further urged that even if there are settlements and dues have
been cleared, in such type of cases the accused cannot be
absolved from the criminal culpability without the trial taking
place.                                                           G

     7. Resisting the aforesaid submissions it is canvassed
by Mr. Tankha, learned senior counsel for the first respondent
that when the High Court, considering the controversy from all
1
    c2011) 5 sec ?OB                                              H
    780          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015) 9 S.C.R.


    A the requisite angles has quashed the proceedings, this Court
      should not interfere with the impugned order in exercise of its
      jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Learned
      senior counsel would contend that when the respondent has
      already paid the amount due to the Bank from her own savings
    B and settled the matter with grieved financial institutions,
      continuance of the criminal proceeding is not desirable as it is
      unlikely to serve any fruitful purpose. That apart, submits Mr.
      Tankha, continuation of the proceeding would unnecessarily
      load the criminal justice dispensation system as there is
    C likelihood of an order of acquittal at the end of the trial.

              . 8. To appreciate t./le submissions advanced at the bar,
          we may straightaway refer to the authority in State of
          Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi and
     D    others8 . In the said case, the accused was charged for the
          offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 467,
          468 and 471 IPC. The allegation in the said case was that the
          accused no. 1 had obtained Letters of Credit from the State
          Bank of India and Dena Bank in favour of fictitious companies
     E    formed by the accused and used the said Letters of Credit to
          siphon off the funds from the banks. During the pendency of
          the case, the accused settled the dispute with the Bank by
          paying the amount and the Bank in turn had issued no·due
     F    certificate. The Court referred to case in CB/ v. A.
          Ravishankar Prasad and others 9 , wherein the
          pronouncements in CB/ v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. 10
          and Nikhil Merchant (supra) were distinguished. It is
          necessary to note that the Court in Ravi Shankar Prasad's
     G    case referred to /nder Mohan Goswami v. State of
          Uttarancha/1 1 and stated thus:-
          • 2014 (10) SCALE 690
          ·' (2009) e sec 351
          10 (1996) 5sec 581
-    H
          11 (2007) 12 sec 1
STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.                   781
     VASANTHI STANLEY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

 38. Let us consider the facts of this case and apply the       A
 ratio of Goswami case where facts are as follows:

    (/) The allegations are. that the accused have
    committed serious offences such as forgery,
    fabrication of documents and used those documents           B
    as genuine.

    ( //) The allegations are that the respondent-accused
    herein A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad
                      a
    have entered into conspiracy with the Chairman and          c
    Managing Director and other officials of Indian Bank,
    Chennai with the object of cheating Indian Bank in the
    matter of recommending, sanctioning, disbursing huge
    credit facilities running over hundreds of crores.
                                                                D
    (///)Trial of all four cases are at an advanced stage in
    which 92 witnesses have already been examined.

 While applying the ratio of Goswami case, how can any
 court in its legitimate exercise of power under Section
 482 CrPC quash the proceedings against accused A.               E
 Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad in the face
 of the aforesaid allegations? in the instant case, wrong
 application of the ratio of the said judgment has led to
 grave miscarriage of justice.

 39. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly reveals
 that the exercise of inherent powers would entirely
 depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
 The object of incorporating inherent powers in the Code
 is to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure    G
 ends of justice.

  40. Both English and the Indian courts have consistently
  taken the view that the inherent powers can be exercised
  in those exceptional cases where the allegations made          H
782             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A              in the first information report or the complaint, even if are
               taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety
               do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
               case against the accused. When we apply the settled
               legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to
 B             conclude that the complaint and the charge-sheet prima
               facie do not constitute any offence against the
               respondents."

          Being of this view, the Court in A. Ravishankar Prasad
 C    (supra) allowed the appeal preferred by the CBI.

           9. Apart from above, in Vikram Anantrai Doshi & Ors.
      (supra) the Court referred to Gian Singh v. State of Punjab
      and Another12 , with regard to the power of the High Court as
 o    regards the quashing of the criminal proceedings on the basis
      of a compromise. This Court also referred to Narinder Singh
      & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. 13, Dimpy Gujral v. Union
      Territory through Administrator14 and State of Rajasthan
      v. Sambhu Kevat15 and thereafter dwelt upon the ratio in CB/;
 E    ACS, Mumbai v. Narendra Lal Jain & Ors. 16 wherein the
      charges were framed under Section 120-B read with Section
      420 IPC. A passage from the said judgment was reproduced
      which is to the following effect:-

 F             'The offences are certainly more serious; they are not
               private in nature. The charge of conspiracy is to commit
               offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The
               accused has also been charged for commission of the
               substantive offence Under Section 471 Indian Penal
 G
      .12   (2012) 1o sec 303
      13 (2014) 6sec 466
       • AIR 2012 sew 5333
      1


      15    2013 (14) SCALE 235
 H    1•    (2014) 5 sec 364
     STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.               783
          VASANTHI STANLEY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

        Code. Though the amount due have been paid the same A
        is Uilder a private settlement between the parties unlike
        in Nikhil Merchant (supra) and Narendra Lal.
        Jain (supra) where the compromise was a part of the
        decree of the Court. There is no acknowledgement on
        the part of the bank of the exoneration of the criminal · B
        liability of the aq;used-Appellant unlike the terms of
        compromise decree in the aforesaid two cases. In the
        totality of the facts stated above, if the High Court has
        taken the view that the exclusion spelt out in Gian
        Singh (supra) (para 61) applies to the present case and C
        on that basis had come to the conclusion that the power
        Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure should
        not be exercised to quash the criminal case against the
        accused, we cannot find any justification to interfere with
                                                                    0
        the said decision."                                ·

     10. After distinguishing many a decision, the Court relied
upon Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagjit
Singh 17 wherein the court being moved by the CBI had
overturned the order of the High Court quashing the criminal       E
proceeding and in that backdrop had taken note of the fact
that accused persons had dishonestly induced delivery of the
property of the bank and had used forged documents as
genuine. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that:-
                                                                   F
       · "23 ...... availing of money from a nationalized bank in the
         manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly
         exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The
         modus operandi as narrated in the chargesheet cannot
         be put in the compartment of an individual or personal G
         wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense .societal
         impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance
         that whenever, there is manipulation and cleverly
11
     (2013) 1o sec 686                                             H
784   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits
      it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly
      and predominantingly of civil character. The ultimate victim
      is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest
      of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent
      in the economic spine of the nation. The cleverness which
      has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations are true,
      has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in
      our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences
      which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It
c     has the potentiality to usher in economic crisis. Its
      implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a
      concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial
      transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the
      amount and obtain a "no due certificate" and enjoy the
 D
      benefit of quashing of the criminal proceeding on the
      hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. The
      collective interest of which the Court is the guardian
      cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow the
 E    proceedings to be withdrawn, or for that matter yield to
      the ingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke
      the jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution or
      Under Section 482 of the Code and quash the
      proceeding. It is not legally permissible. The Court is
 F    expected to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves.
      The High Court, we humbly remind, should have dealt
      with the matter keeping in mind that in these kind of
      litigations the accused when perceives a tiny gleam of
      success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for
 G    quashing of the criminal proceeding. The court's principal
      duty, at that juncture, should be to scan the entire facts to
      find out the thrust of allegations and the crux of the
      settlement. It is the experience ,of the Judge comes to
      his aid and the said experience should be used with care,
 H    caution, circumspection and courageous prudence."
   STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.             785
        VASANTHI STANLEY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    11. Recently, in CBI v. Maninder Singh 18 , the allegation A
against the accused was that bill of lading presented by the
proprietors of the accused firms were found forged and cases
were registered under Section 120-B IPC read with Section
420 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (d) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and further substantive B
offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The
accused person arrived at a settlement with the Bank and
thereafter moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing of the FIR. The High Court placed reliance on the
decision in Nikhil Merchant (supra) and allowed the petition C
and directed for quashing of the criminal proceedings. This
Court placed reliance on Vikram Anantrai Doshi and others
(supra) and came to hold as follows:-

     "10. The allegation against the respondent is 'forgery' D
     for the purpose of cheating and use of forged documents
     as genuine in orderto embezzle the public money. After
     facing such serious charges of forgery, the Respondent
     wants the proceedings to be quashed on account of
     settlement with the bank. The development in means of E
     communication, science & technology etc. have led to
     an enormous increase in economic crimes viz. phishing,
     ATM frauds etc. which are being committed by intelligent
     but devious individuals involving huge sums of public or F
     government money. These are actually public wrongs or
     crimes committed against society and the gravity and
     magnitude attached to these offences is concentrated
     at public at large.

      11. The inherent power of the High Court Under G
      Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure should be
      sparingly used. Only when the Court comes to the
    . conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there
" 2015 (9) SCALE 365                                          H
786        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 9 S.C.R.


A         would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power
          is not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings. In
          economic offences Court must not only keep in view that
          moriey has been paid to the bank which has been
          defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of
 B        simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence
          with which we are concerned is a well planned and was
          committed with a deliberate design with an eye of
          personal profit regardless of consequence to the society
          at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground
c         that the accused has settled the amount with the bank
          would be a misplaced sympathy."

        12. Testing the present controversy on the anvil of the
   aforesaid principles, we are disposed to think that the High
 D Court has been erroneously guided by the ambit and sweep
   of power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the
   proceedings. It has absolutely fallaciously opined that the
   continuance of the proceeding will be the abuse of the process
   of the Court. It has been categorically held in Janta Dal v.
 E H.S. Chowdhary19 , that the inherent power under Section 482
   CrPC though unrestricted and undefined should not be
   capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised
   in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and
 F substantial justice for the administration of which alone the
   courts exist. In lnder Mohan Goswami (supra), it has been
   emphasised that inherent powers have to be exercised
   sparingly, carefully and with great caution.

       13. We will be failing in our duty unless we advert to the
G proponements propounded with regard to other aspects. They
  are really matters of concern and deserve to be addressed.
  The submission as put forth is that the first respondent is a
  lady and she was following the command of her husband and
 H ,. (1992) 4 sec 305
    S"'fATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE CCB v. R.               787
          VASANTHI STANLEY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

 signed the documents without being aware about the A
 transactions entered into by the husband and nature of the
 business. The allegation in the chargesheet is that she has
 signed the pronotes. That apart, as further alleged, she is a
 co-applicant in two cases and guarantor in other two cases.
 She was an Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes B
 and after taking voluntary retirement she has joined the public
 life, and became a member of the 'Rajya Sabha'. Emphasis
 is also laid that she is a lady and there is no warrant to continue
 the criminal proceeding when she has paid the dues of the
 banks, and if anything further is due that shall be made good. C
 The assertions as regards the ignorance are a mere pretence ·
 and sans substance given the facts. Lack of awareness,
·knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted
 in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented
                                                                     0
 on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the
 criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the
 gender of an accused. True it is, th~re are certain provisions
 in CrPC relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 437,
 etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A E
 person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial
 scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or
 acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither
 constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is
 gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score.          F

      14. As far as the load on the criminal justice dispensation
system is concerned it has an insegragable nexus with speedy
trial. A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or
for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a G
dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be
quashed on the ground thatthere is delay in trial or the principle
that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to
avoid the load on the system. That can never be an acceptable
                                                                    H
788          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     principle or parameter, for that would amount to destroying the
      stem cells of law and order in many a realm and further
      strengthen the marrows of the unscrupulous litigations. Such
      a situation should never be conceived of.

 B          15. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we allow the appeal,
      set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct the
      trial magistrate to proceed in accordance with law.

      Devika Gujral                                      Appeal allowed.


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